
• • • » , \. 









PHILANDER P. LANE 



Colonel Lane 

(From a photograph taken in 1863, age 41) 



PHILANDER P. LANE 



Colonel of Volunteers 
IN THE Civil War . 

eleventh Ohio infantry 



By 

William Forse Scott 

of the Fourth Iowa Cavalry, Veteran Volunteers 



Privately Printed 
1920 




6^ 



To 

Sophia Bosworth Lane 
whose wish was 
the chief incentive to this work 

The devoted wife and companion 
OF Colonel Lane through the 
fifty years from their marriage 
to the end of his life 



FOREWORD 



As one draws on toward the close of life, its conditions 
and purposes take on a new meaning. Its hardships and 
disappointments appear as but the lessons of experience, 
and count in the long run as stepping stones to better 
things. These trite observations are illustrated by numer- 
ous examples in our American life, and perhaps nowhere 
more clearly than in the life and character of the great 
Civil War President, Lincoln; in whom we trace, as the 
result of hard conditions of early life, that wisdom and 
patience and gentleness that have immortalized his name 
among men. 

I esteem it a privilege to contribute a brief foreword to 
this history of a man of men, whose virtues I esteemed 
and whose friendship I highly valued. He was a noble 
character, — one of those products of American life, which, 
like Lincoln's, combined sterling qualities of manhood 
with gentleness and courtesy. The parallel does not end 
here, for there was much in Colonel Lane's makeup that 
suggests the great Commoner — patience, loyalty to 
principle, and the same quality of sturdy Americanism sp 
admirably emphasized by the lamented Roosevelt. 

We know only the general conditions of his boyhood; 
but enough appears to show that he was thrown very 
early upon his own exertions for livelihood and made his 
way unaided to final success, in a business that stood as 
one of the highest character and influence in the early up- 
building of the City of Cincinnati. In the early " fifties " 
Colonel Lane was generally recognized as one of the im- 
portant factors in the welfare and widely extended fame 
of the city of his adoption eulogized by Longfellow as the 
" Queen City of the West 

There were great men in those days, — and Colonel Lane 
was of them, — earnest, intelligent and self-reliant men 
who wrought great things. Later, when the threat of 



disunion roused the latent Americanism of the Republic, 
Colonel Lane was among the first to respond to the call to 
arms; and that part of his life-history is the subject of 
these memoirs. He bore a gallant part, and lived to see 
the Union restored and its flag honored and respected by 
the entire Nation. 

In the fulness of time he was laid away, honored and 
respected by his fellow citizens, and mourned as only those 
are who have lived up to the measure of opportunity with- 
out fear, without reproach. Surely all is well with such a 
man in the great hereafter. His memory is a precious 
heritage to his family and an inspiring example to his fel- 
low citizens. 

LEWIS M. HOSEA. 



PREFACE 



This book was at first only a manuscript narrative of 
the life of Colonel Lane in the army during the War of 
Secession, written for the private use and pleasure of his 
family. The materials were letters he wrote from the 
field to his family and others, some personal papers of the 
time preserved by him (including a few official docu- 
ments), some papers he wrote on various occasions after 
the war, and the official records of the War Department. 
It is believed that many of his papers were lost in a fire 
which destroyed his home in 1885. 

The available matter found in his letters and papers 
was remarkably scanty. His letters seldom contain more 
than bare mention of military affairs in which he took 
part, tho some of them discuss the general political and 
military conditions and operations of the time at length. 
A small pocket diary for the year 1862 (the only one pre- 
served) contains but little that is now of use beyond the 
fixing of dates. His official reports and letters printed in 
the records of the War Department are very few in num- 
ber and very brief, — a striking exception to his constant 
insistence, in all other duties, upon full compliance with 
the Army Regulations. Much the greater part of the 
narrative Vv^as thus necessarily worked out from the official 
records of the campaigns in which he was engaged, with 
some aid from books written by other officers. 

Under these circumstances the reader will see why a 
complete or satisfactory record or story could not be made. 
But that has not prevented those who have read the manu- 
script from persisting in a wish to have it printed. This 
has led to an extensive revision, with the result that the 
manuscript has been much reduced, partly rewritten and 
here and there readjusted, so as to bring it into the 
ordinary form and proper proportions of a printed book. 
Whether with success is yet to be seen. 



Two things have been much in my mind while on this 
work : One, that out of a quantity of meager and largely 
casual materials, quite commonplace as one would suppose 
on taking it up, comes a fine character, — an American 
volunteer soldier of high intelligence, patriotism, unswerv- 
ing purpose, devotion to duty, great achievement, and un- 
conscious heroism; and the other, that, tho this char- 
acterization only gives Colonel Lane the place in the his- 
tory of the war that he amply earned, he is still only one 
of a large number of equal desert. It may be said safely 
that the volunteer army in the great war was full of 
officers and soldiers who displayed all the virtues I have 
credited to him, endured the burdens as steadily and self- 
denyingly as he, and improved or sought as eagerly as he 
any opportunity toward the winning of the great cause. 
So I have felt in writing this story of Colonel Lane, that 
I was writing the story of a thousand other colonels in 
that war that saved the country. 

That there may be no adverse comment upon Colonel 
Lane in relation to the criticisms upon certain generals 
and campaigns which the reader will find, I ought to say 
that they are in no way drawn from or suggested by any- 
thing found in his writings. I alone am responsible for 
them. As to General Rosecrans, indeed, Colonel Lane 
personally liked him, was on friendly terms with him from 
the beginning of the war, thought him a great strategist, 
and felt that a great injustice was done when he was re-, 
moved from command. These opinions were widely held, 
indeed, and Rosecrans has not lacked zealous defenders. 

In fact, the very high respect and esteem in which 
Colonel Lane was held by all who knew him personally was 
due, in part, to his habitual fairness and toleration, — his 
patient and kindly consideration for the shortcomings of 
others. It was only where he thought right or justice was 
infringed that he was immovably set against any yielding. 

WM. FORSE SCOTT. 

New York, 

May, 1920. 



CONTENTS 



I 

1861: April — June 

Lincoln's First Call for Volunteers — Enrollment 
and Organization of Lane's Company — Camp 
Dennison — Re-enlistment for Three Years — Re- 
organization of Eleventh Ohio Volunteer In- 
fantry Page 



II 

1861: June — July 

The Second Brigade Ordered to the Field — The 
Regiment Receives Arms — Its First March — 
Captain Lane on Special Duty Patrolling the Ohio 

— Invasion of Virginia — The Kanawha Move- 
ment 

Ill 

1861 — July 

In Western Virginia, under General McClellan — 
First Campaign on the Kanawha — McClellan' s 
Personal Campaign — His Battle of Rich Mountain 

— His Excessive Egotism — General Cox Advances 
upon Charleston — Battle of Scarey Creek — Cap- 
ture of Colonel of Eleventh Ohio 

IV 

1861: July — August 

Cox Drives Wise up the Kanawha — Takes Charles- 
ton and Gauley Bridge — Captain Lane Builds 
Bridge over the Pocotaligo — Another over the 
Elk — Several over Other Streams — Then a Big 
Ferry on the Gauley 



V 



1861: August — November 

General Rosecrans Succeeds McClellan — Re-organ- 
izes the Army — Cox's Troops the " Brigade of the 
Kanawha " — Second Kanawha Campaign — Cox 
Drives Wise and Floyd up to Lewisburg — First 
Engagements of Captain Lane and His Company 

— Rosecrans Comes with Reinforcement — Battle 
of Carnifix Ferry — Lane's Gauley Ferry Swept 
Away in a Flood — He Builds Another in Four 
Days — Colonel DeVilliers Returns from Captiv- 
ity — Causes Much Trouble in the Regiment . . 4:4: 

VI 

1861 : November — December 

Battle of Cotton Hill — Captain Lane Saves the 
Gauley Ferry Under Fire — Builds Boats and 
Crosses New River — Holds Outpost Against 
Floyd — Conflict with Colonel DeVilliers — Two 
Days in Action Against Floyd — Builds Bridge 
over Loop Creek and Opens Road to Fayetteville 

— Winter-quarters at Point Pleasant .... 57 

VII 

1862: January — May 

Driving out Colonel DeVilliers — Captain Lane 
Leads the Movement — Files Charges Against Him 
for Court-martial — Arrested by Colonel's Order 
and Deprived of His Sword — Charges Filed 
Against Him by Colonel — Two Months Awaiting 
the Sitting of the Court — Captain Lane Tries to 
Keep Whisky Out of the Camp — Colonel DeVil- 
liers is Put Under Arrest to Await His Trial — He 
is Tried on Captain Lane's Charges, Convicted and 
Cashiered — Lane Put Under Arrest and Tried on 
the Colonel's Charges, Acquitted and Restored to 
Duty 



78 



VIII 



1862: May— August 

Third Kanawha Campaign — General Fremont Suc- 
ceeds Rosecrans — Cox in Command of Army on 
Kanawha — Fremont and Cox Ordered on Cam- 
paign for Liberation of East Tennessee — Lincoln's 
Persistent Efforts — Five Generals in Succession 
Disappoint Him — Cox Marches on Time and 
Reaches Princeton — Co^mpelled to Fall Back by 
Fremont's Failure — Eleventh Ohio in Reserve on 
New River — Battle of Lewisburg — Captain Lane 
on Typical Scouting Expedition — Builds Flying 
Ferry on New River — In Command of Corps of 
Sapper s-and-Miners — Makes Forced March to 
Relief of Gauley Bridge — Another to Relief of 
Charleston — Sent to Ohio in Recruiting Serv- 
ice 106 



IX 

1862: August — October 

Eleventh Ohio in Army of Virginia under General 
Pope — Camp at Washington — The Eleventh in 
Battle at Stone Bridge on Bull Run — Again under 
McClellan — Campaign of Antietam — Battles of 
South Mountain {or Sharpsburg) and Antietam — 
Colonel Coleman of the Eleventh Killed — In Mc- 
Clellan' s Body-guard " — The Brigade Returns to 
the Kanawha 133 



X 

1862: August — October 

Captain Lane in Ohio — Fills the Eleventh with Re- / 
cruits — Organizes and Commands Troops in De- I 
fense of Cincinnati against Bragg — Promoted to 
Colonel — Rejoins in Virginia and Takes Com- 
mand — Finds Conditions Bad and Begins Re- 
forms 138 



XI 



1862: October — December 

Fourth Kanawha Campaign — Continuous Storms 
Make Great Difficulties — Colonel Lane in Com- 
mand at Post of Summerville — Builds Saw-mills 
and Improves the Town — Expedition to Cold 
Knob and Capture of Rebels' Camp — Extraordi- 
nary Winter Stoi^m — Again at Summerville — 
Im.passable Roads — End of Year 1862 .... 142 



XII 

1863: January — March 

Kanawha Brigade Sent to Nashville — Desertions at 
Cincinnati and Louisville — Joins the Army of the 
Cumberland under Rosecrans — Colonel Lane 
Loses His Regiment 153 



XIII 

1863: March — June 

Service at Carthage on the Cumberland as Outpost 
of Rosecrans' s Army — Disaster in the Eleventh 
in Colonel Lane's Absence — He Makes Successful 
Expeditions and Reprisals — Engagements with 
John Morgan's Cavalry — On Court-martial Duty 

— Conviction and Execution of a Spy — Conflict 
with General Crook on " Principle " — Refuses to 
Obey Orders — Expects Arrest and Court-martial 

— General Crook Issues Modified Order that 
Saves the " Principle " — Recurrence of Ill-health 

— Decides to Resign, but to Await Expected Cam- 
paign 160 

XIV 

1863: June — July 

Kanawha Brigade Ordered to Murfreesboro — As- 
signed to Fourteenth Army Corps, under General 
Thomas — Campaign of Tullahoma : Rosecrans 



Against Bragg — Capture of Hoover's Gap — 
Bragg Successfully Flanked Out of Position — Ex- 
pected Battle at Tullahoma — Bragg Escapes Un- 
molested and Occupies Chattanooga — Rosecrans 
Fails to Attack and Neglects to Pursue — Lies in 
Camp and Quarrels with War Department — Lin- 
coln Takes a Hand — Eleventh Ohio in Camp at 
Big Spring and University Place — General Crook 
Transfered and General Turchin Succeeds to Com- 
mand of Eleventh's Brigade — News of Vicksburg 
and Gettysburg 

XV 

1863: August — September 

Rosecrans Driven to Action by the Government — 
Campaign Against Chattanooga — Grand Feint 
upon Chattanooga from the North — Crossing 
the Tennessee and the Mountains on the South — 
Bragg Surprised, Evacuutes Chattanooga and De- 
ceives Rosecrans into Belief He is Retreating — 
Rosecrans Separates His Forces Widely — Discov- 
ers His Error — Makes Desperate Efforts to Re- 
trieve and Cover Chattanooga 

XVI 

1863 : September 13-20 

Battles on the Chickamauga — Minor Preceding En- 
gagements — Numbers of the Opposing Forces — 
Bragg Attacks Rosecrans on His March — Thomas 
Makes Forced Night March — Holds Left Wing 
against All Attacks — Succession of Battles All 
Day the 19th — Reynolds's Division (Including 
Eleventh Ohio) the Right of Thomas's Line — 
Night of 19th Rosecrans Reports Success to War 
Department — Expects Complete Victory — The 
20th Again a Succession of Battles — Left Wing, 
under Thomas, Repels All Assaults — Right Wing, 
Directed by Rosecrans, Broken by Longstreet — 
Part Escapes Over Missionary Ridge — Rosecrans 



Abandons the Field — McCook and Crittenden 
Follow — Negley Follows, Taking the Artillery — 
Thomas Holds on, with His Corps and Parts of 
the Others, in the " Horseshoe " Till Night — 
The Rock of Chickamauga — Rosecrans Sends 
Order to Thomas to Retreat — Thomas's Great 
Achievement — Turchin's Brigade {Eleventh 
Ohio) Makes the Last Charge and Wins the Last 
Battle — Colonel Lane and Part of Eleventh and 
its Brigade Lost — Recovers His Position — The 
Last to Leave the Field of Chickamauga .... 210 



XVII 

1863 : September — October 

At Chattanooga After the Battle — Confederate Re- 
ports — Bragg Did Not Know He Had Won — 
Colonel Lane's Report of the Battles — Rosecrans 
in Despair — Holds Chattanooga, hut Neglects 
Protection and Supply of the Army — At Last Re- 
moved, Superseded by Thomas — Grant in Su- 
preme Command in Mississippi Valley .... 263 



XVIII 

1863 : September — October 

Reorganization of Army of the Cumberland — Rein- 
forced by Hooker and Sherman — Bragg Under- 
takes Siege of Chattanooga — Thomas Reopens 
" the Cracker-Line " and Gets Full Supplies — 
Brilliant Capture of Brown's Ferry — Colonel 
Lane and Eleventh Ohio Share in It — Bragg Sends 
Longstreet to Recover Ground, but is Wholly De- 
feated 273 



XIX 

1863: October — November 

Brown's Ferry Colonel Lane's Last Engagement — 
His Resignation Offered and Accepted — Reaches 
Home in November 283 



XX 



1863-1864: November — June 

Closing Career of Eleventh Ohio — Grant's Cam- 
paign of Chattanooga — Great Victory at Mission- 
ary Ridge — Eleventh Ohio Engaged — Battle 
Above the Clouds " — Thomas's Campaign 
Against Johnston — Battle of Buzzard Roost — 
Sherman's Campaign Against Atlanta — Battle of 
Resaca, Last Engagement of Eleventh Ohio — End 
of its Three-years Term — Sent to Ohio and Mus- 
tered-out — Veterans and Recruits Remain as 
Eleventh Battalion Ohio Volunteers — Served to 
End of the War — Muster ed-out at Washington, 
June, 1865 288 



XXI 

Colonel Lane After the War 



295 



MAPS 

OPPOSITE 
PAGE 

A part of West Virginia, to show the movements 
described and the places mentioned in the four 
" Kanawka campaigns of 1861-1862 ... 40 

Chattanooga and its region, to show the move- 
ments of General Rosecrans in his Chattanooga 
Campaign in August-September, 1863 . . 200 

Chickamauga: The field of the battles of Sep- 
tember 19 and 20, 1863, with the adjacent 
country including Chattanooga 216 



PHILANDER P. LANE 



I 

1861: April — July 

The Guns of Sumter — Enlistment Under the Three- 
Months Call — Organization — Camp Dennison — Re- 
enlistment for Three Years — Reorganization of 
Eleventh Ohio Infantry Volunteers 

The call of President Lincoln, April 15, 1861, for 
75,000 men was instantly followed in Ohio, as in all the 
other free States, by a rush of volunteers, far more than 
the number called. The quota of Ohio was 10,153, but 
within a week twenty regiments of infantry and many 
smaller bodies for cavalry and artillery were in camps 
for organization or offered and awaiting orders, the 
whole number being more than double the quota. And 
still there were many companies, raised at the same time 
and temporarily organized at their home towns and 
offered to the Governor, which could not be accepted 
because too many. In fact the Governor had already 
much exceeded his authority in accepting the eager vol- 
unteers. Many or most of the disappointed companies, 
however, maintained their organization and went on drill- 
ing, with the aid of such instructors as could be found who 
had professed some knowledge of military service, and 
anxiously awaited events. This was the case of a com- 
pany raised and organized in Cincinnati April 17, 1861, 
by Philander Parmele Lane. 

Colonel Lane was born in the old Dutch town of Nassau, 
in Rensselaer county. New York, October 5, 1821, the 
fourth child and first son of David Lane and Melinda 
Parmele. The parents were both born in Connecticut, at 
Killingworth, David on March 8, 1788, and Melinda 



probably a little later. They were both of Scotch descent, 
but their ancestry has been traced only so far as that it 
is known that Melinda was one of the daughters of 
Josiah Parmele, who was born in Connecticut and was a 
millwright. Both families appear to have lived at Bol- 
ton, Conn., at the time of the marriage of David and 
Melinda, which must have been in or about 1813. It is 
said to have been soon afterward that they moved to 
Nassau, where, according to family tradition, David en- 
gaged in " the leather business " ; but whether as a tan- 
ner or a merchant is not known. Whatever it was he 
dropped it when, in 1828, he moved with his family from 
Nassau to Portage county, Ohio, in the " Western 
Reserve " of Connecticut. This emigration was prob- 
ably induced by the advice or example of friends or rela- 
tions in Connecticut, there being at that time a great 
movement from that State to the Western Reserve. 

In Portage county David Lane took up a large tract of 
land, chiefly, if not wholly, a primitive forest, and began 
the great labor of reducing it to a farm. He was a man 
of remarkable physical strength and untiring industry; 
and, as his sons grew up and became strong enough to 
use the clumsy tools and implements of the time, of 
course they had to share his work. But, just as he allowed 
no respite for himself, so he allowed little to anyone else. 
On the contrary, necessity, as he saw it, imposed addi- 
tional labors upon him. There had to be some one in the 
country able to do the work of a blacksmith and wheel- 
wright, and his mechanical ability and strength made him 
the man. So, to the work of the farm he added a forge 
and wagon shop; and that he had a pride in his own 
handiwork is proved by at least one fine example of his 
skill in wrought-iron that is still preserved. Probably it 
was in this shop that Philander found he possessed that 
special ability in mechanics out of which grew his life- 
work. 

No doubt these doubled labors were often too heavy 
and exacting for growing boys, but the pioneer fathers 
who saw no limit to labor did not foresee certain of the 
results. Many of their sons (not to speak of themselves) 
suffered throughout their lives from the severe physical 
strain and the repression of youthful spirits. Some of 



2 



them rebelled as they grew toward manhood, seeing only 
unending toil, with what appeared to them to be little 
compensation and scanty time or opportunity for recrea- 
tion, and as soon as they reached majority, or even 
earlier, left what they felt to be a grinding and narrow 
life. Naturally their attraction was toward the towns 
and cities, as offering employments furthest removed 
from the irksome toil from sun to sun " on a backwoods 
farm. 

Philander Lane was one of these, tho, in addition to 
the desire to escape, he had an ambition for learning, for 
which he had had as yet but small encouragement or 
means. There is a family tradition that he ran away " 
from home while a boy, but whether to escape the hard 
life or to seek his fortune or both, is not told. If he 
did run away in his minority, he returned ; for it is cer- 
that he left home in the usual way at the age of twenty- 
three, and went to some place in western Pennsylvania, 
to try his fortune in the lumber business, then growing 
important along the upper tributaries of the Ohio. Not 
satisfied with this, after two years' trial, or not yet suc- 
cessful in it, he returned to Ohio and was employed by 
Bill & Brother, machinists, who had a shop at Cuyahoga 
Falls, not far from the family home. 

Here he found the natural field for his taste and genius, 
and rapidly developed skill and originality in mechanical 
work. For some reason not now known he went to Ash- 
land (perhaps also to Akron), and finally to Massillon 
(all in Ohio), still working at his chosen trade, until, in 
1848, he was an accomplished journeyman machinist. 
In that year, with his last employer, he took the bold 
step of going to Cincinnati, then the largest city in the 
west except Saint Louis, looking forward to setting up 
there for himself. The first two years there he worked 
as a journeyman. Then, in 1850, he established his own 
shop — a machine-repair shop, in Pearl Street — and 
employed one journeyman. And from this small begin- 
ning, by his untiring labor, exceptional skill and distin- 
guishing integrity, there grew up within ten years the 
extensive machinery, engine and foundry plant of Lane 
& Bodley, who, when the war broke out, were the largest 
builders of engines and milling machinery within a wide 



3 



region, having especially an extensive business in the 
lumbering and sugar country of the south. 

The only person who was able to distract his attention 
in this early industrial development at Cincinnati was 
Miss Sophia Bosworth, whom he met there soon after he 
established his own business. She was so distracting, 
indeed, tho only nineteen, that within a year they were 
married — July 18, 1851. She was born at Marietta, 
Ohio, the daughter of Charles Bosworth, who was born 
in Massachusetts in 1797. He was the son of Salah Bos- 
worth, also born in that State, who was a volunteer in 
the Revolutionary army, tho then very young, and who 
moved from his home in Boston, with Charles and his 
ten other children, in 1816, to a farm near Marietta (part 
of the lands of the famous Ohio Company of Massachu- 
setts), and died there in 1823. 

Thro her father she had the further distinction of 
direct descent from both Myles Standish and Priscilla 
Mullins, the son of the doughty Myles and the daughter 
of his elusive Priscilla marrying and reaching Sophia 
Bosworth in the sixth generation. 

Philander and Sophia — the very names have a quaint 
flavor of the sentimental and pleasing tales of old ! — 
lived happily together until his death, nearly fifty years, 
having had seven children who reached maturity; and 
she, in her 89th year, is still living. 

Coming thus from Colonial ancestry on both sides, 
Colonel Lane was an unqualified and uncompromising 
patriot and American. He was a zealous Whig of the 
Clay-Harrison-Taylor times, and became an enthusiastic 
Republican when that party arose. With " Western 
Reserve principles," he was irreconcilably opposed to 
slavery, and especially to the domination of the political 
affairs of the country by the selfish and insolent slave- 
holders who had so long controlled Congress and the 
government. 

He had a wide personal acquaintance in the south, and 
he was in New Orleans on business in January, 1861, 
when the Secession Convention of the State was sitting 
there; but yet he came home feeling sure there would 
not be war. To him at that time war was unthinkable. 
But the rapid succession of dire events following soon 



4 



showed his mistake ; and when, finally, Fort Sumter was 
threatened and then actually attacked, his indignation 
and patriotic rage knew no limit. With breathless 
anxiety he waited the action of Lincoln, and felt a certain 
great relief upon the news of his call for troops, received 
at Cincinnati, April 16, 1861. He saw his own instant 
course. 

He was then thirty-nine years old, had a wife and four 
children, from infancy to eight years, and a large and 
complicated business, the management and responsibility 
of which rested chiefly upon him. But, dropping all 
other affairs, he joined actively that day in raising vol- 
unteers. The serious drawback of his years and private 
affairs made him unwilling to be leader, but, urged by 
others, he consented, and next morning issued a call. 
This was April 17. He wrote the call himself. The meet- 
ing was to be held that night, at half -past seven, " at Ohio 
Medical College south side of Sixth Street west of Vine 
next to the Engine house for the purpose of Organizing 
a Military Company for the protection of our homes." 

At the foot of the paper was a notice that " The Stars 
and Stripes will be Raised on Lane & Bodley's shop cor- 
ner of John & Water Streets and saluted with thirty- 
four Guns at o'clock this evening." 

Some of you who read these pages must have heard 
those guns. There were thirty-four, of course, for the 
thirty-four States, tho one of them (Kansas) had just 
been admitted (its star not yet officially on the flag) and 
eight had then seceded. But it was Lane's opinion (as 
it was of most of the loyal men) that " seceding " did 
not take them out of the Union nor release them or their 
people from the obligation of obeying the laws of the 
United States. 

The meeting that night must have been crowded and 
spirited. Volunteers signed a roll to the number of 119, 
an organization was effected, a name was chosen (accord- 
ing to the custom of the time) — "The Union Rifles," 
and an election for officers was held. The choice was 
Philander P. . Lane as Captain, George P. Darrow as 
First-Lieutenant and Frederick Lenner as Second- 
Lieutenant. And George W. Johnson was elected 
Orderly-Sergeant. 



5 



The most of these volunteers were workmen in mechan- 
ical shops in Cincinnati, a large part of them coming 
from Captain Lane's shops. Many of them being mar- 
ried and unable to incur expenses beyond the ordinary, 
Captain Lane issued immediately an appeal ", addressed 
especially to the Ladies of Cincinnati with a sub- 
scription paper (evidently written by himself), to aid 
in the equipment of the company, a step which indicates 
a purpose to maintain the organization whether it then 
went into the army of the United States or not. The 
appeal said, indeed, that the company was raised " for 
our mutual defense " and was ready to hazard their 
lives for the protection of our homes and country." But 
this last phrase was immediately followed by — The 
issue is upon us. Will we bow our necks to the Traitors 
or vindicate the principles of '76 "? 

This language, together with Colonel Lane's statement 
after the war — " My company was not so fortunate as 
to be accepted under the first call for troops, but we kept 
up our organization as a company and were among the 
first to be ordered to camp under the second call, of June, 
1861 " — seem to show that, first of all, the company 
meant service in the general army of volunteers and that 
it was offered under the call for 75,000 as soon as it was 
organized. Still, at that time the Secessionists in Ken- 
tucky were very active, noisy and threatening (tho the 
State did not actually secede), Cincinnati, like other 
border towns, was filled with secession " sympathizers ", 
and there was real, tho unreasonable, apprehension of 
attack, so that organization and preparation for " home 
defense " must have been much in the minds of the people. 

The subscription paper ended with the names of the 
elected officers, followed by " Capt. Rosecrans graduate of 
West Point, Drill Master ". This was William S. Rose- 
crans, who had been an officer in the regular army, 
specially distinguished in military science, had resigned 
to engage in commercial business, but had never suc- 
ceeded, and who was now employed as manager by one of 
the " Coal-Oil " companies at Cincinnati, then trying to 
introduce the newly-discovered petroleum. He could not 
long have drilled the Union Rifles ", for in May he was 
serving as Engineer on the staff of General McClellan, 



6 



who was then in command of the Ohio Militia and on 
May 16 the War Department recalled him to the regular 
army service as Brigadier-General. Three months after 
he was thus announced as Drill-Master to Captain Lane's 
company he was in command of an army in Virginia of 
which that company was a small fraction. Again, early 
in 1863, it came under his command in Tennessee, in the 
Army of the Cumberland, and remained with him to and 
thro the disastrous battle of Chickamauga, which was 
followed by his removal from command in the field. 

Captain Lane must have kept the claims of the " Union 
Rifles " before the Governor and the military authorities 
at Columbus thro May and into June, and he had a friend 
there in Jacob D. Cox, a Cincinnatian, who was one of 
the three brigadier-generals of the Ohio Militia (com- 
missioned at the same time with McClellan as Major- 
General, under a special law of April 23, 1861) and was 
assisting in the organization of the new troops. 

About the middle of June General Cox was put in com- 
mand of troops — the " Second Brigade " (no division 
organization yet appeared) ; — and he ordered Captain 
Lane's company into rendezvous. This was the order: 

" Head Quarters, 
Ohio Militia and Volunteer Militia. 
Adjutant-General's Office 

Columbus, June 19th, 1861. 

Special Order No. 364. 

Report your Company at Camp Dennison Monday miorning: next. 
You are assigned to the 11th Reg: 2. Brigade, General Cox com- 
manding. 

H. B. Carrington 

Adjt Gen 

By order of Commander-in-Chief. 
To Capt. P. P. Lane, 
Cincinnati. 

This Commander-in-Chief " (tho the Governor held 
that office nominally) was really the famous George B. 
McClellan. He had been captain of artillery in the regu- 
lar army, had resigned in 1857, to engage in railway 
building, and in 1860-61 was President of the Ohio and 
Mississippi Railroad (from Cincinnati to St. Louis), and 
was living in Cincinnati. At a meeting of half a dozen 
leading citizens of Cincinnati, at the Burnet House, on 



7 



Sunday, April 21, it was agreed to ask the government 
to entrust Captain McClellan immediately with the local 
command and defense, and a telegram was sent to Wash- 
ington, asking that he be " appointed to organize forces 
and take command at Cincinnati." It was signed Wm. J. 
Fiagg, S. F. Vinton, W. S. Groesbeck, L. Anderson, 
Rutherford B. Hayes, George E. Pugh." Here was the 

home defense " purpose again : apparently even these 
men supposed that Cincinnati was in danger. 

McClellan must have been present at this meeting or 
directly in communication with those who were. He had 
just received two or three proposals from the Governors 
of New York and Pennsylvania for service in the organi- 
zation of their State troops, and he had decided to go to 
Harrisburg to see Governor Curtin about the one that 
most attracted him. He started the next day (22d), but 
stopped at Columbus, and on the 23d met Governor Denni- 
son (who had known him_ as a railroad man), and, as 

requested by several gentlemen of Cincinnati, gave him 
information " of the conditions at that place. 

But they must have talked of other things, for the 
Governor, who had been four days without reply to tele- 
grams he had sent to Washington relating to the rais-" 
ing and organizing of the Ohio contingent, and who now, 
therefore, " felt compelled to assume extraordinary re- 
sponsibilities agreed with McClellan upon immediate 
action. The legislature being in session, he had a special 
bill drawn and presented, which was immediately passed 
by both houses; and the same day, under this law, he 
commissioned McClellan Major-General in the Ohio 
Militia and gave him command of all the State Militia 
and all the volunteers enlisting under the call for 75,000. 
McClellan at once accepted and entered upon the duties 
of the office. This was v/armly approved by General 
Scott, then the head of the armies; but on May 3d the 
War Department created the military " Department of 
the Ohio " (which embraced Ohio, Indiana and Illinois) 
and assigned McClellan to its command as a Major- 
General of the United States Army (the first one ap- 
pointed during the war), — the first of the extraordinary 
acts of the government in the amazing career of this 
incapable general. General McClellan at once assumed 



8 



command under this assignment, but yet retained the 
command of the Ohio Militia and volunteers under his 
earlier commission, and held on to it even after he was 
permanently out of the State and commanding a general 
army in the field. 

The Eleventh Ohio Infantry, to which Captain Lane's 
company was assigned by the order of June 19, was 
originally one of the three-months " regiments accepted 
under the call of April 15 for 75,000 men. It had been 
assembled at Camp Jackson, near Columbus, organized 
there, and mustered into service April 20, and was then, 
early in May, moved to Camp Dennison, near Cincinnati, 
and kept under training there ; but had not been sent into 
the field. Its time of enlistment would expire July 26; 
and when Captain Lane's company arrived at the camp 
the question was already under agitation among its mem- 
bers, as well as among those of the other three-months 
regiments there, whether they would continue in the 
army by enlisting again, for the three years required by 
the second call for volunteers. In the Eleventh a large 
number declined, but enough remained and reenlisted for 
three years to justify the preserving of the regimental 
designation; so that the three-years Eleventh Infantry 
was the original Eleventh reorganized. Five of the 
original companies, however, chose to be mustered out at 
the end of their three-months term (C, E, G, I and K), 
new companies were to be received in their place, and 
the old ones remaining had to be filled up by three-years 
enlistments. 

Captain Lane's company was one of thej new ones. 
Tho it was designated as K " in the regimental line, 
that does not show that it was the last to be received, but 
was due to the accident that the original company K had 
just vacated the position by muster-out.* In fact it was 
the first company of the new regiment to be mustered-in, 
which, as officially reported, was done on June 19. f Five 



* The organization of infantry regiments at that time was in ten 
companies, designated by the letters A to K, omitting J. 

t In a letter dated July 12, 1861, Captain Lane said " My com- 
pany was mustered in on Saturday." The last preceding Saturday 
was July 6, but the Ohio Adjutant-General's records repeatedly 
state the date of mustering Company K as June 19, which was 



9 



other companies (A, B, D, F and H) were mustered-in 
on June 20; two others (C and G) at later dates down 
into September, and E late in December. The tenth and 
last company (I) was not raised and added until October, 
1862, when it was done as part of the energetic work of 
recruiting by Captain Lane, who had been sent to the 
State from the field for that purpose. But it is said, in 
a history of the Eleventh Ohio (written by two officers in 
it), that it was the fii^st three-years regimient of Ohio.* 

Cam.p Dennison (named for the then Governor) was 
one of the first of the camps built for the rendezvous of 
volunteers. It grew to be a very large camp, and was 
more or less filled with troops, coming, training, equip- 
ping and going, throughout the war. It was twelve miles 
northeast from Cincinnati, on the Marietta & Cincinnati 
railroad. 

" Monday morning next " in Captain Lane's order to 
move to the rendezvous was June 24. On that day he 
wrote to his wife from Camp Dennison — ''I am in 
camp. We brought out about 50 men, some drunk, some 
sober. I have a great responsibility, but I will try and do 
my duty." The brought out " means from Cincinnati 
to the camp, and it suggests that some of his men had not 
found it convenient to report for duty when they were 
notified of the marching order or to stay with the column 
on the march to the camp. Drinking at that time, 
especially among workingmen, was very common, and 
the average volunteer was at first quite " independent 
having little idea of discipline or of the obligation he had 
assumed of close obedience to orders. 

The Captain could not take out all the men he had 
originally enrolled, because their enrollment was made 
when the call was for men for three months and before 
there was any purpose of calling for three years. A re- 
adjustment, in fact a reenlistment, was required. Those 



not a Saturday. He may refer to his own muster-in as Captain, 
which would be necessary to complete the company organization, 
but this is officially given as July 7. It may be that the muster-in 
was on Saturday, July 6, but that the officials, for some reason, 
dated it " as of " June 19. 

* " History of the Eleventh Regiment, Ohio Volunteer Infantry: 
Compiled by Horton and Teverbaugh": Dayton, 1866. 



10 



who could not, or would not, go for three years dropped 
out, and, probably, some new men came in. But, when 
finally mustered-in for the Eleventh Ohio, the company- 
roll showed 86 men and 3 officers, — Captain Lane, First- 
Lieutenant George P. Darrow and Second-Lieutenant 
George W. Johnson, the latter taking the place of Lenner 
of the original company, who dropped out. The field 
officers of the reorganized regiment were Colonel Charles 
A. DeVilliers, Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph W. Frizell and 
Major Augustus H. Coleman. The colonel of the original 
regiment had resigned. 

The choice of DeVilliers for colonel proved to be a 
terrible misfortune for the regiment. If it was not ruined 
by his year of comm_and, it was only because there was 
among the inferior officers and the men enough of sterling 
qualities, with zeal in the cause and endurance of con- 
tinuing neglect and bad administration, to bear their dis- 
gracing incubus until it could be thrown off. 

DeVilliers was an example — a rather extreme one — 
of a peculiar class of officers who appeared in the volun- 
teer service early in the war, under the anxious search 
for men experienced in the instruction and drill of new 
soldiers. The instant, pressing need of training led to an 
eager acceptance of the help of any one who had or p]|p- 
fessed to have any knowledge of such work. Tho the 
small regular army was depleted of its younger officers, 
to serve as instructors and field-officers in the volunteers, 
the number so used was very far from supplying the hun- 
dreds of new regiments called out. Any one who had been 
an officer or soldier in the army or in the volunteers in the 
Mexican Vv^ar was now sure of a respected position, tho 
in that short war the most of the volunteers sav; no im- 
portant service. But there were in the country many 
foreigners who had been minor officers or soldiers in the 
armies in Europe, and others came over as military 
adventurers when our war broke out. These were looked 
up to with a kind of awe by the credulous American 
militia, and, with surprising ease, with little or no inquiry 
as to their history or real capacity, and without trial, 
they obtained many important military positions. Ger- 
mans were the most numerous, but there were English, 
French, Austrians and Poles. 



11 



When the new Eleventh Ohio was assembling in this 
rendezvous-camp the Eighth Ohio was already in adjoin- 
ing quarters. The parade-ground employments of that 
regiment were much enlivened by the activities of a small, 
dapper, very alert man as drill-master. He was con- 
spicuously " foreign " in appearance, of very dark com- 
plexion and sharp features, wore a smart red and gold 
cap, bright blue tight coat and red trousers, and was 
highly conceited in manner and talk (he spoke English 
fluently, tho with bad pronunciation) ; and he appeared 
to be acting as a sort of Inspector-General " of the 
camp, tho it does not appear that he had any real official 
position. The soldiers commonly spoke of him as the 
Major'' and supposed him to be Major of the Eighth 
Ohio, but he was not. He was always active and con- 
spicuous, and he made the green soldiers gape with aston- 
ishment at his brilliant sword-play and bayonet-gymnas- 
tics on the Eighth parade-ground. He was the wonder 
of the camps and, in the ignorance of the time, was be- 
lieved to possess all military science and arts. He was, 
or was believed to be, a Frenchman. If so, he had prob- 
ably been a minor officer in the French army or a fencing- 
master ; but his former career was unknown and no care 
was taken to inquire into it. When his true character 
came out he was believed to be a disreputable adventurer, 
— probably a good guess. This was Colonel DeVilliers. 

When the colonelcy of the Eleventh became vacant by 
the resignation of Colonel Harrison, who commanded in 
the three-months service, there was an " election " in the 
regiment for his successor.* DeVilliers was easily a 
candidate, was elected, and the Governor gave him the 
commission, probably influenced not alone by the election, 
but also by the reports of the rare qualifications of the 
candidate. Afterward his enemies said that his candi- 
dacy and election were due to intrigue. Very likely they 



* Colonel Lane has frequently criticized, with just severity, this 
vicious practice of electing officers in the volunteer regiments, tho 
he was himself elected both as Captain and as Colonel. It is im- 
possible to defend the great wrong. The cost of it in waste of life 
and property and demoralization of the volunteers was immeasur- 
able. In many regiments, however, if not in most, it was stopped 
after one or two years of experience. 



12 



were due to a concealed plan, for a much abler man would 
have been found in either the lieutenant-colonel or major, 
or indeed in almost any one of the captains. But this 
knowledge and understanding came too late. When 
DeVilliers was chosen the Eleventh Ohio was thought to 
be rarely fortunate in getting such a paragon of military 
ability for their instructor and commander. But he 
proved to be almost unwholly unfit for the place; and, 
so far from developing the capacity of his regiment, his 
persistent failure in duty and misconduct prevented that 
development as far as it could be prevented. If he was 
not a mere charlatan, his regiment was at least never 
benefited by his supposed knowledge and skill. It had 
never any effective drilling or maneuvering by him in 
either the rendezvous-camp or the field. His inefficiency 
in actual service in the field was so frequently shown that 
he lost all confidence and respect of the regiment, and by 
the end of a year his incapacity and misconduct had be- 
come so notorious and intolerable that he was finally 
ordered before a court-martial, tried on charges of gross 
misconduct, breaches of discipline and criminal acts, 
convicted, and at once cashiered. 



13 



II 



1861 : June — July 

The Second Brigade Ordered to the Field — Receives 
Arms — First March — Captain Lane on Special Duty, 
Patrolling the Ohio — Invasion of Virginia — The 
Kanawha Movement 

The first stage of the unfortunate condition of the 
Eleventh Ohio thus described came to an end on July 7, 
1861, when it was ordered to move immediately to 
Gallipolis, an Ohio town on the Ohio river, just below 
the mouth of the Big Kanawha. The men had not yet 
been armed, but now, while they were packing up under 
this order, they received their first guns. These were 
muskets of the old flint-lock make, recently altered by 
rifling the barrels and substituting percussion-locks. 

The regiment was then, of course, obviously unfit for 
military service, but that was true of most other regi- 
ments in the Northern armies, and true of their enemies 
in the Southern. The companies had been together in 
camp but two weeks, some even less; they had a colonel 
who had not drilled or instructed them; their drilling 
otherwise had been irregular and probably much of it 
misdirected or incompetent; many or most of them had 
had no instruction in arms; three had not yet been mus- 
tered into the service, in fact were not yet completed or 
fully organized; and the seven others had only within a 
week or two been muster ed-in. In short, they were little 
better than if a body of citizens hastily assembled and 
armed for an emergency. 

On July 7, within a few hours after receiving the 
order to move and the muskets, the men were marched 
to the nearest station, put into cattle, coal and box cars, 
and started for the field. Tho it is spoken of as " the 
regiment " there could not have been more than the seven 



14 



companies which had been mustered-in, probably less 
than 600 men in all; but Captain Lane was there with 
71 men of his Company K. In the haste of the movement, 
however, both of his lieutenants were left behind, and 
the duties of all the company officers were upon him. 

At Chillicothe at midnight the train halted and re- 
mained several hours. The people turned out with a 
big reception marching to meet the volunteers with 
flags and a band of music, and the women prepared a 
bountiful meal for all. Captain Lane wrote that they had 

all the substantials and delicacies that could be pro- 
duced and with a hearty welcome and finally a God- 
speed in our great task of suppressing the rebellion." 
This incident is mentioned because it is an example of the 
way in which the volunteer regiments were treated by 
the people, not only at their home towns on assembling 
and on leaving, but in other towns, where they were 
strangers, on their road to the field. There were thou- 
sands of these scenes, ending only with the greatest of 
all on the return to the north at the end of the war. 

At Hamden Station the men were transferred to a 
train on the Hocking-Valley railroad and went on to Oak 
Hill (or Portland) in Jackson county, then a terminal 
station, where it arrived late in the afternoon of July 8. 
From here there had to be a march of thirty miles, to 
Gallipolis,* The weather was hot, the men had had no 
training in marching, only a few could have had experi- 
ence in long walks, they wore the close-fitting boots of 
civilians at that time (shoes for men were little known 
until after the war), they had had little or no sleep the 
night before in the rough cars, they had no doubt been 
eating too much, and they now carried, each, the heavy 
old musket, a full knapsack, blankets,' extra clothing, and 
such other extra personal luggage as every green soldier 
feels that he must add to the regular and sufficient army 
supply. 

The original purpose of this movement v/as a campaign 
in the Kanawha valley under an order of General Mc- 

* Why this movement was not made by steamboats up the river 
I do not learn. That was obviously the easiest and quickest way. 
One has to guess that either boats were not available or that there 
was apprehension of being fired upon from the Kentucky shore. 



15 



Clellan, issued July 2 at Grafton, Virginia, which called 
three regiments from Camp Dennison as soon as they 
could be got ready, but the immediate reason for the 
abrupt march of the Eleventh Ohio, before it was fully 
organized or equipped, was one of the wild rumors that 
were very common at that time of an attack by the 
enemy/' The Secessionists of Kentucky were about to 
cross the Ohio and take Gallipolis, it said. So, when the 
Colonel began the march from Oak Hill he was in such 
thoughtless apprehension that he fancied the enemy " 
on the Ohio side of the river. Accordingly he drew up 
his men, told them they were now " in the enemy's 
country " and might be attacked at any time ; that they 
must, nevertheless, reach Gallipolis, and as quickly as 
possible; that every man must keep to his place in the 
ranks, and that anyone who fell out would be shot as a 
deserter. Rashly assuming that a forced march was re- 
quired, he set out about 7 o'clock for an all-night march. 
Without thought for, or else indifferent to, the heavy 
handicap of these conditions, and without even the prud- 
ence of beginning with a slow movement and making fre- 
quent short halts for " breathing," the excited Colonel 
urged the men on at a fast walk from the first and at- 
tempted to keep it up thro the night. Naturally, within 
a few miles the whole column was in disorder, and its 
condition constantly grew worse. 

But human nature and human endurance are beyond 
the control of colonels. The same men who, after train- 
ing or the experience of a campaign or two in the field, 
could march thirty miles in a day or a night without 
serious fatigue or straggling, were now badly broken up 
within ten miles. As Captain Lane tells the story of this 
attempt at a rapid continuous march, " within the first 
few miles the men showed signs of distress," their " set 
features, heavy breathing and limping steps threatened 
speedy exhaustion " ; the Colonel rode from head to 
rear, from rear to head, of the column and, with oaths 
and vile abuse, strove to maintain the cruel, idiotic 
march." To relieve their swollen feet, many took of£ their 
boots and walked in stockings, while others cut their boots 
open. One after another the articles of extra clothing 
and luggage were thrown to the roadside, but yet the suf- 



16 



ferers began to fall out and lie down, and the number 
increased rapidly, while the others, tougher or more 
resolute, plodded along with little or no semblance of 
ranks or order. Long before the march was half done the 
number of delinquents was so great that the idea of 
punishment would have been highly absurd. 

This is a picture of the first march of many a regiment 
of the green volunteers, except as to the lack of good 
sense and the harshness of the commanding officer. 

Arriving at the village of Centerville, after ten miles 
of this reckless waste. Captain Lane, with sound discre- 
tion, took the responsibility of saving his men in spite 
of the marching order. Hardly more than half the men 
were up in his or any of the other companies. He 
ordered a halt and rest. Some people of the village ap- 
peared and offered him the use of the church, in which 
the seats would furnish better beds than the roadside; 
and he found means of sending back on the road and 
bringing up his disabled men. Other captains, learning 
what he had done, followed his example, quite ready to 
share his fate in disobeying orders and overriding the 
Colonel's lurid idea of discipline. So the most of the 
column spent the remainder of that night in rest. 

At daybreak the aching pains of the tyros were much 
soothed in the news that the citizens were already up and 
cooking" a breakfast for them. With this delightful re- 
freshment and mental comfort, the war-worn heroes set 
out again, and, having no colonel, made easy marches, 
and reached Gallipolis, in fair order, in the afternoon. 
Some who had been riding in borrowed wagons got out 
on approaching the town and marched, to escape the 
disgrace of being seen in an unsoldierly position. The 
fact is, however, after all, that this march — thirty 
miles within some twenty-two hours, in hot weather — 
would have been creditable to old soldiers. 

The rash little Colonel, with a small part of his men 
who must have had special experience afoot or unusual 
endurance, marched all night, and halted in Gallipolis 
early in the morning. And it proved, as might well have 
been foreseen, that there had been no real occasion for 
haste. The Colonel none the less loudly repeated his 
threat of court-martial for every officer and man who 



17 



had fallen behind; but in this, as in other cases, the 
threats ended the matter. 

Active service for the regiment (or, at least, for Cap- 
tain Lane and his company) began at once; and for them 
the next five months were crowded thick with heavy 
labors, many marches, and the often repeated excitement 
of expected or actual conflicts with the enemy. That 
night, the Captain says, the company had " good quarters 
on the wharf-boat." The next morning, July 9, under 
an order of General Cox (who had already reached 
Gallipolis, with another regiment of the brigade). Cap- 
tain Lane took 40 of his men on the steamboat Leslie 
Combs and moved down the river. He was to patrol the 
Virginia shore in the hope of catching or tracing a party 
of marauders who had just held up and plundered the 
steamboat Fanny M. Burns, but he also " carried dis- 
patches " for two Kentucky regiments which were mov- 
ing up the river. He seems to have then known that the 
dispatches " related to the Kanawha movement," of 
which much is to be said later. 

He was to have his men and arms concealed, himself 
wearing civilian dress, and to try to get into communica- 
tion with any parties of men on the Virginia side, with- 
out risking a landing. He saw a number of such parties, 
but they were all dumb to his arts, and he learned noth- 
ing. Finally he did land with a detachment (why he did 
so, in view of his order, does not appear) at a place which 
appeared to him to offer some promise, and searched the 
neighborhood, but without result. He continued this 
search that day and night, reaching a point some fifteen 
miles below Guyandotte (a Virginia town near the Ken- 
tucky border), there meeting the two Kentucky regi- 
ments and delivering the dispatches ; and then found him- 
self ordered to Guyandotte, where he landed with his 
men the night of July 10, at the end of " a fine trip of 
thirty-six hours ". He remained there one day, and then, 
under further orders, m_oved with his detachment on his 
boat up to Point Pleasant (a small town of historic inter- 
est in the Indian wars) in Virginia, just above the mouth 
of the Big Kanawha, landing there the night of July 11. 

There was a reign of terror " at that time in western 
Virginia. Secessionist and Union men had been inter- 



18 



mingled thruout the region, but, under the truculent 
aggressiveness of the Secessionists, many Union families 
had been driven from their homes. Point Pleasant was 
nearly deserted, and Captain Lane quartered his men in 
abandoned houses, while he occupied the judge's cham- 
bers in the court-house. It does not appear whether the 
remainder of his company, or of the regiment, was then 
ordered to Point Pleasant, but on the 12th he says " only 
three companies " of soldiers were there ; nor whether he 
was the commander of the post; but he had the complex 
difficulty common at that time to Union officers command- 
ing posts in the border slave states, in dealing with citi- 
zens alleged to be hostile ; for some of the suspected were 
guilty and some were not. So he writes " I expect to 
make ten or twelve arrests to-night of Secession leaders. 
I find a much worse condition here and along the border 
than I expected. The Union men are cowed down and 
have to run for their lives." And he gives instances of 
their persecution. Four days later he writes " We have 
many of the F.F.V's under arrest and many more ought 
to be." Then, as if in connection with the treachery of 
the Secesh he goes on — " Our pickets were fired on 
twice last night, and we were under arms nearly all 
night ". If this firing was really at the pickets, it was, 
probably, merely desultory, by individuals — the " pot- 
shots " to which the savage but cowardly partisans in 
the South were much addicted, — as there could not have 
been any organized force of the enemy near enough to 
the Ohio at that time to justify a fear of any real attack. 

On the 17th the companies at Point Pleasant were sent 
on boats up the Big Kanawha, to rejoin their regiments 
in the Kanawha movement " already referred to. 
Meantime, under the orders of General McClellan, Gen- 
eral Cox had moved his brigade, on boats up the Kanawha, 
to the mouth of Pocotaligo creek, twelve miles below 
Charleston, and Colonel DeVilliers had gone up with the 
remainder of the Eleventh Ohio from Gallipolis. A day 
or two later one more company (G) arrived from Camp 
Dennison for the Eleventh, making now eight companies 
in the field. The night of the 19th Captain Lane and 
his com^pany thus rejoined the regiment and encamped 
with it at Pocotaligo creek. 



19 



There was immediately very interesting news of the 
war. On the 16th, near there, occurred the " Battle of 
Scarey Creek in which the Eleventh had an unforeseen 
and humiliating share. Colonel DeVilliers was cap- 
tured, thro his own folly, tho neither he nor his regiment 
took any part in the engagement. But of that later. 



20 



Ill 



1861: July 

Under McClellan in Western Virginia — His Battle of Rich 
Mountain — First Campaign on the Kanawha — Battle 
of Scarey Creek — Capture of Colonel DeVilliers 

Arriving in the field in Virginia, the regiment now 
came directly under the command of General McClellan, 
as part of his army in action. From the latter part of 
May this promising general had been laying plans and 
making movements for the occupation of all western 
Virginia.* Indeed his ambition soared so far as that he 
contemplated, first, victory in a decisive battle, then a 
march thro the country, leaving it securely Union behind 
him, either over the mountains to Staunton on the Shen- 
andoah and thence southwestward to the New-river 
country, or up the Kanawha and New rivers and thro the 
mountains to Wytheville and thence down the valleys of 
the Tennessee into eastern Tennessee, where the Union 
men would rise and call for arms; and he would thus 
" break the backbone of Secession His paper plans 
were always comprehensive and his combinations for 
movement always sure to win, tho they never did win, 
even once, in all his career. General Scott, who was 
very friendly to him, avoided refusing flatly, but he 
mildly suggested that the plan of crossing the mountains 
was rather premature and that the march proposed 
would present the difficulties of a rather long line for 
supplies. t 



* It was not yet a separate State as " West Virginia." 

t But this was only a modest curtailing of an earlier plan, upon 
which he proposed to march with 80,000 men up the Kanawha and 
New rivers, over the mountains and down the James and take 
Richmond; or, with a larger army, to march from the Ohio upon 
Nashville and thence to the Gulf, taking either Pensacola, Mobile 



21 



Tho not wholly within the purpose of this narrative, 
some account of the doings of McClellan in western Vir- 
ginia would be interesting. Indeed, the peculiar purpose 
of military operations in that country in 1861 ought to 
be explained anyhow, as Captain Lane and the Eleventh 
Ohio had an active share in them. 

Thruout the war the government felt a keen interest 
in the position of the Unionists in western Virginia and 
North Carolina and eastern Kentucky and Tennessee. 
They were especially always in the mind and plans of 
Lincoln, who not only had a deep feeling of sympathy 
with those sorely tried but faithfully loyal sufferers, but 
also saw the great political value of the occupation by 
Union troops of that region. He had, further, the en- 
couragement of bold political action in the Virginia sec- 
tion of the region, where the autocratic course of the 
leaders in the southern part of the State in f orcing upon 
the unwilling convention at Richmond, in Aprils an 

Ordinance of Secession " was bitterly resented. Forty 
counties in the west held an election in May and chose 
delegates to a convention, which began sitting May 13, 
at Wheeling, repudiated the alleged secession, declared 
the State still in the Union, elected a Governor and other 
State officers, and took steps which brought about finally 
the division of the State and the creation of West 
Virginia. 

Accordingly, in execution of a policy of careful pro- 
tection and conciliation, the government determined to 
occupy western Virginia, as the nearest of the territory in 
question. For this purpose General McClellan, having 
been already assigned to the command of the newly 
formed Department of the Ohio, was naturally chosen to 
conduct the military operations, the western parts of Vir- 
ginia and Pennsylvania were added to his Department, 
and he received instructions from Washington in the 



or New Orleans, as might be desired. General Scott left this 
foolish paper with Lincoln, only commenting that, even if either 
campaign were possible, only 75,000 men were called out for all 
purposes, that their three-months terms of service would expire 
before McClellan could organize and start, and that transportation 
by land would take twice the time and cost five times as much as 
by water and be infinitely more difficult. 



22 



policy and purposes proposed. This was at the time of 
the election just mentioned and when there were no rebel 
troops (no definite body of them) anywhere west of the 
Shenandoah. 

One would assume that, under these circumstances and 
in view of the urgency of the purpose. McClellan's move- 
ments would be prompt and rapid. There were then not 
less than twenty regiments of the three-months men 
available in Ohio, Indiana and western Pennsylvania, as 
well as four or five of western Virginia and eastern Ken- 
tucky, and half that number were enough at that time 
to occupy every strategic point between the Shenandoah 
and the Big Kanawha. But he engaged himself only in 
elaborate preparations and writings, and let tim.e and 
opportunity slip away. True, his men had not yet much 
training, but in that respect the rebels were no better off, 

— much worse, in fact, as was shown in subsequent dis- 
closures historically as well as in the first engagements. 

He established his headquarters in Cincinnati early in 
May, with a large and imposing staff, and began that 
work of elaborate scientific preparation which was the 
most distinguishing feature of his military career. 
Preparation, as he saw it, was without limit; he was 
never, in his own judgment, ready for action, or at least 
was never furnished with the number of troops and 
quantities of supplies he reported to be essential to his 
plans,* tho he Vv^as in fact always much stronger in both 
than any enemxy he met. 

On May 26, however, at Cincinnati, he issued a volume 
of papers. He had determined to place troops at several 
points on the Ohio, ready for the invasion " of Virginia, 

— at Bellaire, Marietta, Gallipolis and Ironton. Not only 
Ohio troops were ordered for this, but he notified 
Brigadier-General Morris, at Indianapolis, to be ready 
to move to-morrow, with two Indiana regiments, to 
Wheeling or Parkersburg and that five or six more 
regim.ents would probably be required. The same day he 
sent an order to Colonel Benjamin F. Kelley, to " make a 
forv/ard movement " with his First Virginia regiment 



* His reports to the Adjutant- General during June and July 
amply support this, as well as many reports in later campaigns. 



23 



on Fairmont (a few miles northwest of Grafton, a town 
on the Baltimore & Ohio railroad in Virginia) ; another 
to Colonel Irvine, to move from Bellaire to Wheeling with 
his Sixteenth Ohio regiment, occupy that place and move 
on to Fish creek, in support of Colonel Kelley; and an- 
other to Colonel Steedman, to move from Marietta, with 
his Fourteenth Ohio, to Parkersburg, occupy that place, 
and thence by rail toward Grafton. 

The same day he issued from Cincinnati a proclamation 
" To THE Union Men of West Virginia: 

" The General Government has long enoug-h endured the machina- 
tions of a few factious rebels in your midst. Armed traitors have 
in vain endeavored to deter you from expressing your loyalty at 
the polls. Having failed in this infamous attempt * * * they 
now seek to inaugurate a reign of terror and thus force you to 
yield to their schemes. * * * 

" The General Government has heretofore carefully abstained 
from sending troops across the Ohio, or even from posting them 
along its banks, tho frequently urged by many of your prominent 
citizens to do so. I determined to wait the result of the late 
election, desirous that no one might be able to say that the slight- 
est effort had been made from this side to influence the free expres- 
sion of your opinion. You have now shown, under the most ad- 
verse circumstances, that the great mass of the people of Western 
Virginia are true and loyal to that beneficent Government under 
which we and our fathers have lived so long. * * * 

"The General Government cannot close its ears to the demand 
you have made for assistance. I have ordered troops to cross the 
river. They come as your friends and brothers — as enemies only 
to the armed rebels who are preying upon you * * * ^jj your 
rights shall be religiously respected. Now that we are in your 
midst, fly to arms and support the General Government." 

The same day he issued from Cincinnati an address 

" To THE Soldiers of the Expedition : 

"Soldiers! You are ordered to cross the frontier and enter upon 
the soil of Virginia. Your mission is to restore peace and con- 
fidence, to protect the majesty of the law, to rescue our brethren 
from the grasp of armed traitors. You are to act in concert with 
the Virginia troops and support their advance. 

" When, under your protection, the loyal men of Western Virginia 
have been enabled to organize and arm, they can protect them- 
selves, and you can then return to your homes with the proud 
satisfaction of having preserved a gallant people from destruc- 
tion." 

On the 27th of May, then, immediately after proclaim- 
ing these patriotic and lofty purposes and issuing these 



24 



resolute orders, we expect to see the redeeming General 
on the soil of Virginia in the saddle at the head of his 
army, with his trumpeter sounding the thrilling Forward! 
But he was, in fact, in his Cincinnati office, writing more 
on his purposes and plans. And he did not appear in 
Virginia for nearly four weeks. 

The regiments designated did, however, cross the river 
and move toward Grafton," and Colonel Kelley 

occupied " that village, without an engagement (unless 
a merely nominal one), a small body of guerrillas who 
had burned a bridge near there running away into the 
mountains. Then that regiment, and the others as they 
appeared in the region, simply lay in camp awaiting 
orders or the General. 

When he (at Cincinnati, May 30) heard of Colonel 
Kelley's arrival at Grafton, he telegraphed the Adjutant- 
General at Washington, that he had the honor to report 
the successful occupation of Grafton without the loss of 
a single life." Then for three weeks more he remained 
at Cincinnati, doing nothing more to occupy Virginia or 
forward the campaign, except to order into the State, 
along the Baltimore & Ohio road, all the troops he could 
reach in his Department, the equivalent of nearly twenty- 
five regiments. There were at that time no organized 
rebel troops worth mentioning in that part of the State, 
nor indeed anywhere west of the Shenandoah. 

But the rebel authorities, being thus freely informed 
and allowed ample time by their enemy, were quite awake 
to the military advantage of being first on the ground. 
And for them there was another impelling cause of action. 
The wide-spread Unionism in the country was well- 
known and gave them great concern. Nothing would do 
for that but suppression by the presence and activity of 
armed forces. This was at first left to the management 
of the authorities of the seceded State. General Robert 
E. Lee (not yet risen to fame) was then in command 
of the Virginia Forces " (State militia) and had his 
headquarters in Richmond. He understood the political 
importance of holding the western region quite as well 
as Lincoln did, and, therefore, tho his Forces " were 
meager and very poorly armed and equipped, his plans 
included the occupation of as many places there as prac- 



25 



ticable (in view of other demands upon him), especially 
for the gathering into his ranks as many of the citizens 
as possible. 

If General McClellan foresaw this policy and move- 
ment, or understood it — as it would seem, in common 
sense, he must have done, — he was indefensibly delin- 
quent in delaying so long his occupation of and defensive 
measures in the disputed country. 

The problem of military occupation and defense was 
simple and, for the most part, not of great difficulty. The 
greater part of West Virginia is mountainous, but about 
one-third, lying along the Ohio a,nd across the two 
Kanawhas, with wide valleys and low hills, is available 
for cultivation. The New river, rising in North Carolina 
and running northwardly thro old Virginia and north- 
westerly thro the mountains, joins with the Gauley, above 
Charleston, to form the Big Kanawha, and so flows 
quite across the State, dividing it, one-third to the south 
and west and two-thirds to the north and east. This 
southwest portion is almost entirely a vast area of 
irregular mountains and has no stream_s or valleys of 
great size. During the war there were only one or two 
tolerable, tho often steep and difficult, roads by which it 
could be crossed and only a sparse and very ignorant 
population. In the portion north and east of the Kanawha 
there are several considerable rivers, flowing to the Ohio, 
with comparatively large valleys; and there were then 
several turnpike " roads, many dirt " roads, a large 
population and many towns. In the northeast quarter of 
this section the mountains take the form of several high 
ridges, lying parallel with each other, remarkably 
straight and uniform in structure, running nearly north 
and south, with narrow valleys between. In each valley 
a river flows northward and is spanned by a bridge of the 
Baltimore & Ohio railroad. In the westerly ridge were 
Laurel Mountain and Rich Mountain, the former about 
twenty miles south of the railroad at Grafton and the 
latter ten or twelve miles further south. Two of the 
turnpike roads mentioned crossed all these ridges, by 
convenient passes, and connected the Ohio with the 
Shenandoah. One ran by Laurel Mountain, the other by 



26 



Rich. The Baltimore & Ohio road, across the northern 
end of the country, was then operated from Baltimore to 
Parkersburg, and was of great value to the government 
for the transportation of troops and supplies. There was 
no other railroad west of the Shenandoah, and the wagon- 
roads leading up the Big Kanawha, and especially those 
from the head of navigation on that river up the New 
river country, as well as by Lewisburg and Covington, 
were therefore of great importance. 

It thus seems clear that to occupy and hold western 
Virginia the first, and the one essential, thing to do was 
to take possession promptly of the Kanawha and the 
lower part of the Gauley and New rivers by a strong 
force, with five or six batteries, commanded by a trained 
general. Tho the protection of the Baltimore & Ohio 
road was essential, that could be provided for by placing 
smaller forces in front of it, with provision for quick 
reinforcement from a base at Parkersburg or Wheeling ; 
for the danger to the road would be rather from small 
raids than from any set campaign. There was no prob- 
ability of an attempt by the enemy to occupy permanently 
the northern part of western Virginia, because of the 
great difficulty of moving a large army westward across 
the several mountain ranges and maintaining its transpor- 
tation and the great risk of having it cut off by a move- 
ment south from the Baltimore & Ohio road or north 
from the Gauley river. Moreover, there was no such 
enemy army available at any time in 1861. But Mc- 
Clellan's course was, to plant nearly all his forces and 
guns on the railroad and for the next two months merely 
hold them in camp, while he left the center of his field 
(the Kanawha valley) to take care of itself. 

The inevitable result was, that the enemy seized the 
opportunity thus offered him. General Lee, then com- 
manding the " Virginia Forces had special orders to 
occupy as far as practicable the western part of the 
State. If he was in need of information of McClellan's 
purposes he found it in McClellan's egotistic publication 
of them in May. Within a few weeks his troops held all 
the country of the New river and the Kanawha, down 
nearly to the Ohio, and another body was marching from 



27 



Staunton thro the mountains, to seize the two pikes at 
Laurel and Rich mountains, where McClellan could and 
should have had fortified posts a month before. 

Thus, to redeem his obvious faults, McClellan was com- 
pelled to engage in two aggressive campaigns. The one 
in the north, against the enemy's positions at Laurel and 
Rich mountains he commanded personally; and he was 
so busy with preparation for it that, for a time, he gave 
no attention to the other, but permitted the enemy not 
only to take possession but to fortify on the lower 
Kanawha. 

The rebel General Garnett, sent by General Lee, late 
in June, to hold Laurel and Rich mountains, had about 
4,500 men and 12 field guns, a force hastily recruited, 
untrained and poorly armed. He posted Lieutenant- 
Colonel Pegram, with two regiments, 1,100 or 1,200 men 
and 4 guns, at Rich Mountain, with orders to establish 
a fortified camp. Laurel Mountain being nearer Mc- 
Clellan's position he retained there the greater part of his 
troops, less than 3,500, under his personal command. 

McClellan had about Grafton 20,000 men for service 
and 34 guns, all of his troops being superior to Garnett's 
in arms and in training. After weeks of special prepara- 
tion he moved into the field with some 13,000 men and 
24 guns, posted half his forces, under General Morris, 
in front of Garnett at Laurel Mountain, to threaten attack 
but await further orders, and moved on himself with the 
other half, tv/elve miles further, against Rich Mountain. 
He appeared before Pegram's position on July 10 and 
began work,, as a military engineer, upon a plan of 
scientific approaches. He had already written to General 
Scott that he w^ould " never throw his men into the teeth 
of artillery and intrenchments if it is possible to avoid 
it " ; but Pegram's defenses were only hastily constructed 
intrenchments eked out by barricades and manned by his 
1,100 or 1,200 men with their 4 field guns. 

General Rosecrans, who commanded one of McClellan's 
brigades, proposed to him that he be sent around 
Pegram's left flank, to get the road in his rear, but was 
only snubbed for his pains. The next day, however, Mc- 
Clellan was willing to consider the plan, and finally con- 
sented to try it. Rosecrans promptly set out with his 



28 



brigade at noon, worked his way thro the forest and up 
the ravines, and by three o'clock reached the road on the 
mountain top three miles in rear of Pegram's camp. 
Pegram had provided against such an attempt by posting 
300 of his men and one gun at that place, under a cap- 
tain. This little force gallantly resisted Rosecrans's ad- 
vance, but was soon defeated by his far larger command 
and driven off to the east. Rosecrans sent a courier to 
report his success to McClellan, but the man was cap- 
tured on the way and McClellan spent all the night at 
work on elaborate approaches and emplacements for his 
12 guns. At daylight his pickets discovered that the 
enemy had evacuated the position during the night. At 
the same time he heard from Rosecrans, and a little later 
had a report from Morris that Garnett was retreating 
and that he was in pursuit. Thereupon he sent to Wash- 
ington two reports of his victory and moved over the 
mountain eastward, to Beverly, where, within the next 
few days he wrote several more reports of the campaign, 
each one further magnifying his achievements. Several 
times he wrote, not only that the enemy had much ex- 
ceeded him in numbers, but that he had defeated two 
armies " ! 

The whole " Battle of Rich Mountain " was, as thus 
shown, only the engagement of Rosecrans, upon his own 
initiative, with his brigade of nearly 3,000 men, with a 
rebel force of 300 men and one gun under a captain ; but, 
within two weeks, on McClellan's reports alone, it led to 
the amazing act of the government in calling him to the 
command of all the armies ; and his career was then for 
a year and a half an unbroken story of vast sacrifices 
and humiliating failures. 

When McClellan thought he was about to begin his 
campaign against Garnett he at last gave attention to 
the Kanawha valley. But, taking advantage of his delays, 
as already said, the enemy had occupied the country in 
force. General Wise was on the Kanawha, with a body 
of troops which he called Wise's Legion ", variously 
reported to number 5,000 to 7,000, with 10 guns, and 
General Floyd was on the New and Greenbrier rivers with 
6,000 men and 8 or 10 guns, known as " Floyd's Army." 
But, tho both generals were in that country for a year, 



29 



their support of each other was never effective, because 
of mutual jealousies. 

To meet these forces and hold the Kanawha, McClellan 
made provision which would seem to be remarkably in- 
adequate, as will appear in his order. This he issued at 
Grafton, Va., on the 2d of July ; and it gave directions in 
such detail as to leave little discretion to the commander 
of the troops it ordered out. It was directed to Brigadier- 
General Jacob D. Cox, of the Ohio Militia at Camp 
Dennison, Cincinnati, and required him to assume com- 
mand of the First and Second Kentucky infantry and 
Twelfth Ohio infantry, expedite their equipment and call 
upon the Governor (of Ohio) for one company of cavalry 
and six guns, move them by rail to Gallipolis; with the 
regiment first ready go to Gallipolis, take command of 
the Twenty-first Ohio there; cross and occupy Point 
Pleasant; with the next regiment that arrives occupy 
Letart's Falls (on the Ohio, Virginia side, below Galli- 
polis) ; move the other two to mouth of Ten-mile creek 
(on the Ohio, Virginia side, ten miles below Letart's) ; 
leave one regiment at Point Pleasant in reserve ; intrench 
two guns at Letart's and four at your advanced position 
on the Kanav/ha ; remain on the defensive ; hold the rebels 
near Charleston until I can cut off their retreat by move- 
ment from Beverly.* If you are certain I am hard 
pressed, seek to relieve me by rapid advance upon 
Charleston, but place no credit in rumors, for I shall be 
successful. "t 

How General Cox was to do all that with the four regi- 
ments does not appear, since the order required all of 
them to be posted directly on the Ohio river ; but, as the 
Eleventh Ohio closely followed them into Virginia, it 
must be that some later authority was received or as- 
sumed by Cox, under which he added at least that one 
regiment to his command. None of McClellan's many 
printed official reports show that he gave any instruc- 
tions for the Kanawha movement after the order of July 
2 ; but he said, in a report on July 6, that he had ordered 

* Beverly was just east of Rich Mountain above mentioned and 
quite 120 miles from Charleston. 

t He was then preparing for the "Battle of Rich Mountain": 
ante, page 28. 



30 



a movement in force up the Great Kanawha and in 
another report, on July 12, he said with the Gauley 
Bridge held, as it probably is by this time by General 
Cox, the occupation of Western Virginia is on a safe 
basis " ; and in another report, on July 13, he said I 
hope General Cox has by this time driven Wise out of the 
Kanawha valley." 

That is, McClellan expected an inexperienced militia 
general to take new and untrained troops, four or five 
regiments, get them armed and equipped, move them 
more than a hundred miles to the Kanawha, place them 
in four positions along a line of twenty miles, intrench 
the six guns in two batteries, and yet move his command 
nearly one hundred miles up the Kanawha, the upper 
half of the movement being thro a very difficult moun- 
tain country, when all bridges over the lateral streams 
were destroyed, take Charleston and Gauley Bridge, both 
of the first importance to the enemy and both fortified; 
and get all this done inside of ten days. And yet he him- 
self, in the north of the State, with more than twenty 
regiments, including those of longest training, with at 
least 34 guns, spent over six weeks in preparing for and 
making an advance of but twenty to thirty miles over a 
comparatively easy country, against an enemy of hardly 
one-fourth his own strength! 

What happened was what would naturally be ex- 
pected. For himself, with his far superior forces and 
guns, he was able, practically, to surround his enemy 
and, after a small and extremely unequal engagement, 
drive him from the region and harass his retreat, taking 
one-sixth of his men, when he ought easily to have cap- 
tured the whole. For General Cox there could be no 
flanking, because his force was too small and there were 
no roads available for that purpose in the wild m_oun- 
tains which composed the country and crowded up close 
to the Kanawha ; so that he was compelled to oppose his 
enemy only on the narrow front permitted by the banks 
of the river, while there were many streams falling into 
the river, thro deep and rocky ravines, all the bridges 
being destroyed by the enemy as he approached. He 
was, therefore, necessarily occupied in continuous hard 
work seventeen days in making the hundred miles up the 



31 



Kanawha, and twelve days of that time (after the affair 
at Scarey creek*) in forcing the enemy out of the 
Charleston and Gauley Bridge positions. In view of the 
peculiar and constant difficulties of the country and of 
the obstructed and defended road and the bridgeless 
streams, the march should be credited as one of remark- 
able speed. 

As it happened, the most conspicuous and effective 
force in overcoming the delays and hastening the march 
lay in Captain Lane and his Company K. With much 
ingenuity and skill, and working night and day, he and 
his company (assisted at times by details from other 
companies) rebuilt the old bridges, improvised new ones, 
cleared av/ay the heavy obstructions thrown in the road 
by rocks and felled trees, and for miles improved the 
way for guns and wagons. 

On receiving the order of July 2, at Camp Dennison, 
General Cox set about its execution with all speed, but 
each of the regiments was more or less lacking in equip- 
ment. There were not yet even enough guns for the 
men. It was impossible at that time for the government 
to get all the arms, clothing and equipage so suddenly 
required for a large army. At least one of Cox's regi- 
ments was not supplied with muskets until the hour it 
marched. General McClellan's order shows that he then 
knew these troops were not yet ready. But within five 
days some of them were moving, and, altho it took two 
days to reach the Kanawha by the route ordered. Cox had 
them all there on the 11th. At the mouth of the Poco- 
taligo creek (a large stream on the east side of the 
Kanawha) he was stopped by the presence of the enemy 
and the destruction of the bridge over that creek. Here 
he made a temporary defensive camp and " intrenched " 
his remaining four guns, as ordered. 

It will be remembered that he was not ordered to make 
an aggressive campaign for the present, but was to be on 
the defensive and was not to advance upon Charleston 
(twelve miles further up the river) unless in a certain 
contingency, which, indeed, never arose. Simply to await 
events or further orders now appears to have been his 



* See page 33. 



32 



whole duty; tho, of course, meanwhile he occupied him- 
self actively in training his new men, securing his posi- 
tion, and seeking information of the position and move- 
ments of his enemy. 

When Cox first moved up the Kanawha, Wise moved 
down from Charleston and destroyed the Pocotaligo 
bridge; and when Cox established himself at Pocotaligo, 
Wise was only a few miles in front, in observation. A 
few days later (July 16) Cox sent Colonel Norton, with 
part of the Twenty-first Ohio (his own regiment) and of 
the Twelfth Ohio, 1,200 men and one gun in all, up the west 
side of the river for a reconnoisance. Norton was not to 
bring on an engagement, but when, within a few miles, 
he came to Scarey creek, a stream flowing into the 
Kanawha from the west, thro a deep and rocky ravine, 
he was fired upon from the other side by an enemy con- 
cealed, but evidently of considerable number, with two or 
three guns. Being only on a reconnoisance, he should 
have fallen back, out of fire, and tried to learn the 
strength and purpose of the enemy; but, being inexperi- 
enced and a brave man, he considered himself in a battle 
and undertook to hold his ground and return the fire. 
The " battle " was thus fought across the ravine, which 
Norton could not, or did not, reach: probably he could 
not have found a passage across it if he had reached it. 
Wise seems to have had the greater part of his forces 
there and was himself in command. 

Norton soon fell, wounded, as well as several of his 
men, and his command, unable to advance and not ordered 
to retire, became confused, fell back in disorder, and re- 
treated to the camp at Pocotaligo, having lost two killed, 
six wounded, and six officers and a few men captured. 
Wise, in a delirium of joy,* crossed the ravine by a cir- 
cuit and followed almost to the camp. 

But this was not all the disaster. Colonel DeVilliers, 
who had just joined the little army, with part of the 
Eleventh Ohio, left the camp with two or three other 
officers (one a colonel) and rode up the east side of the 
river, to observe Norton's movement, for entertainment. 
Hearing the firing, and the view being obstructed, they 



* Official Records, War Dept., vol. 2, p. 291. 



33 



rode down to the river, and finding a flat " at hand were 
ferried over, and immediately rode into the enemy's lines. 
They said afterward that they were betrayed by the dis- 
play of a United States flag. So Wise had as prisoners 
three colonels and three minor officers (Norton's wound 
being so severe that he could not move and one of his 
staff remaining to care for him), with a few men. 

This was the " Battle of Scarey Creek of little 
more consequence in military view than if Wise had 
driven in a picket; but it at once became in the excitable 
imagination of the time a great victory " on one side 
and a great disaster on the other. Morally it did have, 
temporarily, a good effect on the rebel side and a bad one 
on ours. 

McClellan had instructed Cox (the paper does not ap- 
pear in the official records, there is only a reference to it 
in one of McClellan's reports to the Adjutant-General) 
to occupy Ripley with one regiment and move with 
four on Charleston and the Gauley Bridge, and also to 
occupy Barboursville and Guyandotte." But it does not 
appear that any more troops were ordered out for these 
purposes, nor that Cox had more than the five regiments 
already mentioned. Ripley was forty miles to the left, 
while Barboursville and Guyandotte were far in his rear. 
And yet McClellan at the same time, in providing for 
unlimited strength in the forces with himself, telegraphed 
to the Adjutant-General that " the Indiana and Ohio 
troops (all of them, as the context shows) are necessary 
to my success," that is, against the enemy in his imme- 
diate front. A day or two later his demand was " Please 
send me some more regular officers; some old (that is, 
regular) regiments if possible." And a few days later 
he calls for a brigade of the old regular infantry and 
some companies of the regular cavalry." He already 
had more than 20,000 troops at hand, with many regular 
officers (four of them being his brigadier-generals and 
several serving as colonels of volunteers), while his 
enemy numbered less than 5,000, all having had less 
training and experience than the greater part of his own 
troops, and while in his Kanawha forces there was not, 
so far as is known, even one regular officer. 

In view of his orders to Cox and of these circum- 



34 



stances, McClellan's expectations of the Kanawha cam- 
paign can only be characterized as absurd; and it is not 
surprising that when he heard of " Scarey Creek " he 
was unreasonably angry and disgusted. He criticised 
Cox (to others) with harsh injustice, without waiting to 
learn the facts, and by repeated messages to Washington 
much injured his reputation, without sending any definite 
news or statement relating to the engagement but his own 
abuse. On July 19," in a telegram to the Adjutant- 
General, he said " Cox checked on the Kanawha. Has 
fought something between a victory and a defeat. Will 
start as soon as possible to cut off Wise's retreat and 
relieve our credit. In Heaven's name give me some gen- 
eral officers who understand their profession. I give 
orders and find some who cannot execute them unless I 
stand by them. Unless I command every picket and lead 
every column I cannot be sure of success." 

For egotism, arrogance and foolishness this has no 
parallel except in his own similiar later ebullitions in 
other fields. Little more than a month later, when he 
was in immediate command of the great army at Wash- 
ington, he was writing, privately, just such egotism rela- 
ting to the General-in-Chief, the President, and most of 
his Cabinet. He had then, as he said^ only one " friend " 
in the government. The Secretary of War did appre- 
ciate his genius ; but even he was not long in being found 
out and placed among the " incompetents," as he called 
them. 

On July 21, in a private letter (published by his 
family) , he wrote 

" Cox lost more in getting a detachment thrashed than I did in 
routing two armies. The consequence is I shall m.ove down (that 
is, from Beverly) with a heavy column, to take Mr. Wise in the 
rear. It is absolutely necessary for me to go in person. There is 
no one I can trust. I don't feel sure that the men will fight very 
well under anyone but myself. I expect to leave by the day after 
to-morrow at the latest." 

On the day before this letter he had telegraphed to 
the Adjutant-General that he intended to make this 
march against Wise immediately : on the day after it he 
telegraphed General Scott that he had suspended " it, 
— as if it were of no great importance. He never re- 
curred to it. 



35 



He was quite serious about the " two armies." It was 
not merely a playful expression in a private family letter. 
He had issued, on the 16th, a formal congratulatory ad- 
dress to his army which began 

" Soldiers of the Army of the West : * I am more than satis- 
fied with you. You have annihilated two armies commanded by 
educated and experienced soldiers," etc. 

It would be amusing, if it were not painful, to see such 
blind egotism in a man of so much intelligence, education 
and experience. He gets the " two armies " by making 
one of them out of Lieutenant-Colonel Pegram and his 
temporary detachment of 1,100 men from Garnett's com- 
mand, the other being the remainder of about 3,400 with 
Garnett.f If there were thus two armies in front of him, 
then he had four armies to oppose them, — his own, Rose- 
crans's, Morris's and Kelley's, — any two of them being 
much superior, in both numbers and power, to the whole of 
Garnett's forces taken together. 

It was simply not true that "Cox lost more " etc. In 
Colonel Norton's misfortune at Scarey Creek there were 
two killed, six wounded and six missing. McClellan's 
official reports of Rich Mountain and Garnett's retreat 
(made before he wrote the letter of the 21st) show thir- 
teen killed and fifty-four wounded and omit the missing, 
tho there must have been some. 

Again, on July 22, in another report to General Scott, 
he proposed to " send two or three regiments and a bet- 
ter general to reinforce Cox," and asks if that would be 
approved. As he was in unqualified command of the 
Department and had himself planned the Kanawha cam- 
paign and determined what troops were to go, he knew 
he needed no approval for sending such a reinforcement, 
so that his motive in bothering the Commander-in-Chief 
with it must have been his vanity in bringing up the sub- 
ject again. It was then ten days after the end of his 
own campaign, there was no enemy within a hundred 
miles of him, and he had from ten to fifteen regiments 
which had done no material work in his campaign, but 



* There was no " Army of the West." That was only McClellan's 
own phrase for glorification, 
t See page 28. 



36 



had been lying in camps near by for six or seven weeks. 
He could easily and safely have sent, not only " two or 
three but twice as many, to reinforce Cox, and should 
have done it. 

It is noticeable that in the same paper he refers to 
" McDowell's check " at Bull Run, but in a very different 
tone, as if it were merely a misfortune, tho it was in 
fact a very great and shocking disaster, thro McDowell's 
unfitness for such a command; but McDowell was a 
" regular " and a personal friend. 

Finally, and perhaps worst of all, he does not see the 
folly of criticising an inexperienced militia general for 
failing to defeat Wise at the first encounter, with a small 
brigade of the newest troops, while, in the same breath, 
he proposes to do it with a " heavy column " of the best- 
trained troops, led in person as an absolute necessity 
by the best general he knows of — who is himself. 

He had known General Cox, if not in Cincinnati before 
the war, at least from the hour when, together, they be- 
gan service in the war, had worked in close relations with 
him in the organization and disposition of the Ohio 
troops, and thus had good opportunity to judge of his 
capacity; he had himself chosen him to command the 
Kanawha expedition, selected the troops he was to have, 
knew that at least part of them were green ; and he had 
given detailed and limiting instructions for their disposi- 
tion and movements. And yet he writes, even to the 
Adjutant-General of the Army, " In Heaven's name 
give me some general officers who understand their pro- 
fession " ! just as if Cox had been imposed upon him, 
without his choice, by some one else. 

When he wrote these disingenuous and unmanly things, 
however, his head had been turned by vanity over his 
great victory. With an army which was, in action, more 
than five times the strength of Cox's and more than three 
times that of his immediate enemy, he had cleared the 
Cheat river country in the north, and was busy writing 
many glowing reports to Washington. 



37 



IV 



1861: July — August 

Cox Defeats Wise on the Kanawha — Takes Charleston 
and Gauley Bridge — Captain Lane as an Engineer — 
Builds Many Bridges and the Gauley Ferry with Great 
Speed and Ingenuity 

Returning now to Captain Lane and the Eleventh Ohio, 
tho their fortunes were modified by the removal of Mc- 
Clellan from immediate command, it was still some time 
before the forces on the Kanawha were well supported 
in respect to the purpose for which they were sent there. 
When McClellan left (near the end of July) he wanted 
to take with him 15,000 of the troops. As the Govern- 
ment at that time was ready to give him everything possi- 
ble, he did get the greater part of that number; and he 
selected the best regiments. He left only the three- 
months men and newer three-years men ; but the former 
were then being released on the expiration of their term 
of enlistment, and they were soon all gone. 

General Rosecrans, who succeeded McClellan in com- 
mand of the Department, seeing the field thus practically 
stripped of troops, called upon the governor of Ohio to 
send him some of the three-years regiments he was then 
organizing. McClellan, on learning this, telegraphed the 
governor not to do it, but to send all troops to him at 
Washington. It was his peculiar obsession, shown in a 
number of instances in his career, that no other part of 
the field in the war was really important as compared 
with that directly under his own command. Rosecrans 
did, however, get more troops, and, after providing for 
the protection of the Baltimore & Ohio road, he was lable 
to have two, and finally three, small brigades in the 
Kanawha valley. 

Meantime, in July, while McClellan was still lying in 



38 



camp at Beverly, exulting over his success at Rich Moun- 
tain, General Cox, meanly ill-treated and practically 
abandoned by him, as already described, tho still expected 
to force his way up the narrow and easily defended valley 
of the Kanawha against an enemy superior in numbers 
and guns, was steadily doing his duty, without complain- 
ing and without the advertisement of repeating reports, 
learning by experience in daily action how to meet and 
to oppose his enemy, and winning the ground by untiring 
care and persistence. He gained perfect success in the 
campaign, and did his duty so well that McClellan's suc- 
cessor in the command officially wrote of him with high 
appreciation again and again. He was soon in command 
of a division ; later of the army in the Kanawha region ; 
later, transferred to a broader field in the Department 
of the Ohio and in the Army of the Cumberland, he held 
yet more important positions, and finally commanded an 
army corps; and after the war held high office in the 
government. 

He was not disheartened by Colonel Norton's repulse, 
nor did it in the least alter his movements, tho it must 
have had temporarily a demoralizing effect upon his com- 
mand. With his practically isolated brigade he simply 
kept at v/ork, feeling sure it would redeem itself from 
the false imputation it had had to bear. Fortunately, 
he did not then know of McClellan's injustice to him. He 
had been directed to get Charleston and Gauley Bridge, 
and to that job he applied all the abilities he had until 
results should prove whether or not it was possible to do 
it with the means allowed him. 

The first step must be to cross the Pocotaligo, and to 
do that he must replace the long bridge destroyed by the 
enemy. In the arrival of Captain Lane and his com- 
pany, the night of July 18, he had the means. Captain 
Lane was full of mechanical resources, his company was 
largely composed of mechanics used to heavy work, and 
another company of the regiment supplied more. For 
some reason Company K was not landed till the night of 
the 19th; but, beginning early on the 20th, the zealous 
Captain and his men took only seventeen hours for the 
construction, from improvised materials, of a rude, but 
substantial, floating bridge by the side of the destroyed 



39 



one ; and on the 21st the troops and guns were moving 
over. 

This compelled Wise to retire to his fortifications a 
little below Charleston. He had now 4000 men in three 
fortified positions, with 10 guns. Cox had five regiments, 
two nearly full and three small, and 4 guns, about 3000 
men in all. But the Eleventh Ohio was increased by the 
arrival of a new company (G) from Ohio, adding 80 or 90. 
Cox pushed forward, with the Eleventh Ohio in advance, 
now (since the capture of its Colonel) commanded by 
Lieutenant-Colonel Frizell, a bold and capable officer. 
Wise imagined Cox receiving heavy reinforcement and 
hastily abandoned the position and the town (July 24), 
retreating toward Gauley Bridge, forty miles above, 
closely pressed by Cox. On the 29th, without fighting, he 
left the very strong Gauley position, burning the big 
bridge over the Gauley, and retreated up the mountain 
to Lewisburg, thirty miles further. Thus, within two 
weeks after Scarey Creek ", the little brigade forced its 
way fifty miles up the river and possessed all the 
Kanawha. 

Wise merited the scornful comments of his rival. Gen- 
eral Floyd, upon this retreat. He could have held back 
such a force as Cox's almost indefinitely if he had been a 
soldier and of cool judgment. Half a dozen streams fall- 
ing into the Kanawha and passable only by bridges 
offered fine positions for defense, his left flank always pro- 
tected by the Kanawha and his right by continuous rocky 
hills. As Cox had not enough men for safe flanking 
operations, he could only drive ahead on the one narrow 
road to the front. 

This road lay close along the river, crossing a number 
of streams at their mouths, the smaller ones f ordable, but 
seven or eight requiring bridges, to replace those Wise 
had destroyed. Captain Lane's success with the Poco- 
taligo bridge threw lall this work upon him ; and he won 
the respect and admiration of the whole command by his 
ingenious devices and the zeal, energy and untiring 
labors of himself and his men. Within ten days he built 
five important bridges and as many lesser ones. 

It being impossible to get and ship bridge timber and 
tools in time and there being no saw-mill within reach, 



40 




Harri«cnbop« 



We,st Virginia 
The, KanawKa C/ampaigns in ISGi-|?§?l 



he did all this work with axes and hand-saws, augers, 
spikes and trees felled near, except that for the Elk river 
bridge, near Charleston, he found some milled timber in 
the town. This bridge was the largest, but it was a 

wire bridge (that is, suspension), and Wise's men 
had got only one span (about forty feet) effectively de- 
stroyed. Captain Lane put a span of timber in its place 
and made the other repairs required, all between four 
o'clock p. m. and two a. m. On the 28th, between 
Charleston and Gauley, the zealous engineer noted, 
" Built four bridges within last three days." 

But he and his company were doing more than bridge- 
building on this march. They had a part in driving the 
enemy. In the march upon Charleston, after crossing 
the Pocotaligo, the Eleventh Ohio had the advance, at 
least on the day the town was taken, and Company K waa 
in front. There was some exchange of shots, — not much, 
but it made the first definite engagement of the regiment 
with the rebels. Lieutenant Johnson, with a part of the 
company, in his eagerness got separated from and ahead 
of the remainder, led by Captain Lane on the other side 
of the road, and, as it happened, was the first to enter 
the enemy's intrenchments. 

In view of the bad condition of the roads and the ab- 
sence of bridges above Charleston, General Cox gained 
time by moving the main body of the troops on boats up to 
the falls (about half way to the Gauley), where they 
landed and marched on as rapidly as the road permitted. 
But Wise had destroyed the long bridge over the mouth 
of Gauley, and the whole army halted. The energy of 
Captain Lane and his pioneers had, however, completed 
the bridges from Charleston up, and they reached the 
Gauley little behind the main column. 

Here was the most serious problem the new " Chief- 
Engineer " had met, tho there were others to come. 
General Cox left it to his discretion. The one important 
thing was, to get the men and artillery across at the 
earliest hour possible. The bridge destroyed was five 
hundred feet long, the abutments one hundred and fifty 
feet apart. The stream was three hundred feet wide at 
ordinary water, swift and turbulent, interspersed with 
large rocks which rose above the w^ater at a low stage and 



41 



were buried at a high stage, and there were deep holes 
between them. To rebuild on the old abutments would 
certainly take too much time. To build a lower, and 
therefore shorter, bridge would probably take no less 
time, and its approaches would be steep and difficult for 
wheels. The currents and the rocks made a floating 
bridge impossible. 

Captain Lane decided upon a ferry as the only means 
practicable under the circumstances; but the swift and 
irregular currents presented special difficulties and com- 
pelled great caution. There were some flat-boats below 
the falls in the Kanawha, but they could not be got up. 
The Gauley above the bridge was so shallow and so filled 
with rocks that timber could not be floated down. He 
sent back for a steamboat hawser, to be used as a cable, 
and set about building a boat with such planking and 
timbers as could be found or cut near by with axes. On 
the fourth day he finished a boat sixty feet long, eighteen 
wide, with a capacity of two hundred men or four loaded 
army wagons and their animals, or two guns and their 
caissons. Of course it had to be built and caulked bottom 
up and on the shore, and its great weight made it very 
difficult to turn it over and into the water safely without 
a derrick, but this was accomplished successfully by sim- 
ple mechanical means. The hawser was dragged across 
and secured at both ends, a " walk " was built along the 
outer side of it, on which the men could pass to work the 
boat, which was secured to the cable by guide-ropes at 
stem and stern. Six men on the walk," pulling on the 
cable, could then easily propel the boat with full loads. 
On the 4th of August, the fifth day after beginning, the 
ferry was in regular operation, carrying over the troops 
and trains. 

This kind of employment of Company K (it was aided 
more or less by details from other companies, usually 
from B and G, which contained many mechanics) must 
have had a salutary influence upon the development and 
health of the men, being done, as it was, for an obviously 
highly important purpose and under the imm.ediate obser- 
vation of the officers and men of the brigade. Captain 
Lane writes at this time, " Our position as a company is 
very desirable one and is the only one so far as I know in 



42 



the volunteer service. We have less sick, better food, 
better order, and retain more of our self-respect than any- 
other company in the brigade." About the same time he 
wrote that he had 83 men present (i. e., of Company K) 
and not a man sick. 



43 



V 



1861: August — November 

Reorganization of the Army — The Brigade of the 
Kanavjha " — Second Kanawha Campaign — First 
Fighting of Captain Lane and his Company — Battle of 
Carnifix Ferry — Gauley Ferry Lost in a Flood — Cap- 
tain Lane Builds Another in Four Days — Colonel De- 
Villiers Returns — Causes Much Trouble 

Meantime General Rosecrans, in command of the 
Department of the Ohio and of the "Army of Occupation 
of Western Virginia '\ had organized his army into four 
brigades. The first three were retained in the north. 
The fourth was to be called the Brigade of the 
Kanawha " and to be commanded by Brigadier-General 
Cox. It contained the First and Second Kentucky, the 
Eleventh, Twelfth, Nineteenth, Twenty-first and parts 
of the Eighteenth and Twenty-second Ohio infantry and 
the " Ironton (Ohio) company of cavalry. The order 
does not mention artillery in the Kanaw^ha Brigade, but 
there was one battery of four guns. The number of men 
in the brigade can now only be estimated. We cannot 
know whether the regiments were full or had full num- 
bers present. Some of them surely had not. But the 
total present was probably more than 4000 and certainly 
less than 5000. 

The prospect of aggressive operations in western 
Virginia was much better under Rosecrans than under 
McClellan. Rosecrans would at least fight and would 
not wait, like McClellan, until he was in every way over- 
whelmingly stronger than his enemy. But he proved to 
be conspicuously lacking in some of the qualities neces- 
sary to a successful independent commander in the field. 
He was impulsive and got into difficulties where prudence 
©r foresight would have prevented; he was repeatedly 



44 



surprised, and felt it a sort of injustice to find that his 
enemy was ready for him; when he was campaigning 
under specific orders he had a curious way of acting as 
if the orders did not exist and he was to do whatever 
the immediate hour suggested to him; he repeatedly 
stopped an important movement, even tho ordered by a 
superior officer, for some unimportant or even irrelative 
reason; and, tho he was free from the inordinate vanity 
and egotism that were so great a fault in McClellan, in 
their place he had an extreme jealousy of the promotion 
of any general to a rank higher than his own. But he 
would fight; and he did fight several battles heroically, 
tho not always successfully, because he lacked judgment 
of his enemy's plans and movements. 

He realized that the forces on the Kanawha must be 
increased, to meet the peculiar difficulties of that country 
and the increasing strength of the enemw there, but he 
did not act upon that judgment for a month. Then, with. 
characteristic zeal, he went himself, but.with character- 
istic failure to see the need of prompt action, instead of 
sending his troops by the rivers on boats (Avhich would 
have taken but five or six days) he marched them across 
the country, from near the Baltimore & Ohio railroad, 
taking ten or twelve days, and, tho he arrived in time, it 
was on the very eve of serious danger to the Kanawha 
Brigade. 

While the Gauley ferry Avas being built the Kanawha 
Brigade was not othervrise much occupied, tho detach- 
ments of the mien got some training and experience in 
various scouting expeditions into the neighboring country, 
but as soon as the ferr^^ was in operation the greater 
part of the brigade crossed, and, from, time to time, m_ade 
scouting expeditions up the Lewisburg pike and on lateral 
roads. These reached as far as " Camp Lookout about 
fifteen miles, and Big Sewell Mountain, thirty miles, from 
Gauley . The belief in the brigade at that time Avas that 
Wise and his command Avere directly in front ; but in fact 
he had retreated beyond LoAvisburg and gone into camp 
at White Sulphur Springs, from AA^here he Avrote several 
reports and letters to Richmond, repeatedly insisting that 
he needed tAvo Aveeks time for resting and refitting there, 
tho his real reason Avas, undoubtedly, to show his inde- 



45 



pendence of Floyd, who was assuming to be in command 
of all the forces in the region. 

But Floyd was now moving west thro the mountains to 
the Kanawha and to his childish and irreconcilable, but 
entertaining, quarrel with Wise. Meantime also General 
Lee had come out in person, to direct or oversee opera- 
tions in western Virginia, but it does not appear that he 
remained long or took command in any action or went 
further west than White Sulphur. 

A curious bit in the correspondence between Lee and 
Wise at that time shows that Wise had called urgently 
for more arms, especially for " 1000 percussion muskets," 
and that Lee replied that the State had none and that 
the only guns available that he knew of were flint-lock 
muskets. It should be remembered that Lee's command 
then was only of Virginia State troops : he had no Con- 
federate command. 

But the mild pressure of Lee was not so much of a spur 
to Wise as his jealousy of Floyd. On the 7th of August 
Floyd appeared and assumed to be in control, as of course, 
of all operations against Cox. He told Wise he was going 
to move down the Lewisburg pike and attack him at 
Gauley Bridge. Wise (to Lee) strongly " dissented 
demanded that the two commands be assigned to separate 
fields of operations, and thought it best to assign him 
(Floyd) to guard the Fayette and Beckley roads and me 
to the Lewisburg pike and Summerville roads." The 
Fayette and Beckley roads were west or south of the 
river, where there were no Yankees, unless in foraging, 
while Lewisburg and Summerville included the only 
region where real operations were probable or then 
practicable. But Floyd was so slow that, tho Wise's 
ingenuous proposal failed and both remained east of the 
river. Wise did get out by the end of the month and take 
some active part in the campaign. 

General Cox during the second and third weeks of 
August kept portions of his command in movement be- 
tween Gauley and Big Sewell Mountain, repeatedly meet- 
ing bodies of the enemy, and finally establishing the fact 
that Floyd was at Big Sewell with all his command. 
Several brushes with the enemy resulted in no loss until 
the 16th, when two men of the Eleventh Ohio were 



46 



wounded, — not badly, but the first men struck in the 
regiment in the war. On the 19th, hov/ever, in a more 
important clash, one of its men was killed, the first in 
the war, James Roach, and two captured - — all from Com- 
pany B. 

Tho the Eleventh seems to have been the most con- 
spicuous regiment in these affairs. Captain Lane and 
Company K did not share in them. They were held at 
Gauley, probably on guard and operation of the ferry; 
but near the end of the month, at Captain Lane's 
special request, he was relieved there and, with his com- 
pany, joined the regiment up the road. After ten days, 
however, the whole regiment was replaced by another, a 
larger one, and ordered back to Gauley. In the interval, 
tho, on September 3rd, it fell into another conflict with 
Wise, who must have found himself rested and willing 
to operate on Floyd's left. 

Wise found the Union troops in bivouac on the Lewis- 
burg pike, behind Big creek, a couple of miles up the 
road from Gauley Bridge with its advance at Honey 
creek, a mile or two further. He appears to have em- 
ployed his whole force, tho without the boldness which 
might have given him some success. The Eleventh ad- 
vance fell back from_ Honey to Big creek on his approach, 
as it ought to do, and Wise, elated by this, moved on and 
fired from several field guns, at a safe distance, frequenth/ 
throughout the day, but without otherwise attacking and 
without any effect. Colonel Frizell, commanding the 
Eleventh, replied with one gun to some extent, but ceased 
that and only held quietly to his position. ¥/ise remained 
there a day or two, and then withdrew; and thereupon 
made a long, detailed, official report of the affair, with a 
m^ap showing the positions and neighboring country. In 
this report he represented his doings as a battle arid a 
victory, while the reports of the Union officers mention 
it as only one of the incidents of the campaign. But Y/ise 
had a vivid imagination and v/as much given to lurid 
literature. 

The Eleventh was getting useful lessons in the arts of 
war now, — how to watch the enemy and yet protect 
themselves, how to meet or make an attack and keep their 
heads, how to grapple cheerfully with the difficulties and 



47 



bear philosophically the hardships of the work, thus 
developing into efficient soldiers. Captain Lane's request 
to be sent to join the regiment in this active service 
brought him and his company a share in these valuable 
experiences. Their first real trial by fire he used to de- 
scribe with humorous appreciation. The Eleventh, being 
in front, found the enemy in position, sheltered by a 
thicket, and obstinate. The first two or three companies 
were thrown into line across the road and ordered to 
advance, Company K being on the right. On the right 
of the road was a small spur or ledge of a hill, around 
which it curved. As soon as this bend was passed the 
enemy opened fire upon the line. Captain Lane turned 
to his men, to order them to return the fire, but, to his 
great amazement, he saw no men. Shocked and be- 
wildered, he yet swiftly scanned the ground to the rear 
and saw that there were at least some men behind the 
projecting ridge; and then found the whole company 
there! They had instinctively taken shelter, just as they 
would have done individually in civil life if they had sud- 
denly found shots flying. It was often the case in the 
war that green soldiers shrank from their " baptism of 
fi_re." Exceedingly vs^ounded in pride and in great anger 
(General Cox just then came up), he beat " the men 
back into line, again led them forward, when they fought 
well ; the enemy was driven off, their camp was taken, 
and that evening peace was restored over a supper fur- 
nished by the enemy's provisions. Captain Lane takes 
care to do justice to his men in the comment — These 
men were not yet soldiers. Six months later they could 
charge the enemy in solid line and show as little fear 
under fire as under a shower of snow balls." That too 
was the general experience in the war. 

But they did very well in a shorter time than six 
months. Only a day or two after the affair just men- 
tioned, September 4th, they had an opportunity to show 
that they were not lacking in courage. When Floyd 
moved down the Lewisburg road, on his way to Summer- 
ville, as hereinafter to be told, Cox, inferior in strength 
and supposing Floyd's objective to be Gauley Bridge, 
prudently fell back. Wise, being left by Floyd to hold the 
road, pushed after Cox, assuming that he was beating 



48 



him. The Eleventh Ohio, again in the post of danger, 
held the rear. The pressure becoming close. Cox sent 
back six companies of another regiment, to increase his 
rear-guard. Lieutenant-Colonel Frizell, Eleventh Ohio, 
commanding the rear, then, in the night, established a 
line of defense across the road, sheltered by trees and 
thickets, and undertook to hold it. Companies G and K, 
with Captain Lane in command, formed the right wing 
of the line. At daybreak the enemy advanced and, find- 
ing Frizell's line, made a general attack, and soon a direct 
charge against its right. The G and K men received this 
assault with courage, without flinching and with such 
good effect from their steady fire that the rebels were 
driven back in confusion and miade no attempt to renew 
the attack, firing only casually and at long range from, the 
shelter of trees and rocks; and Colonel Frizell held the 
position all day and until Wise finally withdrew. 

No doubt the K men were influenced by that lesson of 
the day or two before, as well as by the fine example of 
their captain. For his example was one of clear courage 
and resolution on both occasions. During the attack on 
the 4th he simply remained at his post, directing the fire 
of his men carefully and coolly, as if not at all disturbed. 
He does not tell of it himself, and does not mention this 
engagement in his letters or other papers so that it can 
be distinguished as one in which he took part, but he was 
observed from other parts of the line. A soldier who was 
there, in another company, and who, like many other 
soldiers at that time, was an amateur " correspondent " 
of home newspapers, wrote to his home paper an account 
of the engagem.ent, in which he said that the charge was 
" repulsed with severe loss to the enemy, four of Com- 
pany K being wounded. Captain Lane, tho in the midst 
of the flight, displayed admirable coolness and bravery." 

There are many other instances of this steadiness and 
courage of Colonel Lane in dangers, but, like this one, 
they are usually found outside of anything written or 
said by himself. 

In the Kanawha Brigade at this time they were looking 
daily and anxiously for news of the approach of Rose- 
crans from the north, with more men and guns.* 



* See page 45. 



49 



Already his march had taken more time than he had set 
for it. Floyd was strong enough, with good management, 
to defeat Cox east of Gauley Bridge, or below if he could 
safely cross the Gauley; but, notwithstanding his 
" biggity " announcement to Wise already mentioned, his 
resolution failed when he had m.ade half the distance, 
and he turned off to the north, to occupy Summerville, 
a town twenty-five miles northeast of Gauley Bridge. 
He may have had an idea that this movement would flank 
Cox out of Gauley Bridge and compel him to retreat tu 
Charleston ; but he seems to have been ignorant of Rose- 
crans's march, which was directly toward Summerville. 
Floyd's cavalry advance reached Cross-Lanes, near Sum- 
merville, September 8th, and caught a small detachment 
(part of a company) of the Seventh Ohio infantry (not of 
the Kanawha Brigade), whose proper guard duty had 
been neglected, and killed or captured the greater part of 
it. Floyd lost no time in reporting this " battle in 
extravagant language, to Richmond, and the officials 
there celebrated " another crushing defeat of the enemy 
on the Kanawha." If he had waited a bit and skilfully 
questioned his prisoners, his report would have been 
sobered. He had hardly settled him.self in Summerville 
with his pleasing reflections when he was surprised to 
learn of an enemy near at hand, coming from the north. 

To reach Sumimerville he had had to cross the Gauley, at 
Carniflx Ferry, about thirty miles above Gauley Bridge. 
He immedia^tely abandoned Sum.merville and fell back to 
Carniflx Ferry, taking a very good defensive position in 
a bend of the river, sheltered by a thick wood and cover- 
ing the ferry crossing. Rosecrans found him there a 
day later, on the 10th. The two forces were about equal 
in numbers and guns, tho Rosecrans's guns were prob- 
ably much better; but Floyd's peculiarly strong position 
for defense put any attack upon him at great risk. Rose- 
crans finally advanced, however, late in the afternoon, 
and there was a hot battle, v/ith varying hopes, until 
night put an end to it. Rosecrans had gained ground, 
but had had severe losses, due to the necessity of open 
frontal attack. But Floyd was not equal to the occasion, 
was unnecessarily alarmed, and thought only of getting 
away. He spent all night moving his army back across 



50 



the river; and in the early morning Rosecrans's recon- 
noitring parties found the position abandoned and 
Floyd's rear guard on the left bank. 

As Floyd obviously must be retreating to Lewisburg, 
and probably in haste, to avoid an attack by Cox on his 
right, Rosecrans ought to have vigorously pushed a cross- 
ing and pursuit. But he was dilatory and ineffective, 
and it was more than a whole day before he moved over 
even a detachment. Yet he was very anxious about Cox, 
fearing that Floyd would strike him with his larger 
forces above Gauley Sridge ; and he sent several messages 
to Cox during the day. 

But he did not yet understand Floyd. That general was 
not at all seeking another fight. Cox was in fact tw^enty 
miles above Gauley Bridge, with a considerable part of 
his brigade, but he had not yet heard of Carnifix, nor 
even of Rosecrans's arrival. Floyd could easily have 
given him serious trouble, but he was thinking only of 
Lewisburg, and hurried by Cox's ground, so near that 
his movement was easily observed; and Cox was per- 
plexed as to what his great haste could mean. But, feel- 
ing sure that it was caused by Rosecrans's advance, he 
concentrated and followed up the retreat, sending back 
a courier to get a report to Rosecrans. The next day, 
the 12th, he had his first news of the battle at Carnifix, 
in a letter from Rosecrans; but did not yet know that 
Rosecrans had that morning got one brigade across the 
Gauley, with orders to reinforce him. 

Rosecrans was still perversely slow. On the 14th and 
on the 16th (still near Sum.merville) he wrote to Cox, in 
the first letter proposing and in the second giving direc- 
tions for a movement against Floyd in force ; but said 
nothing of speed nor of any cause for his own delay. He 
ought to have been on the Lewisburg pike himself, with 
the greater part of his troops, early on the 12th, in vigor- 
ous pursuit. Under the circumstances Floyd's defeat, if 
he should resist, or his capture or dispersal if he should 
not, would have been practically sure. 

Finding that Rosecrans was not pressing his advan- 
tage in force, as expected, Floyd stopped short of Lewis- 
burg, got his breath, and, being undisturbed, considered 
that he had won the contest. Accordingly, the War Office 



51 



at Richmond learned that he had been attacked by far 
superior numbers, that he had steadily repulsed all 
assaults, with great losses to the enemy, and that, seeing 
he would be overwhelmed the next day by increased 
forces, he deemed it prudent to retire his little army, 
which he had done in perfect order, after remarkably 
smail losses.* 

But, if Rosecrans v/as not then very zealous against 
Floyd, Oox's brigade kept at least part of his men busy 
on and near the Lewisburg road« The Eleventh Ohio in 
particular, under the active and courageous Lieutenant- 
Colonel Frizell, pressed closely upon his rear or western 
front, with sharp fighting at times. But Rosecrans had 
lagged so much in following up his advantage gained at 
Carnifix that any further movement against Floyd would 
not be a pursuit, but only a renewal of the effort to drive 
him back into the mountains. He did finally take the 
field himself, and, with a force now much stronger than 
Floyd's, slowly pushed him toward Lewisburg. So slow, 
indeed, it was that he did not reach Big Sewell Mountain, 
thirty miles from Gauley Bridge, until September 23. 
His advance finally reached the top of the mountain and 
found the enemy holding it in a fortified camp ; but he 
did not venture an attack. He seems to have been much 
mistaken in estimating Floyd's strength and in his belief 
that another force, under Lee, was waiting its oppor- 
tunity to strike from the Huttonville road on the north- 
east. Lee had come down from the north of the State on 
hearing of Floyd's defeat, and remained about Lewisburg 
and Big Sewell until early in November, directing affairs 
generally, but not taking command of troops in active 
operations. By his unvarying patience and courtesy he 
had gained the confidence of both Floyd and Wise, but he 
could not reconcile them : nobody could. All the troops 
were finally called the "Army of the Kanawha how- 
ever, and Floyd was placed in command. This clipped 
Wise's wings, but had no other effect upon him. ; and he 



* One of the principal causes of the prolong-ation of the war is 
to be found in the almost universal perversions of the truth in the 
reports of campaigns and engagements sent to the Richmond 
government. That government lost the war in spite of an almost 
unbroken series of " victories." 



52 



was at last ordered to Richmond and sent with a brigade 
of Confederate troops into North Carolina, while Lee, in 
November, was sent to Charleston, S. C, to command a 
Confederate department. 

For two days after reaching Big Sewell Rosecrans 
maneuvered in a desultory way, with a few unimportant 
skirmishes, and then withdrew and slowly fell back to 
Gauley Bridge. He reported that he did this because of 
lack of force enough, want of transportation, and almost 
impassable roads ; but his forces already exceeded Floyd's 
and the War Department was ordering six more regi- 
ments from Pittsburg to reinforce him, while the diffi- 
culty of transportation and bad roads was but tem.porary, 
the latter being due to rains, which were usually, at this 
season, followed by fine weather. Continuous bad 
weather could not be expected till late in November. 

Tho the most of the Eleventh Ohio was with its brigade 
on the Big Sewell movement, Captain Lane, with his com- 
pany, was retained at Gauley Bridge, to make sure of the 
protection and c::eration of the ferry, since the supply 
of the army above depended upon it. There was a sudden 
great rise in the Gauley, from a phenomenally heavy rain, 
and it was with great anxiety that he saw the big tor- 
rent rushing down and rapidly rising in height. In 
spite of the unceasing care and labors of himself and all 
his men, the swift flood at last carried away the cable, 
all the boats but one, and the lumber and timbers col- 
lected and prepared for reserve. It was said to be the 
greatest flood the country had known. 

It v/as now impossible for the army to cross the Gauley, 
if compelled to retreat, and at the same time impossible 
to supply it with food and ammunition where it was. 
Captain Lane keenly felt the weight of the disaster and 
the urgency of action. He v/rote in a private letter " I 
felt as if I had the whole army on my back." There 
would have to be some fall of the flood before a new cable 
could be carried over and secured, and it would take time 
to get a new one anyhow. Meantime he had every man 
and axe he could find hard at work, getting out new 
materials, to be ready for the first hour when reconstruc- 
tion could possibly begin. Tho he does not say so, he 
must have worked, in reliefs, by night as well as by da.y. 



53 



On the 2d of October, only four days after seeing nearly 
all the product of his former labors swept down the 
flood, he sent the first wagons, loaded with supplies, over 
the new ferry. In respect to time this was a remarkable 
performance, against the great obstacle of the high water, 
which was still running at flood. 

But neither the restoration of his communications nor 
the fine October weather nor the coming of reinforce- 
ments induced Rosecrans to proceed with the campaign. 
He had said, in a report, that the country he was yield- 
ing could be " retaken w^hen we require " and that " the 
troops would move nearer to the Gauley, to get their pay 
and clothing." Of course they could get pay and clothing 
just as well at Big Sewell, by only bringing the pay- 
master and quartermaster up there; but he really had 
also the idea of going into winter-quarters, tho the winter 
was yet some time ahead. Whether due to him or not, 
this idea got among the m^en, and they were to some ex- 
tent demoralized by the fixed belief that they were now 
to lie for four or five months in comfortable camps, 
perhaps back on the Ohio. 

So, by the middle of October, all the troops were back 
on and behind the Gauley, but v/ere not paid. The pay- 
master had not come, and did not come until near the 
end of the month. Lying thus idle in camp the men were 
much discontented by the failure of what they considered 
a promise of their pay (but few had received any pay 
since entering the service, from four to five months be- 
fore) and by the lack of definite news of winter-quarters. 

One incident of this period is of special interest, as it 
was in Captain Lane's personal service. A small force 
was kept at Summerville, already mentioned, as a kind 
of outpost of the Kanawha army. Captain Lane " had 
occasion " (he does not say what) to go there personally. 
The distance was twenty-five miles and the road hilly, 
very rough, and often thro v/oods and narrow ravines. 
Guerrillas were much on such roads, in the hope of get- 
ting one or several Union men or soldiers ; and some of 
the citizens who professed to be Union men were more 
than suspected of treachery, really belonging to guer- 
rilla gangs, or at least harboring them and giving them 
information of any Union movement. Captain Lane de- 



54 



cided to g^o by night, and, for some reason not given, 
went alone. He rode thro the night without stopping, 
cautious in passing any house or other possible lurking 
place, and keeping his arms always ready for instant use. 
Nothing happened, but he writes " It was a lonely ride." 
He does not speak of his return to Gauley, from which it 
is to be assumed that he returned with troops. 

One of the grievances of the soldiers at Gauley was 
removed by the appearance in camp of the paymaster, 
w^ho arrived near the end of October, and immediately 
had many of the officers and sergeants busy on the 
preparation of the " muster-and-pay-rolls " required for 
his use. For the Eleventh Ohio, however, this agreeable 
experience was abruptly marred by a disaster. Its 
Colonel returned from his three months captivity, and 
of course resumed com.mand of the regiment. He had 
notified the brigade commander that he was coming, and 
the regiment was turned out, on formal parade, to 
" welcome " him, tho to nearly all the officers and men 
the occasion was anything but welcome. At the best 
there was in his regiment but little respect for him or 
confidence in him, and what there was had been dimin- 
ished by the circumstances of his capture.* As there 
was little or no evidence of his adventures after his cap- 
ture beyond his own story, and, as that story contained 
many fearful and hairbreadth perils and deeds of daring, 
he found few believers. He may have been in one of the 
escapes of officer prisoners from Libby Prison, but also 
may have been m.erely one of those exchanged: no one 
seems to have taken the trouble to make an inquiry, and 
his loquacious boasting was left to free play. He had 
little or none of the personal dignitj^ that induces respect 
for an officer, and some of his tales of dangers and daring 
were openly ridiculed as being only lying inventions. 

During his absence the regiment had been finely de- 
veloped under the Lieutenant-Colonel and Major, and 
had become at least the equal in discipline and efficiency 
of any regiment in its army. Now, under the new regime, 
it fell rapidly into a bad condition of discouragement 
among both officers and raen. By his erratic performance 



* See page 33. 



55 



of his own duties, his rash orders, violent language and 
many threats of punishments that were never attempted, 
he broke down discipline instead of strengthening it; 
and, what with this and his obvious lack of a real knowl- 
edge of drill and maneuvers, he hampered and irritated 
the officers ; and frequently during the winter got into a 
quarrel with one or another of them, indulging in the 
most vulgar and insulting language. During the next 
four months after his return he made his camp the scene 
of unhappy turmoil, involving both officers and men. The 
Lieutenant-Colonel and one of the captains resigned in 
disgust, seeing no other way to escape their share of the 
trouble. The Major (Coleman) accepted the place of 
Lieutenant-Colonel, hoping to see soon the natural end 
of such a condition; and the end did soon come. But it 
was to Captain Lane, much more than any other man 
that the regiment owed its release from the dreadful 
handicap. It was he who took the risks and responsibili- 
ties of action, endured the disgrace of arrest and court- 
martial and a long period of conspicuous deprivation of 
his command, with constant anxiety as to the result for 
the regiment and for himself. But his final exoneration 
and success were complete. It is not too much to say that, 
by risking the sacrifice of himself, he saved his regiment 
from ruin. 



56 



VI 



1861: November — December 

Battle of Cotton Hill — Captain Lane Saves Gauley Ferry 
Under Fire — Holds Outpost Against Floyd — Conflict 
With DeVilliers — Builds Another Bridge — Winter- 
quarters at Point Pleasant 

Early on the morning of November 1, 1861, when the 
Paymaster was ready to begin paying the Eleventh Ohio 
at Gauley, a gun was heard, fired from the south side of 
New river, opposite the mouth of the Gauley, and a shell 
struck in the camp of the regiment. Naturally, all other 
considerations were suspended. While the excited won- 
der was still on another shell struck. No damage was 
done. The Paymaster moved himself and his money to a 
safer place, and, tho the shelling continued during the 
day, he resumed his work after a time ; and by night had 
paid off all that regiment. 

Floyd had crossed the New river from Big Sewell, 
moved down the south side, and planted a battery of two 
guns on the front of a high and very steep hill having a 
bold face rising almost directly from the water's edge, 
directly opposite the mouth of the Gauley. He meant 
to annoy and disorder Rosecrans's camp and destroy the 
ferry. One of his two guns got the direct range of the 
ferry, and his sharpshooters, concealed by rocks and 
trees along the shore, stopped the use of a piece of the 
road which lay open and exposed just east of (above) 
the ferry. 

Captain Lane had been relieved of duty at the ferry 
(as there was no movement of troops now, the operation 
of it was only routine work for a small party) and was 
in camp with his regiment at some distance. When the 
shells began to strike near the ferry, some one there sent 
a messenger in a rush to tell him. He could answer only 



57 



that he had no authority and that the message should 
have gone to Colonel DeVilliers. The. messenger ran to 
find the Colonel. He had taken no action in the emer- 
gency, and did nothing now but send the man to 
Captain Lane with authority to do what he thought best. 
Angered by this cowardly shuffling off of responsibility, 
but seeing the importance of instant action, the Captain 
at once ran down to the ferry. He found thirty or forty 
men there, sheltered, but in a helpless state of mind, 
while the ferry-boat was at the other side of the river, 
clearly in sight from the rebel battery. A shell had just 
struck dangerously near it. He called for four men to 
go over with him and move the boat out of range. Three 
did volunteer, and with these he crossed on the " walk " 
attached to the cable, which, like the boat, was fully seen 
from the battery, and, with strenuously rapid labor, they 
released the boat and hauled it up stream and behind a 
projecting point of rocks. The movement took time 
enough, however, to enable the rebels to get in three more 
shells, which he describes as " two very close and one 
wild." 

Tho the Captain was much vexed by the manner in 
which this affair was thrust upon him, it added to the 
reputation he had already gained for ready resource and 
unshirking behavior in danger. The promptness, cour- 
age and success of his action were quite in the line of what 
had already been seen in his service. 

But the ferry was put out of use while that battery 
remained there, except under the cover of night, a condi- 
tion that proved very awkward. For Rosecrans was not 
able to dislodge Floyd's guns for seven days, and every 
day the camps at Gauley and just below were teased by 
the shelling, tho no serious injury was done by it. The 
sharpshooters, however, having a shorter range, wounded 
a few men and killed or wounded a number of horses and 
mules. 

Whether Rosecrans knew of Floyd's movement down 
the New river does not appear. He probably did know, 
but yet, if he did, it is curious that he did not occupy this 
hill opposite his ferry and camp. The road on that side 
of the river ran close behind the hill (curved around it, 
in fact) , and the nature of the ground was such as that 



58 



one brigade could have held both hill and road against 
the whole of Floyd's force; and Rosecrans had three 
brigades at hand. 

Floyd was engaged in what he considered a momentous 
campaign. The authorities would not, or could not, in- 
crease his army to 10,000, as he had repeatedly urged, to 
enable him to plant himself firmly on the Ohio, but he 
could show that he deserved it. When Rosecrans retired 
from Big Sevvell to Gauley, Floyd was satisfied that it 
was a defeat, and he proposed to Lee a joint movement 
with an ambitious goal. He was to cross the New river, 
move down the left bank, by Fayetteville, and take Cot- 
ton Hill (the hill oposite Gauley, on the river-front of 
which his guns were now planted), while Lee should 
advance on the Lewisburg road and make a determined 
attack upon the Gauley position. By co-operation Rose- 
crans would be decisively defeated, or at the least driven 
down and out of the valley. Floyd would then occupy 
and easily hold all that part of the State south and west 
of the Kanawha, if not also a portion north and east. 

Lee was not so hopeful; in fact he disapproved of the 
scheme as quite impracticable, — as indeed it was, from 
lack of force, lack of transportation, bad roads con- 
stantly getting worse and the peculiar great strength of 
Rosecrans' position behind two rivers. One cannot but 
wonder that Lee had the patience to treat Floyd's plan 
respectfully, but he listened to it and finally consented 
to the trial of one feature of it, — an attempt to take and 
hold Cotton Hill. 

Floyd accordingly crossed the New river with the 
greater part of his " army " — about 4000 — and marched 
down the Fayetteville road. He wrote afterward, when 
he was accounting for his failure, but in cautious lan- 
guage, as if Lee had neglected to make the expected 
attack on the Lewisburg road on the north side, but there 
is nothing in Lee's reports or correspondence to give any 
color to such an expectation; and there are other in- 
stances in Floyd's career of disingenuousness.* Floyd, 
indeed, knew that Lee had just been compelled to send 

* John B. Floyd, of Virginia (formerly Governor) , Secretary of 
War in the cabinet of Buchanan. Used his office in 1860 to aid 
the seceding States in seizing United States forts and arsenals; 



59 



his best or most experienced troops (Loring's Brigade) 
a hundred or more miles away, to reinforce Stonewall " 
Jackson in the Shenandoah valley. It would have been a 
mere waste of effort, or worse, to throw his small re- 
mainder against Gauley Bridge. It ought to be said, 
however, that Lee did have a hope, if not m.ore, that 
Floyd's movement would cause the enemy to withdraw 
from the Gauley but that is one of the rather many 
instances in which Lee's military judgment was poor. 

Floyd left behind, at Big Sewell, the ''Legion" of 
Wise, saying, in contempt, that it was so insubordinate 
and ill-disciplined that it was unfit for military pur- 
poses " ; but, privately, he would have been glad of any 
kind of a reason for keeping Wise out of the campaign. 

If Rosecrans knew of Floyd's movement he took no 
steps to interfere with it. He must have known the dis- 
advantage to him, or worse, of letting his enemy get 
possession of Cotton Hill. One of his brigades placed 
across the Fayetteville road, east of the hill, could have 
prevented it, and, with a couple of regiments in reserve, 
could have brought Floyd's enterprise to naught and 
put him out of account for months. But he did nothing 
about it ; and, within a few days after crossing the New, 
Floyd's advance occupied Cotton Hill and he was en- 
camped a short distance east of it. There he remained 
a week, undisturbed, while he planted the battery already 
m.entioned on the river front of the hill. 

There is no indication in Rosecrans' reports or corre- 
spondence that he had any knowledge of this until the 
shells began to fly on November 1. Then he busily set 
about dislodging Floyd, but he found it a long and awk- 
ward job. He sent General Benham, with his brigade. 



and ordered larg-e quantities of small arms removed from arsenals 
in the North to those in the South, together with heavy guns from 
the Pittsburg arsenal. He had 121 of these guns shipped to 
southern forts before the work was discovered. He resigned and 
fled from Washington under charges of complicity in a fraud upon 
the Interior Department, for which he was later indicted. His 
reward was a commission as Major-General in the Confederate 
army. He was in command at Fort Donelson when Grant attacked 
it, and was so afraid of being captured that he fled in the night,, 
leaving an inferior oflicer to surrender the fort. 



60 



some eight miles down the Kanawha, to cross and get the 
Fayetteville road near the mouth of Loop creek, while 
General Schenk, with another brigade, made a persistent 
but futile effort to cross New river above Floyd's posi- 
tion. For seven days the only thing accomplished was 
the crossing of Benham's brigade. Schenk could not yet 
get over, without going too far up the river for safety, 
and Benham, slow and lacking in energy, failed to make 
the advance required. Meantime the two guns and the 
riflemen along the shore kept up daily practice, to the 
great annoyance and mortification of the whole command. 

Floyd knew what was being done against him. From 
the front of Cotton Hill, with a glass, he could see the 
greater part of Rosecrans's camps, and reconnoitring 
parties must have reported to him Benham's position and 
Schenk's efforts. On the 7th, having no stomach for an- 
other battle, tho superior in numbers to either of the two 
brigades, if not to both, he decided to withdraw, and did 
that night withdraw the two guns and the sharpshooters, 
but still occupied, with part of his command, the west 
or south end of the hill, which was higher than the river 
end and wooded. 

As it happened, it was Captain Lane and his company, 
later supported by the remainder of his regiment, who 
brought the situation to a fighting crisis. He had been 
ordered to build two scows large enough to carry troops, 
and they were done on the 7th or 8th. What use they 
were intended for does>not appear. A fair guess is, that 
they were for Schenk's crossing above the Gauley, tho 
they may have been for crossing Cox's men at the mouth 
of the Gauley, in which service, apparently, they finally 
were used. 

The shelling and sharpshooting having ceased late on 
the 7th and the two guns having apparently disappeared 
from the brow of the hill, a reconnoisance was ordered. 
Why it was not made from Benham's brigade, already on 
that side of the river, is not learned. Captain Lane was 
chosen for the service, probably by General Cox, because 
of his skill in the use of boats (both rivers being then 
high from the recent rains) and his proven courage. At 
night of the 9th he received an order to move at three 
a. m., with his company, cross the river by boat, and 



61 



find what the enemy had done on the hill. He was ready 
on time, but found only 37 men of his company fit for 
the duty (the regiment was much reduced at that time, 
from hard service, detachment &c, and mustered for duty 
much below 300), but with the 37 he set out in the two 
boats he had built. He was to run down the Gauley and 
pull with oars across the mouth of the New, but a heavy 
rain that day had raised the Gauley to a very swift 
current, the boats were caught in it and swept down the 
Kanawha toward the falls. This was great danger, and 
it was only with desperate efforts that the boats, after 
a mile or more, could be worked out of the flood of the 
channel and into the slower current at the side. They 
finally escaped the peril and reached the shore on the 
side they started from. But the Captain was not daunted : 
he was intent only on obeying his order. With great 
labor they hauled the boats up along the shore to the 
Gauley, up that river to a possible crossing place, pulled 
over to the left side, and again ran down, this time tak- 
ing great care to keep in the shore current and to work 
up into the New river along its right shore with every 
energy. This brought them into comparatively easy 
water, and, v/ith the strongest men at the oars, they got 
over the New without mishap, and landed at the upper 
side of the foot of Cotton Hill. 

But several hours had been lost and dawn was now 
appearing. Captain Lane was very anxious to get to the 
top of the hill without being met or seen by the enemy. 
Leaving a small guard with the boats, with the rem.ainder 
he climbed the hill as fast as possible, tho its steepness 
and roughness, — small, difficult ravines, rocks and tan- 
gled thickets — made the v/ork slow at the best. The 
gun of one of his men was fired by accident. This halted 
him for an anxious minute or two, but no sound from an 
enemy following, he was reassured and hurried on to the 
top. Here, in the misty light of early day he found the field 
abandoned, the guns gone, and no enemy in sight.* 

Taking a position with prudent care for retreat, if 

* Captain Lane says, in a paper written long after the war, that 
he was ordered to cross and " take that battery," but that was one 
of the lapses of memory in old soldiers. Of course minor officers 
seldom know the plans or purposes of their generals or the dis- 



62 



compelled, he sent out small parties to scout in several 
directions; and, finding no sign of the enemy near, he 
advanced himself, and found him about a mile from the 
Gauley front, at the interior or southeastern end of the 
hill (where it was the highest) and sheltered by a wood. 

This took some hours and, seeing by Captain Lane's 
advance that the enemy had left the front of the hill, 
General Cox sent over the remainder of the Eleventh 
Ohio — then little more than 200 for duty — under 
Colonel DeVilliers, v^hose order was to " occupy and hold 
the crests if possible At the same time he sent 
Lieutenant-Colonel Enyart, with 200 of his regiment 
(First Kentucky), to cross just below the hill, reach the 
Fayetteville road and the left of the battery position. 
Again appears the puzzling question, why v/as this latter 
movement not made by Benham's men? He was already 
on that road, a few miles belov/, Avith his v/hole brigade. 
If there was a strong force of the enemy between him 
and Cotton Hill, it would be far too strong for Enyart's 
200. The only explanation suggested by reading the 
records lies in the marked inertia ^f General Benham, a 
charge Vv^hich seems to be fully justified in the perfect 
hail of orders and messages sent to him by Rosecrans 
within the week with no effective results. 

Whatever the reason was the whole affair v/as now left 
to Cox'c brigade, tho stiP: on the north side of the river. 
Seeing thai D'^'^^illiers had landed his contingent of the 
Eleventh Ohio and advanced beyond sight, General Cox, 
for some reason not found, sent over no more troops until 
night ; and that regiment held the hill (that half nearest 



positions of the enemy. They know little more than their imme- 
diate orders and the enemy's position as they then see it. It 
would have been an extraordinary thing indeed, to send a captain 
and 37 men to attack a battery on a high hill, very difficult of 
ascent, manned and guarded by a larger number and in the front 
of a force of several thousand. It must have been known to Rose- 
crans (or Cox) that the guns were gone, at least from that site, 
and it was necessary to learn what the position was. So Captain 
Lane's movem.ent, delicate and dangerous tho it was, was recon- 
noitring, tho probably with direction to hold the hiil, if prac- 
ticable, until he could be reinforced. Indeed, a letter he wrote 
soon after the affair, when it was fresh in mind, points to the real 
purpose of his important expedition. 



63 



the river), with several skirmishing advances and re- 
treats, throughout the day (Sunday, November 10). 
This was very creditable to the small command, tho also 
a proof that Floyd had now no great force on the hill 
and expected to abandon it. 

Captain Lane's share in this day was characteristically 
steady and self-reliant. He had no instruction for action 
beyond the stage he had reached, but he understood it to 
be his duty to remain in immediate observation of the 
enemy until relieved by orders or driven back by attack. 
Accordingly, after making sure of the position of the 
rebels by feeling their pickets, he disposed his men where 
they could best watch and yet quickly concentrate for 
defense or retreat if compelled. He then sent a man back 
to the river, to report the situation. He had had skir- 
mishing in fixing the rebel position, but as yet not loss. 

His messenger saw Colonel DeVilliers at the river, 
where he had landed,* made the report, and was sent back 
with an order to him (Lane) to report in person at the 

* Captain Lar^w tells of two incidents of this arrival of De- 
Villiers which are very musing, not only in themselves, but in 
Captain Lane's taking theiii so seriously. His indignation, how- 
ever, was more than justified. The Colonel came over in a row- 
boat with three men, two at the oars and one steering. On landing 
he ordered these men to remain in their seats, then called off the 
sergeant commanding and one man from the guard Cap+:*iii Lane 
had left in charge of his two large boats, directed ^nan to hold 
the bow of his rowboat to the bank, ready tor instant use, and 
the sergeant to remain there in command of the four and shoot 
at once any of them who attempted to leave, while he provided 
for the sergeant himself by declaring his intention to cut his head 
off if he failed in any of these duties. This ridiculous stuff seems 
almost incredible, but tho it comes only from the men thus marked 
for sudden slaughter, and so must be taken with some allowance, 
there were many such incidents in the career of this curious mounte- 
bank in office. The m.en directly concerned in the Colonel's careful 
provision at the boat account for it upon the simple tho harsh 
theory that he was thinking only of his personal safety. Perhaps 
they did not then know that it is the duty of a commanding officer 
to avoid exposing himself unnecessarily, tho that rule is supposed 
usually to apply to the field of action in front rather than to a 
position in the rear! 

The other incident was in an absurdly comical scene, tho both 
actors v/ere hotly in earnest, one of them righteously angry enough 
to knock the other off the earth. The Colonel must have known of 
the misfortune by which the boats were carried down on the flood. 



64 



landing at once. As I find nowhere any comment upon 
this astonishing order, I would make allowance for the 
possibility of circumstances not reported which might 
make it seem less unreasonable. What it did was to take 
away the commanding officer from a small party of troops 
in a dangerous position directly in front of the enemy, 
and take him so far away that he could not return, at 
the best, for nearly an hour, meantime not knowing what 
was happening at his post. If it was necessary to see 
the Captain, the Colonel should have gone at least as far 
as to the top of the hill before sending for him. If he had 
done that, he would have met him much sooner and kept 
him from his post less than half an hour. 

As it was, the Captain hurried down to the river, and 
the Colonel, without asking for further report or informa- 
tion, at once began to berate him for not getting across 
the river earlier, and filled the air with violent and vulgar 
abuse and epithets, applied to the Captain and his men 
and all the regiment.* Captain Lane, tho in a deep rage, 
commendably restrained himself and waited for the end, 
only keeping ready for action if he were struck or ap- 
proached. When the truculent little Colonel's wind was 
spent, he was so far from ordering any one to execution 
that he directed the Captain to take that portion of the 
regiment now landed to the position of his company on 
the top of the hill and command the whole till further 
orders. It was barely in time, for the enemy was showing 



inasmuch as they were hauled back along the front of the camps, 
and undoubtedly the Captain had reported it on the way; but, 
whether he knew it or not, he now worked himself into such a 
passion he would listen to nothing". In the coarse and profane 
language he was given to, he declared the Captain was unfit to 
command, and that he had failed to cross the river and get up 
the mountain from cowardice; and all the time he was flourishing 
in the air a cavalry sabre (he carried it constantly, instead of the 
proper infantry officer's sword) as " wildly as a madman." Cap- 
tain Lane at first tried to speak, but seeing the uselessness of it 
and unwilling to lower his dignity in a quarrel, he was silent, only 
keeping his hand on his pistol " if the fellow came near me." 

* When he was under court-martial trial some months later a 
number of similar affairs of gross insults to his offcers appeared 
in evidence under the charge of " conduct unbecoming to an officer 
and a gentleman." 



65 



signs of activity. Closer skirmishing followed, soon 
afterward Major Coleman appeared — an experienced 
soldier and very capable officer — and took command ; 
and finally Colonel DeVilliers came, as he ought to have 
done long before. There was a good deal of desultory 
fighting, with no definite gain that day. 

As the battle here the next day had a decisive result 
(tho it was not improved) and was the most important 
one the Eleventh had up to this time, some account of it 
ought to be given. It was known as " Cotton-Hill " or 

Blake's-Farm in the Kanawha army, but is " Gauley- 
Bridge " in Phisterer's Statistical Record 

Cotton Hill is a ridge or " hog-back about one and a 
half miles long, lying northwest and southeast. The 
northwestern end rises to a head or promontory, several 
hundred feet high, overhanging the river, with a pre- 
cipitous, rocky face, inaccessible except that at a few 
places footmen may climb up thro narrow gorges. Be- 
hind the head, on top, the land falls away into a 
" saddle making a fairly workable tract large enough 
for a small farm., which was then occupied by a farmer 
nam.ed Blake, Southeast of this farm rose the true hill, 
higher than the river end and then covered with forest. 
The southwestern side of the ridge is deep and steep, 
but to the north and east of it the land is considerably 
higher, so that from there the hill is easily reached. 

Floyd had had a couple of regiments encamped at the 
foot of the southwest side, on the Fayetteville road, which 
there curves southward to get around the base of the 
hill, but he withdrew them when he did the guns ; and his 
whole force was now on the Fayetteville road, east of the 
hill. Thus there was nothing to prevent Benham's brigade 
from m-oving up the Fayetteville road to the southern 
end of the hill, a movement which would have induced 
Floyd to give it up at once; and there need have been 
none of the labor and cost to Cox's men of taking it by 
attack on top. 

When the Eleventh Ohio detachment arrived in sup- 
port of Lane's company, it was posted, with that com- 
pany, beyond Blake's farm, and finally, under Major 
Coleman, advanced to an attack. The rebels soon broke 
and fell back thro the wood on to the higher ground. 



66 



Getting aid, however, they returned and, in a counter- 
attack, drove the Eleventh men back to the edge of 
Blake's farm. Here, behind a ravine, a defense was 
undertaken and the rebels were held until another de- 
tachment of the regiment arrived.* Then the advance 
was renewed and the rebels were driven farther than at 
first, — beyond the farm and well up the wooded hill at 
the outer end of the ridge. Night coming on the com- 
mand was posted in a good defensive position, its left 
holding the ground nearest the New river ferry, and re- 
mained there during the night. 

If it were not Floyd in command it would be remark- 
able that this small force — less than 250 — was allowed 
to remain on the hill. With any boldness he could easily 
have destroyed it in a single movement. He does seem 
to have had an idea of his opportunity. In the night a 
feeble attempt upon it was made, under which its left 
wing, under Major Coleman, moved back a few hundred 
yards and lost six men captured (Lane's company was, 
as I gather, on the right), but just then two companies 
of the Second Kentucky, sent over by General Cox, ar- 
rived to reinforce, and Coleman recovered his ground. 
Some firing then followed upon all parts of the line, but 
seemingly without any set purpose, and, after an hour 
or two, the enemy retired without having accomplished 
anything and without any spirited effort. 

During the night four more companies of the Second 
Kentucky came over from Gauley, thus raising the com- 
mand to about 600 men, but it was impracticable to bring 
up even a small gun. General Cox too came over, to 
direct operations. At daybreak (the 11th) began an 
advance of the whole force, by General Cox's order but 
under immediate command of Colonel DeVilliers. The 
rebel pickets were soon uncovered and driven in, and the 
main body steadily pushed again onto the wooded hill, 
tho keeping up a constant fire. Judging the enemy's force 
there to be much superior to his. General Cox halted this 
movement; but it had gone far enough to bring the 
Fayetteville road into view to the southeast, and the 

* Apparently the detachment taken up the hill by Captain Lane 
on his second ascent was not all of the 200 the Colonel was bring- 
ing over; but a part came over after the Colonel arrived. 



67 



enemy's baggage train was seen there, moving toward 
Fayetteville. Floyd was preparing for full retreat, as 
was further shown by the fact that Enyart's detachment 
of the First Kentucky (that first sent over) now moved 
up the Fayetteville road, by the southwest and south side 
of the ridge, and in the afternoon was on Laurel creek, 
at its southernmost point, where it remained until the 
next day. 

General Cox did nothing more, not even " feeling " 
the enemy more than he had done with his contingent on 
the hill. He could now easily communicate with General 
Benham, a few miles down the road (as of course with 
Rosecrans across the river), and one would expect to 
hear that Benham was ordered to move at once up the 
road, at least so far as to determine what Floyd was 
doing or what his position was. And so he was ordered 
(as soon as Rosecrans learned from Cox that Floyd's 
wagons were moving) to move up immediately; but he 
says, in his report, that he received the order at 11 p. m., 
while Rosecrans says, officially, that his acknowledgment 
is dated 7 p. m. Whatever the hour was, Benham's idea 
of "immediate" was such as that, as his report says, 
he began his march " next morning " (the 12th) and 
spent the day up to 4 p. m. in reaching, on the Fayette- 
ville road, the right of Cox's position on the hill, a march 
of eight miles. Here his advance had a slight skirmish 
(probably with a small section of Floyd's rear guard, 
left in observation), and he bivouacked for the night. 
During the night his picket or scouts reported hearing 
wheels moving up the Fayetteville road, but it was not 
till " next morning " again that he sent a reconnoitring 
party to learn what it meant. He waited till after 4 p. m. 
of that day (the 13th) for this party to return, and then 
advanced. Of course he found no enemy ; and he marched 
ten miles (to and beyond Fayetteville) without seeing one. 
Floyd had passed there the afternoon of the 12th, more 
than a whole day and night ahead of him. 

Early in his operations Rosecrans had sent General 
Schenk, with his brigade, a few miles up New river, to 
try to make a crossing at a long-abandoned ferrying 
place, in the hope of getting the Fayetteville road above 
Floyd's position, and six days of labor were spent there 



68 



in making boats or floats and getting them down the bluff 
to the water. This was just done when the river rose 
high and the crossing was declared impracticable. But 
Floyd was then (night of 12th) known to be in retreat; 
and on the 13th Schenck's brigade was brought down 
across the Gauley and put over the Kanawha where the 
first detachment of the First Kentucky men had crossed, 
thus placing it on the Fayetteville road, several miles in 
the rear of Benham's brigade. Schenck then followed 
up Benham, and was directed by Rosecrans to take com- 
mand of both brigades. 

On the 14th Benham moved on and that night was ten 
miles further toward Raleigh, tho he had been twenty- 
four hours or more in doing it. Under these persistently 
adverse conditions, disgusted with Benham and hopeless 
of recovering the prey he had believed surely in his hand, 
Rosecrans stopped the movement, and Schenck ordered 
Benham to return to Fayetteville, which he did promptly 
and within one-fourth the time he had used in marching 
the same distance in the other direction.* 

A certain hasty judgment, characteristic of Rosecrans, 
may well be said to have led to his failure in this cam- 
paign. There was, in fact, no good reason why he could 
not cross New river some miles above the place attempted 
by General Schenck. Without any certain information 
he believed that General Lee was on the Lewisburg road 
with a strong force, ready to attack him at Gauley Bridge, 
and, so, of course, able to prevent his sending a brigade 
any distance up New river. He could have learned, with- 
out serious difficulty, that the force remaining after 
Floyd crossed was practically insignificant and that after 
November 5th Lee was not there.f Schenck could easily 



* General Benham was a regular army officer and evidently a 
man of education and cultivation, but he was possessed of a 
remarkable inertia or timidity, and was habitually neglectful or 
careless as to orders and instructions. The records show that from 
November 2 to 13 Kosecrans sent him forty written orders and 
messages, with information and instructions in many details, but 
there is no sig^i of any energy or activity or carefulness in him. 
Why Rosecrans did not supersede him with another commander is 
a problem; but some weeks later he did order him under arrest 
for some other gross neglect. 

t On that day Lee left for Richmond under orders. 



69 



have been over and in control of the Fayetteville road 
before the 10th, and then, cut off on his only road on 
both flanks, Floyd's whole command would have been 
taken, if only Schenck and Benham attacked and pressed 
him with energy. 

On the 13th, when it was certain that Floyd was in full 
retreat and Benham was at Fayetteville, in pursuit, Cox's 
men were withdrawn from Cotton Hill to their camp at 
Gauley, They were in high spirits and proud of them- 
selves. As they saw it, all the fighting had been done 
by them, and Floyd's whole army was beaten. And when 
they learned that Benham and Schenck were in pursuit, 
taking wagons and picking up prisoners without a battle, 
they claimed that the hard work and dangers and con- 
flict were theirs, while the other brigades reaped the 
credit. That is the way soldiers talk, because, usually, 
they know only what occurs immediately under their 
observation and do not know the causes or meanings of 
operations or movements as a whole. But they were 
really entitled to high credit. They had been two days 
and nights on the field, in immediate contact with the 
enemy, under constant excitement and probably with lit- 
tle or no sleep. Tho they had not fought any large part 
of Floyd's forces, as they, or some of them, seem to have 
imagined, they had finally beaten those they did meet, and 
in their several advances and retreats had been under fire 
a dozen times, several times quite hotly; and they had 
borne all the loss in men in the whole affair. They had, 
in short, successfully maintained the most important 
action in the fi^eld that had yet fallen to their brigade. 

The Eleventh Ohio had, indeed, borne the hardest 
part. The most of the work and all the losses had been 
in that regiment. And Captain Lane and his company 
had done the most, or at least had been the longest on 
the field and most at risk. Their adventure in crossing 
the two flooded rivers in the night and climbing the high, 
steep hill, to meet an enemy of unknown strength, would 
make a thrilling story. The particular part taken by the 
Captain and his company in the various fights of the 
10th and 11th is not known. What he wrote about the 
actions was but little and was all of a general character. 

A day or two after Cox's men got back into camp 



70 



Benham's brigade was brought back, while Schenck's 
was left at Fayetteville, where Rosecrans now intended 
to erect defenses, to be held indefinitely as the outpost 
of the army on that side of the river. But there were to 
be no more field operations until spring : indeed no more 
were practicable, the roads having become quite impass- 
able and sure to be kept so by the winter storms. 

That was Floyd's view too, and, partly for that reason, 
partly because half his men were sick and all demoral- 
ized, at the end of November he moved thro the moun- 
tains southeastward and encamped on the Virginia & 
Tennessee railroad, near Newbern. 

There was nothing now to prevent the Kanawha Bri- 
gade from talking all the time about winter-quarters, and 
the only other subject of much interest was that of fur- 
loughs. General Kosecrans had, a month or more earlier 
and rather rashly, promised the winter-quarters. It was, 
indeed, especially important that soldiers: should have 
sound shelter in a region in which winter is usually a 
close succession of rains and snows. A plenty of timber 
was at hand, and only axes and other tools were required 
for the building of huts. But the men hoped to be quar- 
tered in the milder and drier country (and nearer home !) 
on the Ohio, tho they knew some troops must remain on 
the Kanawha. Meantime many were allowed furloughs 
and the others counted the time for the coming round 
of their turns. 

Captain Lane had been for some time anxious to get 
a leave. Not only his desire to visit his family (he had 
then four young children), but his manufacturing busi- 
ness, which had suffered much during his six months 
army employment, kept his mind much concerned. His 
letters from the middle of October, or earlier, show that 
he was anxiously hoping and planning to go home. At 
the end of October he thought he was near it, but Floyd's 
irruption stopped all thought of it for the present. When 
that episode was ended other obstructions appeared. 
About all the other officers wanted to go too. The 
Lieutenant-Colonel and the Major went, on sick leave, 
and then the Colonel went (and entertained the admiring 
people in Ohio with lectures ") ; and, finally, the Cap- 



71 



tain agreed to wait while his First-Lieutenant went 
home. The fates were against him; and thus kept him 
on the ground when there was another bridge to be built ! 
As if he had not already done, in work of practical great 
advantage to the operations of the army, much more than 
any other officer in it. 

As it had been determined to maintain a strong post at 
Fayetteville, it was essential to have a sure line of supply 
for it. That must be by a good road on the south or 
west side of the river, from the head of steamboat navi- 
gation, v/hich was just below the mouth of Loop creek, 
twenty miles below Fayetteville. This road had been 
neglected for a long time, especially that portion along 
the Kanawha, which was now much obstiucted by fallen 
trees and rocks and wash-outs, while the bridge over the 
mouth of Loop creek had been carried away by a flood. 

Captain Lane was, apparently, the only " Engineer " 
and Company K the only body of " Pioneers " or " Pon- 
toniers " in the army ; and the work fell upon them. But 
Company B was also put under the Captain's command 
to assist. With a detachment of Company K, leaving 
behind all arms and equipments except blankets and 
haversacks, he went down the road from Gauley to Can- 
nelton, ten miles, on the north side of the Kanawha, to 
get the tools and materials for the bridge-building and 
move them to the south side by steamboat. On the way 
dov/n he found one of his company, a guard, carrying his 
gun, and took him along, thus having one gun in his 
party. Owing to various causes of delay it was dark 
when the landing on the south side, below the mouth of 
Loop creek, was made. The remainder of the command 
was to cross the river a little below the Gauley, on scows, 
with two wagons, which were to bring provisions, axes 
and other pioneering tools and the arms and ammunition 
of Lane's detachment, and were to work their way down 
the old road on the west side, clearing it enough, if prac- 
ticable, to enable them to reach Loop creek by night. If 
that were found impossible, then a party was to march 
on to Loop creek, carrying provisions and arms for the 
men with Captain Lane. This latter party did get thro 
to the creek by dark, but the creek was " booming 
from the rains, and they could not cross. The date of 



72 



this expedition is not found, but it was in November, 
1861, apparently just before the 20th. 

A day of continuous rain was followed by a heavy 
storm of rain, sleet and snow, which went on all or most 
of the night, at times with great violence. The Company 
B men were found to be on the upper side of the creek, 
with the arms and provisions, but there was deep dark- 
ness and the torrent was impassable. There were several 
log cabins near, unoccupied, and Captain Lane and his 
men settled in the one best adapted for a post, and soon 
had a fire in the big fire-place. That was their only 
comfort. They had set out with one day's rations in 
haversacks, but, with the usual hunger and improvidence 
of marching men, they had eaten all within half the day. 

The position was dangerous. All the region beyond 
the picket-posts was infested by bands of guerrillas, and 
there was a road down the left bank of Loop creek by 
which they had sometimes come for sharpshooting prac- 
tice on the steamboats on the river or the soldiers on 
the Gauley road. They had once or twice brought down a 
small field-gun and interrupted operations on the river 
for a short time. Floyd's retreat may have drawn them 
off for the present, but there was no knowing as to that. 
Captain Lane set a picket post of one man with the gun 
up this road, provided for relief every two hours, and 
all the remainder were devoted to warming and drying 
themselves and trying to sleep in the cabin. There was 
some sense of security in the fierce storm, which, with 
the intense darkness, would make any attack very doubt- 
ful and difficult ; but there must have been much anxiety, 
especially in the Captain's mind, as his men were in a 
corner from, which there was no escape and the one gun 
could not do much. The steamboat captain had insisted 
upon taking his boat back to Cannelton as soon as he had 
got the men and m.aterials landed, unwilling to risk a 
stay on the enemy's side over night. 

Here was the incident of the bursting of the chimney, 
a tale Colonel Lane was fond of telling as one of the 
humorous experiences of his camps. The big fire-place 
had been built of stone, the back of it being a single large 
stone with a smooth face, well adapted for reflecting 

r: • 

73 



the heat of a fire. The men were greatly pleased with 
its effective service that cold, stormy night. But they 
did not know what was in it or behind it. The house 
had not been occupied for some time, the many rains 
of the season had saturated the chimney, and some water 
must have found its way into crevices of the big stone 
or behind it, which the great heat finally converted to 
steam. 

About midnight, when all the men were asleep or 
drowsy, there was a tremendous explosion and the room 
was instantly filled with broken stone, ashes and embers 
from the fire. Every man sprang to his feet while he 
grabbed for his gun. Of course the one idea was, that a 
shell had struck in the house and exploded. But no other 
sound followed, two or three men ran out, but found no 
sign of an enemy ; the picket with the gun ran in to learn 
what the shock was, and reported all quiet on the road. 
A blaze quickly started on the hearth showed no damage 
but in the back of the fire-place, where there was a great 
cavity. 

Meantime the blankets were burning from the scattered 
fire and fragments of hot stone, and the house was in 
danger. Jerking up the blankets and scraping the debris 
into the fire-place, followed by handfuls of brush as 
brooms, the men were at the same time in a dispute as to 
the cause of the catastrophe. Most of them clung to the 
shell theory until the cleaning-up failed to produce even 
one fragment ; and there was no one hurt. All agreed at 
last that the explanation of the Captain was right, that it 
was an explosion caused by steam from water confined 
in some wa,y in or behind the big backstone ; and a good 
part of the night was spent in speculating on the extra- 
ordinary event and joking on the conduct of individuals. 

This was not the last of the terrors of that stormy 
night. The lone picket-guard, an hour or two later, 
caused another abrupt excitement by falling into the 
house upon the sleeping men ; but we will leave that, with 
other amusing incidents, in the Captain's reminiscent 
papers. 

V/ith the earliest light the harassed and hungry soldiers 
turned out to learn their further fortune, with an imme- 
diate strong desire toward the food supply. The storm 



74 



had ceased, but all the world was saturated and the creek 
was a roaring torrent. Their provisions and arms were 
on the other side, but there v/ere no means of crossing. 
To bring over the steamboat (if it would come) and 
transfer around the mouth of the creek would take much 
time; and there must be a direct passage anyhow, in 
order to carry on the bridge-work effectively. A little 
way up the creek the gorge was narrow, and there some 
tall trees v/ere felled so as to lie across above the water. 
A rude foot bridge was thus made, and the arms and 
rations brought over. 

All other considerations were lost for the present in 
the joys of cooking and eating a substantial breakfast, 
except that the busy Captain was meanwhile surveying 
the site and planning his bridge. ¥/ith his habitual 
energy, he soon had the whole detachment actively cut- 
ting, hauling, and pushing the various parts of the work ; 
and before night he had a substantial bridge practically 
completed. It took longer to recover the old road, the 
eight or nine miles up to Cotton Hill, from its very bad 
condition. When done, however, the supply of the post 
at Fayetteville direct from the steamboat landing was 
assured, and at the same time the demand upon the road 
on the north side was much diminished. That road be- 
tween the landing at Cannelton and Gauley Bridge had 
become almost literally impassable, much of it reduced 
to a bed of mire several feet deep. 

It was here and at this time that Captain Lane saw 
the sunken team of four mules and a v/agon of which he 
tells in his essay on " Mud." All soldiers who had any 
real campaigning experience in the South were familiar 
with such scenes, tho the Captain's tale went rather fur- 
ther than any I could tell of what I saw. Nearly all 
roads in the southern States were " dirt " roads, running 
over the natural surface of the ground, exceedingly dusty 
in dry weather and exceedingly muddy in wet weather. 
Heavy and frequent rains marked the winter in most 
parts of the South, and the soil became a thick sponge two 
or three or more feet deep. Abandoned wagons and 
ambulances, now and then even a gun or caisson, broken 
down and abandoned horses and mules, were fam.iliar 
sights, while dead horses and mules at the road-side were 



75 



too numerous to count. Any Wagonmaster was an ex- 
pert in the art of getting animals and wagons out of the 
mire with ropes and doubled teams and levers of fence- 
rails or heavy poles. But what Captain Lane saw on the 
Lewisburg pike below Gauley Bridge was a wagon sunk 
in the road until the bed reached the mire, with its four 
mules still hitched to it and sinking more and more by 
their struggles, like a man caught in quick-sands, until 
only their heads were above the half-fluid mass. And 
there of course they died. No wonder the men felt as- 
sured of winter-quarters, for there could be no campaign 
without wheels and mules, even tho the men might pick 
their v/ay without regular marching. 

Thus, for Company K and Captain Lane, the four 
months of most strenuous and exhausting labor and 
marching, hardships and fighting, ended, as they had 
begun, in the building of a bridge of immediate and great 
importance to the service of the army. Within that 
period, with the aid of details from other companies, they 
had constructed four big bridges, half a dozen or more 
smaller ones, the long and dangerous ferry on the Gauley 
twice, and eight or ten boats large enough to carry troops 
and wagons. It is quite safe to say that they had done 
more toward the practical and effective service of the 
army than any other troops in it. 

With Schenck's brigade now in a strong outpost at 
Fayetteville, it was not necessary to maintain a large 
force at Gauley. General Cox placed one regiment of 
Benham's brigade there as a fortified post, another at 
Summerville on his left, others at other posts ; and with- 
drew his own brigade to Charleston, where he established 
the headquarters of the District and had a portion of 
the brigade prepare their quarters for the winter. For 
the remainder, including the Eleventh Ohio, he got leave 
to send them down to the Ohio and quarter them at Point 
Pleasant. Early in December, to their great joy, they 
were settled there, almost at home and free for months 
from marches, labors and threatened attacks. Of course 
they all wanted to go home, and many did get leave; 
but it was easy for their friends to come, by rail and 
river ; a,nd the little tov/n was filled with social activities 
and improvised entertainments for several months. 



76 



Captain Lane's pleasure, however, was lost in his 
anxiety to see his family and attend to his business at 
Cincinnati. His wife had come up to Marietta (her old 
home) with the children a month or more before, to 
meet him as soon as he could get the leave he had been 
counting upon five or six weeks ; but private communica- 
tion between the army and the State was at that time 
surprisingly slow and uncertain, and she gave up her 
hopes for the present and went back to Cincinnati. Much 
disappointed on learning this, he wrote her at once 
(December 6) to come up to Point Pleasant and to bring 
her mother, saying they could stay at the " Virginia 
Hotel They must have come immediately, as a later 
letter shows that they had been at Point Pleasant and 
had returned to Cincinnati before December 20. He 
had not been able to apply for the leave of absence he had 
so long wanted, the last reason being the absence of 
Lieutenant Johnson. That officer returned a few days 
before the 20th, and the application was sent in at once. 
But the routine of such things was usually (to the mind 
of the applicant) cruelly slow, and it was several weeks 
before the leave was received. 

But other events now crowded the field for Captain 
Lane and the regiment, much more important than any 
leave of absence, and he was prevented from using it. 
The Colonel, since his return to command at the end of 
October, had been so abusive and tyrannical toward the 
officers, so neglectful of duty, and so vociferous in threats 
and insulting language to any one who displeased him, 
that the regiment was constantly in turmoil; order and 
discipline were much broken down, and demoralization 
of the command was in rapid progress. Proceedings to 
remove the Colon 1 were undertaken, in which Captain 
Lane was the principal figure, but their culmination and 
final success were not reached till some months later, and 
the episode is therefore left to the events of 1862. 



77 



VII 



1862: January — May 

Driving Out Colonel DeVilliers — Captain Lane Leads the 
Movement — Files Charges Against the Colonel — Is 
Himself Put Under Arrest, Deprived of His Sword, and 
Has Charges Filed Against Him by the Colonel — Long 
Wait for the Court-Martial — Captain Lane's Campaign 
Against Whiskey — Colonel DeVilliers Arrested and 
Brought to Trial — Convicted and Cashiered — Captain 
Lane Tried on the Colonel's Charges, Acquitted and 
Restored to Duty 

The year of the greatest trials of the Eleventh Ohio, 
of the hardest labors, of the most profitable experiences, 
and of its steady and rapid development as effective sol- 
diers. But, for Captain Lane, it was all that and much 
more. As an engineer, he exceeded the achievements of 
1861. As a recruiting officer in Ohio, he succeeded not 
only in replacing all the losses of the regiment, but in 
filling it up to the maximum, — a condition never reached 
before. As an officer burning with zeal in the great 
cause and with a mind single to the best development of 
the regiment and the good of the service, he planned and, 
at great personal risk and sacrifice, resolutely fought out 
to success the dismissal from the army of the unfit 
Colonel. No wonder that before the end of the year he 
was the foremost man of the regiment. 

The very beginning of the year was marked by the 
undertaking, led by Captain Lane, to force Colonel De- 
Villiers out of the regiment. It was his greatest battle 
and greatest success during the war. It proved his cour- 
age and his capacity for self-sacrifice in the highest de- 
gree ; and, so far from crushing him, as he keenly feared 
from the beginning of the attempt, it led, indirectly and 



78 



wholly unforeseen, to his becoming the Colonel of the 
regiment himself. 

In so large an army of volunteers as that in the Civil 
War, hastily assembled, containing, comparatively, very 
few men of military training, with no system or standard 
in the selection of officers, it wias inevitable that many 
unfit men would be commissioned. The line " (com- 
pany) officers were, relatively, better than the " field " 
officers (majors, colonels and lieutenant-colonels), be- 
cause, as a rule, they had proved at least their zeal in 
the cause and energy in action by " raising " their com- 
panies. But the field-officers were mostly commissioned 
thro the influence " of political or social friends of con- 
spicuous position; their possession of military capacity 
remained to be tested by trial. It is true, a number of 
the field-officers were men of former experience in the 
regular army or in the volunteers in the Mexican war; 
but another class was that of certain foreigners who had 
had experience in the armies of European monarchies. 
Some of these were naturalized Americans, but many 
were still aliens and many came to America after the 
war began, confident of obtaining positions much higher 
than any they could hope for in their own countries. 
Some of these foreigners were very troublesome, from 
their lack of adaptability, and some were impostors or 
mere adventurers. Little or no care was taken to learn 
their antecedents and in some cases the only knowledge 
obtained of them was in their own tales. 

The Eleventh Ohio Infantry had the great misfortune 
to get for its colonel one of these impostors. He was 
said to be French, but he spoke German fluently, his 
former career was unknown, and when he was dismissed 
in disgrace from the Eleventh Ohio he disappeared so 
completely that he was never heard of again.* Whatever 
connection he may have had with a European army, he 
proved to be a man of low breeding, of no high pur- 
pose or sense of honor, and without personal honesty. 
He showed knowledge and skill as a drill-master in 
sword and bayonet exercise, tho his regiment profited 
little or nothing by them. It seems that the only thing 



* But see page 104. 



79 



he tried to do with any persistence was to bring his com- 
mand under discipline but he was so conceited, mer- 
curial and impatient that he could not wait upon the 
necessity (for green volunteers) of laying the proper 
ground by constant drilling and practice in the primary 
school of the soldier. So he tried to reach his end by 
erratic violence and harshness, personal ridicule and in- 
sult, and wholly failed. He was, however, very alert 
mentally and physically, made a smart, soldierly appear- 
ance, had an ingratiating address toward superiors, and 
to them in his earlier service appeared to be a capable 
officer. Even General Cox wrote of him, on his return 
from prison, in a manner which, later, must have brought 
him mortification and regret.* Colonel Frizell, of the 
Eleventh Ohio, was much better qualified to form a cor- 
rect judgment, as appears by his letter to Mrs. Lane, 
written December 27, 1861.t 

Colonel DeVilliers had been in the field but two or 
three days, and on no important duty, when he was cap- 
tured.J He had hardly returned to his command 
(November 1, 1861) when his ability and courage were 
put to test (at the battle of Cotton-Hill, as already de- 
scribed) and failed. His vicious and insulting abuse of 
Captain Lane and his company at that time was soon 
followed by similar instances in dealing with other 
officers of his regiment, while many of the non-commis- 
sioned officers and soldiers were subjected to his vitupera- 
tion and silly threats of impossible punishments. Dis- 
respect and contempt for him spread thro the regiment 
and was not carefully concealed by either officers or men. 
He lost hold of the regiment practically, while discontent, 
disorder and danger of demoralization were only too 
apparent. To most of the officers the situation became 
intolerable. Privately nearly all wanted to get rid of 



* See General Orders No. 27, Head Quarters Kanawha Brigade, 
October 9, 1861. 

t Referring to Captain Lane's arrest (see page 82) he wrote 
" I can well assure you that the brave and gallant Captain will 
soon be honorably discharged (from arrest) and his persecutor 
receive such treatment as his ungentlemanly course to officers so 
richly merits." 

t See page 33. 



80 



him, but for any action there must publicly be a leader, 
tho the position must be one of serious risks, from which, 
naturally, most men of inferior rank would shrink. 
There were but few of the officers who could reasonably 
be called upon to undertake it. Either of the two junior 
field-officers would fall under the imputation of seeking 
his own advancement. A lieutenant would lack weight 
because of his inferior rank. So the leader must be a 
captain. 

Captain Lane had been the first to suffer conspicuously, 
and in his case the Colonel had followed up his first 
offense by an exasperating petty persecution. The Cap- 
tain had a plenty of courage, braced up by righteous 
indignation at the injustice of his own treatment and 
that of others; but, in his simple-minded directness of 
speech, he had openly expressed his opinion of the 
Colonel personally and of the bad influence of his conduct 
upon the regiment, — indiscreet, of course, to say the 
least, but also a breach of military discipline and law. 
An obvious handicap, too, this was in his heading the 
movement against the Colonel, but his mind was made up 
to accept any risks in the clear duty to himself and the 
regiment as he saw it. It is true, he exaggerated the 
possible evil results to himself, but that made his act in 
taking the leadership all the more creditable to him. He 
reduced the whole case to the simple proposition that 
either DeVilliers or himself must be driven from the 
army, and he would think of no compromise. 

Soon after the regiment reached Point Pleasant, to go 
into winter quarters (early in December, 1861), consulta- 
tions of company officers were held and Captain Lane 
became their spokesman in requesting the Colonel to 
resign. Seeing that they had a set purpose, he finally 
said that, if the officers and men (i. e., the regiment gen- 
erally) should ask it, he would resign. He fancied that 
they would not commit themselves to writing, but they 
did. Captain. Lane soon had a petition signed by a num- 
ber so large as to make it certain that the Colonel could 
not have many friends in the regiment. When he saw 
this he denied that he had given such a promise, but said 
that if all the officers, or a majority of them, should really 
demand it, he would resign. Then, curiously enough, he 



81 



himself called a meeting of the officers. Perhaps he 
thought they would not dare to make the demand openly, 
for (apparently) he was himself present. There were 
then eighteen officers in camp (the other six or eight 
were absent sick or on furlough), and sixteen attended 
the meeting ; and their vote was unanimous for the resig- 
nation. But his word was worth no more now than 
before. He refused, and in a patesion declared he was 
the Colonel and would be the Colonel in spite of them. 

Captain Lane immediately set to work in drawing up 
charges against him for court-martial, a step which he 
had quite expected he would have to take. He finished 
them the same night and handed them in the next morn- 
ing, December 27, 1861. He must have felt a sense of 
relief in reaching at last a definite, clear-cut issue; but 
yet his troubles were only just begun. 

At that time an order for the court-martial required 
could be made only by the general commanding the De- 
partment, who was General Rosecrans. But the charges 
could reach him only thro the " regular military channel " 
(as it was commonly called), that is, the person making 
them must deliver them, in writing, to his immediate 
commanding officer, he to his immediate commander, and 
so on, each commander endorsing upon the paper his ap- 
proval or disapproval or recommendation. Thus the first 
officer to see Captain Lane's charges was the one accused. 
It is not now known what he did with them nor what 
endorsement he wrote upon them, if any. But what he 
did on seeing them was clear and quick. 

Captain Lane delivered the paper at the regimental 
headquarters and returned to his company with much 
relief of mind in the performance of a high duty. It 
was the regular hour for drill. He ordered out his com- 
pany and was engaged in drilling on the parade-ground 
when an officer arrived with an order from Colonel De- 
Villiers, putting him under arrest and demanding his 
sword. The Colonel did not wait until the Captain was 
off duty, but put this humiliation upon him in the pres- 
ence of his men and in a public place. No charge was 
made, no cause for the arrest was stated, and the Captain 
knew of no cause unless it was in the filing of the charges 
against the Colonel ; but that he had the right to do, not 



82 



only in the mere nature of things, but under the Articles 
of War. The fact was that the Colonel was in a reckless 
rage. Likely he had a vague idea that the filing of the 
charges could be punished as an act of insubordination. 

The effect of an arrest is to deprive the officer of his 
command and of regular service and confine " him to 
his quarters, the next junior officer taking over his com- 
mand. So a captain arrested must stay with his company 
while his lieutenant controls it. 

When the Colonel's head cooled he saw that he had 
gone too far, especially in depriving the Captain of his 
sword. Probably now, for the first time during the 
quarrel, he read the military law. The Articles of War 
require an officer under arrest to give up his sword only 
when a specific charge is made of criminal conduct; and 
the filing of charges against a superior officer, so far from 
being a crime, is a right expressly recognized by the 
Articles. 

The Colonel within two days sought to repair the mis- 
chief he had done, but, instead of taking the reasonable 
and manly course of frankly admitting his blunder and 
apologizing, he only sent for the Captain (December 29) 
and offered his sword to him. The Captain demanded 
an explanation and a statement of the cause of his arrest, 
and refused to receive his sword without it. The mean- 
spirited Colonel would not comply. He sent for the 
Adjutant and ordered him to return the sword; but he 
was still met with a refusal to receive it. Then he di- 
rected the Adjutant to take the sword to the Captain's 
quarters and, if he then still refused it, to leave it there.* 
At the same time he (the Colonel) ordered the Captain 
to return to duty and resume his command. The Captain 
declined to do either until he was told why he had been 
arrested, — that is, he refused to be released from arrest ! 

However, he seems to have then consulted someone, and 
to have been advised that he " could not make any point 
in refusing my sword and that my only redress was in 
preferring charges for false imprisonment." This was 
not correct advice as to the law, for the acts of the 



* If the Adjutant did this — and it seems he did — he must have 
been a " weak sister." It was not at all within his duty. 



83 



Colonel in the arrest and taking the sword were clearly 
usurpation of power and furnished ground for another 
charge against him, under one of the Articles of War. 
The Captain says, however, that he did prefer a charge 
oi false imprisonment but he does not tell what was 
done about it, and such a charge does not appear among 
the papers nor in the proceedings of the court-martial. 
Perhaps it was thought good policy to drop it, to avoid 
as far as possible the appearance of a personal quarrel. 

The war was now on. It could end only in total defeat 
of one side or the other; but, for the present, Captain 
Lane did nothing more in it than to prepare his evidence 
for the prosecution, tho he or some other officer at some 
time added further charges, based upon other tyrannical 
acts of the Colonel, committed while awaiting the cre- 
ation and sitting of the court and while he (the Colonel) 
was under arrest. 

The Colonel would have liked now to placate the Cap- 
tain, knowing there were many witnesses against him 
and knowing also that there was ground for yet more 
serious charges if enemies should discover the evidence 
of them. But the Captain was perfectly implacable. He 
was quite settled in mind to risk his position and army 
career, and (as he then imagined) himself, in the cause 
of justice and the good of the service. He wrote to his 
wife at this time — " I have come to the determination 
deliberately to follow the thing as long as there is a place 
to hang a hope on, and one or the other of us must be 
dismissed from the service in disgrace 

I have feared that I might have General Cox as my 
opponent in this matter, but I have strong hope that his 
good sense will dictate the proper course for him. I have 
right on my side and I will prevail against all that oppose ; 
and if it is necessary for me to fight General Cox, I will 
do that : it will only prolong the struggle."* 

A few days later he wrote her — I promise you I will 



* His fear of General Cox's position was, I think, due to his 
knowledge of the General's character, — cautious and moderate in 
all things, considerate and unpartisan in any controversy, and 
perhaps rather likely to be imposed upon by a skilful pretender. 
And his unlucky certificate of Colonel DeVilliers' ability already 
mentioned (page 80) had been published in the regiment. But 



84 



do my best to drive such a scoundrel from the American 
army and from a country of freemen." This promise " 
was not due to her asking it : on the contrary she shrank 
from the contest, because of fear of the possible conse- 
quence to him and the family of a failure, naturally not 
fully understanding the affair, but feeling keenly the 
apparent disgrace of his public arrest and loss of his 
sword. It was probably this that led him to write, in 
this last letter — " Do not let my children suppose that 
I am dishonored, but teach them it is better to die in 
defense of a right than to live in luxury and submit to 
a wrong 

Fortunately, he did not foresee the further sacrifice 
and humiliations he must endure to reach the decisive 
act in the struggle, tho his course would certainly have 
been just the same if he had foreseen. It was full ten 
weeks from the day he filed the charges when, at last, 
he heard the welcome call of the case for trial. This 
delay, in the dark and full of anxieties — for he could 
get no news of action by the authorities, except that of 
the arrest of DeVilliers upon his charges, — was heart- 
breaking and seemed almost intolerable. The bad effects, 
morally, of the uncertain conflict upon the company and 
the regiment, the lack (real or fancied) of whole-hearted 
sym.pathy among his fellow-officers, the natural (tho 
mistaken) apprehensions and doubts of his wife and per- 
sonal friends at home as to the necessity or wisdom of his 
undertaking, and finally his fear (unreasonable tho it 
was) of a disastrous result to himself, even if DeVilliers 
were also destroyed, — the situation must have been a 
constant distress to him, tho it could never shake his 
fixed purpose. He was penetrated by the conviction that 
he was right, and he did not permit himself to doubt his 
final triumph, however much the labor and pain might 
be. It was all a strikingly fine exhibition of his strong 
character. 

The authority to order a court-martial lay with the 

he must have formed later a very different jud^.ent; and 
there is no doubt that, privately, he now sympathized with Captain 
Lane and his purpose and was sincerely desirous to help all he 
could (in view of his position) to rid the regiment and brigade of 
its incubus. 



85 



Department Commander, General Rosecrans, and he, or 
his Judge-Advocate-General (the prosecuting officer) did 
not consider the case as one for a special court. It was, 
therefore, left to await convenience or occasion for a 
general court to try accumulated cases. So the order was 
not issued until February 26, 1862, two months after 
Captain Lane's charges were filed. But he did not know 
— could only surmise — the causes of delay, and so was 
almost daily looking for news of action. It is quite possi- 
ble that this delay was, in part, due to mere neglect or 
official indifference to the need of prompt action for the 
good of the service. The administration work of the 
Department must have been much influenced by the slip- 
shod, happy-go-lucky methods of its head. 

Officers and men under charges are off duty and often 
under arrest, or even under guard, in disgrace in any 
event, tho a trial might prove them not guilty ; the other 
officers and men see it all; and there is usually more or 
less demoralization. In common sense and common right, 
therefore, a military trial ought to be speedy. The case 
of Captain Lane seemed to him of great importance, not 
merely to himself, but far-breaching (as indeed it was), 
and, not knowing why it dragged, looking every day 
vainly for some sign of progress, his anxious thoughts 
and feelings can well be imagined. 

Colonel DeVilliers' character justified a suspicion that 
he would suppress the charges against him or, at least, 
withhold them as long as possible from his brigade-com- 
mander ; and Captain Lane was determined, in that event, 
to insist upon filing another set directly with General 
Cox. Accordingly, six days after he first filed his 
charges, he sent a duplicate set to General Cox, at 
Charleston, and at the same time asked leave to go up 
to see him. The leave was granted, and on January 8th 
he reached Charleston, saw General Cox, dined with him 
that day, and on the next returned to Point Pleasant. 

His interview with the General must have been satis- 
factory. He does not tell what occurred, nor whether 
the duplicate set of charges was officially accepted and 
filed ; but the General found occasion to constitute him a 
" bearer of dispatches " to General Rosecrans at Wheel- 
ing. Probably the chief reason for this mission was to 



86 



enable him to see General Rosecrans, in the hope of as- 
suring and expediting the court-martial. Incidentally, 
he was probably advised to ask at Rosecrans's head- 
quarters for immediate approval of the application he had 
made in December for a leave of absence, and to make 
use of it at once. At any rate he stopped at Point Pleas- 
ant only long enough to get the next boat to Wheeling, 
took aboard at Marietta his wife and three children 
(Laura, Harry and Bertha), and landed at Wheeling on 
the 11th. Unluckily, General Rosecrans was absent, — 
gone to Washington. 

Whether he was able to do anything more than to 
deliver his dispatches does not appear, but he must have 
received his leave of absence; and he left the same day, 
by boa,t, landed with his family at Marietta, stopped 
there two days and, as appears in his diary, went to 
church on Sunday ''(the first time in seven months)", 
" attending Lotta Bosworth's wedding at 6 a. m. on 
Monday and on the 14th went on to Cincinnati, begin- 
ning that day his twenty days leave of absence, the first 
he had had since he enlisted nine months before. 

More than half of this leave he spent in travelling to 
and from Cleveland and Streetsboro (Portage county), 
where certain of the Lane family affairs required his 
personal a^ttention. Before and after this journey he 
spent a few days at Cincinnati with his family and in the 
affairs of his firm, which had suffered much by his 
absence. He v/as constantly anxious about the case of 
DeVilliers, however, and wanted to be on the ground. 
The day before his leave was up he was again at Point 
Pleasant. But he was to endure another whole month 
of delay in the case, with more troubles. 

One thing occurred in his absence, however, which 
gratified him, as being an earnest of his progress toward 
the court-martial so much desired. When his charges 
v/ere seen at Department Headquarters, Colonel De- 
Villiers was ordered under arrest. It does not appear 
whether he was deprived of his sword (probably he was, 
since som.e of the charges against him were of criminal 
character), but he remained under arrest and without 
command (Lieutenant-Colonel Coleman commanding the 
regiment) until he was tried and cashiered. 



87 



Notwithstanding his arrest the Colonel continued his 
plotting against Captain Lane, but, worse than that, the 
damage to the morale of the regiment, due to his lack 
of efficiency in command and the now notorious antagon- 
ism between him and the most of the company officers, 
had reached a stage greatly discouraging to all. The 
position of the late Lieutenant-Colonel (Frizell) had be- 
come intolerable to him, thro the ColoneFs conduct, and 
he had gone home and resigned in disgust. One of the 
best captains (Drury) followed his example.* Others 
held on only in the hope of Captain Lane's success. 

But even this oondition of the regiment was not enough 
trouble for Captain Lane. During his absence his com- 
pany had been put under the command of a lieutenaint 
transferred from another company (B) ; and this officer, 
from either weakness of character or indifference to duty, 
had failed to get control of the company. The discon- 
tented and mutinous men in it (some are found in any 
company of volunteers), aided by the general bad spirit 
in the regiment, had nearly ruined its discipline and 
obedience. 

Among other evils the whisky-drinking in the camp 
was at its worst. There had never been any effective 
restraint upon it in the army, because up to that time 
the general public opinion was not really opposed to it; 
and the men and officers who were accustomed to drink 
regarded any attempt at restraint as an interference with 
personal rights. Yet probably every camp in the army 
was under orders absolutely forbidding the bringing in 
of liquors. But the devices of the drinking men and 
their confederates outside, with lack of vigor and per- 
sistence in the officers in enforcing the orders, assured 
a means of supply, small in some commands it is true, 
but existing in all or nearly all. 

Captain Lane saw little control of the evil in the regi- 
ment when he returned to Point Pleasant and less in his 



* Six months later Frizell was commissioned Colonel of one of 
the new Ohio regiments (94th) and became highly distinguished 
in service in Kentucky and Tennessee. Drury joined the same 
regiment as Captain, and was killed in the famous battle of 
Perryville. 



88 



own company. He had set himself uncompromisingly 
against it from the beginning, and had tried repeatedly to 
get the other officers to join in efforts toward its real 
suppression, but he met small encouragement. This was, 
no doubt, one reason why the bad element in his company 
was hostile to him. They must have remembered, among 
other things, his conspicuous descent upon the keeper of 
the store on the wharf-boat at Point Pleasant soon after 
the regiment arrived there for winter-quarters. Suspect- 
ing that an increase in drinking was due to a concealed 
trade carried on by this man, he Vv^ent himself, with a 
file of soldiers, searched the boat, and found and dumped 
into the river nine barrels of v/hisky. If this act added 
any to the number and strength of his friends, it must 
have increased more the number and hostility of his 
enemies. It was no doubt one of the causes of the pecu- 
liar personal obstruction he found in his company after 
returning from his leave, tho his determined course in 
recovering control and discipline and resisting the at- 
tempt of the Colonel to appoint its non-commissioned 
officers were causes enough. It reached such a pitch as 
that, at the end of some particularly trying day, he wrote 
in his private diary (February 23, 1862) " My men all 
hate me." But this pitiful entry was to be follow^ed by 
another, seven months later, which shov^^s that all the 
companies then joined in a vote (when he was absent 
from the regiment), by which they called unanimously, 
or practically so, for his promotion from Captain to 
Colonel. 

To-day it seem.s singular that the officers of the regi- 
ment did not, as a body, share in a determined course 
to prevent the men from getting liquor,'^ but they left 



* Tho public opinion was then generally opposed to drinking, 
there was, practically, little effort to restrain it. Most of the 
officers of the army, regulars and volunteers, drank more or less, 
and freely. The army Commissaries kept a supply of whisky, 
which they sold to officers at cost, like provisions, tho forbidden 
to supply it to soldiers. The whisky was called " commissary " 
and was the occasion of much levity, joking and camaraderie 
among the officers. Very many officers were court-martialled for 
drunkenness or for drinking on duty, many punished, and some 
dismissed. And yet the Government encouraged the drinking by 
supplying at least a large part of the whisky they drank! 



89 



Captain Lane practically alone in it. A letter written 
four or five months after the raid upon the wharf -boat 
shows that he was still struggling unsuccessfully against 
the evil. He says he is glad the regiment is out in the 
field again, because " there will not be as much whisky 
for a time. How it is to be checked is more that I can 
tell. If I had three or four to stand by me, I would hope 
for a reform, but as I am alone what can I do? "* 

It was with a heavy heart, then, that he resumed the 
company command the day after his arrival at Point 
Pleasant (February 3) and set himself to the work of 
recovering it from the low condition it had fallen into 
under the several demoralizing influences described. 

The result of the Coloners venture in the arrest of the 
Captain was far from satisfactory to him ; he was further 
angered by it, indeed, and spurred on to another attempt. 
He found two soldiers in Company K — a sergeant and 
a corporal — who could be influenced by the flattery of 
his attention, and he descended to plotting with them 
against Captain Lane. He probably hoped to discredit 
him in his company and annoy him so far as to bring 
him. to resign in disgust. And he undertook to reward 
the soldiers in advance. On the first of January, 1862, 
he issued a formal regimental order appointing the ser- 
geant to be First-Sergeant of the company and the cor- 
poral to be a sergeant. As he had, probably, not read 
the law when he ordered the Captain to surrender his 
sword, so, probably, he did not read the law when he 
made these appointments. 

Under the Army Regulations the commanding officer 
of a regiment had the power to appoint the sergeants and 
corporals in a company, but only " upon the recommen- 
dation of the company commander This is based, of 
course, upon the good sense and necessity of things, since 



* It ought to be said, however, that the vice was probably worse 
in his company than in the others, because so many of its men 
were workingmen* of low social degree in a river city. The towns 
and cities on the great rivers of the west during the high steam- 
boating period were notoriously overrun by its worst vices. Cin- 
cinnati, Louisville, Cairo, St. Louis, Memphis, Vicksburg, Natchez 
— were " sinks " of drunkenness, gambling and yet lower life. 



90 



no one can know so well as the captain the fitness of his 
men for the several positions and services required. 

Captain Lane took this bull by the horns at once. He 
acknowledged the order in writing the same day it was 
issued, and added — ''I would refer you to paragraphs 
No. 73 and No. 80 of the Revised Army Regulations. 
I have not been advised with or consulted in regard to 
the promotions named in the order and shall disregard 
it a,s an illegal act Number 73 was the one which 
required the recommendation >oi the company com- 
mander " for the appointment of his sergeants and cor- 
porals, and Number 80 provided that " The first, or 
orderly, sergeant will be selected by the captain from 
the sergeants Thus the Colonel had had no power in 
any event to appoint the First-Sergeant. 

The ill-balanced Colonel, in his rage against the Cap- 
tain actually used the Captain's refusal to recognize the 
promotions " as the basis of one of the charges he 
made against him in the court-martial now appealed to 
by both parties. The two misguided soldiers were dis- 
posed to insist upon their rights under the promotions 
but the Captain seized the first chance they gave him in 
refusal or neglect of dutj^ in their old positions, and put 
them under arrest for disobedience of his orders. The 
sergeant appears to have yielded, but the corporal was, 
later, so troublesome that the Captain had him reduced 
to the ranks as soon as circumstances brought Lieutenant- 
Colonel Coleman into command of the regiment. There- 
upon he too preferred charges against the Captain for 
court-martial. He got over his disorder, however, became 
a good soldier, and a year later was promoted to sergeant, 
and became First-Sergeant near the end of his term of 
service. But while the struggle between the Colonel and 
the Captain was in progress* both these soldiers tried 
secretly to help the Colonel by finding matter for charges 
against the Captain, tho nothing was found.. 

The charges of the reduced corporal against Captain 
Lane appear to have been filed directly after he was re- 
duced. What they were is not now known, but the time 
and circumstances indicate, pretty surely, that they were 
instigated by the Colonel and were based upon the Cap- 
tain's refusal to recognize the promotions. A court to 



91 



try them was appointed and assembled with remarkable 
speed. It tried the ease only ten days after the corporal 
was reduced, and apparently at Point Pleasant. Captain 
Lane appears to have paid little attention to it. The 
only record or statement of any kind that I find relating 
to it is an entry in his diary on February 24, 1862: 
" Court-martial on McGowan's charges against me. 
Verdict not known yet." The Captain must have been 
promptly acquitted, as he never afterward refers to the 
matter; and he went the next day to Charleston on the 
business of his own charges against DeVilliers. 

But this affair was only an incident in the campaign 
of the truculent Colonel. A few days after Captain 
Lane resumed command of his company at Point Pleasant 
he received a message from General Cox, calling him to 
Charleston. He was then busy (whenever off regular 
duty) in the preparation of the testimony to support 
his charges against the Colonel, and he spent two days 
more in that work. Then he went to Charleston, arriv- 
ing on February 9, but found that General Cox had gone 
away. He waited a couple of days, but the General was 
not heard from, and he had to return to Point Pleasant 
without seeing him.* He learned then, however for the 
first time, that Colonel DeVilliers had, a month before 
(early in January), filed charges against him for a court- 
martial and had demanded his arrest. He could not then 
learn what the charges were, but he did learn that Gen- 
eral Cox had not acted upon them and had not considered 
an arrest, from which he inferred that the General re- 
garded the charges as trivial or founded in malice. 
Finally, however, they were forwarded to Department 
Headquarters, and Captain Lane was tried upon them 
(with additions, based upon later acts) by the same 
court which tried DeVilliers. 

Then, for a month, he could only wait and hope for 
news of the court, in unceasing anxiety and yet eager for 
the trial any day, spending half that time at Point Pleas- 
ant and half in going back and forth between there and 
Charleston under orders and notices relating to the sit- 
ting of the court, — which was to be at Charleston. 

* Apparently he did see him a week later, at Point Pleasant, 
but he does not tell what General Cox wished to see him about. 



92 



What wounded him the most of all at this time, per- 
haps, was that, from the time he filed the charges he 
had to endure the coldness of many of his fellow-officers, 
who hedged when it was seen that the struggle must 
damage some one (not willing to be identified with the 
losing side), and the constant disrespect and covert 
shirking of duty among the men who considered him in 
disgrace and likely soon to be out of the army. But yet, 
excepting that his comments on the character of the 
Colonel were usually unqualified and in vigorous words, 
the only bitter thing he is found saying during this 
period relates to these hedging officers. In a private 
letter to his partner at Cincinnati, written soon after the 
trials of DeVilliers and himself by the court-martial, 
but before the result was known in either case, speaking 
generally of the other officers in the regiment and their 
attitude toward the cases, he says they " are as intelli- 
gent a set of men as you would be likely to get together, 
but their vacillation and indecision and want of any 
fixedness of purpose in this matter surprised me. A 
majority of them were ready to jump into the boat that 
was likely to win, with no other compass than self- 
interest." 

But the Captain was more or less diverted from his 
troubles, and much comforted, by the news of the war in 
February. His diary contains more about that than 
about his own affairs. Foote's capture of Fort Henry, 
Grant's of Fort Donelson and Burnside's of Roanoke 
Island especially filled him with joy. He thinks Foote 
and Grant great heroes, says he has " read their reports 
twenty times and will continue to read them until the 
next victory." He " thinks the rebellion virtually crushed 
and not much more to be done," tho, in writing this 
optimistic opinion, he was trying to comfort his wife, 
who was much troubled by what appeared to her his 
great dangers and his long absence. 

At last the painful delays of the court-martial came 
to their end. On March 1, at Point Pleasant, he had 
notice that it would sit at Charleston on the 5th. He 
was there at one o'clock in the morning, but the mem- 
bers of the court were not all there until the 7th. His 
diary on the 8th reads : " My case called at 1 o'clock. 



93 



Pleasant day." " My case " means, not the case against 
himself, but his case against DeVilliers : but it was post- 
poned to the 10th. On the 9th his diary only says Sun- 
day. Went to church. Pleasant day." 

Now, after more than ten weeks of keen anxieties and 
many struggles, tormenting him in a hundred ways, came 
the day which, to his simple, honest mind, appeared big 
with fate. But it was a very welcome day, and he was 
ready and confident. 

Here ought to be told just what was to be tried, — 
what the two cases were. They were both to be tried 
by this court. A court-martial must be composed of 
officers of whom at least some are of rank superior to 
that of the officer under trial. So the " President " of 
this court was a Brigadier-General — Hugh Ewing, a 
son of the famous Old Tom Ewing " of Ohio and a 
brother of the General Tom " Ewing who was distin- 
guished in the war in Missouri, as well as brother-in- 
law of General Sherman. 

The case against DeVilliers was called first, on the 
morning of March 10. The charges against him were, in 
form, but one charge, with many " specifications." This 
charge was " Violation of the 83rd Article of War," 
which was ''Any commissioned officer convicted before a 
general court-martial of conduct unbecoming an officer 
and a gentleman shall be dismissed the service." 

Whoever aided Captain Lane in preparing the charge 
and specifications was little, if any, more skilful than 
himself in the work. They show lack of experience and 
good advice. The specifications disclose ground for mak- 
ing charges under two or three others of the Articles 
of War,* as well as under the 83rd. In fact eight of the 
specifications do not come under Article 83 at all; but, 
as it happened, this defect did not prevent a conviction. 
We have not a copy of the proceedings of the court — only 
of the charges, specifications, conviction or acquittal and 
sentence, — but we can assume, that the court treated 
the charges against DeVilliers as if amended at the trial 
to conform to the evidence presented. 

* It should be noted that the Articles of War are not a code 
devised by the War Department or subject to its modification, but 
are statute law, enacted and amended only by Congress. 



94 



There were thirteen specifications under the charge 
against him. The first was upon a gross and vulgar in- 
sult to Lieutenant McAbee, of Company F of the regi- 
ment;* the second, upon the insult to and personal abuse 
of Captain Lane and his company on the occasion of the 
action at Cotton Hill already mentioned; the eighth, 
upon an insult to and personal abuse of Lieutenant Alex- 
ander, of Company B (afterward Adjutant and killed in 
action) ; the ninth,* the general charge that he was " in 
the habit of insulting officers under his command and 
making use of unofficerlike and ungentlemanly lan- 
guage;" the third, that on November 11, 1861 (at the 
battle of Cotton Hill) he " made a speech " to officers 
and privates of the Second Kentucky infantry, in Ger- 
man, in which he used the " reproachful and provoking 
language " — Gentlemen : I am glad you com.e ; the 
ofl^icers and men of the Eleventh Regiment are cowards " ; 
the fourth* and fifth, that he had obtained a sum of money 
from the sutler of the regiment upon a false and fraud- 
ulent (written) statement; the sixth,* that he had seized 
(without authority) certain cattle in the country near 
Gauley Bridge, sold them to the QuPvrtermaster and kept 
the money; the seventh,* that he had plundered the house 
of a citizen at Point Pleasant and had taken from it a 
sum of m_oney, silver-ware and much other personal prop- 
erty, all of which he had appropriated to his own use; 
the tenth,* that he had arrested a citizen of Mason 
County, Virginia, and t^wo negros, slaves of other citizens 
of that county, and refused to release them until he was 
paid a sum of money for each of them, and had appropri- 
ated the money to his own use ; the eleventh, that he had 
brought two soldiers of Comipany K to his quarters, put 
them under oath and required them to give information 
upon which charges might be made against their Cap- 
tain (Lane), and this after Captain Lane had filed 
charges against him; the twelfth, that, v/hile himself 
under arrest, under charges, he had advised a corporal 
of Company K not to obey an order issued by Lieutenant- 
Colonel Coleman, then in command of the regiment; and 

* See pages 103, 104. 

On the specifications marked thus * he v/as found guilty, on 
the others not guilty. 



95 



the thirteenth, that he had delivered to General Cox a 
letter which was addressed to General Rosecrans, con- 
taining charges against Lieutenant-Colonel Coleman, 
then in command of the regiment, made by two privates at 
his (DeVilliers') suggestion. 

This thirteenth specification is not clearly drawn, and 
it must iseem, to most readers, rather indefinite. It was, 
I think, intended to charge a violation of the army regu- 
lations in trying to reach Department Headquarters di- 
rectly with charges against a regimental officer, instead 
of taking the required military channel " thro the 
brigade-commander, and, at the same time, " conduct 
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman " in acting per- 
sonally (being then under arrest, he had no official com- 
mand) for private soldiers in promoting their charges. 
It must have been well known to him that the soldiers 
could have filed charges against the regimental com- 
mander in the regular manner, thro their captain, and 
that they would be duly forwarded thro the brigade 
adjutant, unless obviously trivial or false or malicious. 
The explanation is, naturally, that these charges were 
really his own and that the soldiers were meanly used 
as a cover in a'n attempt to injure Colonel Coleman. The 
comment already made upon a lack of good sense in 
DeVilliers seems quite justified. 

When the case was finally called and the trial begun 
Captain Lane found himself excluded from the court- 
room, altho he v\^as the accuser and had filed the charges. 
Whether this was due to a rule adopted by this particular 
court or by the Judge-Advocate-General of the army at 
that time I do not know. It was a serious disappoint- 
ment and discouragement to Captain Lane, who thought 
it highly important that he should be present, to aid the 
Judge-Advocate with information and suggestions. The 
fact was, that he distrusted the Judge-Advocate, because 
he had heard that, on the boat on the way up to Charles- 
ton, he was " drinking more than was good for a judge- 
advocate," that he had got a favorable idea of Colonel 
DeVilliers and assumed that the charges against him 
were filed by a " sore-head," and because he could not 
get him to spend any time in conferring on the case be- 
fore the trial. But, tho he could not be present in the 



96 



room, -he stood outside the door and wrote questions to be 
asked the witnesses, and must have been able to send 
them in; so that the rule of exclusion seems to have 
been enforced in form only. DeVilliers must have been 
present, tho I do not find it said that he was, nor whether 
he had counsel, nor what defense he made. But to the 
charge and all specifications he pleaded " Not guilty." 

Captain Lane must have had many witnesses ready, as 
he says not one-third of them were examined, altho the 
trial occupied two days. One of his witnesses was the 
Lieutenant-Colonel commanding the regiment (Coleman), 
who told him, when he came out, " how things stood."* 
So it was probably on Coleman's information that he 
wrote in his diary, at the end of the first day — Many 
of my charges thrown out." By " charges " here he 
means the specifications, for there was only one charge 
(as stated above) and on that DeVilliers was found 
" guilty," as he was on six of the specifications. In fact, 
as the limited record we have shows, none were " thrown 
out ", as Captain Lane understood, but all were con- 
sidered in the final verdict, tho as to seven the ultimate 
finding was not guilty." Anyhow he learned enough 
on the second day to give him the satisfaction of writing 
in his diary — I think I have won. DeVilliers is proved 
a scoundrel." 

But near the end of the second day a sensational event 
brought the Colonel's trial abruptly to a close and made 
it not necessary to call more of Captain Lane's witnesses. 
It had happened that a detective of the Cincinnati police 
was at Charleston, a man known to Captain Lane and 
probably to General Cox. Upon certain testimony given 
on the first day, this dectective was sent by the court at 
once to Point Pleasant. The next day he telegraphed a 
report. He had searched DeVilliers's quarters and found 
there " sl lot of stolen property under lock, a trunk packed 
ready to ship, filled with stolen goods, a lot of money — 



* Without the full record of proceedings, this account has to be 
limited and unsatisfactory. I do not find that Captain Lane ever 
had a copy or applied for one, tho he could have obtained it. It 
would be highly interesting (and entertaining) to read the dis- 
cussions in that court and the testimony, especially if DeVilliers 
or counsel for him took an active part. 



97 



over $1000, probably stolen," and papers showing a pre- 
ceding shipment. It also appeared that there was " an 
accomplice at Charleston." 

The court thereupon closed the trial (the civil courts 
would now take charge of the criminal acts, i. e., in addi- 
tion to the action of the court-martial), ordered the ac- 
complice arrested and sent under guard to Wheeling for 
trial, changed DeVilliers's arrest to " close confinement " 
{" they have got him here in jail," writes Captain Lane 
on March 15), and, for the purposes of a final judgment 
on the trial, " took the case under advisement." That 
ancient phrase always sounds particularly wise, judicial 
and carefully considerate of the interests involved, but 
quite too often, as in this case, it only covers unneces- 
sary and injurious delay. 

When the work of the court was completed, it was 
necessary to send the proceedings to Washington for 
approval or disapproval, because only there was the 
power to order execution of the sentence in such a case ; 
but in this case, as the evidence made a conviction and 
dismissal certain, the good of the service " loudly de- 
manded that the officials should lose not a day in reach- 
ing final action. The Colonel was in deep disgrace and 
in prison for crime; the Captain who had brought him 
to judgment was himself in disgrace by arrest* and com- 
pelled to remain in camp, seen by all to be without 
authority, awaiting judgment on the charges against 
him, conditions only too favorable to the malcontents and 
demoralizing the v/hole body. But it was two months 
after the real decision of the case by the court (at the 
end of the trial) when the judgment was announced in 
the regim.ent! One could safely risk his salvation upon 
the proposition that there was no sufficient reason for 
all this delay. 

Immediately after the trial of DeVilliers Captain Lane 
was put under arrest and called for trial on DeVilliers's 
charges. This arrest, tho really only formal, was neces- 
sary under the practice, because the penalty, if he were 
convicted, would be dismissal. He had expected arrest 
long before; and the Colonel had tried to have him ar- 



* ^<^e below, on this page. 



98 



rested, but had failed, probably because General Cox 
believed, as already said, that his charges were induced 
by malice. 

There were three charges against Captain Lane, alleg- 
ing violation of the 6th, 7th, and 9th Articles of War, 
and under each charge one specification. Article 6 pro- 
vides that ''Any officer or soldier who shall behave him- 
self with contempt or disrespect toward his commanding 
officer, shall be punished according to the nature of his 
offense, by the judgment of a court-martial." 

The specification was, that " on sundry occasions in 
December, 1861, in the presence of various m.embers of 
his company. Captain Lane did behave himself with con- 
tempt and disrespect toward his comm.anding officer. 
Colonel Charles A. DeVilliers, applying the term 
' scoundrel ' to his said commanding officer." 

Article 7 provides, that **Any officer or soldier w^ho shall 
begin, excite, cause or join in, any mutiny or sedition in 
any troop or company in the service of the United States, 
or in any party, post, detachment or guard, shall suffer 
death or such other punishment as by a court-martial 
shall be inflicted." 

The specifi-cation was, " that between the 15th and 31st 
days of December, 1861, the said Captain Lane did w^rite 
or cause to be written a petition requesting Charles A. 
DeVilliers, Colonel of the 11th Regt. O. V. to resign his 
commission ; and that in his efforts to procure signatures 
to the said petition the said Captain Lane made such 
false statements as were calculated to create a feeling of 
hostility and prejudice against the said Colonel Charles 
A. DeVilliers and his lawful authority." 

Article 9 provides, that "Any officer or soldier who 
shall strike his superior officer, or lift up any weapon, 
or offer any violence against him, being in the execution 
of his office, on any pretense whatsoever, or shall dis- 
obey any lawful comm.and of his superior officer, shall 
suffer death, or such other punishment as shall, accord- 
ing to the nature of his offense, be inflicted upon him by 
the sentence of a court-martial." 

The specification was, " that on the 1st day of January, 
1862, by the order of Colonel Charles A. DeVilliers, com- 
manding the 11th Regt. 0. V., 2nd Sergt. John Girten of 



99 



Oo. K, 11th Regt. 0. V. was promoted to 1st Sergeant 
of said Co. K, and Corporal Elliot McGowan of Co. K 
was promoted to Sergeant in said Co. K, and that the 
said Captain Lane refused to acknowledge said appoint- 
ments and did place the said John Girten and Elliot Mc- 
Gowan under arrest, because of their having obeyed the 
orders of the said Colonel DeVilliers." 

To all the charges and specifications Captain Lane 
pleaded " Not guilty." 

Courts-martial take their methods and practice, sub- 
stantially, from the civil courts, and " Not guilty " does 
not mean a denial of the facts alleged, but a denial of a 
violation of the law, even if the facts can be proved as 
alleged. In fact, all of the allegations in the specifications 
were substantially true, except the one that " false state- 
ments " were made in obtaining signatures. Captain 
Lane had spoken with contempt and disrespect of the 
Colonel and had characterized him as a " scoundrel," both 
directly and to others; he had written the petition re- 
questing the Colonel to resign and obtained signatures to 
it (which, taken alone, was insubordination, tho hardly 
to be construed as " mutiny or sedition ") ; he had refused 
to recognize the Colonel's promotions in his company, 
and had put under arrest the two promoted, for dis- 
obedience of his own orders ; so that, practically, the only 
question for the court was, whether these acts constituted 
violations of the law as charged. 

Unfortunately, as in the other case, we know nothing 
of the proceedings of the court upon this trial, who the 
witnesses were (except one) , what the evidence was, nor 
anything from which one could guess at the result. But 
the trial was short, not much evidence could have been 
required for the prosecution, and the defense must have 
been merely an explanation of the provocations and 
proof that the statements made in obtaining signatures 
to the petition were not " false ". The diary on that 
date (March 12) shows that Captain Lane was much 
relieved in mind, tho it says only " DeVilliers does not 
make much of a case ". And the next day he was back 
at his quarters at Point Pleasant, under arrest, to begin 
that unhappy experience — " waiting for the verdict," 
knowing that he would not be relieved of the arrest until 



100 



the verdict was officially declared and having at least 
some fear in the possibility that the relief would be by 
dismissal from the army. 

For, notwithstanding his frequently expressed confi- 
dence in a favorable result, he was extremely uneasy. 
Tho he magnified the chances of disaster, they were real 
chances. Under strict construction his acts had made 
him liable to punishment under either or all of the 
Articles of War invoked against him. Under Article 6 
it would be some form of humiliation, and perhaps a fine. 
Under Articles 7 and 9, it could be extreme, that is, 
either death or such other punishment " as the court 
might decree (tho, if death it would be subject to 
the approval or disapproval of President Lincoln). 
While a death penalty was, practically, inconceivable 
under the circumstances, yet the alternative " such other 
punishment " might be of a character not much less pain- 
ful to a man of high nature. 

So Gaptain Lane evidently had the possible outcome 
often in mind during the three months between the filing 
of the charges against him and the official news of the 
judgment, — a period of infernal inward disturbance it 
would be to any one. He felt compelled to tell his wife 
of it, and at last did so, tho not till after the trials were 
over and the probabilities could be judged; and then he 
took care to couple the statement with what he artlessly 
thought an artful device to overcome her fears, saying 
that the other officers were offering to take his chances " 
of the penalties for different sums, ^' from 25 cents to 5 
dollars." Looking on from outside the field of these 
events, however, one sees that the only dread he could 
reasonably have — tho that was enough — would be the 
dread of the consequences of delay in the rendering of 
the judgment, the character of which was now a fore- 
gone conclusion. 

To close the episode without the interruption of an 
account of other events during the two months between 
the trial and the official announcement of the judgment, 
it appears that during that period he remained at Point 
Pleasant, still under arrest and without position or duties. 
A significant disclosure of his state of mind at this time 
is found in his diary on March 24, when only two weeks 



101 



of the two months waiting were gone — The monotony 
of my life is intolerable 

On May 5 an officer (Captain West) from headquarters 
at Wheeling, casually stopping at Point Pleasant, 

brought news of the cashiering of Colonel DeVilliers 
— the first news to reach Captain Lane since the trial. 
To that statement in his diary that day, he adds only the 
words York evacuated " (meaning Yorktown, Virginia, 
in McClellan's campaign against Richm.ond), one of the 
many bits which show that his eager interest in the 
operations of the war gave him some relief of mind from 
his personal troubles. But Captain West's news was 
only camp news and it included nothing about the 
case against himself. 

Three v/eeks before this the regiment was moved to 
Winfield on the lov^er Kanawha, for the beginning of the 
spring campaign in the Kanawha district. Captain Lane 
remained at Point Pleasant (deprived of service by his 
arrest) , and must have found a certain comfort in being 
for a time out of the camp, where he had to feel his 
humiliating position every day; but the day after he 
heard Captain West's story he followed to the camp at 
Winfield, probably feeling sure that the end of his trials 
was now near. 

In fact the end had already been reached, apparently 
a full month before, certainly more than two weeks 
before. It is a shameful proof of mismanagement of 
administration in the Department, that he was not in- 
formed and at once released from arrest when the judg- 
ment was finally approved as rendered by the court. 
Nothing but gross neglect of officials can explain this 
period of delay. In the Horton & Teverbaugh " his- 
tory of the regiment it is stated that the judgment of 
the court-martial was approved April 4, 1862. That date 
may not be correct (no authority is given), but the 
printed official record of the judgments, sentence and 
orders in both cases, issued from Department Head- 
quarters at Wheeling and showing the official approval, 
is dated April 23, 1862. The Department must, there- 
fore, have had the approval at least some days before 
April 23 (for the official routine and the copying and 
printing) ; so there could have been no reason why they 



102 



were not communicated to General Cox and to Captain 
Lane on or before the 23rd, if not on the 4th, of April. 

Two days after Captain Lane arrived at Winfield the 
regiment was moved up the Kanawha, to its old ground 
at Gauley Bridge, and he went along. They reached 
Gauley on the 9th, and the same day he received his 
first certain news of the end of his long war, in an order 
releasing him from arrest and putting him in command 
of his company. His diary of that date reads only " Was 
released from arrest. Have been under arrest two 
months ; and after that nothing more appears in his 
diary at any time relating in any way to DeVilliers or 
either of the cases. 

The judgments we <^irs : In the case against 

DeVilliers, on the fii \j^d eighth specifications, 

charging gross insu" "^^"^ ^ ^Jsonal abuse of certain 

officers, or both, he t ".uun.3}^ guilty " on the first and 

not guilty " on the second and eighth ; on the ninth 
specification, charging a habit of insulting officers under 
his command &c," he was found " guilty " ; on the third, 
charging the use of reproachful and provoking lan- 
guage insulting to the officers and men of his regiment, 
in a speech he made in German to officers and privates 
in another regiment, " not guilty " ; on the fourth aind 
fifth, charging the getting of money by fraud from the 
regimental sutler, " guilty " on the f ourth and " not 
guilty " on the fifth ; on the sixth, charging the seizing 
of cattle in the country, selling them to the Quarter- 
master and keeping the money for his own use, " guilty " ; 
on the seventh, charging the plunder of a citizen's house 
and keeping the goods, " guilty " ; on the tenth, charging 
the arrest by him of a citizen and two slaves of other 
citizens and taking money for their release,* "guilty"; 
on each of the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth, charging 
an abuse of his position in requiring two soldiers of 
Company K, under oath administered my himself, to 
aid him in finding ground for accusing their Captain, 
advising a certain soldier in Company K not to obey a 
certain order issued by the Lieutenant-Colonel command- 

* As showing how pitifully small or weak was good sense in 
this man, he did these reckless acts (reckless because sure to be 
disclosed) for $11.50 from the citizen and $10 each for the negros! 



103 



ing the regiment, and making an improper attempt, thro 
two other soldiers, to get charges made against the com- 
manding officer of the regiment, not guilty But the 
field of all the material specifications was substantially- 
covered by the verdict " guilty " on the first, fourth, 
sixth, seventh, ninth and tenth specifications; so that, 
finally, Of the Charge " (violation of the 83rd Article 
of War) it was guilty 

And thereupon he was sentenced To be dismissed 
from the service of the United States and forfeit all pay 
and alloivances. And the Court orders his property to 
he seized by the Commanding Officer of his post and held, 
subject to future and legal disposition." (The italics 
are in the original.) ^ 

The judgment and se. ^^^(r-. approved except as 
to the order to seize pt>^ ' being referred to 

the United States Dis^-*/., ?^ i or action *\ — i. e., 
for criminal proceeding cue v.iv._. jurts. 

Whether he was indicted or criminally prosecuted in 
a civil court v/e cannot now tell. There is no later refer- 
ence to him of any kind in any of the papers I have seen, 
except one scrap, in a slip torn from a newspaper, show- 
ing no place or date or what paper contained it, tho I 
think there is evidence in the slip that the paper was 
printed during the war, probably toward the end. It 
reads — Charles DeVilliers has been arrested in Balti- 
more on a charge — which he admitted — of passing a 
worthless check. He is the individual of whom Colonel 
Ellsworth learned the famous Zouave drill, and was at 
one time Colonel of the 11th Ohio Infantry 

Captain Lane ought to have had (no doubt he did 
have) unmeasured credit and gratitude for this great 
service and achievement. By his unshakable conviction 
of duty, his courage, tenacity and self-sacrifice, he had 
rendered a service of supreme value to his regiment, to 
the army, and to the country. The cost to him had been 
terrible, but it is sure that he felt amply repaid for all 
in his success, — perhaps especially in having kept his 

promise to " drive such a scoundrel from the Ameri- 
can army ". 

In the case of DeVilliers' charges against Lane : on the 
first charge, that of violation of the sixth Article of War, 



104 



and on the specification under it, that he had " behaved 
himself with contempt and disrespect toward his com- 
manding officer the Captain was found not guilty " ; 
on the second charge, that of violation of the seventh 
Article of War, aind on the specification under it, that 
he had written and procured signatures to a petition re- 
questing Colonel DeVilliers to resign, " not guilty ; and 
on the third charge, that of violation of the ninth Article 
of War, and on the specification under it, that he had 
refused to acknowledge the appointment by the Colonel 
of two non-oommissioned officers in his company and 
put these men under arrest for obeying the ColoneFs 
orders, " guilty : 

''And the Court did therefore honorably acquit the 
prisoner Philander P. Lane, Captain of Company K, 11th 
Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry * * * « ^en- 
tence a.pproved. The Captain is ordered to duty with 
his company." (The italics are in the original.) 

It will seem curious to one not experienced in courts 
and military affairs, that Captain Lane was found '' not 
guilty under the first and second charges and specifica- 
tions when the facts alleged against him were notoriously 
true and were not denied, and that he was found 

guilty " under the third charge and specification, and 
was then honorably acquitted The reasons must 
have been that the Court was satisfied that at least the 
first and second charges were made in malice, and that 
the Captain's provocation was great, if not, indeed, a 
justification; while, as to the third charge, that it was 
merely fatuous, since, under the Army Regulations, a 
colonel had no power at all to appoint a first-sergeant 
and could appoint sergeants and corporals only on the 
recommendation of the captain. That is, that the court 
used an underlying discretionary power to defeat a 
malicious prosecution. 



105 



VIII 



1862: May — August 

Third Kanawha Campaign — Fremont's Campaign for 
the Liberation of East Tennessee — The Kanawha 
Forces Under Cox to Co-operate — Cox Reaches Prince- 
ton — Fremont Fails and Cox Falls Back — Eleventh 
Ohio in Reserve on New River — Battle of Lewishurg 
— Captain Lane on Scouting Expedition — Builds 
Flying-ferry on New River — Commands Corps of 
Sapper s-and-Miners — Makes Forced March to Relief 
of Gauley Bridge — Another to Relief of Charleston — 
Sent to Ohio on Recruiting Service 

Captain Lane's great zeal in the war was not in the 
least cooled by the injuries he had to endure in the affair 
of DeVilliers. The arrest, irksome tho it was in the ex- 
treme, at least gave him time for the news of the war, 
and he thought much and wrote often about it; and with 
never-failing hopefulness and assurance of final success. 
He was so eager to do his share that, as we have seen, 
when his regiment was ordered into the field for the 
next campaign, he went to join it there while still under 
arrest and unable to act, so that he might be on the 
ground for service the moment he was released. The 
troops were then moved up the Kanawha for another 
campaign, and he hopefully went with them, tho still 
without official authority or position, but, as it happened, 
his release and restoration to duty cam_e the very day of 
the end of this movement, at Gauley Bridge, May 9, and 
he was at once actively employed under orders for im- 
m.ediate march in the campaign now to be described. 

There had been, in March, a change in the department 
organization. The Mountain Department " had been 
created, embracing all the mountain region of Virginia 
west of the Shenandoah and all of the present West 



106 



Virginia, and Major-General John C. Fremont placed in 
command. The Kanawha, Gauley and New rivers region 
became the District of Kanawha " in this department, 
under General Cox. 

The first service assigned to Gox under Fremont's 
command was a joint campaign for the relief and occu- 
pation of East Tennessee. The object was one that Lin- 
coln had deeply at heart, as already said, from the begin- 
ning of the war. He was much impressed by the facts 
that there was (in 1861) a real and strong Union senti- 
ment in the greater part of the South and that in cer- 
tain large districts (especially the mountainous ones in 
five or six States) the Union men were strong enough to 
control if assured of the support of the government. 
But the best field for occupation was eastern Tennessee 
and western North Carolina. That region held by a 
Union army would present a most effective object-lesson 
to all parts of the South politically, and, to the distinct 
military advanta2*e thus gained locally, would be added 
the greater one of cutting off all communication and 
trainsportation betw^een Richmond and all the great re- 
gion west and north of the Tennessee river. There would 
be, practically, a stronghold for the Union from the Ohio 
to Chattanooga. If 50,000 men should be required to 
hold the country after it was occupied, there was no 
more valuable service to which that number could be 
put in the war. But a comparatively small a^rmy of 
Northern men would answer, since an army of Union 
men of no mean size could be raised within a hundred 
miles around Knoxville. 

If Lincoln had been willing to neglect the great sub- 
ject — as he was not — he would yet have been pre- 
vented from forgetting it, for even a day, by the impor- 
tunate appeals to him by the people and especially by 
their representatives at Washington. One of the Sena- 
tors from Tennessee, Andrew Johnson, and two of the 
Representatives in Congress, Maynard and Clements, 
v/ere constantly calling upon him for help ; and " Parson 
Brownlow editor of the " Knoxville ¥/hig the widest- 
known and most feared journalist in the South, preached 
every day in his paper unqualified Unionism, detestation 



107 



of slavery, and the right of the Union men to recognition 
and support. 

So Lincoln tried, from the summer of 1861, again and 
again and again, to get some general to make the cam- 
paign, or at least energetically try it. Four different 
generals he specially ordered and instructed to that end, 
and six different times he tried to push them on to action, 
only to be balked by their delays or neglect of opportunity 
or their incapacity. At last, the last one, in 1863, after 
delaying his campaign five months, moved upon Knox- 
ville and took it without a battle, when other events had 
made it easy to do, but when time had largely reduced the 
advantages of the occupation and when thousands of the 
Union men had been killed or driven out. 

In his message to Congress in December, 1861, he 
treated the subject at length ; and followed up his recom- 
mendation by going personally before the proper com- 
mittee, to urge the construction of a railroad, to extend 
from the terminus of one of those already in operation 
in Kentucky toward Knoxville, immediately for the pur- 
pose of supplying troops to be posted in East Tennessee 
and ultimately for the benefit of the country. Then a 
bill for the purpose was presented in the House, but was 
not finally passed. 

In 1861 McClellan proposed two routes for a campaign, 
and when he was moving against Garnett in July he was 
thinking of following up his expected success by march- 
ing on one of them into East Tennessee ; but when he was 
called to the command of all the armies, and could send 
any other general, with whatever forces he might assign 
to him, he gave no further attention to the subject for 
six months. 

When Rosecrans succeeded McClellan in command in 
western Virginia, in August, 1861, and Lincoln called 
upon him for a plan of campaign into Tennessee, he was 
zealous enough, but he thought it necessary first to drive 
the enemy out of the Kanawha district and, even for that 
purpose, to increase his army. And he did get more 
troops, but then he wasted the rest of the year in halting 
and futile local movements, resulting in no gain of terri- 
tory. The next spring, however, he prepared and sub- 
mitted to the War Department a comprehensive plan of 



108 



campaign and urged that he be supplied with troops to 
carry it out ; but in March he was displaced in command 
by Fremont. 

Then Fremont was called by Lincoln into special con- 
sultation on the problem and given special instructions 
for a campaign to be begun in April. But he delayed 
until McClellan's failure before Richmond enabled Lee 
to send a considerable army to the Shenandoah, under 
Stonewall Jackson, who drove Fremont, as well as Banks 
and McDowell, back upon the Potomac. 

Meantime McClellan had highly recommended for pro- 
motion Don Carlos Buell, a friend of his in the regular 
army, then a brigadier-general of volunteers, with the 
assurance that he would take Knoxville. Buell was ac- 
cordingly promoted to Major-General of volunteers, 
placed in command in Kentucky, relieving Sherman ; and 
immediately troops began to pour into his camps. Within 
six weeks he had 90,000 men, or five times the number 
allov/ed to Sherman in the same command. 

He too had a consultation with and direct instructions 
from Lincoln. He was expected, after providing against 
the invasion of western Kentucky, to march himself thro 
Cumberland Gap and establish a permanent post at 
Knoxville. In Jalnuary, 1862, after two months of prepa- 
ration with no sign lof movement, he answered repeated 
inquiries from Lincoln only by saying he was not yet 
ready, and wrote of other fields as if of much more impor- 
tance. Even McClellan finally sharply criticised him and 
reminded him of the initial promises and expectations. 
But his large command had filled his mind with a dream 
of the conquest of the Missippi valley, and he was jealous 
of what he thought the rivalry of Halleck and Grant in 
that field. He finally moved to Nashville, when Grant 
had prepared the way by opening the Cumberland, and 
wholly abandoned the campaign of East Tennessee, altho 
after Grant's capture of Fort Donelson it would have 
been a holiday march. Eight months later, when he had 
defeated Bragg at Perryville and pursued him nearly to 
Cumberland Gap, he could have gone on and taken Knox- 
ville with but one or two divisions; but he halted, and, 
when called to account, answered that the roads were 
narrow and rough. He was thereupon (October, 1862) 



109 



relieved and replaced by General Rosecrans, who had 
abruptly come into high favor upon his victory at Corinth. 
Rosecrans was, indeed, entitled to credit for heroic fight- 
ing at Corinth, tho his obstinate disobedience of repeated 
orders from his superior officer prevented the total defeat 
of the enemy. 

On this promotion Rosecrans was again urged by Lin- 
coln to bend his eff orts promptly to the recovery of East 
Tennessee, and two routes were suggested to him. He 
was ready with sympathy, good intentions and plans, but 
his head was full of other things. As was the case with 
Buell, his elevation filled him with ambition for a wide 
field. First of all he must defeat Bragg in southern 
Tennessee. He spent the whole year in trying to do 
that, from Murfreesboro to Chickamauga, and ignored 
Knoxville except on paper. Indirectly, however, in 
August, 1863, when he drove Bragg in upon Chattanooga, 
thus compelling him to bring troops from Knoxville for 
reinforcement, he made it easy for Burnside to take 
Knoxville from the north. 

Finally, early in 1863, Lincoln sent General Burnside, 
from the Army of the Potomac, to Cincinnati, to com- 
mand in eastern Kentucky, and urged upon him his per- 
sisting purpose to get East Tennessee and uphold the 
Union men. It was a curious choice, for, tho Burnside 
had a high reputation for patriotism, intelligence and 
ready submission to orders, he had none for initiative, 
energy or determination. So again there was a record of 
unnecessary delays. Burnside found much to do in the 
civil affairs of the department; there was trouble from 
small bodies of the enemy at different places ; the return 
of certain troops was awaited; the roads were too bad 
for transportation. At last, again, when Rosecrans was 
advancing upon Bragg at Tullahoma, in June, and again 
when he began the Chickamauga campaign in August, 
Lincoln urged Burnside to move. Then, when Lincoln's 
patience was worn out, near the end of August he did 
move; and, Bragg having called away nearly all his 
troops from Knoxville, Burnside marched in with flying 
flags and bands of music, and was received with the 
greatest rejoicing as the " Savior of East Tennessee." 



110 



In striking contrast to all these generals who saw 
difficulties always in the way, there was one who only 
asked leave to go and take Knoxville. That was George 
H. Thomas, then a brigadier-general, posted at Somerset 
in Kentucky, not far from Cumberland Gap, with six 
regiments of volunteers. In October, 1861, he asked 
General Anderson, then commanding in Kentucky, to give 
him four more regiments and let him march upon Knox- 
ville. He was confident he could take it; but for some 
reason not known Anderson did not act. In November, 
when Sherman succeeded Anderson in command, Thomas 
renewed his proposal earnestly " and said he was sure 
he would take Knoxville and cut off all communications 
between Virginia and the south-west; but Sherman was 
compelled to decline because he then had but 18,000 men 
in the whole State, while the enemy was constantly mak- 
ing and threatening inroads from middle and western Ten- 
nessee. 

Thomas's ten regiments would have numbered on the 
march probably 6000 men. No other general dreamed 
of going with less than several times that number. It 
is an infinite pity that Thomas was not supported. He 
would surely have taken Knoxville and could have raised 
20,000 Union men in East Tennessee, poorly armed no 
doubt, but yet as well armed as their enemies. 

This view is well supported by the fact that when, in 
November, 1861, a report was spread in East Tennessee 
that Thomas was coming, the Union men rose in arms, 
organized, quickly got control of the whole country, and 
held it several weeks, in the belief that a Union army 
was coming to support them. The rebel government was 
greatly alarmed, and it regained possession onb/ by send- 
ing two considerable forces into the country and fighting 
for it ; and then held it by a long course of bloody terror- 
ism. 

Thus Lincoln was entirely right as to the people; and 
so he proved to be as to the political and military advan- 
tages of the occupation when it was once accomplished. 
No occupation of territory during the war caused more 
disaffection in the Confederacy or more anxiety in its 
Eichmond councils, while its armies in Virginia were 



111 



seriously straitened in provisions, which could now come 
only over the inadequate and badly managed lines thro 
the Carolinas. 

Returning now to the Kanawha, in May, 1862, we are 
at the beginning of the only campaign that ever made 
any actual progress toward the relief of East Tennessee 
until the one of General Burnside in August, 1863, above 
described. 

Fremont's plan was approved by Lincoln before the 
end of March, 1862. Fremont was to provide for the 
protection of the Baltimore & Ohio railroad, and then, 
in April, march with 20,000 men southward along the 
narrow valleys between the ranges west of the Shenan- 
doah, and thence along the route of the Virginia & Ten- 
nessee railroad to Newbern and Saltville. Cox was to 
march from Gauley Bridge with 7000 men up the New 
river to Blue Stone river, up that river directly south to 
Princeton and thence thro the mountains, and join Fre- 
mont about Saltville. The combined forces were then 
to move as rapidly as practicable directly toward Knox- 
ville; and Cox's route was to be the line of supply, by 
wagons, from a base to be maintained at Gauley Bridge. 

Cox was to march on the first of May, and he took 
care to be ready and on the road that day ; but Fremont, 
who should have started full two weeks earlier, delayed 
his affairs and did not get started until the 12th of May. 
He was then too late. He had not made forty miles when 
his march was blocked by Stonewall Jackson, who had 
been sent from Richmond to operate in the Shenandoah 
valley; and Jackson drove him back upon the Potomac. 
Cox, who had then reached Princeton, was thus left in a 
remote wilderness, with a force too small to make the 
campaign alone and too small even to maintain itself 
there under the changed conditions due to the abortive 
campaign of McClellan against Richmond. 

In his preparations in April for the campaign Cox 
scraped together all the men he could possibly take from 
post and guard duty in his territory, and thus had about 
8000 men in hand. It was necessary, however, to leave 
a substantial number, to protect his rear and hold the 
intended base at Gauley on the Kanawha. These pro- 
visions seem to have required about 3000 men, and there 



112 



remained hardly more than 5000 for the march to the 
south. 

The troops left behind consisted chiefly of the Third 
Brigade of Cox's command, as then organized, com- 
manded by Colonel George Crook, of the Thirty-sixth 
Ohio, composed of the Eleventh, Thirty-sixth and Forty- 
fourth Ohio infantry, with 100 cavalry and a battery 
of 4 mountain howitzers. Tho a small brigade. Crook 
had made it the most reliable and effective in the Dis- 
trict of the Kanawha. 

Some separated companies of other regiments were 
posted as guards at Gauley Bridge and Charleston, 
Colonel Crook was directed to hold Lewisburg with two 
of his regiments, while the third — the Eleventh Ohio — 
was temporarily detached and placed at Fayetteville and 
Raleigh Court-House, south of New river, on Cox's road 
of supply and under his direct orders. 

Thus the Eleventh Ohio, tho rendering service of special 
importance essential to the success and the safety of the 
troops in the campaign, was not in the marching column, 
nor in any engagement, excepting in the petty incidents 
of scouting and picketing. It did not even take part in 
a small, separate campaign or raid made by Colonel 
Crook with the remainder of the brigade upon the Vir- 
ginia Central railroad. What it did will be told after 
completing the account of the controlling campaign. 

By way of reconnoitring and clearing the road to his 
front. General Cox, at the end of April, sent forward one 
brigade under Colonel Scammon, of the Twenty-third 
Ohio. This brigade marched from Fayetteville to Raleigh 
and thence on to Blue Stone river, a tributary of New 
river, where, on May 1, the enemy was found and resisted 
the advance. Cox pushed on his supporting column and 
Scammon moved ahead, up the Blue Stone, forty miles 
further due south, to Princeton, and occupied that town, 
after a sharp fight, on the 15th. 

McClellan had been so ponderous and slow in his Rich- 
mond campaign that his adversary (Johnston) not only 
sent more troops to Jackson, on the Shenandoah, but 
assigned several brigades of local troops, as well as one 
brigade of regular Confederates, to service in the south- 
west of the State. General William W. Loring, a West 



113 



Point regular, yvsls placed in general command in this 
latter field, and he had one very good brigadier in Gen- 
eral Henry Heth, also a West Pointer. Two other bri- 
gades or divisions, sent into the mountains, toward 
Princeton and the Blue Stone, were commanded by Gen- 
erals Williams and Marshall; but these two appear to 
have acted as if each had an independent army much 
after the foolish example of Floyd and Wise already 
mentioned. But then Hum.phrey Marshall was another 
of those roaring old politicians who encumbered the Con- 
federate army as " generals Between the two they 
lost a good opportunity to make serious trouble for Cox. 
Ma'rshall did, however, by sending two regiments, drive 
out the small detachment Scammon had posted in Prince- 
ton. But the next day (17th) Scammon came up, with 
the remainder of his brigade, and in a spirited attack put 
Marshall and all his men to flight and held the town. 

These events, with information from reconnoisance 
and scouting, now showed Cox that his position was one 
of grave danger. He found the enemy in front and on 
his left flank in numbers larger than his own, and an- 
other body, of unknown number, v/as reported in Wyom- 
ing county on his right. He knew that Loring, with at 
least one brigade, was in his rear, north of New river, 
within striking distance of Lewisburg, where he had only 
the two regiments under Crook ; and there were roads in 
his rear by which the position at Princeton could be cut 
off from Raleigh and New river. Further, tho he now 
had news of Jackson's aggressive campaign on the Shen- 
andoah, there was an ominous lacks of news of any move- 
ment of Fremont southward. This combination of ad- 
verse circumstances, impossible to foresee, now put 
Colonel Crook's command at a risk greater than had been 
considered and compelled Cox to withdraw to a position 
safer for his own forces and at the same time nearer to 
Crook. So he prudently decided to abandon Princeton 
a'nd fall back beyond the east-and-west roads north of 
it, which he did on the 18th, retreating down the Blue 
Stone ten miles, to a defensive position at Flat Top Moun- 
tain, where he opened communication with Crook, estab- 
lished a fortified camp and remained, awaiting events 
and orders. The wisdom of this movement was amply 



114 



justified when information of conditions elsewhere was 
received; but Loring, mistakenly accepting as true a 
boastful report of Marshall, that he had defeated Cox 
and forced him to retreat, at once undertook to " destroy 
Cox " by an attack upon his rear. 

About the 12th, while Cox was marching south on 
Princeton, Colonel Crook, with the available parts of the 
Thirty-sixth and Forty-fourth Ohio, had marched from 
Lewisburg, by White Sulphur Springs, against the Vir- 
ginia Central railroad, which ran from Charlottesville 
to Covington and Clifton Forge. He was successful, 
penetrating beyond (east of) Covington, breaking up 
the road and destroying bridges, and returning safely to 
Lewisburg by the 20th ; but he had found about Coving- 
ton a substantial body of the enemy, part of Loring^s 
command. 

On the 20th these troops, with others provided by 
Loring, forming a brigade of about 3000, with 8 or 10 
guns in three batteries, the whole commanded by General 
Heth, under Loring's orders marched west from White 
Sulphur, to take Lewisburg. Crook expected such a 
movement and, in view of his inferior strength, he could 
have justified a retreat. He had his two regiments of 
infantry and one hundred cavalry, about 1200 men, with 
two howitzers. However, Heth reports that he had but 
2100 men in the battle (that is, not the 3000 just men- 
tioned), including 150 cavalry and his three batteries. 

Crook took position on a low ridge, just west of the 
town, and waited attack; and Heth attacked as soon as 
he could get into potsition. Heth's artillery must have been 
poorly used, since there was enough of it in numbers to 
win the battle alone. The contest was obstinate for an hour. 
Crook yielding no ground ; and it was ended by a daring 
charge made by Crook's right wing, which broke Heth's 
lines and completely routed him. Crook had not enough 
men to risk in pursuit, but on the field he took 4 of Heth's 
guns, 300 small arms and 100 prisoners, besides killing 
and wounding 150 more. Heth's report frankly admits 
the disparity of the forces and his rout, and charges the 
disaster bitterly to the quality of his men. 

This victory assured the safety of all Cox's forces for 
the present, and made Crook Brigadier-General of Vol- 



115 



unteers. It was, however, a peculiar trial to the Eleventh 
Ohio, which was almost within sound of the guns, on the 
other iside of New river, doing nothing of note, while the 
remainder of its brigade was achieving great distinction. 

Another result of the victory was, that it encouraged 
General Cox to plan sl raiding campaign a'gainst the Vir- 
ginia & Tennessee railroad on his own account. Partly 
with that purpose he set about opening a road directly 
across the country, to connect his position at Flat Top 
with Crook's a/t Lewisburg, so that all his troops could 
quickly be joined at any time favorable to a rapid march 
to Newbern. Meantime Fremont telegraphed him that 
he was urging the War Department to send him (Cox) 
more troops, so that East Tennessee could yet be gained, 
— that is, by Cox's army, — on the Princeton-Newbern 
route, but under his (Fremont's) commaJnd. But the 
situation in Virginia, east of the mountains, was then 
very discouraging to the government; and at last. May 
27, Fremont telegraphed to Cox, in effect, that he was 
now entirely diverted to the defense of the Shenandoah 
valley against Jackson and that You must do the best 
you can ". On the 29th he threw out his kst word in 
the matter, in a telegram to Cox, proposing that he 
" make a dash " on the railroad (Virginia & Tennessee) , 
to break the road and return. But Cox saSv further 
ahead than Fremont could, and gave up thought of an 
East Tennessee campaign for the present. He answered 
the telegram proposing a dash " (Fremont had not 
made it an order) , that he thought it best to await the 
recovery of the control of the Shenandoah. And he was 
clearly right. Under the circumstances at the time he 
could not have remained on the line of the railroad, if he 
reached it, more than a day or two, and the damage he 
could do within that time would not only be small, as 
compared with the cost of doing it, but would be repaired 
as soon as he retired. 

East Tennessee had to wait and suffer a year longer. 

But a connection between Flat Top and Lewisburg was 
important for other purposes, even if, finally, it should 
not be for that one ; and Cox went on with the work on a 
connecting road. 

During this period — or at least thro May and into 



116 



June — the Eleventh Ohio was, practically, in an inde- 
pendent service, occupying all the country between Flat 
Top and Gauley Bridge, with headquarters at Raleigh 
Court-House. General Cox frequently sent down orders, 
and Colonel Coleman kept the regiment busily at work 
in scouting, now and then to a considerable? distance, 
especially eastward on both sides of the New and west- 
ward into Wyoming. Ca^ptain Lane had fully his share 
of these movements. 

As a type of that kind of war work (which was very 
common in all the armies in the field), and at the same 
time to keep up the story of his personal service, one of 
his scouting expeditions is here described. All of the 
incidents related would be found repeated in one or an- 
other, or many, of the " scouts " of the war. On May 14 
he had just a'rrived at Raleigh, in a heavy rain, bring- 
ing up from Fayetteville six companies of the regiment, 
including his own, when he was ordered to march, with 
two companies (K and B), as rapidly as practicable, to 
Woodrum's Mill cn Wolf creek in Monroe county, where 
there was reported to be the rendezvous of an organized 
body of " bushwhackers This place, by the route he 
must take, wa's over forty miles southeast of Raleigh, and 
he would have to cross both New and Greenbrier rivers. 

He started at 6 a. m. on the 15th, with 96 men of the 
two companies and 4 officers besides himself. He had 
for guide a man of the country named J. C. Gurton, who 
proved to be capable and faithful. He must have carried 
ratioins for five days, tho he does not speak of that. With 
halts for rest, they marched till 5 p. m., when they reached 
the New river, above a place called Rich Ferry. They 
had then to go four miles up the river, to the home of 
William Richmond. The road was a path which ran 
directly along the shore, sometimes near the level of the 
water, sometimes high above it. It was a rough moun- 
tain gorge. 

The other shore was, or was supposed to be, picketed 
by the enemy, and it was prudent to wait for the night ; 
but the night proved to be very dark, closing in with 
thick clouds and rain. The path was often found to be 
on a narrow strip of rocky ground, dangerously near the 
torrent, so that much of the way the men had to go single 



117 



file and slowly, sometimes feeling their way, under the 
direction of the guide, by the rocky wall on the right 
hand. It was 10 p. m. when they reached Richmond's, 
all safe.* They had the reward of clearing weather, a 
line night, a good supper and plenty of hot coffee. The 
Captain says it was a beautiful bivouac that night 

Richmond had brought in 30 Union men, to join Cap- 
tain Lane's command, armed with the rifles and shot- 
guns of the country, some with flint-lock muskets. They 
were to enlist in the Union army, but they wanted first 
to go on the expedition to Woodrum's. It is a safe 
guess, indeed, that it was upon Richmond's instigation 
that the expedition was ordered and that some of his men, 
a^s well as himself, had private hopes of wreaking ven- 
geance upon personal enemies among the bushwhackers. 
Richmond himself was a remarkable man, — of great 
strength and courage, an uncompromising Unionist and 
the natural leader of the Unionists of his region. 

Next morning Captain Lane organized Richmond's 
men into a company, with him as captain, and the whole 
body crossed the river, using a la'rge boat, and marched 
five miles, to a crossing of the Greenbrier. Not being 
sure of finding boats at the crossing. Captain Lane had 
prudently sent some canoes up the Greenbrier, and they 
proved to be his only ferry-boats. The time required in 



* Captain Lane wrote home, with keen interest, of the grandeur 
and beauty of the scenery of this day's march. He makes a fine 
picture of the lofty heights, the great cliffs and huge rocks, the 
roaring streams and many cascades (there had been much rain), 
and contrasts the splendid natural scenery with the desolation 
brought by the war upon the homes and farms of the poor moun- 
taineers. He rested for an hour at Bragg's Mill on Pinch-Gut 
creek (there are many anecdotes of the extraordinary place-names 
of that region), and observed the coming and going of the mill- 
customers. The miller was a woman and all the customers were 
women (the men were all away, no one would tell where, — most 
of them hiding from enemies in the mountains or hunting them 
as bushwhackers), some coming afoot, some on old horses or mules. 
One "young lady" (as he gallantly calls her) of nineteen came 
afoot, with a bushel of corn in a bag on her back. She had carried 
it five miles. When her "turn " (corn) was ground she shouldered 
the bag again " and tripped off up her mountain path as lightly 
and gracefully as our city ladies would move on Fourth Street." 



118 



crossing so many men in a few canoes caused much 
anxiety, for surprise was essential to the success of the 
expedition, and Woodrum's was only ten miles further. 
As a precaution against the news of his march flying 
ahead of him, Captain Lane had taken every m.an and 
boy he could on the Vvay and m.arched them along with 
him under guard, at the same time v/arning the women 
of the danger for them if they should spread the news. 
So, from the Greenbrier he made the march as rapidly as 
possible, reached the mill before dark, caught Woodrum 
at home and effected a complete surprise. But the bush- 
whackers were not there, — gone only that morning. 

Captain Lane put the miller alid his family under care- 
ful guard, while detachments were sent out to scour the 
country and bring in all the people, to prevent the enemy 
from learning of his presence. At the same time he had 
the premises searched and found ample evidence that 
the mill was really the rendezvous it had been reported. 
The grounds had been used for catoiping with horses, 
there were boxes for guns and ammunition, mess-chests 
and other military articles, while Woodrum's sullen 
silence and ill-concealed enmity confinned the other 
proof. But no one would admit any knowledge of the 
direction or purpose of the m.ovement of the band that 
morning. 

Captain Lane went into bivouac. In the m_orning he 
put his men out of sight, waited for the inhabitants to 
come to the mill with their grist and questioned them; 
but there were no men among them, and not much was 
learned until two boys appeared, each about twelve years 
old. They said they v/ere cousins, the sons of two 
brothers named Sanders. These men w^ere notorious 
Secessionists and bushwhackers, a terror to Unionist 
farailies in several counties for murder and persecution. 
The boys supposed Lane's m.en to be a certain band of 
guerrillas they had heard much of as the Moccasin 
Rangers ", and when they recognized some of Richmond's 
Union men, they supposed them to ha,ve been captured 
by the Rangers. They were so much pleased with this 
idea and the privilege of going among the armed men 
(a privilege allow^ed v/ith a purpose) that they talked 



119 



freely.* This led to the Captain's marching immediately 
upon another guerrilla rendezvous and the sending out 
of a special scouting party to catch the two Sanderses, 
but neither of them was caught. 

The miller Woodrum was obstinately silent or sullen, 
but enough was learned to show that he was intimately 
connected with the rebels and the guerrillas, and Cap- 
tain Lane felt fully justified in exacting such compensa- 
tion as there was in having his men well fed upon the 
eggs, chickens and hams found on the place, an agreeable 
change of diet which braced them up well for the next 
leg of their march. 

The Captain had not been directed to go further into 
the enemy's country, but, upon the information now ob- 
tained, he hoped to gain, substantially, the object of the 
expedition by a quick movement upon the Roberts tobacco 
factory, ten or twelve miles still eastward. Here was 
a Secessionist center and, as reported, another guerrilla 
rendezvous. But, since he was now going on his own 
responsibility, he meant to take as little time for it and 
incur as little further risk as possible. Looking out that 
his men were in as good condition as possible for fast 
marching, he pushed on without a halt of any length, 
arrived early in the afternoon, again with a surprise. 
In fact, his advance guard nearly caught one of the 
Sanders brothers at the factory. He had barely time to 
run to his horse and reach him first. This escape 
troubled the Captain, because the man galloped away on 
the road to Union, the county-town of Mionroe, twelve 
miles distant, where there was an established camp and 
headquarters of rebel troops and surely some cavalry. 
He had also information of another body of rebel troops 
at Red Sulphur Springs, eight miles south of the tobacco 
factory. He had found no guerrillas at the factory, tho 
he learned they were often assembled there ; but he was 

* It may seem hard or unfair to use information unwittingly 
given by the young boys to capture their fathers; but it must be 
remembered that the fathers were already known to be guilty of 
many crimes against Union men, relying for immunity upon the 
lawless condition of the country, that the boys were old enough to 
understand and to boast of their fathers' deeds, and that there were 
Union men present who had suffered, or knew of the death or suffer- 
ing of their relations or friends, at their hands. 



120 



now more than fifty miles from his own camp, the country 
hostile on all sides, and he had no mounted men. It would 
be reckless to go further, reckless to remain even a few 
hours where he was; and he had done all that was prac- 
ticable under his orders. His duty was clearly to counter- 
march for Raleigh and to move as fast as the condition 
of his men would permit. 

But there was a large stock of tobacco in the factory 
and the owners were Secessionists and allowed the use 
of their place as a rendezvous for the guerrillas. The 
Confederate government had out a standing order, re- 
quiring owners to destroy all tobacco and cotton upon 
the approach of Union troops, and this stock had been 
appraised for that purpose. Captain Lane decided not 
to destroy the tobacco,, hoping that his refraining would 
induce the owners to hold it and that it might be cap- 
tured by a foraging train from LoAvisburg, sent upon the 
information he would give. But he let his men take all 
they wanted for their personal use and put good loads 
of the coveted weed upon several horses the men had 
picked up. Then he turned back upon the road to the 
Greenbrier. Wishing to avoid Woodrum's Mill, he found 
a road nearer the Noav river, and marched steadily till 
dark (it was now the 17th), when he bivouacked at the 
farm of one Landcraft, said to be a Union man. 

More Unions men having come in and joined Rich- 
mond's company on the march, the column now numbered 
150, and the provisions were failing. The farmer Land- 
craft being on friendly terms Avith the soldiers as a Union 
man, Captain Lane proposed to buy of him what " meat " 
(bacon and hams) he could spare. Landcraft said that 
he had none, — it had all been used or taken by the rebels. 
But an experienced scouting soldier is shrewd in ob- 
serving signs. On some clue a good supply was found 
concealed on the place, from which the Captain says we 
helped ourselves." And he adds, indignantly, " Such 
Union men, who send Union soldiers starving from their 
doors, are a disgrace to the cause." He might have said, 
with at least equal logic, that, if Landcraft had no meat, 
then that found could not have been his, and must have 
been sent by a benign Providence foT the hungry soldiers. 
By noo^n the next day the Greenbrier was reached,. 



121 



the canoes found where they had been concealed, and 
the crossing made safely, tho slowly. The march was 
then comparatively free from danger, and the foot-sore 
men had some respite. The New was crossed and Rich- 
mond's home reached at five p. m. Here was found an 
order from Colonel Coleman, directing Captain Lane to 
return to Raleigh at once. But many of the men were 
jaded, many foot-sore, and he decided to bivouac at Rich- 
mond's and march at five in the morning. Between that 
hour (on the 18th) and five p. m. he made the remaining 
twenty-six m^iles to Raleigh. On the road he received 
three more messages from Coleman, who had become 
very anxious for his safety. This was due to the failure 
of Cox's march for Newbern, his retreat from Princeton, 
and the closing in of the rebel forces, already mentioned, 
all of this being then unknown to Captain Lane. In fact 
Cox and Coleman had feared that the detachment was 
lost; and they now had the pleasure of congratulating 
Captain Lane upon his judicious and energetic manage- 
ment. 

As already said, this expedition was a typical scout 
In hundreds of instances during the great war some or 
all of the same experiences were met. The figure of a 
" Captain " Richmond, too, was common, and the strik- 
ing incidents of his stormy career were, substantially, 
repeated in many other cases.* 

* One of his adventures occurred not long before this Monroe 
county scout. After many attempts upon him by guerrillas, he 
was captured at his house by a band of them and sent off to some- 
one's " headquarters " under a guard of three men. The guard 
was mounted and he was mounted behind one of them. It would 
not do to trust him on a separate horse, tho of course the three 
were armed and he was not. He knew he would be killed when 
he was delivered to a commanding officer. By some art of his or 
oversight of his captors, they had failed to get his pocketknife. 
Seeing that the double-laden horse kept lagging behind the others, 
he managed to open the knife in his pocket, waited an opportunity 
when the guards were not looking back, abruptly seized the hair 
of the man in his front, jerked back his head and cut his throat, 
seized his rifle, threw him off, and instantly shot and killed one 
of the other guards. The third galloped away in fright, and 
Richmond rode back to his hom.e, fifteen miles, covered with his 
victim's blood. The women were equal to the times. His wife 
had him quickly change his clothes, and while she went and buried 
the bloody garments, he took some provisions and his captured 



122 



Events quickly justified the anxiety about the exposed 
position of Captain Lane beyond the New and Greenbrier. 
Generals Heth and Loring had two brigades of Confed- 
erates in the eastern part of the county (Monroe), por- 
tions of them being within three or four hours march of 
the Roberts factory when Captain Lane was there, and 
a movement westward was then intended. In fact Heth's 
advance to attack Crook at Lewisburg, already described, 
followed closely upon his (Lane's) countermarch. 

Crook having firmly established himself at Lewisburg 
by defeating Heth and Cox being settled indefinitely at 
Flat Top, the proposed direct road between them became 
very important. They were hardly more than thirty 
miles apart, but the wild gorge of New river lay between 
and there had never been any means of crossing but the 
rudest ferries at the very few places where the river was 
not in rapids or cascades, each ferry being merely a small 

flat " operated by pulling on a rope stretched from 
bank to bank, but impracticable in the frequent rises of 
the water. One of these ferrying places was a few miles 
above the mouth of Greenbrier, near the present town of 
Hinton, and was known as Pack's Ferry. 

When Floyd retreated from the country a few months 
before, he obstructed the road from Raleigh to Pack's 
Ferry, a work most effectively done, there being plentiful 
materials in the great forest trees of the country, which 
were felled across the road, a^nd rocks thrown down from 
cliffs and precipitous slopes. Captain Lane says that he 
found miles of the road filled with such trees and rocks. 
General Cox's staff engineer, sent to inspect the road, 
reported that it would be impossible to open it within any 



rifle and hurried off to his hiding haunts in the mountains, know- 
ing that there would be a search for him. 

He had a sister of the like courage. Just before Captain Lane's 
expedition, when guerrillas appeared in the neighborhood, prob- 
ably to get her brother, she rode from her father's house, in the 
night, six miles, to warn him, riding in the darkness the same 
path along the New river which Captain Lane found so difficult 
and dangerous for footmen. About the same time she joined her 
father in defending their home against a set attack of guerrillas, 
taking a rifle from a weak-kneed male inmate, with caustic re- 
proaches, and using it effectively. But such events were only too 
common in the war, especially in the mountain regions. 



123 



time practicable for the purpose intended. An officer 
sent down with a detachment of the Twenty-third Ohio 
(apparently to try the job), returned and reported that 
the road could not be reopened and that a sufficient ferry- 
boat could not be built because no materials were to be had. 

But Cox regarded the passage as necessary, because, 
without it, either he or Crook might be compelled to fall 
back on Gauley. Remembering Captain Lane's exploits 
as a practical engineer, he consulted Colonel Coleman, 
with the result that Lane was ordered to take two com- 
panies and open the road, and, on getting that done, to 
establish a post at the ferry and build a boat large enough 
to carry 200 men or two loaded army wagons. The 
order was received by Captain Lane at Raleigh May 24, 
four days after his return from the Monroe county scout- 
ing. At that time Cox had news of Crook's signal defeat 
of Heth, upon which his spirits rose to a hope or plan 
of being ready for a quick junction of his troops and 
Crook's upon any favorable opportunity for a bold in- 
dependent campaign against that Virginia & Tennessee 
road. 

Early on Sunday, the 25th, Captain Lane marched from 
Raleigh with 140 men of Companies K and G and 4 
wagons. The evening of the 26th brought them to the 
beginning of the blockade on the Pack's Ferry road. All 
the 27th and till noon of the 28th he kept half his men 
vigorously at work on the road, while the other half 
maintained the several picket-guard posts required. 
There were various reports of parties of the enemy in 
the vicinity and it was thirty miles from the nearest 
Union post. 

¥/ith axes, bars, hand-spikes and levers of all kinds 
and sizes the seventy men attacked the blockade upon a 
plan of cutting a passage but ten feet v/ide. This was 
probably not so wide as the staff-engineer had assumed 
to be necessarj% but it was wide enough for the immediate 
purpose, and the Captain clearly realized the value of the 
earliest possible use of the road. In the same economy 
of time, the removed material was not dragged away, 
but only piled up alongside the passage, so that there 
was, more or less, a wall close on each side. By noon of 
the 28th the Captain sent to Colonel Coleman a report 



124 



that the Raleigh road was clear to Pack's Ferry, and the 
weary pioneers moved on to the bank of the river and 
prepared their bivouac for the night. Not all were 
allowed rest, how^ever. On a report that a paily of the 
enemy had been seen lurking on the other side of the 
river a detachment was sent over in the night to recon- 
noitre, returning after daybreak without result. That 
morning all the command not on guard-duty was at work 
preparing for the boat-building and scouring the country 
for tools and lumber. The post at Raleigh had been able 
to supply only axes, while augers, saws, planes and other 
tools were needed. 

The ferry had long been owned and operated by a man 
who lived there, on a farm occupying all of the small 
area of tillable land, having a house and outbuildings 
remarkable in size for that country, and some slaves. 
He was also the Baptist minister of the region. Captain 
Lane applied to him for any lumber or materials he had 
that could be used in building a boat, but he said he had 
none. While detachments of his men hunted the farms 
south of the river for materials, the Captain crossed with 
a guard and hunted the north side ; but all returned with 
either little or no success. Then he went again to the 
reverend person and told him that he must have lumber 
and that, if it could not be had other^vise, he must tear 
it from some of the buildings on the place, but the good 
man said he knew of none nearer than a certain mill, 
where there was a plenty. This mill was twenty miles 
away and that much further in the enemy's country. 
Something in the man's expression in saying this aroused 
the Captain's suspicion; and he went out and sent small 
parties to search thoroly the whole place. One of them 
soon ran in to report the discovery of a large lot of 
planks artfully hidden in an oM building. It had been 
provided by the pious owner before the Union army ap- 
peared in the countrv^ expressly for building a new boat. 

While the men were gleefully drawing out the lumber 
the Captain went to the house and " politely requested my 
reverend friend to lend me his yoke of oxen, to haul it 
dowTi to the river ". Encouraged by his success in bor- 
rowing the oxen, he then asked his reverend friend to 
" lend him the use of his blacksmith shop for a few days 



125 



In short he quickly turned the whole place into a boat- 
building plant, and took care to have the doings of the 
minister constantly watched. There was the further 
good fortune of finding a sufficient quantity of tow and 
caulking materials concealed in one of the barns, — which 
had been forgotten by the owner, like the lumber. 

Two great " poplars (tulip-trees) near the river 
were felled for gunwales; and, with every possible man 
at work, at the end of two days a substantial boat was 
in the water — forty feet long and twelve wide, — " as 
tight as a bell and floated like a duck as the much 
pleased builder wrote to his wife. 

The position of the detachment was so remote and 
exposed as to invite attack. A bold raider could easily 
cut it off from either Raleigh or Flat Top, while a small 
party with a single field gun, on the north side -of the 
river, could break up the camp. Captain Lane had no 
means of reconnoitring to a distance and was thus at 
the risk of a surprise. He had asked for cavalry and, 
after three days, seven were sent him, — too small a 
party to be of any important use ; but later the number 
was increased to thirty, and two companies of infantry 
(of the Twenty-third Ohio), with two howitzers, came in 
from General Cox. With this reinforcement the position 
and the ferry were fairly safe. 

The new boat was to be moved by a " pulling-rope " 
stretched across the river or by large oa'rs, or by both, 
and a two-inch rope or hawser known to be at Gauley had 
been sent for, but before it arrived the river suddenly 
rose (from heavy rain) and the rush of the current pre- 
vented the use of the oars. Tho this difficulty was not 
surprising, it pointed to the danger of having some impor- 
tant movement of troops interfered with by a sudden 
rise, which might be high enough to put out of use the 
oars and the pulling-rope. Captain Lane thereupon de- 
cided to make it a flying-ferry (sometimes called 
"flying-bridge"), a form not often used, but known 
from ancient times. The current at Pack's, being quite 
evenly swift, even at low water, was well adapted to the 
purpose, and the river could only rarely rise so high as 
to prevent the running of such a boat. 

Accordingly, he built a crib and sunk it, loaded with 



126 



stone, in the middle of the stream, four hundred feet 
above the line of crossing. One end of the hawser was 
then anchored to the crib and the other fastened to the 
middle of the upstream side of the boat, and a guy-rope 
was run from the hawser to each end of the boat. When 
such a boat is ready to start, the guy at the outer end 
is shortened and the current, then striking the boat at an 
angle, drives it out from the shore. As it cannot go 
down the stream, because held by the hawser, it must go 
across, on the principle applied in sailing a ship " to 
wind'ard ". 

The soldiers were much amused by the incredulity of 
the natives on seeing or hearing of the movement of the 
ferry, v/ho fancied there Avas some unholy trick in prac- 
tice. The old negro ferryman, who had been pulling a 
" flat " across there all his life, refused to go on the boat, 
in the fear that only the devil could make it run without 
the labor of any man. 

Captain Lane and his men wanted to get back to their 
regiment at Raleigh when their road and ferry work 
were done, and Colonel Colem.an v.^as equally desirous to 
avoid any further separation of his companies. On his 
urgency General Cox released them on June 12, and the 
next morning they marched for Raleigh, leaving the 
Twenty-third Ohio detachment to guard and operate the 
ferry. They bivoucked half Avay, dreaming of the lighter 
work and comforts of a real camp, but, when he was about 
to resume the march early the next morning, the Captain 
received from General Cox an order, to return to Pack's 
and build another boat. So their march was a counter- 
march, and the next morning, Sunday, they were at the 
ferry at work upon the new job. 

The second boat was to be larger than the first, — fifty 
feet in length ; but with more men and wagons now avail- 
able the search for lumber could be carried further. The 
tall poplars for gunwales had to be brought from a dis- 
tance, because, as they could not be hauled, they must be 
found on the bank of a stream above the ferry, in a place 
convenient for throwing the great logs into the water, 
to be floated do\\Ti. Tho the work on the second boat Avas 
thus double that on the first, it was done by practiced 
hands, and the new boat was launched within a few days. 



127 



It was intended to fasten the two boats together, stem 
and stern, and move them as one. This required a re- 
adjustment of the flying-apparatus, but the Captain was 
much gratified to find that the two moved even better 
than the one had done. The wonderful ferry was com- 
pletely successful. It would now carry about five hun- 
dred men at a time, or five or six wagons or guns and 
caissons. 

Captain Lane was now in great reputation in the army ; 
and, with commendable recognition of the accomplish- 
ment of all this heavy and skilful work on the road and 
the ferry, under peculiar diflficulties and with such 
limited means. General Cox, on June 22, issued 
" Special Orders, No. 25 by which Captain Lane and 
his company were constituted a Corps of Sappers and 
Miners for this Column, to be placed on extra duty and 
relieved from all guard and scout duties; and will be 
under the orders of Colonel Whittlesey, Chief -Engineer."* 

There was one purpose of immediate importance, how- 
ever, in making this order, namely, to leave Captain 
Lane and his men free from all em_ployment except that 
upon the ferry. Rebel forces were now hovering about 
the region, considerable bodies aproaching the ferry, and 
General Cox was anxious to have the passage ready for 
full use at the earliest time possible. He increased the 
number of men at the ferry to eight or nine hundred 
and added a full battery of artillery. The enemy were 
watching, with the purpose of attacking upon any favor- 
able opportunity, but did not find courage to trj^ until 
some six weeks later. 

When this order was issued the work on the ferry was 
not all done, and the Sappers-and-Miners " remained 
there ten da,ys longer, completing and correcting their 
work and adjusting the operation of the boats, so that 

* Captain Lane, in a letter to his wife, tells of this order, and 
says " it is an honorable distinction And he adds, with 
justifiable pride, " I am now in the position held by McClellan in 
the Mexican war But McClellan would not have thought of 
building a ferry in such a place, with such materials and tools. 
He would have called upon the Government to send a vast quantity 
of materials and tools fitted specially for the purpose, and then 
waited for it to come, in the serene assurance that the responsi- 
bility was then on the Government and not on himself. 



128 



little instruction would be required by green hands. In- 
deed, the detachment now wanted to stay at the ferry. 
The air and the water were fine there, their tents had 
been sent up from Raleigh, and they were raising bowers 
to shelter them in the hot mid-day sun. They were so 
near the end of their special work that on Sunday, June 
22, the two companies " celebrated " by taking a whole 
day for rest, the first workless Sunday for five weeks. 
They did not even " attend service ", did nothing but 
" wash up " and " loaf The Captain thought this re- 
markable enough to put in his diary. But any colonel 
is troubled by the separation of his companies, and 
Colonel Coleman got the two under Captain Lane ordered 
to move to Raleigh as soon as their work at the ferry 
was completed. Accordingly, the last improvements and 
additions being finished on the 5th of July, on the 6th 
they marched for Raleigh, and the next day settled in the 
camp of their regiment. 

Unfortunately, the use of the remarkable ferr^^ was 
short-lived. Loring's rebels were watching its construc- 
tion, their pickets were seen on the other side of the river 
from time to tim.e, and a body of them was encamped on 
the river near " The Narrows eight or ten miles above. 
But Loring was cautious about attacking. It was just a 
month after Captain Lane left the ferry, finished, when, 
under Lorings's orders. Colonel Wharton came, with 900 
men and 2 rifled 10-pounders, to destroy the ferry and 
the camp. He did not venture to cross the river, but 
tried a safer course by planting his two guns on an eleva- 
tion on the east side, half a mile above the camp, and 
posting sharpshooters along the shore opposite it. This 
was the morning of August 6. 

It seems rather discreditable to the officer commanding 
at the post, that he did not know of the presence of the 
enemy until the shelling began. The first effort of the 
enemy was to reach the boats, and one of them was 
struck before they could be moved out of range. But the 
damage done was not material, and it was repaired within 
a day. For the rest, the attack was only an annoyance. 
The guns were turned upon the camp, but did no harm, 
and the sharpshooters were not bold or skilful enough to 
get one victim. The howitzers and field guns on our 



129 



side made a g^ood defense, and at night the rebels with- 
drew, their imaginative colonel reporting to Loring an- 
other victory. Loring apparently believed his tale, for 
he immediately sent to his War Department one of those 
ridiculous reports so common (on both sides!) during 
the war, saying that Colonel Wharton had killed twenty 
of the Yankees, had destroyed their boats, broken up 
their camp and compelled them to throw their supplies 
into the river to prevent their capture, every item in the 
report being wholly imaginary. 

But only ten days later the ferry had to be destroyed 
by General Cox, when he abandoned the country under 
orders to move, with the greater part of his troops, to 
eastern Virginia, to reinforce Pope's army, then opposing 
the advance of Lee toward the Potomac after the calamity 
of McClellan's failure at Richmond. 

Captain Lane remained at Raleigh with the regiment 
from the 8th to the 25th of July, but repeatedly off duty 
for two or three days at a time because of illness. The 
ten weeks of continuous severe labor and special responsi- 
bilities were followed by the natural reaction. Indeed, 
he had been a full year under a great strain of both 
nervous and physical powers. The extraordinary labors 
he was charged with during the five months of the 
Kanawha campaigning from July to December '61, im- 
mediately followed by the four months of keen anxieties 
in the struggle to free the regiment from DeVilliers, 
would be strain enough upon the health of any one, and 
he was not of robust constitution. The ten weeks more 
of hurried labors and constant anxieties under a new 
test iof his abilities brought him to the limit of endur- 
ance. During July he was compelled several times to ask 
for relief from duty for a day or two at a time. When 
he felt bestter " from time to time, however, he took the 
usually light duty of " Officer-of-the-Day and the rest- 
ing, coupled with new marching orders for his company, 
braced him up. 

There was a raid by rebel cavalry upon Summerville 
(northeast of Gauley Bridge) on July 24, which caused 
much alarm at Gauley and Charleston; and a call was 
made upon the Raleigh troops for help. Several com- 
panies of the Eleventh Ohio were ordered out, and Cap- 



130 



tain Lane was glad to go in command. He marched 
July 25, on two hours' notice, and, with some rest on the 
road during the night, made the forty miles to Gauley 
within twenty-five hours, — a remarkably good march. 
Two companies were then sent on to Summerville, to re- 
occupy the post. With the other companies (including 
K) Captain Lane went into camp at Gauley, v/here they 
remained until August 10. During this period, to keep 
the men occupied and escape the discontent sure to arise 
in camp in idleness, he had the men daily on drill and 
under inspections, tho only early or late in the day be- 
cause of the great heat of the weather. 

On the 10th the garrison at Charleston was alarmed 
by a report of an intended attack. Captain Lane was 
ordered down with the companies of the Eleventh he 
then had in camp. He started immediately, at six p. m., 
and, with a rest of two hours in the night, reached 
Camp Piatt, ten miles above Charleston, before ten a. m., 
doing better, relatively, than even in the march from 
Raleigh to Gauley. It was a waste of effort, however, 
there being no sufficient cause for the alarm ; and he was, 
the same day, ordered to return to Gauley. But this 
march was easy, a bivouac over night being allowed. 

The commanding officer of the regiment, Lieutenant- 
Colonel Coleman, had become much concerned about 
Captain Lane's health, seeing that he could not supply 
the place of so valuable an officer if his illness should be 
serious or long. There was no colonel since DeVilliers 
was dismissed (the regiment had been so diminished in 
numbers that it was not entitled to have a new colonel), 
the major at that time was of little use, because of a cer- 
tain a,ntagonism of officers and men toward him (due to 
his having been appointed by the Governor from out- 
side"), and Captain Lane thus happened to be the com- 
mander's right-hand man. He did not like to apply for 
a sick-leave, and the Colonel finally proposed to get him 
ordered to go to Ohio on recruiting service. This would 
accomplish two highly desira.ble purposes at once and 
would avoid the discredit of " going home sick Gen- 
eral Cox gladly approved, and on August 15 issued a 
formal order directing Captain Lane to proceed at once 
to Ohio on recruiting service for the regiment and con- 



131 



tinue until further orders. He started at once (expect- 
ing the order, he had got ready), rode down to the 
" Falls the head of navigation on the Kanawha, and 
on the morning of the 17th the " Silver Lake " was carry- 
ing him down the river, the happiest man in the army. 



132 



IX 



1862 : August — October 

Eleventh Ohio in " Army of Virginia " Under Pope — 
Camp at Washington — Battle at the Stone Bridge on 
Bull Run — Again Under McClellan — Campaign of 
Antietam — Battles of South Mountain (or Sharps- 
burg) and Antietam — Colonel Coleman Killed — In 
McClellan' s Bodygvxird — Returned to the Kanawha 

But often the best-laid schemes of men go wrong. 
Captain Lane was hardly half-way on his journey when 
his regiment was assembling under urgent marching 
orders for the east; and he just missed one of the great- 
est campaigns in its history. As Gaptain Lane was not 
in this campaign, it is not described in this book; but, 
as his company and regiment had a very effective and 
honorable part in it and one result of it was a great 
change in his service in the army, a brief account ought 
to be given. 

When McClellan's campaign against Richmond col- 
lapsed, in June, 1862, Lee determined upon an aggres- 
sive campaign in the north. He had already an army 
on the Shenandoah under Jackson and Ewell, and now, 
with large reinforcement, he moved to Charlottesville and 
took general command. McClellan lay idle in his camp 
on the James, afraid to move. Halleck, then " General- 
in-ohief," organized at Washington another army (the 
"Army of Virginia ") under General John Pope, and gave 
him, among others, all troops in western Virginia. 

The troops under Cox on the Kanawha were then 
ordered to join Pope, but their commander was not in- 
cluded in the order. Cox begged leave to go in command, 
and got it. By the rivers and the Baltimore & Ohio road 
he moved all his available men to Washington, reaching 
there August 25. They were then provisionally organ- 



133 



ized as a division, in two brigades, of which the First 
was composed of the Eleventh, Twelfth and Twenty- 
third Ohio regiments, commanded by Colonel Scammon, 
of the Twenty-third. 

On the 27th Colonel Scammon was sent with the 
Eleventh and Twelfth Ohio, by rail from Alexandria, to 
reinforce a New Jersey brigade then holding the stone 
bridge " on Bull Run, a conspicuous position in the 
famous battle of July 21, 1861. They arrived in the 
afternoon, only to find that the New Jersey brigade had 
just been attacked and driven off. The two regiments 
were at once engaged in the hottest battle they had known 
up to that day. Without knowing it they were opposing 
a determined effort of General Stonewall Jackson, with 
two divisions, to get possession of the bridge. Forced 
from one position to another in several struggles, and 
Jackson having got the bridge, the two Iregiments were 
withdrawn at night and moved back to Alexandria. 
Their losses were the severest in their history. The 
Eleventh lost, among others, its Adjutant, Alexa(nder, 
who was mortally wounded and died in hospital. 

Cox's division remained in camp near Washington 
until Lee crossed the Potomac, early in September, after 
defeating Pope at Manassas. All troops were then con- 
centrated and sent against him; and McClellan, in spite 
of his repeated failures and persistent disobedience, was 
placed in command. His dilatory methods at once ap- 
peared. He was nearly two weeks on the march to 
Sharpsburg, less than a hundred miles from Washington. 

On this march, at Frederick, on the 12th, Moor's bri- 
bade (the Second) of Cox's division had a sharp engage- 
ment with a raiding force of Lee's cavalry, in which it 
suffered some loss in all its regiments, including the cap- 
ture of Colonel Moor. The Second brigade was then 
reorganized, the Eleventh Ohio was added to it, and Gen- 
eral Crook placed in command. And the division was 
attached to the Ninth Army Corps, commanded by Gen- 
eral Reno, which was part of General Burnside's " left 
wing " of the army. 

The Ninth Corps was the first to reach and strike Lee, 
near Sharpsburg, thus opening the great battle of South 
Mountain ". Cox's division was conspicuously engaged. 



134 



especially all the regiments of Crook's brigade, the 
Eleventh Ohio, with the others, suffering severely; and 
the Corps commander, Reno, was killed. McClellan then 
allowed Lee two whole days to choose another positio>n, 
when he attacked him, on the 17th, in the famous battle 
of ''Antietam." Cox had succeeded Reno in the command 
of the Ninth Corps, leaving Crook to the command of his 
division. The chief part in the battle for the possession 
of the stone bridge on Antietam creek fell to this division. 
After repeated assaults it took the bridge in a splendid 
charge, and then held it permanently. The Eleventh Ohio 
again lost many, and among its killed was its noble com- 
mander, Lieutenant-Colonel Coleman. 

McClellan's conduct at Antietam is wholly indefensible. 
Whatever his plan of battle was, there was a conspicuous 
lack of co-ordination of his forces in action. Here and 
there a corps or a division was left to a desperate and 
prolonged struggle, with the advantage to the enemy, 
while other troops lay idle within full hearing or sight 
of the battle. When, at night, the battle ended, two 
whole corps had been in it only nominally. A concerted 
attack the next day would have defeated Lee, but Mc- 
Clellan lay in camp two days, " waiting for reinforce- 
ments," altho he already outnumbered Lee two to one; 
and then he permitted Lee to recross the Potomac, un- 
molested, within a few miles of his camp. And even then 
he made no pursuit, but remained in camp six weeks, 

getting ready " and having grand reviews, while Lee was 
resting and reinforcing hardly fifty miles away. On one 
occasion his explanation of his delay was, that the 
horses had sore tongues and were much fatigued a 
report which brought from Lincoln one of the few bits 
of sarcasm found in his writings.* And it was on a visit 
to McClellan at this time that he made the famous re- 
mark, that it was not an army he saw, but " only Mc- 
Clellan's bodyguard." Finally even Lincoln's patience 
failed, and when McClellan at last crossed the Potomac 

* October 24, 1862, Lincoln tele^aphed McClellan — " I have 
just read your dispatch about sore-tongued and fatigued horses. 
Will you pardon me for asking what the horses of your army 
have done since the battle of Antietam that fatigues anything?' 
A. Lincoln." 



135 



and, instead of moving against Lee, went into camp 
again, he peremptorily removed him, and never again 
cailed him to service. 

While McClellan's army thus lay idle in camp m 
September there were loud cries from western Virginia 
for help, the enemy having taken the Kanawha valley 
down to Charleston and driven the garrisons from many 
posts between the Kanawha and the Ohio. General Cox 
was ordered by Halleck to return with his division ; and 
he was promoted to Major-General for his fine service in 
the late campaign and his command of the Ninth Corps 
at Antietam. 

Finding that the Union troops in the Kanawha region 
had been reduced to mere garrisons at posts, the rebel 
General Loring set out from Salt Sulphur in Monroe 
county, to redeem the country. But first, toward the end 
of August, he sent a body of cavalry under General Jenk- 
ins, to raid the posts north of the Kanawha. Jenkins rode 
north along the Greenbrier to Huttonsville, then turned 
west and captured half a dozen small posts, destroyed 
such supplies as he found, threatened Point Pleasant, 
forded the Ohio at Ravenswood, made a spectacular cir- 
cuit of twenty miles in Ohio, recrossed at Racine, then 
crossed the Kanawha at Buffalo, and, by the way of 
Logan Court-House, rode to meet Loring at Charleston. 
But Loring was not there yet and Jenkins did not ven- 
ture to attack the post, but rode on to Raleigh. He had 
done something he could boast of, but nothing of sub- 
stantial military value. 

As to Loring, he was too cautious to move until he felt 
assured the field was easy. About September 7 he 
marched from Salt Sulphur, with 5000 men, crossed New 
river above Fayetteville, drove the sma;ll garrison there 
back upon Gauley Bridge and then both garrisons down 
to Charleston. On the 12th he reached Charleston, but 
found the post evacuated, all the troops and supplies 
having been safely removed to the Ohio. He then settled 
comfortably for a stay at Charleston and issued a procla- 
mation " To the people of Western Virginia," in which 
he said he had reclaimed their country for them and " you 
can now act upon your obligation to support your Gov- 
ernment and serve in the army." But there was no re- 



136 



sponse, and he found nothing to do but enjoy his con- 
spicuous position as commander for a month. 

Relieved from service with McClellaai's army of the 
Potomac, Cox's division set out on the 8th of October 
for its old field in the Kanawha valley, carrying with it 
a very handsome acknowledgment of its services, with 
thanks and high praise, from General Burnside. It was 
so much delayed for trains on the Baltimore & Ohio road 
that it did not reach Clarksburg until the 15th. There 
Crook's brigade was stopped and encamped, with the 
purpose of marching across the country to Gauley Bridge, 
while the remainder went on to Parkersburg, under Cox, 
to be moved up the Kanawha by boats or by land, as 
might be practicable. 



X 



1862 : August — October 

Captain Lane in Ohio — Fills the Eleventh With Recruits 
— Organizes and Commands Troops in Defense of Cin- 
cinnati Against Bi^agg — Promoted to Colonel — Re- 
joins in Virginia and Takes Command- — Finds Bad 
Conditions and Begins Reforms. 

Meantime Captain Lane had been very active and 
very successful on his recruiting service. He was in 
Ohio two months, but unexpected events threw him, un- 
der orders, into a very different service during three 
weeks of that time. He arrived at Cincinnati the 18th of 
August, was in Columbus the next day, and for two 
weeks was busy in selecting recruiting officers and get- 
ting them lat work in the important towns in his quarter 
of the State, at the same time picking up many men 
himself. Then the service was suddenly checked and he 
himself taken off it during three weeks, as one of the 
results of the operations of the enemy in Kentucky. 

General Bragg was marching north, thro Tennessee 
and Kentucky, driving General Buell toward Louisville, 
and General Kirby Smith, who, tho commanding a 
separate Confederate Department, was, practically, 
Bragg's right wing, was moving directly toward Cin- 
cinnati. It was the common belief, both north and south, 
that Bragg and Smith had a fixed purpose of going to 
the Ohio No doubt that was their underlying purpose ; 
but Bragg lacked a daring spirit, delayed his march in 
Kentucky, permitted Buell to cut him off from Louisville 
and, some weeks later, to defeat him at Perryville and 
drive him out of the State. Smith was hardly more 
aggressive, but he had a much smaller force — only 12,000 
to 15,000 — and, tho a portion of his troops, at their 
extreme advance, appeared within a few miles of the 



138 



Ohio, opposite Cincinnati, there was no attempt to attack. 

Smith's movement did, however, cause much alarm in 
Ohio, where, of course, his strength was much exagger- 
ated ; and all other affairs were subordinated to the work 
of concentrating defensive troops at Cincinnati and along 
the river above. Such regiments and detachments of 
the regular volunteers as could be reached and many 
companies of the State militia were hastily collected at 
Camp Dennison and Cincinnati, and all officers of the 
volunteers who happened to be available (at home on 
leave or on special service) were impressed and employed 
in organizing and training this mixed provisional army. 
Captain Lane, with his long and active experience in the 
field, was a highly valuable acquisition, and General 
Wright, commanding at Cincinnati, loaded him with 
orders and employments, in advising as to the measures 
for defense, organizing the incoming troops, training the 
militia, and finally marching in command of different 
bodies to the supposed fields. He first led a force of 1300 
militia to Anderson's Ferry, and then, when Smith was 
reported to be nearing the city, he crossed the river and 
held Fort Mitchell and vicinity with 2200 volunteers and 
militia; and, at last, when the militia was well under 
the command of other officers, he was assigned to the 
command of the One-hundred-and-eighteenth Ohio in- 
fantry, which had arrived to take the front. 

There was a little skirmishing or picket-firing beyond 
the forts in Kentucky, but Smith himself, much further 
south, turned off to the west, and marched to Frankfort, 
where Thomas promptly attacked him, drove him south, 
and ended his campaign. 

The scare being over. General Wright relieved Captain 
Lane (September 20), and he at once resumed his work 
of recruiting for his regiment. The same day came news 
of the death of Lieutenant-Colonel Coleman, killed in 
battle at Antietam. 

One effect of this episode of an advance upon Cincin- 
nati was lan increase in the number of recruits, and 
within three weeks more there were enough to fill the 
regiment. An entire new company was raised at Dayton, 
under the immediate service of Joseph P. Staley, who had 
been a lieutenant in the Eleventh. This company became 



139 



" I Staley being commissioned Captain, and the regi- 
ment had now, for the first time, the regulation number 
of ten companies. Another company was raised at Cin- 
cinnati, immediately under Captain Lane's direction, to 
take the place of the old Company E, which had become 
much diminished in number and was finally disorganized 
by the resignation of all its officers, the remainder of the 
men being distributed into other companies. Thus the 
zeal and practical labor of Captain Lane, within two 
months and with hardly more than five weeks' actual 
employment, had brought his regiment up to full strength, 
and beyond the number at which it was entitled to have 
a colonel again. He was greatly pleased, as indeed were 
all in the old regiment. 

This achievement, added to those in the field for which 
he was already highly respected, led the regiment to 
call for his promotion. In their camp at Antietam, in 
the old American fashion, they had an election " (with- 
out his knowledge) and a petition was sent to the Gov- 
ernor to make him Colonel. There seems to have been 
no dissent among the men and the officers were unani- 
mous. The Governor said he would do it on the approval 
of General Cox, which was at once gladly given. The 
commission was accordingly issued October 9, to date 
(to " rank ") from September 17, the date of the battle 
of Antietam and the death of Lieutenant-Colonel Cole- 
man.* On the 14th the new Colonel was in Columbus, 
received his commission, and was mustered-in. 

Captain Ogden Street, of Company C, was then pro- 
moted to Lieutenant-Colonel, to succeed Coleman, and 
(Major Jackson ha'ving resigned) Captain Asa Higgins, 
of Company G, was promoted to Major. Both these 
officers were highly capable, and the regiment now had 
a body of field-officers who could hardly have been ex- 
celled in ability in any regiment in the field. In Company 
K First-Lieutenant George Johnson was promoted to 
GaptaJin, in place of Lane, promoted. 

There was for the present a plenty of work for all 
field and staff officers, to bring the regiment up to that 
plane of discipline and military value which they, or at 



* See page 135. 



140 



least the Colonel, intended. From the death of Colonel 
Coleman and Adjutant Alexander the command and 
administration had been poor and ineffective, and the 
regiment had fallen off much from the pride and self- 
respect it had shown while they were in office. 

Colonel Lane spent a few days clearing up the recruit- 
ing business, and then, on the 17th, left Cincinnati to 
join his regiment at Clarksburg. He arrived on Sunday 
the 19th, with 180 of the recruits. Other parties had 
been forwarded and more were yet to come. The first 
two days he spent in learning conditions and making 
preparations for his first orders, so that when he formally 
took command (on the 21st) the much-needed reforms 
were at once initiated. He had found the regiment (as 
he wrote in a private letter) " in bad condition, the men 
dispirited, lacking in discipline, in order and cleanliness, 
lacking in clothing, some without shoes, some without 
shirts, some without trousers, and the sick not well cared 
for." But he also found a responsive spirit. The mere 
fact of the presence of a permanent commander would 
have a certain moral influence, and the well-knov/n deter- 
mination and zeal of the new colonel added much more. 
Improvement began from the hour of the first order and 
developed rapidly. 

The recruits, of course, required much attention. They 
now constituted more than one third of the men, they 
had had but little training in the rendezvous in Ohio, 
many of them none at all, but they had at once the great 
advantage of living and working side by side with " old " 
soldiers. This close association with experienced troops 
is, probably, of more value to recruits, in practical ways, 
than any drilling or school of instruction. It rouses their 
pride and spirit of emulation. The criticism or ridicule 
of a veteran has a kind of terror for a recruit. 

The second morning, tho he knew the present camp 
was but temporary, the Colonel began regular daily drill, 
battalion and company; but he was able to get in only 
three days of it. 



141 



XI 



1862: October — December 

Fourth Kanawha Campaign — Continuous Storms Ob- 
struct — Colonel Lane Commands Post of Summerville 
— Builds Sawmills and Improves the Town — Expedi- 
tion to Cold Knob and Capture of Rebels' Camp — Ex- 
traordinary Winter Storm — Impassable Roads — 
Winter-quarters — End of Year 1862 

On the 24th came the marching order, and at eight 
a. m, of the 25th the column was on the road for the 
Kanawha, distant about one hundred and twenty miles. 
It was then called Crook's Division, composed of the 
Eleventh, Twelfth, Twenty-third, Twenty-eighth, Thir- 
tieth and Thirty-sixth Ohio infantry and three batteries of 
artillery. And there was a long wagon-train of rations, 
forage, ammunition and baggage. The road was by 
Weston, Jackson, Bulltown, Sutton, Big Bush and Sum- 
merville, to Gauley Bridge, all of it hilly and a part very 
rough. There was the ill luck of a great storm, with 
cold winds. The night of the 27th, when Jackson was 
reached, was " a terrible night of rain and cold, — the 
worst of the war," the Colonel wrote. It was so bad that 
all the next day there v/as not even an attempt to march ; 
and still on the 29th the road was so heavy with mud 
that, tho the men moved very slowly, the train lagged far 
behind them, keeping back the tents and reducing the 
food for the remainder of the march. 

General Crook halted the division at Summ.erville 
November 3, and held it in cam.p there a week, waiting 
for the laborious dragging up of the supplies. But Gen- 
eral Cox v/as a little ahead with the other division, hav- 
ing occupied Charleston on the 31st and Gauley Bridge 
on the 2nd. 

Loring had just begun the evacuation of the valley, 



142 



upon news of the arrival of Cox's troops at Clarksburg, 
when he was relieved by order and sent to another com- 
mand. General Echols, on the 17th of October, on his 
way west to take Loring's place, found three of Loring's 
brigades moving up New river and turned them back for 
Charleston, v/here he remained in command till the 27th, 
when Cox was moving up the Kanawha and Crook was 
well on his way to cut him. off at Gauley. On that day 
he (Echols) heard that the enemy, 12,000 strong, was 
within ten miles. This was far from true, as to either 
numbers or distance; but he left Charleston that night 
and, by forced marches, reached safety, at Fayetteville, 
on the 29th. 

It is interesting to note that Echols judged, " from 
the strength of the enemy and size of their trains ", that 
" They will endeavor to penetrate to the Virginia & Ten- 
nessee railroad So he " v/ould make a stand, but it is 
impossible to get forage." He was then near Raleigh 
Court-House, and says he is looking for forage to be sent 
him from Lynchburg ! — that is, more than a hundred 
miles and across all the mountain ranges. Coincident with 
these prophecies of Echols appears a rem.ark in Colonel 
Lane's diary, v/hich shows that it was expected also in 
Cox's army that it would undertake a campaign against 
the Virginia & Tennessee road as soon as the Kanawha 
valley was recovered, tho this may have been due only to 
their knowledge that they had been, for more than a year, 
expected to make such a campaign and now saw that 
their movem_ent was in that direction. If there was any 
such purpose, however, at Washington or department 
headquarters, it was effectually prevented by the early 
and terrible winter weather in the Virginia mountains, 
making wagon transportation literally impossible. 

On the 11th of November General Crook moved on 
toward Gauley with four of his regiments, leaving the 
Eleventh and Twelfth Ohio at Summerville under com- 
ma,nd of Colonel Lane. Two days later Lane was ordered 
by Crook to send the Twelfth on to Gauley and to remain 
with the Eleventh in comma^nd at Summerville as a per- 
manent outpost. 

This was the most important command he had yet held. 
It wa*s the principal outpost for both Charleston and 



143 



Gauley Bridge and it was peculiarly exposed to attack, 
especially by raiding cavalry. It had been captured by 
the enemy three times within a year, twice with the most 
of its garrison, tho on each of these occasions the garri- 
son was small. He felt his responsibility and was proud 
of it. He set about the improvement of the defensive 
earth-works, kept his officers on the alert in scouting and 
reconnoitring parties, and personally looked after his 
picket-posts. A week after he was ordered to remain, 
seeing that he was likely to be held there all winter, he 
moved the camp near the town, placed it in a position 
for best protection and quick movement, and kept the 
men busy with devices for better shelter and comfort. 
They could build chimneys to their tents and sheds with 
the few bricks they could get, stones, sticks, mud and 
emptied barrels, but for other purposes they much wanted 
boards a;nd other sawed material. An old saw-m-ill for 
water-power was found, and the Colonel directed the re- 
pair of it, intending to set it up on a creek near the town. 
At the same time he was building an oven for bread- 
making, which seems to show that he had some flour, tho 
it may be he only expected to have it. All other rations 
had fallen short and hard-bread was gone. The train 
from Clarksburg had not arrived, did not arrive, in fact, 
until nearly two weeks after the troops, so that it must 
be that at least limiited supplies were received from 
Gauley Bridge by the 10th or 12th. 

He also undertook some improvement of the town. It 
had been a beautiful little town, the " seat " of a pros- 
perous county (Nicholas) and the home of many well- 
established families, but the war had brought ruin. It 
had been occupied and reoccupied by the troops of both 
sides, suffering from one side because of its Union citizens 
and from the other because of its Secessionists. Several 
engagements had been fought in or near it ; and now two 
families, of low degree, were all that were left. The 
abandoned houses had all been used by the armies for 
one purpose or another, the court-house had been de- 
stroyed, the jail used as a military guard-house, and the 
principal church had been cleared of pews, pulpit and 
windows, and used as a stable for cavalry. If it must 
be a town of soldiers. Colonel Lane meant it should be at 



144 



least a decent one, orderly, clean and healthful. And one 
of his first reforms was to redeem the dishonored church 
and restore it to its proper use. 

But on November 23d these active and zealous employ- 
ments were interrupted by an order to Colonel Lane to 
march on the 24th. A camp of rebel cavalry had been 
reported on the Cranberry branch of Gauley river, about 
fifty miles east of Summerville. General Crook ordered a 
raid upon it, to be made by the Eleventh Ohio, 500 men, 
under Colonel Lane, and the Second Virginia cavalry, 
400, under Colonel Paxton. It seems that neither colonel 
was given command of the whole, but the tvv^o were di- 
rected to meet on the " Cranberry road " on Cold Knob, 
at eight o'clock a. m. of the 26th, forty miles from Sum- 
merville. Colonel Lane wrote a brief note, only acknowl- 
edging the order and saying he would be there on time 
If he had known what was to happen he would have said 
the same thing, but would have been much troubled. He 
marched early on the 24th, crossed the Gauley by noon, 
and spent the rest of the day on the long ascent toward 
Job's Knob, a lofty and conspicuous peak. The next day's 
march began in rain which continued steadily till even- 
ing, when there was a change to sleet and snow with 
wind and rapidly increasing cold. No one could escape 
getting wet. In the night they reached the top of Job's 
Knob, forty miles from camp, in severe cold. Here there 
was to be a bivouac, but only small fires could be per- 
mitted, as the enemy was, or was supposed to be, near 
and discovery must be avoided. Clothing and shoes were 
frozen and some or many of the men had to be kept mov- 
ing about C' in a circle," it is said) for fear they would 
freeze. It was a terrible night. The storm ceased before 
morning, but the cold on the mountain top was intense. 
At daybreak the column moved on and reached Cranberry 
road on Cold Knob at eight o'clock, the place and time 
appointed; but the cavalry was not there, and the 
Eleventh waited for it four hours, still exposed to the 
bitter cold wind. 

When the cavalry came the two colonels conferred and 
agreed upon their action. The position of the rebel camp, 
as reported, was six or eight miles ahead, no enemy had 
been met, and a surprise seemed to be assured. 



145 



As agreed, Colonel Lane moved forward in advance as 
rapidly as practicable, with the cavalry close behind, until 
he uncovered and drove in the rebel picket-post, when he 
halted and opened his ranks to let the cavalry through. 
Colonel Paxton at once dashed forward in a mounted 
charge upon the camp, with a complete success. As the 
camp could not be wholly surrounded on the instant a 
portion of the rebels escaped, but 20 or 30 were killed 
or v/ounded, 117 captured, with about 100 horses, a lot 
of arms and ammunition, and all the cam.p equipage. 

Colonel Paxton v/anted to go on, in pursuit or to extend 
the expedition, but Colonel Lane declined. His men had 
just walked fifty miles under exceptionally hard condi- 
tions vx^hile Paxton's were mounted. He had been di- 
rected to take but five days' rations and, even if he set out 
for camp at once, he would have to reduce the ration 
before he got thro: to go further into the wilderness 
would be imprudent, to say the least. There could be 
no reasonable chance of catching the flying rebel cavalry, 
especially not with infantry, 'and the men were already 
worn out by their long march and climbing, while the 
snow lay deep in all the region. Colonel Lane was clear 
that he ought to return to Sumxmerville, and he started 
as soon as the men had rested and eaten; and Paxton 
could do nothing but follow. 

The march was picturesque enough, but pitiful. The 
deep snow was now frozen and the northwest wind was 
in the faces of the silent, plodding column. As far as 
one could see there was only the unbroken wilderness of 
mountain and forest, a)ll white in the snow. In spite of 
the hardships of the march and his fears for his men. 
Colonel Lane was much interested in the wonderful 
beauty of the scene, especially in crossing Job's Knob the 
next morning. This bold summit gave a view unlimited 
in all directions. In the crystal atmosphere after the 
winter storm he saw, in rare clearness, the endless ex- 
panse of hills and mjountains, nearly all more or less 
covered with forests of evergreens, which all now hung 
heavy with frozen snow. The rising sun behind filled the 
whole scene in front with brilliant, sparkling light, and, 
in quick succession, appeared to set all the eastern slopes 
on fire, while the deep valleys and gorges lay in dark 



146 



shadows. No wonder the Colonel's letter showed his de- 
light in what they saw that morning, nor that the toiling 
soldiers forgot their sufferings while the wonderful 
spectacle was impressed upon their memories for life. 

As they dragged on down into the lower lands they 
found less snow, but also they had less food. The last 
two days there was little more than coffee and sugar left ; 
but they had the luck to find a few cattle and at least 
escaped hunger. They reached Summerville the evening 
of the 28th, without the loss of a man, and " thought they 
had got to Paradise ". Colonel Paxton's command stayed 
there with them till next day, and then went on to Gauley 
Bridge. An entry in Colonel Lane's diary the next day 
brings to an old soldier a sympathetic memory : " The 
Second Virginia Cavalry destroyed and stole half we had 
in camp ". 

The second day after the return was Sunday, the day 
of " inspection ", when all officers are expected to see that 
their camps 'and men, with their clothing, arms and 
equipage, are ail in the best condition and order; and all 
the men 'are formally paraded for those purposes. 
Colonel Lane's controlling isense of duty is illustrated by 
the entry in his diary, as if failing in what he ought to 
do, that on that day he did not order inspection because 
it was so stormy and cold — a quite sufficient reason, 
considering that any weather described by him in those 
words would be called very harsh indeed by almost any 
one else. 

The early coming of winter in these persistent storms 
was causing much trouble for the army in the Kanawha 
valley, and especially at Summerville, All the supplies 
had to be hauled in wagons from the steamboat landing, 
fifty miles, the rains and snows, the freezing and thaw- 
ing, had made the clay roads almost impassable and, for 
some reason not given, the wagons and teams for Sum- 
merville were very few. They could not take animals 
or wagons from the supply line even for hauling the neces- 
sary fire-wood, and that the men had to carry on their 
backs. Wagons were sometimes four to five days work- 
ing their way from the river to Summerville. And now 
there was a fear that the river would freeze and block 
the receipt of supplies, preventing the steamboats from 



147 



going down and others from coming up, while land trans- 
portation would be, to say the least, extremely difficult 
and slow. 

In the midst of the>se harassing conditions fate, in the 
shape of an indiscreet invitation given by the Colonel, 
added another. About the middle of November, feeling 
pleased with his post and having a mansion of six whole 
rooms, he wrote to his wife that the weather was good, 
that he had rooms for " boarders and proposed her 
coming, saying that, if she could get two or three other 
ladies (the wives of certain officers) to come with her 
for company, he could provide for them and would send 
an ambulance to the steamboat landing to bring them out. 

He did not hear from her, did not know that she had 
received his letter (many letters were lost in those times) , 
and meantime conditions had greatly changed. The per- 
sistent winter storms had brought great discomfort, 
made the roads nearly impassable for wheels and the 
supply of provisions uncertain, and he had frequent re- 
ports of the movement of guerrilla horsemen. He had, 
indeed, in a later letter, told her not to think of coming 
until warm weather, but did not know that she had re- 
ceived that letter. To his mind it was all in the settled 
past, when, three weeks after the proposal, a telegram 
came to him from Charleston, that his " wife and family " 
were there, ready to be brought out to Summerville. His 
astonishment, his emotions and sentiments, may, perhaps, 
be imagined, but they can hardly be described. He would 
have given anything to have them come up, but it would 
have been recklessly imprudent. Even if he were to go 
down on horseback, he would be two days on the way, 
and meantime the river might freeze and prevent return 
to Cincinnati for an indefinite time. If they were to come 
up, he must send an ambulance and four horses, they 
would be at the best three days on the way, because of 
the deep mud and many hills, they would have to sleep 
and live in the ambulance, and it might be seized by guer- 
rillas. He cut the knot by telegraphing her to turn back 
at once and go home. 

What she thought and felt may also be left to the 
imagination. She had been invited to come, had traveled 
a hundred and forty miles, and was now, as it seemed to 



148 



her, only a short distance from his camp. If she thought 
of the possibility of a change of conditions during the 
interval, she did not consider it as likely to present a 
serious obstacle. But she knew that his telegram was to 
be acted upon immediately, and she took the next boat 
down the river. It does not appear how many of the 
children she had with her, but the Colonel's sister Ellen 
was in the party, — an unhappy, disconsolate party. The 
Colonel was a long time getting over the misfortune. He 
wrote to her a long letter, explaining the conditions and 
difficulties and adding that, under present circumstances, 
he might any day be ordered away upon an expedition 
and that he could not bear the thought of leaving her and 
the children alone at Summerville, exposed, as they would 
be, to privation and danger. 

But, if he could not forget the domestic episode, he 
had enough to do to keep his thoughts busy. The work 
already laid out and the difficulties to be overcome in ob- 
taining materials for it and the constant struggle with the 
heavy roads in bringing up the necessary supplies from 
the river left no room for leisure or quiet. The water 
saw-mill had to be given up, because the stream proved 
too fitful and uncertain in supplying the wheel. A circular 
saw, carriage and boiler, designed for steam-power, were 
found (the parts " scattered all over the country " and 
incomplete) , and the Colonel undertook the construction 
of a steam-mill. With his devices in repairs, supplying 
missing parts and adding necessary apparatus, this mill 
succeeded ; and great improvements in the camp and the 
town soon followed. After sa,wing materials for the 
better shelter of the men and animals and the supplies, as 
well as for walks in the camps and along the streets where 
especially needed, the repair of buildings was undertaken. 

In this latter work a chief purpose was the restoration 
of the principal church. The Colonel sent to Gallipolis, 
at his own cost, for window-sash, glass and hardware, 
had the building thoroly cleaned and renovated, a pulpit 
built and benches to fi_ll the place of the pews, put in all 
new windows, restored the doors, repaired the roof and 
exterior walls, and with a couple of weeks of work by will- 
ing hands, had the church completed and ready for use. 
Chaplain Lyle arrived from Ohio while this work was 



149 



going ion and was zealously identified with it to the end. 
The sash and glass were slow in coming, but on the last 
Sunday in the year the Chaplain held a service in the 
church,— a kind of dedication, — and the crowd was so 
great that hardly half could get in, so that another serv- 
ice was held in the afternoon. 

Yv hen Mr. Lyle arrived from Ohio this time he brought 
a large quantity of donations " for the regiment, but 
they reached Summerville after him, his wagons making 
only ten or twelve miles a day in the deep mire and tak- 
ing five days from the river. On the 16th of December 
he and all the regiment v/ere immensely pleased in the 
distribution, most of them receiving packages from their 
own homes or friends and the others sharing liberally in 
the general supply. 

Among the many efficient chaplains in the volunteer 
army, Mr. Lyle seems to have been in the first class. He 
had great good sense, bore the hardships of the field 
cheerfully and on equal termis with the men, was remark- 
ably well adapted for the services he rendered, and was 
held in high respect land esteem thro all his army career. 
Other chaplains did much for the spiritual v/elfare or 
personal comfort of their men, but Mr. Lyle was unceas- 
ingly employed, with excellent judgment, in a success- 
ful combination of religious care and practical service.* 
The donation party " above mentioned was only one of 
several that he organized and personally promoted during 
his time, going to Ohio, travelling thro several counties 
in collecting the goods, and bringing them into the field 
several wagon loads at a time. At the same time his 
religious services in the camp were always treated with 
respect and well attended, usually driav/ing men from 
other camps, perhaps especially becau'se he had a remark- 
able skill or " gift " in public addresses. One of them, 
just before the regiment went into battle at Chickamauga, 
will be spoken of later — the most striking and effective 



* There were, unfortunately, many others who were not effec- 
tive, — unfitted by temperament for the life, mistaken in their con- 
ceptions of their practical duties and opportunities, and so in 
their methods in dealing with the men. There was thus a great 
number of failures and resignations among them, bringing the 
office more or less into contempt in the minds of the men. 



150 



scene on the religious side of the army life that I know 
of. Chaplain Lyle could have said^ at the end of his 
services in the Eleventh Ohio, that every man in it v^as 
his friend; but especially between him and Colonel Lane 
there grew up a personal respect and attachment that 
lasted, unmarred, until the separation of death. 

The end of the year 1862 brought the Eleventh Ohio 
nearly to the end of its service in Virginia. It happened 
that that service covered just the period of the struggle 
of the western part of the State for the overthrow of 
secession and the erection of a new State. The slave- 
holders and politicians of the eastern part of the State 
(it vv^ould be a juster limitation to say the southeastern 
part) , in their mad attempt to impose secession upon the 
whole State,* made the fatal mistake which led directly to 
a permanent geographical ^and political division and re- 
duced their State from its proud position as one of the 
greatest of the States in territory, population and political 
power. In December, 1862, the many disappointments, 
sacrifices iand sufferings of the Unionists in the forty 
western counties were rewarded by the assured creation 
of the new state of West Virginia; and our Eleventh 
Ohio had the credit and honor of a. conspicuous share in 
the work of its redemption and final establishment. 
After that time, tho Union troops were maintained at 
different places in defense against raiding and guerrilla 
bands and took part in certain campaigns in aid of opera- 
tions in eastern Virginia, there was never any danger of 
reoccupation by Confederate forces. 

Tho a winter campaign in West Virginia was now im- 
practicable, as already said, rumors still persisted in the 
camps of a campaign the immediate object of which would 
be the Virginia & Tennessee railroad ; but the War Depart- 
ment could hardly have considered seriously such a cam- 
paign. The difficulties of winter transportation over the 
mountains would alone have prevented or defeated it. 

* See the history of the regular convention, which sat in Rich- 
mond, February- April, 1861, and of the other (self-appointed) 
convention, which was organized and sat in another hall, near by, 
during the latter part of that period and openly threatened and 
intimidated the regular convention, — an amazing and shocking 
proceeding. 



151 



The service of the regiment, however, was busy enough, 

— constant, indeed, and interrupted only in some parts 
when storms were at their worst. The heavy picket- 
guarding and unceasing fatigue details, with reconnoiter- 
ing or scouting marches, may have been thought by the 
men sufficient employment, but the Colonel steadily 
maintained drills, except in impossible weather, and sel- 
dom permitted even a storm to prevent his Sunday in- 
spections, which were made in a very close and exacting 
manner, including every officer and soldier within the 
camp. He also established a " School for Officers " which, 
under the Army Regulations, all officers not actually on 
other duty at the time are required to attend. It may be 
remarked that this duty of commanding-officers, under 
the military law, was much neglected in most of the vol- 
unteer regiments. Another of the duties, in regular 
course, of a regimental commander was the " muster " 
of his regiment at stated intervals. The last day of 1862 
was muster-day, but that day was marked by another 
burst of weather, making any formal action on the 
parade-ground quite impracticable. But Colonel Lane 
had his church. He says that in a " furious snow-storm " 
he turned the regiment out and mustered it in the church ! 

— the last act of the service of 1862. 



152 



XII 



1863: January — March 

The Kanawha Brigade Sent to Nashville — Desertions on 
the Way — Joins the " Armij of the Cumberland'' — 
Colonel Lane Loses His Regiment 

[As compared with the year 1862, not much can now be learned 
of the particulars of the service of Colonel Lane and his regiment 
during 1863. They had become part of a great army in the field 
operating together toward one object, and in such service the work 
of any one commander or regiment is not often conspicuous in 
relation to that of the others. Then Colonel Lane made but few 
official written reports. It looks as if he never made them unless 
directly ordered to do it. His brigade commanders seem to have 
done not much better. And, altho the great campaign of Chicka- 
mauga, occupying three months, comes within the year, bringing 
out a vast quantity of printed reports and accounts, there is but 
little to distinguish in detail any one colonel or organization. 

The letters preserved of those he wrote during the year, tho as 
many as in 1862, tell not so much of his daily service as those 
did. But this was only the natural effect of accumulated experi- 
ence. As we grow more and more accustomed to any kind of life 
the familiar things drop from attention, and only the larger seem 
worth any thought. Finally, if the Colonel kept a diary in 1863, 
it has been lost. 

So, altho there are several sources of information for 1863, none 
of them are full or without gaps and uncertainties; and the per- 
sonal story must be pieced out from scanty and disconnected 
materials.] 

The beginning of the year brought a great change for 
Colonel Lane and his regiment. Their service in the 
Kanawha and New river region had seemed to them 
interminable and unprofitable. A constant succession of 
marches up and down, back and forth, on the sam.e roads, 
always with hard labor, scouting the rough mountain 
ways in search of elusive bands of rebels or guerrillas, 
petty and inglorious fighting now and then, only one cam- 
paign of importance undertaken and that abruptly ended 
when hardly begun, no service that appeared to them to 



153 



have a'ny practical bearing on the war, except in one 
instance. They were all tired of it. That exception was 
in the detachment of the brigade in August, 1862, for 
service in eastern Virginia and Maryland, where, in the 
campaign of Antietam, they did bear a very honorable 
part, as already told in the ninth chapter. But no sooner 
were McClellan's battles fought than they were hurried 
back, to be buried again in the western mountains. 

That was the way they thought of it in the Kanawha 
Brigade, from the general down to the last private, and 
they all longed for a wider and (as it seemed to them) 
more effective service. They looked particularly to the 
western fields, where the year 1862 had witnessed great 
campaigns, brilliant successes, and the conquest of large 
territories, contrasting strikingly with the futile opera- 
tions of the year in the east. Colonel Lane wias especially 
filled with interest in these western campaigns. He read 
over and over again the news of Fort Donelson, Mill 
Spring, Pea Ridge, Shiloh, Perryville and Corinth; and 
talked with zealous admiration of the energy and successes 
of Grant, Thomas and Rosecrams. 

But still the brigade seemed condemned to confinement 
indefinitely in the Kanawha valley, and when winter over- 
took them there the men went on grumblingly improving 
the ishelter of their quarters against the constant succes- 
sion of winter storms. At the Summerville post these 
improvements were kept busily in progress under the 
zealous oversight of Colonel Lane, The diary says the 
saw-mill was " running nearly all the time to supply 
the demand for lumber for many uses. Finally a ware- 
house v^as undertaken, to relieve the Catholic church, 
which up to that time had been used for storage of sup- 
plies. 

In the midst of this work came an exciting promise of 
furloughs. As there seemed to be certainty of a long 
time in the camps in the valley, General Cox conferred 
with the colonels upon a scheme of furloughing a certain 
proportion of each regiment. In the first lot from the 
Eleventh Ohio the number was thirty-five. The choice 
was made by an open selection after careful inquiry into 
circumstances, and the lucky ones had a hearty send-off 
from their comrades left behind, who expected their own 



154 



turns to come in due course. But the hopes of the others 
were soon dashed and the whole scheme brought to 
naught by an order to move the brigade to Tennessee. 

There was much sadness in the camp of the Eleventh 
at this time, from the death of the Sergeant-Major, 
Thomas M. Mitchell, who was killed by the accidental 
discharge of a gun. He had been one of the victims of 
Colonel DeVilliers. He had the distinction (rare in a 
Sergeant-Major!) of being very popular in his regiment, 
and was held in high regard by both officers and men. 

A great battle usually has effects reaching far in the 
general field of the armies, altering positions and causing 
movements of troops at distant places. The defeated or 
retreating army calls loudly for reinforcement, to pre- 
vent its ruin or the abandonment of the country. The 
victorious army at once wants more men, to make up its 
losses and to provide for moving on to further conquest. 

The battle of Stone's River '' (Murfreesboro, Tenn.), 
December 31, 1862, is an apt illustration. Both sides 
claimed a victory, but there was no victory, tho two days 
after the battle Bragg did retreat to the south, leaving 
the field to be occupied by his adversary, Rosecrans, who 
did not know he was gone. 

But Bragg hsJted at Shelbyville, tv/enty-five miles from 
Murfreesboro, established headquarters at Tullahoma, a 
few miles further to the southeast, and began calling for 
reinforcements. Rosecrans remained in camp at Mur- 
freesboro and did the same thing. The Confederate gov- 
ernment found it very difficult to get more troops to 
Bragg, and he had no substantial increase until seven or 
eight months later, on the eve of the battle of Chicka- 
mauga, while Rosecrans received large additions alm.ost 
immediately, and more from time to time until Septem- 
ber, his forces nearly all that time being much heavier 
than those of Bragg; but yet he lay idle in camp for 
nearly six months after the victory ", making no at- 
tempt upon a campaign. 

Among the troops sent to Rosecrans from other fields 
directly after Stone's River " (in January, 1863) were 
four regiments from the Kanawha. General Crook, then 
in immediate command in the Kanawha valley, had, on 
December 29, reported to the department commander the 



155 



positions and numbers of the rebel forces in his district, 
and gave his opinion that nine regiments could hold the 
country (and protect the citizens until spring. So, when, 
a little later, General Cox was called upon for troops to 
reinforce Rosecrans, he admitted that several regiments 
could safely be sent. Upon that, on January 19, 1863, 
General Wright, commanding the Department of the 
Ohio, ordered Cox to send four regiments. Crook's own 
brigade, composed of the Eleventh, Thirty-sixth, Eighty- 
ninth and Ninety-second Ohio, was chosen, perhaps as a 
kind of distinction or special favor, perhaps to gratify 
Crook's ambition for a larger field. But then all the 
troops also wanted a larger field. 

The order came to Colonel Lane at Summerville with- 
out warning and without previous news of any movement. 
His camp had settled into the assurance of remaining at 
the post until spring, and improvements in the winter 
quarters were being devised and worked upon every day. 
The night of January 23 he wrote to his wife that he had 
just received an order to move his regiment immediately 
to Camp Piatt, — above Charleston, at the head of 
Kanav/ha navigation. The regiment marched early the 
next morning, and, by keeping it up until late in the 
nights, and leaving its train to drag in the mud far be- 
hind, it reached Camp Piatt on the 27th. The distance 
was only about fifty miles, but the labor on, or in, the 
dreadful roads must have been very great. A few days 
before the Colonel had written " It rains or snows here 
nearly all the time ", and the day after going on the boats 
he wrote "A storm has been raging 36 hours ". Toward 
the end of the march to Camp Piatt he received an order 
from Crook's Adjutant-General, requiring the regiment 
to be at the landing at a certain hour, which he acknowl- 
edged with the reply " You require an impossibility. 
We are twelve miles from the landing. -It will take us 
six hours to make that by daylight and longer at night." 

Fortunately the boats were ready and the men did not 
have to lie or wait at the landing, but went aboard at 
once. There were eleven boats in the fleet, filled by the 
four regiments. From the colonels down no one knew 
where they were going; and it was with great pleasure 
that, at the mouth of the Kanawha, they saw the boats 



156 



turn down the Ohio. They had feared they were to go up 
the river and again to the Army of the Potomac, and they 
much preferred service in the west. 

Then at once the men asked for leave to land at Cin- 
cinnati and visit their friends there and in that part of 
the State. But General Crook could not allow it. His 
order required him to take the troops directly to Nashville, 
and he halted at Cincinnati only to take on coal. As a 
precaution he anchored the boats in the stream. The deep 
disappointment of the men broke out among the turbulent 
ones in violent language and threats; and a considerable 
number, who found the guards not too rigid, managed to 
get ashore and deserted^ More escapes occurred below 
Cincinnati, and at Louisville many more. Colonel Lane 
wrote, after leaving Louisville — We have lost a large 
number of men. It is frightful. Not less than 150 have 
deserted. Company K has lost 30, A 34." A few days 
later he wrote of being pleased with the change from 
Virginia, " but it has been at a cost of 170 deserters from 
my regiment." A month later, however, he speaks of the 
voluntary return of many of these men, and says " The 
conscript law and the proclamation are sending them 
back by hundreds, and all profess themselves ashamed of 
their conduct." 

This lawless spirit broke out at different times in many- 
of the volunteer regiments. There were cases of the 

arrest " of a whole regiment, and now and then of some 
punishment, for a general and wilful disobedience of 
orders; but the penalty was rarely, if ever, adequate. 
Usually, when the rebels returned to obedience the offense 
was simply condoned. The vicious result of this toler- 
ance was that there v/as a general belief in the volunteer 
arm.y that there was no serious danger in merely being 
" absent without leave," and that no desertion was likely 
to be punished unless it was to the enemy."* 

* An illustration of this " independence or lawlessness, is in 
the fact that, even after the war, two of the officers of the 
Eleventh Ohio, joining in a book (" The History of the Eleventh 
Ohio ") characterized the refusal of leaves at Cincinnati as 
" fiendish treatment " — " a specimen of refined cruelty worthy the 
devils of the slaughter-pen at Andersonville And they add, 
with evident satisfaction, that " Many of the men succeeded in 
getting ashore and taking * French leave visited their homes and 



157 



The fleet was ordered to rendezvous at Dover (Fort 
Donelson), on the Cumberland, till all the boats arrived, 
and then to proceed to Nashville, convoyed by gun-boats ; 
for the rivers of Tennessee were at that time harried by 
rebel cavalry, moving rapidly, with field guns, and finding 
unarmed transports easy victims. 

The head of the fleet reached Dover the night of Feb- 
ruary 3d, and on the 6th the whole fleet proceeded, in close 
order, with gun-boats in front and rear — it must have 
been a stately procession, — up to Nashville, where they 
stopped and landed a part of the troops on the 7th. But 
the greater part, including Crook's brigade, remained 
quartered on the boats for several days while awaiting 
the coming up of their tents. This brigade was not landed, 
indeed, until the 13th, when it marched two miles out 
from the landing and encamped on an elevated site, in a 
beautiful oak wood. Here it remained ten days, awaiting 
orders. 

The troops thus brought to Nashville from other depart- 
ments numbered 20,000. They were not yet assigned to 
position in Rosecrans's army. In fact they appeared to 
be in the ''Army of Kentucky " (whatever that was) ; but 
later Eosecrans did place them, under the command of 
General Gordon Granger, in a provisional " Reserve 
Corps 

During this interval Colonel Lane seems to have gone 
to Cincinnati, on some special service. It is knov/n now 
only by a letter he wrote at Louisville, on the 26th, on his 
way back to Nashville. The dates show that he could not 
have been at Cincinnati or in Ohio more than a few days. 
He was two days getting from Louisville to Nashville by 
rail, delayed by a raid by rebel cavalry, who had cap- 



returned at their pleasure while others " availed themselves of 
opportunity at Louisville and returned to Ohio And " a number 
of these men, in view of the heartless course pursued toward 
them, never returned, and on the rolls of their companies are 
reported as deserters Apparently they were not deserters, but 
only "on the rolls as deserters"! These judicial historians, in 
the roster of the regiment printed in their book, mention only 4 
men as " deserted " in all the career of the regiment, tho they 
name 135 others as having " left the Company " on such or such 
a day, that is, left and never returned. 



158 



tured and burned the train preceding his and damaged a 
bridge. 

When he reached Nashville, on the 28th, he found that 
his regiment and brigade v/ere gone and could not learn 
where they were, nor anything more than that they had 
been sent up the Cumberland on boats. He was told that 
they had embarked on the 24th, under Crook's command, 
with forty days' rations, for some unknown service up 
the river. After some days news was received at Nash- 
ville headquarters that Crook had landed at Carthage, in 
Tennessee, one hundred and fifty miles by river above 
Nashville ; but there was no means of transportation, the 
country between was roamed by guerrillas or rebel 
cavalry, and the Colonel was compelled to await some oc- 
casion for the sending up of a gunboat. General Mitchell, 
in command at Nashville, could promise only a permission 
to go up on such a gunboat if he should learn that the 
brigade was not to return to Nashville. 

He was thus compelled to lie at Nashville seventeen 
days, much mortified by having lost his regiment and full 
of anxiety as to what was happening in it. The irksome- 
ness of this blank in his service was made the worse by 
the singular fact that no boat came down from Carthage, 
nor any news of Crook's movements or experiences, for 
about two weeks. The current belief at Nashville (and 
even of General Mitchell) was, that Crook's expedition 
was temporary and that he would soon return; but the 
order from Rosecrans under which Crook had moved 
gave no such prom.ise. In fact it indicated an indefinite 
time of service. 



159 



XIII 



1863: March — June 

Service at Carthage on the Cumberland, as Outpost of 
Rosecrans's Army at Murfreesboro — Disaster in 
Eleventh Ohio in Colonel Lane's Absence — His Suc- 
cessful Expeditions and Reprisals — Engagements 
with John Morgan's Cavalry — On Court-martial 
Duty — Conviction and Execution of a Spy — Conflict 
with General Crook On Principle " — Refuses to 
Obey Orders — The " Principle " Saved — Recurrence 
of III Health — Decides to Resign, but to Aivait an 
Expected Campaign 

While other brigades of the rebel cavalry were making 
trouble for Rosecrans west and north of Nashville, the 
brigade (or division) of the famous John Morgan was 
harrying the country south of the upper Cumberland and 
was now reported to be intending a great raid thro Ken- 
tucky and up to the Ohio. Upon that Rosecrans ordered 
Granger to send Crook with his brigade (called 
" division " in the order) up to Carthage, to prevent 
Morgan's crossing the Cumberland. Whether he suc- 
ceeded in that purpose or not, he was to " take post at 
Carthage, establish a depot there, make expeditions and 
scour that country 

General Rosecrans could hardly have expected a brigade 
of infantry to impede Morgan's movements materially, 
tho it could put him to some inconvenience in respect to 
supplies and equipment and could protect a certain area 
of the country against the forays of his detachments and 
their persecutions of the Unionists. Another object no 
doubt in Rosecrans's mind, tho not referred to in his order, 
was the advantage of a strong outpost on the upper 
Cumberland, to cover his left flank and at the same time 
reach well toward General Burnside's field of operations 



160 



in Kentucky. Burnside's department, with headquarters 
at Cincinnati, included eastern Kentucky. Once at Car- 
thage, General Crook would surely remain for some time. 

The importance of the post was soon proved. The 
operations of the rebel cavalry and the partisan "* bands 
in a wide region of Tennessee and Kentucky were much 

* The name " partisans " was the euphemistic cover used by 
the Richmond g-overnment for these detestable freebooters, whose 
lawless forays it mistakenly assumed to be of value to the " great 
cause On the contrary, they damaged the cause and helped to 
defeat it by embittering the Union men in the border States, in- 
creasing their enlistment in the Union army, and inducing the 
sternest reprisals upon the miscreants when they were caught. 
Their formation and operations were especially favored by Presi- 
dent Davis, tho, when their atrocities in certain notorious instances 
were charged upon him by the Washington government, he in- 
dignantly denied responsibility for them. But it has appeared 
since the war that he advised and approved a law under which he 
alone was to direct the organization of " Partisan Rangers 
determine their numbers and appoint their officers, that they were 
to have the same pay and rations as Confederate soldiers, and 
that they were to " be paid their full value " for any " arms and 
munitions " they captured. The word " munitions " could be 
stretched to cover anything, and the provision was an incitement 
to indiscriminate plunder, any owner being easily classed as an 
" enemy There is evidence that they cared little, or knew noth- 
ing, of any law for such organizations, or their officers, but gath- 
ered into loosely formed bands with the double purpose of escaping 
regular enlistment or conscription and of having a free field for 
rapine and revenge upon personal enemies and Union men, but 
when moved by temptation or need they plundered Secessionists 
without scruple. Many were the complaints of their outrages 
made to Confederate authorities by real Secessionists, without 
effect. Their cruelties were nearly incredible. In Kentucky, 
Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Missouri and Kansas 
they committed, literally, thousands of murders, burned dwellings 
and towns, drove out the families of their victims, and plundered 
houses and stores without number. They became so notorious, 
indeed, that the Richmond government felt compelled, for its own 
credit, to attempt some control, at least on paper. An order was 
issued June 12, 1863, based upon "the irregularities reported to 
this department as having been committed by such corps ", and 
(not ordering, but) " authorizing department commanders to com- 
bine " the gangs into battalions or regiments under the same regu- 
lations as other soldiers as to discipline and movements. But this 
order expressly excepted from its operation " Such partisan corps 
as are serving within the enemy's lines." This exception would, 
at that time, include nearly all of them, so it would seem that the 
order was insincere and issued only for " effect 



161 



interfered with and restricted, and large quantities of 
corn and other supplies which would have been taken by 
them were gathered for the use of the Union army. 

V/hatever was to be the time of the stay of the brigade 
at Carthage, Colonel Lane wanted much to be with his regi- 
ment. Still more when he received, as he did on March 
12th or 13th at Nashville, the very disturbing news of a 
disaster. Two companies of the regiment (G and K), sent 
out from Carthage on the 8th, on a foraging expedition, 
were attacked by a much larger body of rebel cavalry, 
with a loss of several men wounded and three officers and 
fifty men and all the forage train captured. The Colonel's 
anxiety now became distress ; but at the same time several 
boats came in from the Ohio, which were to be loaded 
with supplies and sent up to Carthage. He had the good 
fortune to be put in command, and he took no rest until 
the fleet was ready. One of the boats (the Orient) was 
fitted as a " gun-boat '\ Three 6-pounder field-guns were 
mounted on her and the gunwales were lined with bales 
of hay for the shelter of sharpshooters. 

New arms had been ordered for the brigade, and they 
had arrived at Nashville while he was waiting there. He 
says they were " rifles tho he does not tell of what kind 
(probably Enfield then considered the most effective 
gun for infantry), and he was much pleased with them. 
He took all the men of the brigade he found at Nashville 
(about 250), issued the new guns to them, distributed 
them on the four boats, taking the greater part on the 
gun-boat " with himself ; and on the 17th, at dawn, set 
out up the river, his own boat in advance. An attack was 
expected, but nothing happened on the 17th. On the 18th 
he found the southern bank occupied by rebel sharp- 
shooters, who kept up a rifle fusillade continuously for 
ten miles. They had no artillery, however, and his own 
guns and sharpshooters compelled them to keep concealed 
or at a safe distance. He had two men wounded, both 
on his boat, but he tells with satisfaction of seeing " two 
of the scoundrels roll down the bank 

Reaxhing Carthage and landing the night of the 18th, 
his first concern was the character and extent of the dis- 
aster of the 8th. He found that none had been killed, that 
three were wounded (two so severely that they were left 



162 



with citizens near the field), and that Captain Johnson 
of K, Lieutenants Arthur and Eoney of G, and about fifty 
men of the two companies had been captured. Among the 
captured was " Charley " Bosworth of K, a brother of 
Mrs. Lane ; but all the captured men had been paroled by 
the rebel officers and sent to Carthage, while the three 
officers were still held prisoners ; and all the captured had 
been plundered of all personal property, including hats, 
shoes and all but the scantiest clothing. The paroled men 
had now to be sent to a camp of paroled prisoners in Ohio, 
to await exchange; but the three officers were, within a 
few weeks, exchanged at Murfreesboro and returned to 
duty. It was a sore trial for the Colonel, but he loyally 
defended the men against an imputation that they had not 
fought well, and protested indignantly against a news- 
paper report in Cincinnati to the contrary.* It is fair to 
say, further, that General Crook, a severe critic, in his 
report of the affair, spoke well of Captain Johnson, the 
commander of the detachment, as a " good officer tho 
he thought he had been " flurried However weak 
Johnson's fighting may have been on this occasion, in later 
engagements he quite justified Crook's commendation of 
him. 

Colonel Lane was gratified to fimd, however, that the 
account with the enemy was at least nearly balanced. A 
few days before this loss his regiment, on a scout near 
Kome (on the Cumberland, below Carthage), struck a de- 
tachment of Morgan's cavalry and captured 10, with 16 
horses and equipments. And a few days after he arrived 
at Carthage he went himself, with his regiment, on an ex- 
pedition, in which he attacked a body of rebels guarding 
a train, and, after a running fight of several hours, cap- 
tured the whole train, with 28 rebels and their captain 
(Reese) and some 60 horses and mules. Upon this he 
felt better, especially in that he was " complimented by 
the General " for his management and success. 

This kind of service continued thro March, April and 
May. With experience the ofl^cers and men of these scout- 



* The enemy in this affair was not a " party of guerrillas," as 
in one official report, but was from Morgan's cavalry. The leader 
v/as Colonel Ward, commanding the " Second Brigade, Morgan's 
Division,, C. S. Army". 



163 



ing and foraging expeditions became more wary and at 
the same time more bold; for the enemy most often met 
were treacherous and cowardly, aided and sheltered 
usually by Secessionist citizens pretending to be Union 
men, and usually unwilling to fight unless from ambush 
or when having much advantage in numbers. 

The one movement of a force from Bragg's army ap- 
pearing to be an attempt upon Carthage was discovered 
by Colonel Lane, on the Middleton road, south of Carthage, 
April 15th. On the 13th he marched, in command of the 
available men of the brigade, about 1300, but without 
artillery, to Rome (on the river below Carthage), to pro- 
tect a fleet then passing. That done, he returned by a 
detour, south and east, as a reconnoissance in force. No 
enemy was found until within a few miles of Carthage, 
when his advance guard was fired upon. 

To learn the character and weight of the enemy (it was 
a wooded country) he moved on cautiously, using his 
skirmish line only to " feel " the enemy. After two hours 
of this, the enemy appeared to move off. Colonel Lane 
suspected a pretended retreat, designed to induce him to 
pursue. If this were so, the rebel force was surely the 
larger. He remembered the case of a Colonel Coburn, 
who had recently been " trapped and ruined " by that de- 
vice. He declined to follow, held his line, and awaited 
events. Upon this the enemy moved forward into posi- 
tion, developing a larger force of cavalry, with artillery. 
Colonel Lane fell back a mile or so, till he found a position 
adapted to defense, sent a fast horseman to Carthage, to 
report and ask for guns, and then put his command into 
position to meet attack. General Crook at once sent out 
three guns, but also sent another brigade, under General 
Spears. 

Colonel Lane wanted to fight, now that the enemy's 
guns could be met, but General Spears thought that im- 
prudent and, having the higher rank, ordered the whole 
command back to Carthage. This order was probably 
right, but the Colonel was much vexed by it, and after- 
ward said he was sure he could have " whipped the 
dogs " if he had been allowed to try with the three guns 
and his brigade. The demonstration of the two brigades, 
however, probably satisfied the enemy that Carthage was 



164 



too strong for attack, as he moved away with no further 
threat. It was afterward learned that the enemy was the 
cavalry brigades of Morgan and Wharton, believed to 
number three to four thousand men, with six or eight guns, 
and it was said that Wheeler, Bragg's Chief-of-Cavalry, 
was in command. Colonel Lane's small brigade of infan- 
try would have found it, to say the least, a serious under- 
taking to engage such a body of cavalry. 

The enemy's cavalry was very active in the Cumberland 
valley all the spring and summer and these expeditions 
and scouts from Carthage were frequent. Meantime the 
troops under Crook were increased until they became a 
provisional division of two, at one time three, brigades of 
infantry. On April 23d the Eleventh Ohio went out for 
three days under Major Higgins, Colonel Lane being on 
duty in camp in a court-martial and Lieutenant-Colonel 
Street then serving on Crook's staff, but no enemy was 
met. There was no material loss of men in any of these 
movements, nor any misfortune after that of the 8th of 
March. 

The engineering skill of Colonel Lane was brought into 
service during this period in the construction of fortifica- 
tions at Carthage, but we do not learn the character or 
extent or position of the works, except that they were on 
the north side of the river. The camps had been moved 
across from the south side, for greater security. The 
works were begun in March and were probably finished 
about the middle of April, as we find Colonel Lane other- 
wise occupied all the latter part of April and thro 
May. 

A new experience for him while at Carthage was service 
on a court-martial, the only time, as it happened, that he 
had that duty while he was in the army. It was a 
" general " court (that is, " for the trial of such prisoners 
as may be brought before it ") , composed of eight oflScers, 
and, as he was the " ranking " oflftcer, he was President. 
Seven captains, from other regiments, were the rest. 

The court sat daily for two weeks and must have had 
many cases before it. The records are not accessible (or 
not easily accessible) and Colonel Lane^s papers mention 
only one of the cases. Probably there was the usual list 
of several officers charged with drinking to excess or when 



165 



on duty, or with neglect of duty, and of soldiers charged 
with insubordination, or cursing or striking an officer, or 
absence without leave, etc. 

The one case the Colonel speaks of was that of " Joseph 
Smith " (supposed to be a false name), a citizen or rebel 
soldier who was arrested in the camp as a spy. The evi- 
dence against him has not been found, but it seems to 
have been conclusive, and the court convicted him and 
sentenced him to the death of a spy. This was on or 
shortly before May 2d. The proceedings were forwarded 
to Department Headquarters, where they were approved 
and the sentence confirmed, and where, on May 8th, an 
order was issued for Smith's execution. Accordingly, on 
the 11th, under General Crook's direction, he was hung. 
Colonel Lane believed the man was only " an ignorant 
dupe " of more responsible persons ; and it is evidently 
with great regret that he writes, in a letter at the time, 
" it fell to my lot to sign his death-warrant But this 
does not mean literally what it says. The conviction or 
sentence by the court-martial could have been disapproved 
by higher authority, and the real " death-warrant " was 
the order for execution. 

There was a small internal war at Carthage in April 
and May, the occasion being magnified by the men beyond 
its real importance, and Colonel Lane fimding himself in 
what he thought irreconcilable conflict with his immediate 
superior in office. There was a struggle between him and 
General Crook over the burning of some fence-rails by 
men of the Eleventh Ohio and the other regiments. He 
thought a great principle was involved where the General 
saw only a case of discipline for the men who had violated 
his order against destroying private property. 

Colonel Lane's " principle " was, that the United States 
government ought not to protect the Secessionists who 
were making war against it. General Crook, who was a 
" regular ", bred at West Point, meant to do his duty under 
the army regulations and orders, which required him to 
prevent the soldiers from taking or destroying private 
property without authority; and he was a rather harsh, 
dogmatic man. He could not admit any difference between 
volunteers and regular soldiers in respect to obedience to 



166 



orders. But the volunteers were entirely sure there was 
a wide difference. 

From end to end of the army lines there were standing 
orders against any encroachment upon the property rights 
of citizens; but it was a civil war and the people of the 
two sides had a sense of deep personal hostility toward 
each other, a sense especially marked among many of the 
Northern volunteers when they found themselves sur- 
rounded in the south by citizens professing to be neutral 
or non-combatant while really aiding the rebels. The 
charge or suspicion was, no doubt, often mistaken or un- 
just or exaggerated, but it was more often well-founded. 
Naturally the volunteers resented being required to guard 
or protect the property of people they believed to be their 
enemies, tho of course they could not be justified in dis- 
obeying orders. But they did more or less disobey, and 
did it with the connivance or indulgence of many of their 
officers. So the enforcement of the orders by the stricter 
or more conscientious officers was everywhere difficult 
and uncertain, and the soldiers everywhere took food and 
forage from " the Secesh " and used their fence rails for 
camp fires. Fence rails are admirably adapted for camp 
fires, whether for cooking or heating ; and often there was 
no other wood to be had in sufficient quantity. 

The camp at Carthage was on the land of one Cullum, 
who owned a large tract. Colonel Lane says he was a 
noted Secessionist, who had raised two companies of m.en 
for the rebel army. As was natural and usual with large 
planters, whether Secessionist or Union, he cultivated 
friendly social relations with the nearest Union general; 
and there were quite too many Union generals indiscreet 
enough to encourage such relations,— an indiscretion 
which led sometimes to serious trouble. 

General Crook had posted guards over Cullum's prop- 
erty (a very general and proper practice when the pro- 
tected man had " taken the oath as no doubt Cullum 
had done), but the service was extremely distasteful to 
the volunteers, who distrusted him so much as that they 
even suspected the General himself of sympathy with the 
rebel " cause " because of his favoring him. 

Colonel Lane, in his intense patriotism and burning 
hatred of secessionism, was very restive under such con- 



167 



ditions. He wrote We are obliged to guard his property 
and everything is sacred that he claims. My men have 
burned a few of his rails, perhaps 50, and I expect an 
order for us to make new ones to replace them. If the 
order is issued I shall disobey it and take the consequences. 
I am here for a principle; and I will sacrifice myself to 
military law before I will disgrace myself and my men 
by making rails for rebels in arms against us." Ten days 
later he wrote The rail question is not settled yet. Gen- 
eral Crook is cursed from end to end of the camp. Making 
rails for a known rebel does not suit us very well.'' And 
a week still later The rail question is not decided yet, 
but before this leaves camp I may be able to say I am 
under arrest again 

The order was issued, and it included several, or all, 
the regiments in the brigade. A copy of it, or of its specific 
requirements, is not found, but, in view of what followed, 
it must have required the regiments to replace the rails 
they had taken from Cullum's fences. It seems, but is not 
clear, that the other regiments in the order, after rebelling 
with the Eleventh Ohio, yielded; but Colonel Lane was 
obdurate. The order was repeated. He wrote to his wife 
that he had " received three positive orders to make the 
rails immediately but had ignored them, and that he 
looked for an arrest. He feared he would " perhaps be 
dismissed from the service." He does not seem to have 
considered the question, whether in a court-martial the 
order would be held to be a proper one. Quite surely it 
would not be. Even tho the General had the power to 
inflict summary punishment upon individuals who took 
the rails, by making them produce new ones, he could 
have no power to include the innocent in the punishment. 
He probably realized this in time. 

The matter seems to have hung unsettled for three 
weeks or more in April and May. Colonel Lane was silent 
from the time he received the first order, only waiting the 
next step, but every man in the brigade knew of the dead- 
lock and speculated on the result. Finally, the General 
must have determined upon a concilatory policy or have 
had some advice or direction from a superior officer. 
He then issued another order, in which it was stated that 
the rails to be made were required for a pen for the beef 



168 



cattle of the Commissary Department and were to be de- 
livered at a certain place for that purpose. For that pur- 
pose the work would be in the regular line of " fatigue " 
duty of soldiers, and the Colonel then ordered the rails 
made. His next letter says that the expected trouble with 
General Crook is now settled, and, instead of being under 
arrest, I am now in command of the Second Brigade,'* 

Of course there may have been a misunderstanding all 
the way thro as to the use intended for the rails, or Cul- 
lum may have received, in a roundabout way, some rails 
originally intended for another use; but the Colonel and 
his men were sure that the last order was only a device 
to escape a troublesome dilemma, — which was a good 
guess. The probability is that the General saw that he 
could reach the Colonel only by making charges against 
him in a court-martial, and that a situation might arise 
there which he would rather not meet. 

The Eleventh and the Colonel supposed that the General 
had been beaten thro the interference of some higher 
officer, and when, on leaving Carthage for the army, a lit- 
tle later, he was relieved of the command of the division 
and resum_ed command of his brigade, they were sure that 
that was a kind of punishment for him. But his " divi- 
sion " had been only a provisional one, being simply all 
the troops arriving at Carthage at different times while 
he was in command of that post, while his proper, per- 
manent, comm.and was the " Kanawha Brigade as it 
was still called. In fact; soon after joining the army in 
the field under Rosecrans, he v/as advanced to the com- 
mand of a regular division. And it was a division of 
cavalry, which was probably just what he wanted. At the 
same time, the assignment of Colonel Lane to the command 
of the brigade was not a reward for insubordination, nor 
a peace-offering from General Crook. He was the second 
colonel in rank in the brigade, and the senior colonel just 
then went away on leave or duty; but no doubt the Gen- 
eral was particularly glad, under the circumstances, to 
make the order directing Colonel Lane to take command. 
And he remained in command until General Crook re- 
sumed it himself, as already mentioned. 

Another experience that troubled the Colonel's mind dur- 



169 



ing this period was a recurrence of ill health. It is prob- 
able that he had never fully recovered from the strain of 
the great labor, exposure and anxieties of the campaigns 
in West Virginia. The first hot weather in the low camp 
on the Cumberland was debilitating, and he had to go 
under medical treatment. He stuck to his work, however, 
tho compelled at times to rest abed during the intervals 
of an hour or two between the regular duties of the day. 
The excitement of a scouting expedition would brace him 
up for a day or two, but on the whole he could not regain 
his normal strength. There was, indeed, much debilita- 
ting illness in the regiment and the brigade at that time, 
and a number of the men died from camp diseases. But 
when he marched, in June, on a great campaign, he was 
in better condition, and then, for three months, the high 
purpose of the campaign and its constant demands kept 
him up to all his dutie^s. 



170 



XIV 



1863: June — July 

Kayiawha Brigade Ordered to Murfreesboro — Noiu in 
Fourteenth Armij Corps, Under General Thomas — 
Campaign of Tullahoma — Capture of Hoover's Gap — 
Bragg Flanked Out of Position — Battle Expected — 
Bragg Escapes and Occupies Chattanooga — Rosecrans 
Fails to Attack and Fails in Pursuit — Lies in Camp, 
Quxirreling With War Department — Lincoln Takes a 
Hand — Eleventh Ohio at Big Spring and University 
Place — General Turchin Succeeds to Command of the 
Brigade — Neivs of Vicksburg and Gettysburg 

Late in May, under much urging by Rosecrans, troops 
were sent by Burnside, then commanding at Cincinnati, 
to relieve Crook's troops at Carthage; and then, on the 
3d of June, the " Kanawha Brigade " was electrified by 
an order from Rosecrans to move immediately to Mur- 
freesboro. 

With much rejoicing the brigade broke camp, packed a 
big wagon train, and marched early on the 4th. There 
were the five regiments of Crook's immediate command 
— the Eleventh, Thirty-sixth, Eighty-ninth and Ninety- 
second Ohio and Eighteenth Kentucky infantry, one squad- 
ron of cavalry, one battery of 6 guns and a train of 150 
wagons. The village of Liberty, twenty-two miles south 
from Carthage, was reached on the 5th. There was met 
Colonel Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry, sent up 
from Murfreesboro against the chance of an attack upon 
Crook by Bragg's cavalry. Wilder's appearance was 
timely. There was a brigade of rebel cavalry threaten- 
ing on the east, which he promptly attacked. Crook held 
his brigade ready in support, but Wilder alone defeated 
the enemy and drove them off in haste. This detained 
Crook's brigade at Liberty on the 6th. Then Crook rode on 



171 



toward Murfreesboro, with the cavalry, directing Colonel 
Lane to take command of the brigade and bring it on, 
which he did without further incident, arriving at Mur- 
freesboro on the 8th. 

General Crook, being a day ahead, had already received 
an assignment for his brigade, by which it became the 
Third Brigade of the Fifth Division of the Fourteenth 
Army Corps, and on its arrival he resumed command, re- 
lieving Colonel Lane. But the same day, in a readjust- 
ment, the Fifth Division became the Fourth, the brigades 
remaining as they were. The Eighteenth Kentucky in- 
fantry had already, at Carthage, been added to Crook's 
brigade. The division was then commanded by Major- 
General Joseph J. Reynolds, contained about 9000 men, 
in three brigades, the First commanded by Colonel John 
T. Wilder, four regiments of mounted infantry,* the Sec- 
ond by Colonel Albert S. Hall, five regiments of infantry, 
and the Third by Brigadier-General George Crook, five 
regiments of infantry, and three batteries of field artillery, 
the Eighteenth,* Nineteenth and Twenty-first Indiana. 

The Fourteenth Corps was then commanded by the 
famous General George H. Thomas, by far the ablest gen- 
eral in that army. All of his officers and men had, then 
and always, unbounded confidence in and respect for him. 
Colonel Lane and his regiment and brigade had the proud 
distinction, three months later, of holding out with him 
on the fi_eld to the bitter end of the tremendous battle in 
which he earned the great title of The Rock of Chicka- 
mauga." 

The Eleventh Ohio now at last, after two years' service, 
was part of a great army. For nearly a month, however, 
it had nothing in particular to do, and, with its brigade, 
only lay in camp waiting for General Rosecrans 
to decide upon the beginning of his cam_paign. But it was 
not idle. Colonel Lane never permitted it to get rusty 
for lack of training. It was drilled and put thro the 
manuals and maneuvers every day practicable and regu- 
larly inspected every Sunday. It found itself famous in 
the division, and men and officers came from other camps 

* This brigade, under Colonel A. 0. Miller, with the Eighteenth 
Indiana Battery, was afterward in Wilson's Cavalry Corps in the 
great Selma campaign of March-May, 1865. 



172 



to its drill and parade grounds for the pleasure of seeing 
its fine drill and evolutions. Of course the men were 
proud of their distinction, tho, if they were like other vol- 
unteers, many of them grumbled much at the practice 
required to achieve it. 

They had a great pleasure at this time in another of 
those bountiful supplies of enticing food and other things 
which their Chaplain so successfully collected in Ohio and 
brought to them. This one was a big lot. Again the 
Colonel could write that nearly every man had at least one 
package direct, while all shared well in the general supply ; 
and he found it " beneficial to their health." 

At the same time he says the w^hole com^mand is well 
pleased with the change from Carthage, more than ever 
determined to fi.ght the war out to victory, eager for news 
of action in other fields and to know when they are to get 
off upon their own great campaign. They were, in fact, 
on the eve of it at that moment. 

For five months the authorities at Washington had been 
trying to satisfy Rosecrans in his calls for troops and 
equipment and listening to his accounts of difficulties and 
obstacles, but frequently urging, and finally insisting upon, 
action. It appeared to them that, if he had defeated 
Bragg at " Stone's River " and Bragg's reinforcement 
since had been much less than his own, he must be able 
to defeat him again. The correspondence, by telegraph 
and letter, was active. Rosecrans was much given to talk- 
ing and writing; and his peculiar mental idiosyncrasies 
were strong upon him. Not only the suggestions and 
advice from superior officers, but their orders and instruc- 
tions, he looked upon as subjects for debate and criticism. 
He seldom obeyed even a direct order without questioning 
it; and he even descended to McClellan's level by intima- 
ting that, if failure followed his operations under orders, 
the responsibility would not be upon himself. 

Amongthemanyreasonshe found for delay, the two most 
conspicuous (after large reinforcements of infantry had 
been sent him) were the bad roads and a lack of cavalry. 
There is usually much rain in Tennessee during the win- 
ter and spring, but in April, May and most of June that 
year the handicap of marching troops there was not mud, 



173 



but deep dust. It was an ironical comment upon the con- 
dition of " impassable roads " which held up Rosecrans's 
campaign during the spring, that, after many weeks of 
dusty roads, on the day late in June when he did move 
great rains began, which went on with little intermission 
for ten days or more, making all the roads he used quite 
as bad as they had been in the spring ; but yet, when he 
did march, no one of the many complicated movements 
required by his plans, in all directions, over a country 
forty miles broad, was either prevented or greatly delayed 
by bad roads. 

As to the cavalry, his understanding was equally dis- 
torted. He exaggerated the enemy's cavalry and mini- 
nized his own. The least estimate he made of Bragg's 
was that it doubled his own, but he often saw it more than 
double, and once wrote General Halleck that it was five 
times his own. Early in the year, before Rosecrans's 
cavalry was reinforced, the cavalry in Bragg's department 
was nearly double the number in Rosecrans's, but later the 
advantage in numbers was on Rosecrans's side. Even after 
Bragg was reinforced by 7500 cavalry from Mississippi, 
under VanDorn, the official reports (May) show that he 
had about 16,000 and Rosecrans about 12,500; but just 
after that Bragg detached Morgan's command (variously 
stated at from 2000 to 3000), for an attempt upon Louis- 
ville (which Morgan perverted into the famous raid into 
Indiana and Ohio), by which the disparity in numbers 
was nearly wiped out. 

Probably the real cause of his trouble about cavalry 
was that, like other generals, he found his less efficient 
than the enemy's and did not know how to improve it. 
There had never been anj^ experience worth mention in 
the use of cavalry in the United States armies (except in 
small, detached bodies), and, incredible as it now seems, 
the Civil war had been in progress two years before there 
was any understanding of cavalry or its best uses, or any 
attempt to give it intelligent, systematic care and train- 
ing. Up to that time the War Department and the army 
com-manders acted and spoke precisely as if their idea was 
that, when a body of men was armed and mounted, it at 
once became cavalry and ought to do anything that any 
cavalry ever did. 



174 



If to any reader this language appears extreme^ let him 
read the records of " Streight's Raid " in April, 1863. 
Tho Rosecrans then had at least 10,000 cavalry whose 
experience in the field averaged a year or more, he ap- 
proved the scheme of a rash volunteer colonel of infantry 
and authorized him to take 1500 infantrymen, mount them 
on such mules as he could get from the quartermaster or 
pick up in the country, get such arms and equipments as 
he could and take two mountain howitzers (a small, light, 
smooth-bore shell gun of short range), and make a raid 
thro north Alabama upon the railroad and bridge at Rome, 
Georgia, about 250 miles. Both of them knew that the 
enemy's cavalry, in considerable numbers, was in the 
country of the proposed march. There were, in fact, two 
brigades of regular Confederate cavalry, each having a 
battery of rifled field guns, and commanded by the already 
famous cavalry leaders Forrest and Roddey. 

Streight was brave enough, but he had allowed his 
preparations and purpose to become well known. Forrest 
was soon on his track, his horses easily overtook the mules, 
Streight was quickly defeated, and he and all his sur- 
vivors captured. But the ideas of the time were so crude 
that this mad-cap adventure and wretched waste of men 
and materials was looked upon as another proof of the 
inefficiency of cavalry ; and Rosecrans was not blamed. 

Whatever the disparity in cavalry, however, between 
Rosecrans and Bragg, Rosecrans had about double Bragg's 
number of infantry all the time from February down 
nearly to the battle of Chickamauga, and was much 
superior in artillery. No sufficient reason appears why, 
at any time after the spring rains were over, he did not 
move out against Bragg and defeat him. His own reports 
and correspondence justify this view and Bragg's confirm 
it. Even when Halleck informed him that Johnston had 
gone to Mississippi (in May) to command the forces re- 
sisting Grant's advance upon Vicksburg, with two divi- 
sions of Bragg's troops, he hesitated, and waited more 
than a month.* 



'■'^ It is amusing- to note that one reason Rosecrans gave for in- 
action (June, 1863) was, that if he should move against Bragg and 
take Chattanooga, that would release all of Bragg's remaining 
forces and they would be sent to Mississippi against Grant. That 



175 



The Washington authorities were entirely right in push- 
ing the dilatory general on to action.* At last General 
Halleck (no doubt at the instance of Lincoln, whose 
patience was worn thin), telegraphed Rosecrans, June 
11th, — I deem it my duty to repeat to you the great dis- 
satisfaction that is felt here at your inactivity. There 
seems to be no doubt that a part of Bragg's force has gone 
to Johnston 

Rosecrans's answer to this despatch (not now available) 
must have been delayed and evasive, for, on the 16th, Hal- 
leck telegraphed him the curt, stern command — Is it 
your intention to make an immediate movement forward? 
A definite answer, yes or no, is required." This language 
was little less than a threat of removal from command. 
He must have seen that, but yet could not resist his habit 
of quibbling. He replied the same day, at 6.30 p. m. — 

In reply to your inquiry, if immediate means to-night or 
to-morrow, no. If as soon as all things are ready, say five 
days, yes This must have been accepted as a promise to 
move in five days, and so was not answered. And he did 
make preliminary movements on the seventh day and the 
general movement on the eighth. 

On receiving Halleck's message on the 11th he called 
a council of his generals, and then reported to Halleck 
that the council was unanimously opposed to an advance, 
at least as long as the event of (grant's struggle at Vicks- 
burg was undecided. He said there were seventeen other 
generals present, but he did not count his Chief-of-Staff, 
General Garfield, who was there and opposed the decision. 
Garfield was, indeed, decidedly opposed, and the next day 
he showed Rosecrans a written statement to prove that 



is, the best use he could make of his great army was to keep it 
inactive and decline a decisive victory, so as to prevent his ad- 
versary from gaining a victory somewhere else! Bewildering 
reasoning, but characteristic of the chop-logic and ingenious irrel- 
evancy of Rosecrans's mental operations. 

* It is interesting that the Richmond government were doing 
just the same to Bragg, — trying to get him out to attack Rose- 
crans! But Bragg (or rather, Johnston, for he commanded the 
department in which Bragg commanded the army) had a better 
reason for hesitation, knowing that Rosecrans was much stronger 
and that a defeat for him would be much harder to repair than a 
defeat for Rosecrans. 



176 



he could then put 65,137 bayonets and sabers into action 
against Bragg's 41,680, allowing the most liberal estimates 
of his force 

General Garfield must have taken reduced figures in 
some way in computing Rosecrans's number, for his official 
field returns of June 30 next (after the casualties of the 
extremely hard turning campaign and the two days' fight- 
ing of the 24th and 25th) show 69,522, while Bragg's 
official returns of June 10 show 43,214, which included 
Morgan's cavalrj^ then on a great raid in Kentucky and 
numbering probably 2500. 

When Rosecrans reported to Halleck the judgment of 
his council and the curious reason for it found in the Vicks- 
burg campaign, he added, with his peculiar, irritating 
assumption of being certainly in the right in any con- 
troversy, a bit of advice : " I therefore counsel caution 
and patience. Better wait a little, to get all we can ready 
to insure the best results, if by so doing we observe a 
great military axiom, not to risk two great and decisive 
battles at the same time 

Halleck, who v/as a soldier of maxims, could not resist 
commenting upon this perversion, that " the maxim applies 
only to a single army, not to two armies acting independ- 
ently," and followed this blow with a malicious cut in 
* * * another military axiom, that ' councils of war 
never fight ' ! " — a wholesome old saw that would have 
made Grant or Sherman chuckle. 

Apparently it took Rosecrans some days to recover from 
this. He did not answer till the 21st, when his message 
showed a distinct change of mind, tho put in hedging lan- 
guage, to save his self-respect. He said that " for Bragg 
to materially aid Johnston he must abandon our front 
substantially, and then we can move to our ultimate work 
with more rapidity 

Now, having satisfied his temperamental necessity for 
controversy, he set out with alacrity to do the very thing 
he had so long contended would be a great error, bad 
strategy, and too dangerous. 

TULLAHOMA 

On June 24th, ten days before the Vicksburg campaign 
reached a result, he moved against Bragg with high spirit. 



177 



energy and skill, and, under a tremendous handicap of 
bad weather and bad roads, within ten days forced him 
out of Tullahoma and beyond the Tennessee, with a re- 
markably small loss of men. 

The grand objective was the possession of Chattanooga, 
then the most important railway position in the South, 
excepting, perhaps, Richmond. It was the rail gateway 
between the north and east and all the country west and 
south to the Gulf. It was also literally a stronghold, pro- 
tected by mountains near on every side. Even the ap- 
proach by the Tennessee river, from north or west, is thro 
narrow and crooked gorges, the mountains crowding up 
close to the shores, A comparatively small force in pos- 
session could hold the place indefinitely, unless cut off 
from supplies. 

But Bragg was now defending Chattanooga outside and 
far to westward. To get it Rosecrans must either bring 
him to battle where he was and defeat him decisively, or 
turn his right flank and get and hold all roads leading 
eastward as far south as the Tennessee. Why he did not 
force such a battle I do not know. Looking back, that was 
clearly his right course. As it was, his maneuvring only 
flanked Bragg out of his present positions, tho in that he 
succeeded quickly and with small loss. This, however, 
drove Bragg right into Chattanooga ; so that the work had 
to be done all over again, under greater difficulties and 
ultimately with an awful sacrifice of life. 

On leaving Murfreesboro, early in January, Bragg had 
taken his main position and fixed his headquarters at 
Tullahoma, a station on the Nashville and Chattanooga 
railroad thirty-five miles southeast from Murfreesboro. 
His left he placed, in strong force, at Shelbyville, a town 
on Duck river twenty-five miles directly south from Mur- 
freesboro and an important center of wagonroads. He 
fortified these two positions, chiefly the latter, and screened 
his whole front by keeping his cavalry in changing posi- 
tions from Spring Hill, thirty miles northwest of Shelby- 
ville, by way of the mountain gaps mentioned in the 
next paragraph, to McMinnville, forty miles northeast. 
Bragg's lines confronting Rosecrans thus lay in the form 
of a broad inward curve, the infantry and artillery reach- 
ing about twenty-five miles and the cavalry in front about 



178 



seventy miles. He had not men enough to hold either line 
safely, and, if steadily attacked at any one point, would 
be compelled to weaken another to bring up support. But 
this embarrassment would be the least likely to occur if 
Rosecrans should begin with an attempt to break his left 
wing at Shelbyville; and Bragg made the mistake of ex- 
pecting Rosecrans to do that, and of keeping, therefore, 
the stronger part of his forces there. 

Murfreesboro is on a large plain which is bounded on 
the east and south, at a distance of eight or ten miles, by 
a curved range of rough hills, the outlying western ridge 
of the Cumberland mountains. There are two " gaps 
in this range east of the town and three south, thro which 
all roads must pass. Of course if Bragg could hold these 
gaps he could check any movement by Rosecrans, unless 
made by a great detour, in which he would be in danger 
of being cut off from his supplies. He did hold those on 
the south in force (called Guy's Liberty " and Bell 
Buckle ") , but at the critical hour he was weak in the two 
on the east (''Hoover's" and '' Brady ville ") , — a condi- 
tion not creditable to his judgment. 

Immediately east of this range of hills is the valley of 
Duck river (which there flows southwesterly) , thro which 
ran a branch railway from Tullahoma up to McMinnville, 
thirty-five miles. On this railway, eight miles northeast 
of Tullahoma and twenty-five directly east of Shelbyville, 
was the village of Manchester, also a center of wagon- 
roads. 

From Tullahoma to Chattanooga, in an air line, it is 
about fifty-five miles, but by the railway then it was not 
less than eighty and by the wagonroads over the moun- 
tains nearly as much. The railway ran southeast to 
Decherd, fifteen miles, near the base of the main range 
of the Cumberlands, and thence southerly thirty miles, to 
Stevenson in Alabama, near the Tennessee, where it was 
merged in the Memphis-Charleston road, which, from 
there, ran northeast, crossed to the south side of the Ten- 
nessee at Bridgeport, and then kept the south side of that 
river to Chattanooga. Finally, the best or easiest wagon- 
roads from Tullahoma to Chattanooga ran southeast by 
east, about thirty-five miles to the Tennessee at Bridge- 
port and Jasper, the latter a little north of the river, in 



179 



the valley of Battle creek. Bragg's army, if retreating, 
would have to go by these roads, except in so far as it 
might be able to use the railroad. 

Now, looking at a map shov/ing the places mentioned 
and the topography of the country, it is clear that if Rose- 
crans should attack Bragg's left wing, at or west of Shelby- 
ville, and should succeed, but without a general victory, 
he would only compel him to fall back upon Tullahoma, or, 
at the worst, retreat down the railway or the wagonroads 
last mentioned toward Chattanooga, while, if he could pass 
the hills next east of Murfreesboro, get into Duck river 
valley and hold against Bragg's right wing, he could then 
move down that valley to Manchester, and thus compel 
Bragg to fight a general battle or evacuate both Tullahoma 
and Shelbyville and retreat in haste southv/ard beyond the 
Tennessee, thus losing Chattanooga. But in the latter 
movement there would be one serious risk for Rosecrans, 
nam_ely, that, if he were defeated in the battle, he might 
find Bragg blocking his roads of retreat toward Nashville, 
which was probably the consideration upon which Bragg 
expected that any decisive action would occur on his 
western flank. But success on the east would be much 
better for Rosecrans and much worse for Bragg, and Rose- 
crans decided to take the risk. 

Bragg's troops for the defense were the two army corps 
of Generals Polk and Hardee (later D. H. Hill), contain- 
ing five or six divisions and numbering in all about 30,000, 
Jackson's separate brigade of about 2000, an artillery 
reserve of about 1000, and Wheeler's and Forrest's 
cavalry, in three divisions, about 11,000. His artillery is 
not mentioned in detail or num.bers; but it may be as- 
sumed that, with such forces of infantry and cavalry, he 
had about 25 batteries, with more than 100 guns. 

Rosecrans's troops were in five corps : The Fourteenth, 
under General George H. Thomas, about 28=000 men, in 
four divisions under Generals Rousseau, Negley, Brannan 
and Reynolds, — the Twentieth, under General Alexander 
McD. McCook, about 17,000, in three divisions under 
Generals Davis, Johnson and Sheridan, — the Twenty-first, 
under General Thomas L. Crittenden, about 18,000, in 
three divisions under Generals Wood, Palmer and Van 
Cleve, — part of the Reserve Corps of General Gordon 



180 



Granger, about 7000, being one division of infantry under 
General Baird and one brigade of cavalry under Colonel 
Watkins, — and a Cavalry Corps under General David S. 
Stanley, about 12,000, in two divisions under Generals 
Mitchell and Turchin and one unattached regiment of 
mounted infantry under Colonel Harrison. 

Each of the infantry divisions contained three brigades, 
of four or five regiments each, and had three batteries of 
artillery, except Palmer's division of Crittenden's corps, 
which had four. Each of the cavalry divisions contained 
two brigades, of five or six regiments each, and one bat- 
tery, and Watkins's brigade of cavalry had one battery. 
There were thus 37 batteries, averaging about 6 guns 
each, there being 208 guns in all. But Van Cleve's divi- 
sion of Crittenden's corps (thirteen regiments and three 
batteries) was left for the immediate defense of Murfrees- 
boro and remained within the fortifications. 

Rosecrans's first movement was a feint upon Shelby- 
ville. Early on the 23d two divisions of Granger's corps, 
led by Watkins's cavalry, moved from the extreme right 
eastward, as if to get between Murfreesboro and Shelby- 
ville, with Mitchell's cavalry on their right flank, and 
bivouacked eight miles southwest of Murfreesboro. To 
Bragg this looked like the first step in an attack upon 
Shelbyville, and the idea was confirmed in the m_orning by 
the abrupt appearance of two of McCook's divisions in 
front of Guy's Gap, on Granger's left, while McCook's 
third division moved on three miles further east and made 
a show of attack upon Liberty Gap. But behind McCook's 
divisions one division of Thomas's corps (Brannan) was 
marching steadily eastward, to join his three others for 
a real attack upon Hoover's Gap and a descent into Duck 
river valley. Bragg was completely deceived. All day the 
24th he held his army anxiously aw^aiting attack at Shelby- 
ville, and did not realize his peril at Hoover's Gap until 
it was too late. 

On the 23d, in the haste of preparation under the abrupt 
order to march, Colonel Lane wrote to his wife — "I 
snatch a moment to say this arm^y m.oves to-morrow, 4 
a. m., for — I don't know where. Roads very dusty, but 
weather not very warm. Health good and in good spirits, 
and that is so of all my men and the whole army." 



181 



All the troops for the field were ordered to march at 
4 a. m., of the 24th. In the night of the 23d began a rain 
which ended a long period of drouth and dust, fell heavily- 
all the next day, followed by an extraordinary succession 
of rains for ten days. Every movement was made with 
great difficulty, some of the roads becoming well-nigh 
impassable. In the spring Rosecrans had declared that 
a campaign under such conditions was impossible: now, 
in the irony of fate, he was compelled to go on and do 
it whether he would or no ; but he did it with great energy 
and success. 

Thomas left his camps at 4 a. m. the 24th, with the three 
divisions of Rousseau, Negley and Reynolds, the latter 
division leading, with its First brigade (Wilder's mounted 
infantry) in front and the Third brigade (containing 
Colonel Lane's regiment) third in order of march. At the 
same early hour Crittenden v/as marching with two divi- 
sions of his corps southeasterly on a road to the left of 
Thomas, for the gap at Bradyville, and his advanced bri- 
gade of cavalry drove off the weak force Bragg had posted 
there. But this position would be of little value to Rose- 
crans without Hoover's Gap, which was, indeed, the key 
of his plan of campaign. 

This gap presented great natural advantages for de- 
fense. It is a narrow pass, with steep sides (at that time 
covered with forest), beginning ten miles southeast of 
Murfreesboro, rising gradually four miles to its summit, 
then descending two miles to McBride's creek, which flows 
south, along the eastern base of the range, to Duck river. 
There was no other road over the hills between Bradyville 
and Bell-Buckle Gap. A small force, with a few guns 
and some defensive works, could have held Hoover's Gap 
against great odds, but Bragg seems to have done nothing 
but station a guard of one or two regiments in it. 

Wilder struck this guard in the western end of the gap 
about ten o'clock, and,, in constant attack, forced it back 
to the summit of the gap by noon. The Second and Third 
brigades kept close behind in support, but not directly 
engaged, and by two o'clock the gap was cleared and the 
enemy driven beyond McBride's creek. The news of this 
movement brought a rush of Bragg's troops up McBride's 
creek and, as more and more arrived, attacks were re- 



182 



peated upon Reynolds' division, holding the crossing of the 
creek and all its west bank, until night ended the attempt 
with nothing gained. During the night the whole of 
Stewart's division of Hardee's corps, with other forces 
and several batteries, arrived and got into position for a 
concerted attack in the morning. Stewart's guns shelled 
Reynolds' bivouac thro the night without effect, Thomas 
brought up Rousseau's and Negley's divisions in support, 
and Crittenden moved down from Bradyville, threatening 
the enemy's right. All day the 25th Stewart's artillery 
tried to open the way for an assault, and several times a 
heavy charge of infantry was made, to force a crossing 
of the creek; but Thom.as, engaging only his artillery and 
a portion of his infantry, simply held his ground. 

This was the day referred to by Colonel Lane, in a letter 
two weeks later, in which he says, of his brigade — We 
were in front of all the infantry and lay under fire 24 
hours, guarding our battery, without firing a gun, which 
is a hard test for soldiers. Solid shot, shell, grape and 
musket-balls fell among us in great numbers, but none 
in my regiment were hurt." 

Early on the 26th Thomas took the aggressive against 
Stev/art, who thereupon retreated toward Tullahoma, and 
on the 27th the advance of Reynolds' division, on the left 
in Thomas's movement, drove the enemy out of Man- 
chester and took possession. Rosecrans's turning opera- 
tion was complete and Tullahoma directly threatened. 

Bragg's mistake was past mending then, and he hastily 
shifted his forces from Shelbyville and its front to Tulla- 
homa. Rosecrans could have completed his discomfiture 
and, at the least, compelled him to retreat into Alabama, 
by promptly advancing upon Tullahoma. He had brought 
seven divisions up to and near Manchester, which was 
but eight miles from Tullahoma, and Bragg w^as two days 
in getting his troops into position there. The only obstacle 
was the mud in the roads, but the troops had already 
moved over such roads for three days, heavy rains having 
fallen in all the region from the hour of leaving Murfrees- 
boro. But he rem.ained three days at Manchester, occu- 
pied only in moving up his trains and disposing his lines 
in front of Bragg's positions, allowing Bragg plenty of 
time to place his troops and improve his works for defense. 



183 



Both Rosecrans and Bragg say, in their reports, that 
they expected and were ready for a battle at Tullahoma ; 
but neither of them acted as if he were willing. Rose- 
crans did, indeed, consider a movement to turn Bragg's 
right and get the railroad, but had hardly received his 
engineer's report on the route proposed when, on the 
morning of the first of July, Thomas reported from the 
front that Tullahoma was evacuated. 

Three days before this Thomas had tried to break up 
the railroad by a mounted raid. He had sent the daring 
Wilder, with his brigade of mounted infantry. Wilder 
forded the Elk river with great difficulty, eight miles east 
of Tullahoma, and made an attempt upon the railroad 
bridge on the Elk, but found it so heavily guarded that 
he could not reach it. He then turned upon Decherd, on 
the railroad three miles further east, where he drove out 
the fortified garrison, destroyed the station, and was tear- 
ing up the track when a division of the enemy, hurried 
down from Elk bridge by train, compelled him to retire. 
'Then he crossed the Cumberland mountain, on a circuit 
to the north by University Place, and tried to reach the 
railroad in the valley of Big Crow creek; but he found 
this valley a deep gorge and was afraid to spend the time 
required to get into and out of it while, as he believed, the 
enemy's cavalry was pursuing him. So he turned back, 
and soon found that Forrest's cavalry was on the road. 
He escaped this danger by a skilful and dramatic conceal- 
ment, and returned to Thomas's command by the night of 
the 30th. 

On the 29th Bragg increased the cavalry forces on his 
right front and flank and vv^ell up the Elk, a movement 
which Rosecrans either did not learn of or did not under- 
stand. It was a screen behind which, during the night 
of the 29th and all the 30th, Bragg was leaving the field. 
By dawn of the first of July all of his army and equip- 
ment was safely beyond the Elk, except a part of his 
cavalry, remaining to check any pursuit. By the railroad 
bridge, one or two wagon bridges near it, and two or three 
fords, he had skilfully v/ithdrawn from the front of Rose- 
crans's guns without discovery, an achievement which was 
highly creditable to him and discreditable to Rosecrans. 

After hearing of the evacuation Rosecrans spent all that 



184 



day (July 1) in moving troops into TuUahoma, making 
no order for the pursuit of Bragg, a part of whose forces, 
at least, might have been caught west of the Cumberland 
mountain; tho Thomas did, on his own judgment, move 
on toward the Elk, with Reynolds's division, until checked 
near the river by Bragg's cavalry. On the 2nd, however, 
a general advance was ordered by Rosecrans, and at night 
several divisions had reached the Elk, only to find that 
river swollen by another great rain. Bragg had, of 
course, destroyed all bridges. All day the 3d, at five 
or six fords within a reach of ten miles, the different divi- 
sions were trying to get across the Elk. The water fell 
in the night and several divisions made the passage with 
their guns, and pushed on to the foot of the mountain at 
Cowan. But the only sign of the enemy was the last of 
his rearguard. That day Bragg had all his army and 
trains on or near the Tennessee, and on the 7th he was in 
Chattanooga, busy in preparations for its defense. 

There was not even a nominal pursuit beyond Cowan. 
In fact Rosecrans himself did not even cross the Elk. 
He considered that he had achieved a great victory, and 
therefore settled himself in camp at Winchester (a village 
near Decherd, where several wagonroads met) , where he 
received congratulations from and wrote reports and let- 
ters to Washington. His achievement was, indeed, in it- 
self, highly creditable, accomplished, as it was, with energy 
and speed under remarkably adverse conditions of weather 
and roads; and yet he was far superior to Bragg in 
strength and could, and ought to, have done much more. 
He could and ought to have prevented Bragg from cross- 
ing the mountains and brought him to signal defeat, if not 
destruction. 

And now this erratic general, always either moving 
with nervous energy, reckless of risks, or lying indolently 
in camp complaining of difficulties and of neglect by his 
superiors, could not be induced to act for six weeks. He 
encamped the greater part of his troops between Elk 
river and the Cumberland range, across the railroad, with 
a division or brigade or regiment back at Shelbyville, at 
Tullahoma, Manchester, McMinnville, Murfreesboro and 
other places. He did, however, repair the railroad, so that 
within two weeks his transportation was complete from 



185 



Nashville to Cowan, and a little later to Bridgeport on the 
Tennessee. 

Meantime, of course, Bragg improved the time thus 
allowed him, strengthened his position at Chattanooga and 
got in reinforcements, guns and ammunition, until he was 
much more formidable than at any time since Rosecrans 
first entered the field against him. Stone's River and 
Tullahoma had to be all done over again, at far greater 
labor and cost and thro a tremendous and most destruc- 
tive battle. 

In the disposition of the troops after giving up the pur- 
suit of Bragg, Thomas's corps was placed at Decherd. 
After a day or two Reynolds's brigades were regularly 
encamped near Big Spring, two miles from Decherd, where 
they remained to the end of the month. This remarkable 
water is a pool, filled from beneath, fifty yards or more 
across and of great depth. Several of the Eleventh Ohio 
tell of the delightful camp-life there, after provisions 
(which had been scanty for a week or more) were again 
regularly supplied. 

Colonel Lane wrote a number of letters from this camp. 
One, of July 5, speaks of a rumor that there had been 
" a battle between Lee and Hooker (or some say General 
Meade) and that Lee was badly defeated ", and of another 
rumor that Grant had had some success at Vicksburg '\ 
That is, they received on the same day their first news 
of the great events at Gettysburg and Vicksburg. On the 
7th he tells of persistent reports of the defeat of Lee, but 
nothing more from Vicksburg. On the 8th, five days after 
the event, he says there is official news of the fall of Vicks- 
burg and a National Salute was fired from all the bat- 
teries on our entire front." To this he adds — " This is 
the beginning of the end. * * * ]\/[y faith has never 
deserted me. It is no stronger now than it ever was. I 
have felt that God was just and that he would not allow 
such an outrage as the Southern Confederacy to prosper." 

From that time on he repeatedly writes of his desire and 
purpose to resign and go home, as he believes the work 
now practically done, or at least the victorious end assured, 
while his family and business obligations constantly press 
upon his mind. On the 12th he writes " We suppose 
Bragg is still running.* We are satisfied Lee is being 



186 



worsted. Would give $10 for a copy of this or to-mor- 
row's date of the Cincinnati Gazette. * * * The fall 
of Vicksburg will have a great influence in the operations 
of this army." 

On the 19th — " The war really looks nearly over. The 
Potomac army can close it now, if they will whip Lee. 
I wish they would send for the Army of the Cumberland, 
which would annihilate Lee in 24 hours." 

He says they have an official announcement that the 
Mississippi is opened and that Grant is driving Johnston 
to and beyond Jackson. And then that he hopes to be at 
home before the first of January, and adds — "I shall leave 
the army as soon as active operations seem to be over." 
He became more cautious, however, within a few days, and 
on the 29th wrote — ''I hope we are now seeing the end, 
but there is an army of 300,000 (of the rebels) in the 
field yet, and it may take months " ; and adds I hope I 
may soon, consistently with my duty, be able to leave the 
army." 

On the 31st there was a rearrangement of portions of 
the troops, in which Reynolds's and Rousseau's divisions 
of Thomas's corps were moved up the McMinnville road a 
few miles, to a point where another road led across the 
mountain southeast, by University Place, to descend by 
the valley of Battle creek Sweeden's Cove ") to the 
Tennessee, and the Third brigade of Reynolds (the 
Eleventh Ohio's) was sent up to University Place. 

The brigade was greatly pleased now to have a new 
commander, — Brigadier-General John B. Turchin. There 
had been a singular exchange of command. General 
Turchin had been a long time in command of a division in 
Stanley's Cavalry Corps, General Crook now, under 
orders, changed places with him, tho the exchange seems 
to have been agreeable to both. General Turchin was 
very successful in the Third brigade, and a personal 
friendship grew up between him and Colonel Lane which 
lasted until death intervened. 

The brigade moved up the mountain by the road over 
Brakefield Point (a long spur projecting to the west), a 



* He was not at all running, but preparing a great defense at 
Chattanooga. 



187 



very steep and difficult road, Colonel Lane says The 
roughest and most difficult road I ever saw." It arrived 
and encamped near the University " on the first of 
August and remained there until the 16th, when it 
marched on the next campaign. This position was di- 
rectly on the top of the mountain, there more than two 
thousand feet above the sea, and in a wilderness of forest 
extending many miles in all directions. 

The singular name of this place in a wilderness was due 
to an ambitious undertaking, some years before the war, 
to establish there a great university, The University of 
the South." Some stone had been brought and exten- 
sive wooden buildings had been erected for workmen and 
materials, and the corner-stone had been laid with great 
ceremony, much speech-making, a barbecue " etc. But 
now weeds and brushwood covered the place and the 
buildings were dilapidated, tho the brigade found them of 
use for various purposes. 

Here nothing of special note occurred to vary the routine 
of camp life, except in one incident. A body of recruits 
was reported in Ohio for the Eleventh infantry, and the 
Colonel sent a few officers and men to bring them to the 
regiment. The number of the recruits is not mentioned, 
but the regiment must have been much reduced during 
the year of service since Colonel Lane filled it up.f 

What news reached this distant camp told of no impor- 
tant action on either side in the war, and the ColoneFs 
letters continue to show his opinion that the rebellion was 
broken, that the army would act chiefly as an army of 
occupation, and that he could soon, in good conscience, 
resign. But it still remained, as he thought, that the Army 
of the Potomac must defeat Lee decisively in Virginia. 
He saw no sign of movement in his own army and had no 



* It was a Protestant-Episcopal " institution and the con- 
spicuous figure in the work was the famous " Militant Bishop " 
Leonidas Polk, who was a general in the rebel army in the cam- 
paign now treated of and who was killed in action in the Atlanta 
campaign in 1864. The work was stopped by the approach of the 
war and during the war, but the first building was completed and 
opened a few years afterward; and the institution has since be- 
come important under the name " Sewanee." 

t See pages 131, 139, 140. 



188 



expectation of any. If he had known what was going on 
at Rosecrans's headquarters down at Winchester these 
ideas would not have occurred to him. That balky gen- 
eral had been urged to action by his superiors from the 
middle of July, with no response but in controversy and 
restatement of difficulties. The duty and advantages of 
following up Bragg as soon as the railroad could be re- 
paired were obvious. To delay was to give Bragg time 
for better defense, to recover the morale of his army, and 
to increase it by reinforcement. All these gains he was, 
indeed, already making. 

The conduct of Rosecrans was inexplicable to the War 
Department, and even to his own Chief-of-Staff, General 
Garfield, who wrote privately, July 27, to a friend, that 

on the 18th the bridges were rebuilt and the cars run- 
ning from Nashville to the Tennessee and I have since then 
urged with all the earnestness I possess a rapid advance 
while Bragg's army was shattered and under cover and 
before Johnston and he can effect a junction. Thus far 
the General has been singularly disinclined to grasp the 
situation with a strong hand and make the advantage his 
own.'* 

It happened, strikingly, that just as the railroad was 
opened to the Tennessee, as Garfield said, Sherman de- 
feated Johnston at Jackson, Miss., and drove him east of 
the Pearl. Johnston had then near 30,000 men, and the 
half of them could now be sent for service out of Missis- 
sippi. Within a few weeks about 15,000 of them joined 
Bragg, and when Chickamauga was fought as many more 
had come from, other quarters. Garfield could well say 
that Rosecrans was singularly disinclined to grasp the 
situation." 

The War Department was so fixed in the purpose of his 
prompt advance that all thro July it was urgently press- 
ing Burnside to act upon the orders already sent him, to 
move thro Kentucky upon Knoxville, which would be both 
a diversion in favor of Rosecrans and a support to him, 
Knoxville being but eighty miles from Chattanooga and 
connected by railway; but Burnside, tho quite unlike 
Rosecrans in being always willing, was quite like him in 
being always dilatory. He could not get himself started 



189 



until late in August and did not get to Knoxville until in 
September, when his action was of little practical value to 
Rosecrans. 

Meantime Rosecrans only went on writing complaints 
and arguments, even in matters which had been settled 
by time and events. He represented that it was nearly 
impossible to overcome the obstacles of mountains and 
rivers in any campaign against Chattanooga. Among 
other great obstacles he said that the roads were worse 
than anywhere in the world and the difficulties of keeping 
up supplies greater, the number of animals he had being 
always inadequate This was in a letter to Lincoln, who 
replied with great consideration and kindness, but asked 
a few of those simple, pithy questions with which he could 
so easily throw a problem into practical shape. " Does 
your preparation advance at all ? " he said ; do you not 
consume supplies as fast as you get them? Have you not 
been furnished more animals since Stone's River than 
your entire present stock? Is not the same true as to 
your mounted force? 

This was about the same as to tell a man that the fault 
was probably in himself ; that if he were not yet ready to 
move he never would be ready. It would seem that it had 
effect, as directly afterward, like a balky horse, Rosecrans 
suddenly and actively began his march. Perhaps he found 
another spur in a letter he received at the same time from 
Halleck, to whom he had written another long letter, com- 
plaining that the Secretary of War had " sl personal 
hostility " to him and did not want him to succeed. Hal- 
leck answered, August 9, that he was " much mistaken 
but that " still many of your dispatches have been exceed- 
ingly annoying to the War Department * * * 
veying the impression that you were not disposed to carry 
out the wishes of the Department tho " No doubt such 
was not your intention." * * * " It is said that you 
do not draw straight in the traces, but are continually 



* Official reports show that during that period Rosecrans had 
received 27,707 horses and 20,396 mules. With those he already 
had this would (probably) give every cavalryman 4 horses and 
supply every wagon with 6 or 8 full teams. It proves a terrible 
waste of animals and an inexcusably bad state of discipline and 
oversight in their care. 



190 



kicking out and getting one leg over."* But," he added, 
" no one doubts your good intentions." 

Rosecrans's familiar spirit " could not let such an 
opportunity pass, tho, if he could wait two weeks, one 
would think he might as well let it alone. On the 22d he 
wrote to Hallack in a singularly conciliatory tone, only 
mildly chiding, but persisting in the idea that there was 
hostility toward him at Washington and seriously argu- 
ing that the simile of the horse's leg was unjust to him. 

It is remarkable that these two letters of Lincoln and 
Halleck were written but a few days after curt and un- 
qualified orders to move at once had been sent to Rose- 
crans. On August 4th he was ordered to " move forward 
without further delay, and report daily the movement of 
each corps until you cross the Tennessee ". To this he 
replied, not that he would move, but that he " had deter- 
mined to cross the river and was making preparations ", 
reminded Halleck of Hooker's fate (on the Rappahannock, 
three months before), and asked if the order was ''in- 
tended to take away my discretion as to time and manner 
of moving my troops ". This bit of trivial fencing Hal- 
leck met at once with stern brevity : " The orders for the 
advance of your army and daily report of its movements 
are peremptory." But even this did not subdue the in- 
veterate irritater. To another querulous message from 
him the next day Halleck telegraphed — "I have commu- 
nicated to you the wishes of the Government in plain and 
unequivocal terms. You have been directed to lose no 
time. The means you are to employ and the roads you 
are to follow are left to your own discretion. If you wish 
to carry out promptly the wishes of the Government you 
will not stop to discuss mere details ". Nevertheless, two 
days later, Halleck wrote the conciliatory, tho hardly 
flattering, letter of August 9, above quoted. 

The fact was that Lincoln, Halleck and Stanton all had, 
or had had, a high opinion of Rosecrans's military abili- 
ties, — much higher than his achievements on the whole 
could justify. A study of his career discloses no military 

* This last is pretty surely a quotation from Lincoln, one of the 
homely illustrations from country life he so often and so aptly 
used. He probably said it in commenting on Rosecrans in one of 
his discussions with Halleck or Stanton. 



191 



quality in which he rose above the average but one, the 
he often fell below it. That one was obstinate fighting 
after he once got into a fight, tho even that quality failed 
at Chickamauga. For the rest, he was dilatory, erratic, 
insubordinate, reckless in assuming authority not in- 
tended, jealous of the fame and position of other generals, 
always magnifying difficulties, and never ceasing his 
criticisms of and objections to any plans or orders not his 
own. And at Corinth, at Stone's Kiver, at Tullahoma, the 
three greatest events in his career up to that time, he had 
signally failed even to try to complete the victories he 
claimed by following his adversary to total defeat. All of 
his fighting had been courageous and all his flanking opera- 
tions brilliant but not all of them together could sup- 
port the high reputation they had brought him as a gen- 
eral, in view of his repeatedly proven incapacity in other 
respects essential to real success or permanent fame. 
Now he was charged with the highest opportunity of his 
military career and he was not equal to it. He was to 
enter upon a campaign in which, by the greatest flanking 
movement of the war, he forced Bragg out of the strong- 
hold of Chattanooga without a battle, only to have Bragg 
immediately force him into battle under great disadvan- 
tages thro his own obvious blunders, v/ith the result of the 
greatest disaster of the war. 



192 



XV 



1863: August — September 
Chattanooga — Chickamauga 

Rosecrans Driven to Action — Campaign Against Chat- 
tanooga — Makes Grand Feint on the North — Crosses 
the Tennessee and the Mountains on the South — Bragg 
Surprised, Evacuates Chattanooga — Deceives Rose- 
crans by Apparent Retreat — Rosecrans Imprudently 
Divides his Army — Bragg Seizes the Opportunity to 
Force Battle 

Having permitted Bragg to get away from Tullahoma 
and move to Chattanooga with his army intact, Rosecrans 
was now compelled to march upon his new position with 
his whole army, with great care and harassing labor and 
at great risk. For Chattanooga was remarkably difficult 
of access by m.ilitary m.ovement. Bragg's new position 
was much stronger than the old and much better situated 
for supply. 

From Virginia to Chattanooga the general course of 
the Tennessee is southwesterly.* Just before reaching 
the town it turns, like a sharp elbow, to the west, and, 
after making four or five deep bends, north and south, 
enclosing long tongues of land, crosses the boundary of 
Alabama at a point about twenty miles west of Chattan- 
ooga, and then makes a long reach southwest. These 
bends are due to the projecting feet of rugged and pre- 
cipitous mountains, which interlock like cogs on opposing 
wheels, so that the river must find its way thro tortuous 
and narrow gorges. On the right or northern bank these 
mountains, for about fifteen miles west of the town, leave 

* There will be occasion from time to time in this chapter to 
refer to a map. The appended sketch will answer fairly if a 
hetter map be not at hand. 



193 



no room for a road. On the southern side there is scant 
space for a wagonroad and the Memphis & Charleston 
(Nashville & Chattanooga) railway. So, to move an army 
eastward along the river, against a determined defense 
of the town by even a small force, would be impracticable. 

The approach of Rosecrans must be, therefore, from 
either the north or the south. If an army could be moved 
into the valley of the Tennessee north of the town and 
supplied there, it could move down the west side of the 
river, to a point directly opposite the town, but it would 
still have the river to cross in the face of an enemy pro- 
tected by fortifications. But, to get into that valley, it 
would have to climb, and drag with it immense wagon 
trains, by very steep and rough roads, over the Cumber- 
land mountain and Walden's Ridge, and the distances 
from Tullahoma would be sixty to seventy miles. Still, 
given time, labor and cost enough, that route was at least 
feasible. For a southern route, it would be necessary to 
cross the river twenty to thirty miles west of Chattanooga, 
in Alabama or near the border, and, by a wide circuit to 
the south and east, reach the mouths of the small north- 
and-south valleys which open northward upon the small 
plain on which the town stands. But the topography of 
the region to be traversed seemed almost absolutely to 
forbid such a route. 

The whole country immediately south of Chattanooga 
is filled with mountains. They take the form of parallel 
ridges, more or less irregular in form, extending south- 
westward across the corner of Georgia and into Alabama. 
These ridges stand close to each other, so that the valleys 
between are narrow and rough, and in each valley there 
is a stream, all of the streams flowing northward into the 
Tennessee, except the one furthest east, which flows south- 
ward into the Coosa, a tributary of the Alabama. These 
mountains rise to from 1600 to 2200 feet above tide, and 
are remarkably rough. At the time of the campaign they 
were all covered with the primitive forests and the only 
roads across them were a few of the earliest type, mere 
wagon tracks or bridle paths, passing thro " gaps " nearly 
as high and steep as the ridges. 

The western ridge is Sand Mountain, which has the 
Tennessee running along its western base. Next to the 



194 



east is Lookout Mountain, with Lookout creek flowing 
between. Then comes Chattanooga river and then Mis- 
sionary Ridge, then West Chickamauga creek, then Pigeon 
Mountain, then Chattooga river, and then Taylor's Ridge. 
Eastward of Taylor's Ridge the mountains are lower and 
irregular in form, and much of the country is practicable 
for roads and agriculture. 

Thirty miles south of Chattanooga the Lookout and 
Pigeon ranges are joined and Missionary Ridge, the short- 
est of the ridges, lies between them, as between the tines 
of a fork. Between the south end of Missionary Ridge 
and the junction of the Lookout and Pigeon ranges there 
is a valley, eight or ten miles long north and south, two 
or three wide, and hilly, called McLemore's Cove. Both 
Chattanooga river and West Chickamauga creek take 
their rise in the southern end of this cove. It was from 
McLemore's Cove northward along the west side of West 
Chickamauga creek and on the eastern spurs of Mission- 
ary Ridge that the great battle of " Chickamauga " was 
fought. 

At that time there was no railway in any of these val- 
leys, except a short branch in Lookout valley, and the only 
one from Chattanooga into Georgia, to get a practicable 
route, had to run first to the east some twelve miles, to 
reach a valley belonging to the Gulf watershed, where it 
turned south and wound a crooked way along a tributary 
of the Coosa and then one of the Chattahoochee, to 
Atlanta. On this railway, about twenty-five miles (in a 
direct line) southeast of Chattanooga, was the town of 
Dalton. Another station, twenty miles south of Dalton, 
was Kingston, and a few miles west of this place, on a 
branch railway, was Rome. 

The possession of Rome and Kingston by Rosecrans 
would be a great blow to Bragg. It would probably com- 
pel the evacuation of Chattanooga, threaten Atlanta, and 
put the army a long way toward that important city. But 
to reach Rome from Rosecrans's position near Bridgeport 
would require a march of seventy or eighty miles, thro a 
country entirely mountainous, and the vast labor of trans- 
portation and the ease with which cavalry raids could be 
made upon the line of supplies were prohibitory. 

Rosecrans gave that route some consideration, but set- 



195 



tied upon a much shorter one, altho it included, for 
some days, a much more difficult mountain passage. It 
would take less time and would be more likely to escape 
for a time the enemy's observation. He determined to 
move directly over the Sand and Lookout mountains to 
McLemore's Cove. That march would be only twenty- 
five or thirty miles and would place him hardly twenty 
miles south of Chattanooga and but twelve or fifteen from 
Dalton, which place could then be reached by his cavalry 
for the breaking up of the Atlanta railway. But, in choos- 
ing this route, one of his chief reasons lay in his judg- 
ment that Bragg would think it impracticable or so 
hazardous as not to be considered, as, indeed, Bragg did. 

Having decided upon his route, Rosecrans set out upon 
an elaborate scheme to make sure of misleading Bragg 
and inducing him to withdraw his forces from the south 
of Chattanooga. No other movement of a like kind was 
made on so great a scale during the war. It was Tulla- 
homa repeated, but far larger. All the country within 
fifty miles west and north of Chattanooga appeared to 
be filled with Union troops moving east, as if intending 
to occupy the Tennessee valley from near Knoxville down. 
In fact only one corps was employed, with two mounted 
brigades, but the purpose was fully gained. 

Returning now to Rosecrans's preparations for the cam- 
paign, spoken of in his despatch of August 4 to Halleck, 
there was at that time little outward evidence of them, 
tho there had been movements of some troops toward the 
Tennessee during the last days of July and the railroad 
had been repaired from Tullahoma to Bridgeport. These 
movements of troops were of the cavalry far out to the 
right, on the Elk, and thence down into Alabama, and to 
the left to the upper Sequatchie as far as Kingston, near 
Knoxville, while, from the main body of the infantry, two 
divisions of Thomas's corps (Rousseau and Negley) were 
placed at Cowan, on the railroad at the foot of Cumber- 
land Mountain, and the remainder of Reynolds's division 
was sent up to University Place, to join its Third brigade 
(Turchin), followed by Brannan's division. Two brigades 
of Sheridan's division of McCook's corps were sent over 
the mountain southward and along the railroad, to the 



196 



Alabama border, with a small body of cavalry scouting 
in front as far as the Tennessee. 

But none of these movements could fairly be called 
" preparations for a forward movement as intimated 
to Halleck. They were, rather, prudent dispositions of 
the army against a forward movement by the enemy, which 
was not only possible, but was in Rosecrans's mind and 
was repeatedly urged upon Bragg by the Richmond gov- 
ernment. However, letting ten days pass after receiving 
peremptory orders to move, just as he had done before 
when ordered to move from Murfreesboro upon Bragg, 
Rosecrans suddenly put all his army upon the march ; and 
he moved upon a comprehensive plan, carefully laid, with 
a sure hand and with striking success, again gaining great 
fame as a practical tactician. 

The physical difficulties were certainly great. Between 
him and Chattanooga, north of the Tennessee, were two 
high ranges of barren mountains ; no forage in the country 
and long distances without water; roads few and far 
apart (the natural ''dirt" roads), narrow, crooked and 
very steep and rough. The men could climb and descend 
slowly, but for the guns and the hundreds of wagons, 
laden with provisions and ammunition, there was great 
labor and creeping progress. 

On August 13th Rosecrans sent to the Adjutant-General 
at Washington a message, in effect, that his advance had 
begun. This referred to Reynolds's division on the road 
from University Place southeast to Jasper, but the mes- 
sage was hardly frank, as Reynolds was not actually 
marching, tho in a position to do so. Orders for march- 
ing were, in fact, not issued until the 15th, and the march 
of the first division was begun the morning of the 16th. 
Then the first columns and trains so crowded the few 
narrow roads that it was three or four days before all 
were fairly on the way. 

Colonel Lane heard on the 13th that some movement 
was intended, but his brigade did not get marching orders 
until the 17th. That division had already done half its 
work, however, in climbing the mountain to University 
Place. 

The Second brigade had marched on the 16th, leading 
the way across the plateau of the Cumberland mountain 



197 



and descending southeasterly, by Sweeden's Cove (the 
valley of Battle creek) , along which a road was practicable, 
coming on the 18th within a mile or two of the Tennessee, 
near the mouth of Battle creek, crossing that stream 
northerly, and halting to camp on the east side of it, five 
miles from the village of Jasper. Reynolds reported this 
to Thomas and said " Turchin's brigade will be up to- 
morrow." 

But the Eighty-ninth Ohio had just before been de- 
tached from Turchin's brigade and sent back to Tracy 
City, north of University Place, as a guard for that post. 
It followed the army to the field of Chickamauga, how- 
ever, with Granger's Reserve Corps, and reached there in 
time to suffer a heavy blow in the second day's battle, in 
which it lost more in killed and wounded than any other 
regiment in the brigade and lost half its remainder by 
capture. 

Brannan's division followed Rejmolds down Sweeden's 
Cove, Reynolds having command of both. Wilder's bri- 
gade (mounted infantry) of Reynolds's division marched 
up to Tracy City and thence east across the Cumberland 
range, the Sequatchie river and Walden's Ridge, to the 
Tennessee, and thence south toward Chattanooga. 

It should have been said that the Sequatchie river flows 
southwesterly, along the eastern base of the Cumberland 
range, in a narrow valley parallel with that of the Ten- 
nessee and separated from it by Walden's Ridge, a long 
mountain of the Cumberland system., but lower than the 
main range, both valleys being little more than great 
gorges. 

Crittenden's corps moved up the western base of the 
main Cumberland range, and its three divisions turned 
east separately and crossed the mountain, by different 
roads, into the Sequatchie valley. Wood's division coming 
out first, at Therman on the Sequatchie, about twenty 
miles northeast of Jasper, then Palmer's at Dunlap, seven 
or eight miles above Therman, and Van Cleve's at Pike- 
ville, twenty miles above Dunlap. From Wood's division 
one brigade (Wagner) and from Palmer's one (Hazen) 
were then sent east, across Walden's Ridge, into the Ten- 
nessee valley, where they moved south, on the west side 
of the river, toward Chattanooga, and took positions 



198 



separately in support of Wilder's mounted brigade, the 
movements of which were at times (as intended to be) 
observed from the town. 

Thus we see two of Thomas's divisions posted near the 
Tennessee and the mouth of the Sequatchie and the three 
of Crittenden northward at different points on the latter 
river, making a line of forty-five miles nearly facing Chat- 
tanooga, while three brigades were in front, over in the 
Tennessee valley, directly north of the town. 

The two other divisions of Thomas were moved down 
to Stevenson in Alabama (near Bridgeport on the Ten- 
nessee), where all of McCook's corps was concentrated 
and where Rosecrans now established his headquaters, 
while the greater part of the cavalry was kept well to the 
west of Stevenson, from the Elk to the Tennessee, to pre- 
vent any attack or near reconnoisance by the rebel cavalry. 

With the beginning of these movements Minty's brigade 
of Crook's division of cavalry was sent on a rapid march 
forty miles north of Manchester, to Sparta, where it de- 
feated a brigade of rebel cavalry, an outlying part of For- 
rest's command under General Dibrell, and then marched 
rapidly toward Kingston on the Tennessee. This was 
done to create the belief that a strong cavalry force was 
coming into the Tennessee valley as the left of Rosecrans's 
forces. 

Then Wilder appeared on the river just north of Chat- 
tanooga, with a large battery, and began to throw shell 
into the town. At the same time King's brigade of 
Reynolds's division, supported by Turchin's, appeared on 
the north side of the river, east of the Sequatchie, about 
fifteen miles west of Chattanooga, and shelled a station 
on the railway on the south side called Shell Mound. 

All of these operations north of the Alabama border 
were easily observed by the enemy, as it was intended 
they should be. They were on so many roads and so evi- 
dently directed to the occupation of the Tennessee valley 
that Bragg believed that a large army was employed in 
them. The advance by Burnside thro Kentucky upon 
Knoxville at the same time appeared to him to be pre- 
liminary to reinforcing Rosecrans from that point. The 
troops seen near Bridgeport (the most of the troops there 
were kept back some miles from the river for conceal- 



199 



ment) he thought were only for the prudent holding of 
that crossing against any attempt upon Rosecrans's right 
while engaged in an attack upon Chattanooga from the 
north. Accordingly Bragg moved the greater part of his 
forces up the river on the east side, above Chattanooga, 
his right reaching as far as opposite Van Cleve at Pike- 
ville, while Forrest's cavalry held the space from there on 
to Loudon and Kingston. The country south of Chatta- 
nooga, therefore, which Rosecrans wanted to reach, Bragg 
left almost bare of troops. 

It is surprising that Bragg v/as so deceived, the more 
since he had already been deceived by Rosecrans by a 
similar device when he was flanked out of Shelbyville; 
but yet the records show that he and his immediate ad- 
visers assumed, as of course, that a movement across the 
mountains south of Chattanooga, from Bridgeport, was, 
practically, beyond attempt. 

Meantime McCook's divisions and the two of Thomas at 
Stevenson, Reynolds's above the Sequatchie, opposite the 
railway station at Shell Mound, and Brannan's a little 
below, at the mouth of Battle creek, were busily employed 
upon the means of crossing the river. The railway bridge 
at Bridgeport was to be repaired and fitted for the pas- 
sage of guns and wagon-trains, but it was under observa- 
tion from the hills on the opposite shore. Sheridan 
found a way to cross a small force there, which drove out 
the rebels and held the hills, and then the bridge work 
was pushed with great energy. The pontoon-train had 
boats enough for one bridge, but hardly half enough for 
another, and for the second a low trestle-work was run 
out from the shore to supply the lack. Reynolds's men 
had been hunting for and raising some flat-boats which 
had been sunk by the enemy above Bridgeport, and build- 
ing others, and Brannan's were building rafts. 

On the 21st Colonel King, of the Sixty-eighth Indiana, 
now commanding Reynolds's Second brigade, posted just 
east of the mouth of the Sequatchie, took a small party 
across the river by night, in canoes, and burned a bridge 
on the railway near Shell Mound, thus cutting off Bragg's 
use of the road between Bridgeport and Chattanooga. On 
the 28th, again at night, he crossed on the flat-boats, 
with 300 men, and reconnoitered the road six miles 



200 



tov/ard Chattanooga, ran upon the enemy's picket, 
at once attacked and broke up the camp of the 
regiment which supported it, captured a number of 
men and horses, and returned to Shell Mound and 
recrossed the same night. In the night of the 30th he 
moved his whole brigade across, with a battalion of 
cavalry, sent the cavalry up the road to find the enemy's 
outpost, which it found at the foot of Lookout Mountain, 
only three miles from Chattanooga, and encamped his bri- 
gade near Shell Mound, This was the first permanent 
crossing of the army for the great campaign. The next 
night (31st) Turchin's brigade crossed on the fiat-boats 
and Brannan's division (or most of it) on the rafts, all 
camping near Shell Mound. On the first of September 
the raihvay bridge was ready for the wagon-trains, a 
pontoon bridge was done at Caperton's Ferry, eight miles 
below Bridgeport, and between those places the pontoon- 
and-trestle bridge was nearly done. 

Crittenden's divisions had been ordered down from the 
Sequatchie valley (but Wilder's, Hazen's and Wagner's 
brigades were left opposite Chattanooga, to make a show 
for the present) and moved rapidly, by Jasper, to the 
crossings of Reynolds and Brannan, v/here they made the 
passage within the first days of September. 

On the first of September, then, all the troops except 
Granger's Reserve Ccrps (which was still back near the 
Elk) were either over or crossing or awaiting their turn 
on the shore. The cavalry went on the first and second, 
mostly by a long ford a little below Bridgeport, McCook's 
corps and the divisions of Rousseau and Negley of Thomas's 
corps by the pontoons, and the wagon-trains by the rail- 
way bridge. By the night of the 4th practically the whole 
army (except Granger's Reserve Corps) was on the south 
(and east) shore. Crittenden moved at once up the rail- 
way to V/auhatchie, in the mouth of the Lookout valley, 
and the army then held all the roads and gaps on the north 
and west fronts of Sand Mountain, from Wauhatchie 
thirty miles down to Bolton's Ferry, belov^ Caperton's. 

The m^ovements of the different parts of the army lead- 
ing up to the fall of Chattanooga and the battle of Chicka- 
mauga will not appear in detail in this book, because the 



201 



narrative is limited to Colonel Lane and his own command, 
the actions of other troops being brought in only to 
show the causes of his movements and their relation to 
the general field of action. Further, indeed, the move- 
ments and experiences of the different corps, divisions, 
brigades and regiments during the three weeks from the 
crossing of the river to the end of the battle were so num- 
erous and so complicated, and during the last days so con- 
fused, that it would hardly be possible to recount them 
with certainty or clearness. Within a space about fifteen 
miles wide and thirty-five long these movements were back 
and forth and crossing and recrossing each other in all 
directions so many times, with so many objects, that to 
almost any reader they would be bewildering. During 
the days of the battle, and especially on the 20th, there 
were so many changes in orders and movements and such 
haste and confusion that there were instances of parts of 
a division or brigade or regiment moving in different 
directions, with different objects, at the same time, the 
parts being separated from each other by orders of dif- 
ferent commanders or by misunderstandings in the exi- 
gencies of the moment. Under the tremendous demands 
of the battle for which the commanding-general was not 
ready, in which his enemy outnumbered him and con- 
stantly held the aggressive, the most of the field being very 
rough and thickly wooded, it often happened that divisions 
of different corps, brigades of different divisions, regi- 
ments of different brigades, and even companies of dif- 
ferent regiments were separated, joined to others, and 
moved here or there by different commanders, while some- 
times colonels, brigade commanders, even division com- 
manders, did not know where they were in relation to the 
field nor what was next expected of them, and so at times 
had to act each upon his own responsibility. The official 
reports therefore show a number of instances of a sub- 
ordinate commanding officer moving or fighting as it ap- 
peared to him the immediate circumstances required, in 
some cases showing ability and courage of high order. 

The report of General Rosecrans himself is strikingly 
meager and inadequate, showing much less than it ought 
to of the general ordering and co-ordination of movements 
after the battle began, tho of course it must have been 

202 



difficult enough for him to write at all of a campaign and 
battle which ended in so shocking a catastrophe. 

From the 2d to the 6th of September the 40,000 men of 
McCook's and Thomas's corps were climbing over the 
huge back of Sand Mountain, which rises 1800 feet above 
the river level and has a very rough top or plateau six or 
eight miles broad, by four or five different routes, each 
worse than any other for roughness and steepness, drag- 
ging with them about 150 guns and about 2000 wagons. 
Dragging is literally the right word, for, in many of the 
steep places the mules or horses were unable to pull their 
loads and the power of the soldiers was added, twenty or 
thirty to a wagon or gun, with ropes and levers. The 
route of Reynolds's division, followed by Brannan's, was 
from Shell Mound south and easterly, ascending thro a 
gorge (like all the other routes used, there being no gap 
all the way across the mountain) and then crossing the 
plateau southeasterly and descending, by a gorge, into the 
valley of Lookout creek at Squirrel Springs. The descent 
was only less difficult for the wheels than the ascent, and 
the toilsome movement took two days, tho the distance 
from Shell Mound was hardly fourteen miles. The next 
morning the two divisions moved on up Lookout valley a 
few miles, to Trenton, a small village and the " county- 
seat " of Dade County. 

Colonel Lane's letter from here says that " the county 
is famous for seceding from the State of Georgia."* Also, 
that the division arrived on Sunday and that, " it being 
the custom of this army to rest on Sunday, if possible," 
there was a service in the rude village church " (an 
army chaplain, probably) ; and he, as well as General 
Reynolds and his staff, attended. 

The two divisions remained at Trenton from the 6th to 
the 9th, the other troops filling the only roads as they 
slowly climbed over Lookout Mountain. On the 9th they 
moved up Lookout valley to Johnson's Crook, where they 
lay by a small creek till the 11th. Johnson's Crook is a 



* I don't know the story of this " secession but there were 
several instances, in different States, of counties seceding" from 
the State, or attempting or threatening to do so, because of opposi- 
tion to the secession from the Union or of hostility to the Con- 
federate government. 



203 



singular, rounded projection (like a shoulder or bent 
knee) of Lookout Mountain, which there recedes abruptly- 
eastward two or three miles, the Sand Mountain opposite 
advancing so as to partly fill the bay. Its importance lies 
in the fact that behind the shoulder is a long gorge thro 
which a very crooked road reaches the top of the mountain, 
the only crossing of it within thirty miles south of the 
Tennessee, except Nickajack Trace " and " Powell's 
Trace which are (or were then) mere bridle paths. 

But meantime more important events were occurring. 
The Cavalry corps (now commanded by General Robert 
B. Mitchell, in the absence of General Stanley) , excepting 
Minty's brigade, crossed both the Sand and Lookout 
mountains by the 4th and 5th, by a route several miles 
south of Johnson's Crook, and appeared in the valleys of 
Chattooga river, forty miles or more directly south of 
Chattanooga, and was reconnoitring toward LaFayette 
and Rome, while the whole of McCook's corps of infantry 
was following on the same roads. Crittenden's corps, 
crossing the Tennessee at Shell Mound on the 5th and 6th, 
advanced along the railroad toward Chattanooga, as al- 
ready told, and struck Bragg's outpost at the foot of Look- 
out Mountain, near Wauhatchie. 

When he learned of these movements, Bragg, greatly 
surprised, immediately decided that Chattanooga was 
untenable, and ordered evacuation. It was not literally 
untenable, since it was hardly practicable for Rosecrans 
to make a complete investment. Even if he could place 
troops in sufficient force on the east side, where the rail- 
roads came in from South Carolina and southern Georgia, 
the difficulties in the way of supporting and supplying 
them there would be too great. But Bragg rightly pre- 
ferred, under the circumstances, to have his army in the 
open field. He had severely criticised the Confederate 
management at Vicksburg, where, he said, " an arm.y had 
been backed up against a river to be surrounded and cap- 
tured In fact, he counted upon returning to Chatta- 
nooga after defeating Rosecrans in battle. Accordingly 
he issued his orders, recalled his forces from the east side 
of the Tennessee above the town, and on the 8th was mov- 
ing south up the valleys of the West and Middle Chicka- 
mauga. 



204 



On the 9th, early, Colonel Atkins, with the Ninety- 
eighth Illinois, mounted infantry (of Wilder's brigade, 
Reynolds's division), temporarily serving in front of Crit- 
tenden's corps near Wauhatchie, found no enemy on the 
Chattanooga road and moved on into the town. Critten- 
den sent forward a brigade of infantry and ordered Wag- 
ner's and Hazen's brigades, which had been left north of 
the town on the first, to come across, 

Rosecrans, greatly elated by the news, assumed that 
Bragg was retreating. Deserters and excited citizens 
told him that Bragg was trying to save his army by mov- 
ing to Atlanta,* and the cavalry actually found some of 
his troops on the roads to Rome far south of Chattanooga. 
Delighted with another great victory, holding the prize 
of the long, laborious campaign, seeing the enemy, as he 
believed, in full retreat and his own troops now moving 
directly upon their right flank, he undertook to add a great 
defeat of the flying army to the capture of the stronghold. 
He was grossly deceived, he had not a cool head, and he 
committed a dreadful blunder. 

He ordered Crittenden's corps directly across the Chat- 
tanooga and Chickamauga valleys, just south of the town, 
to Ringgold, fourteen miles southeast of it, to reach the 
rear of the supposed retreat, and urged forward over 
Lookout Mountain McCook's corps on the extreme right 
and Thomas's in the center, to strike Bragg's right flank. 
He had high hopes of destroying Bragg's army. 

On the 10th, accordingly, Crittenden was near Ringgold 
(which was already occupied by Wilder's mounted infan- 
try) , Thomas's advanced divisions (the First and Second, 
under Baird and Negley — Baird had succeeded Rous- 
seau), after crossing Lookout Mountain by Johnson's 
Crook and the Stevens and Cooper gaps, reached the east 
side of McLemore's Cove, in front of the two gaps of 
Pigeon Mountain (Dug and Catlett's), while McCook, as- 
cending Lookout Mountain by Valley Head and Winston's 
Gap and descending by Henderson's Gap, appeared at 



* Bragg constantly practiced the device of sending spies into 
his enemy's lines (pretending to be deserters and friendly Union 
citizens) to tell of this or that pretended purpose or movement on 
his part. Rosecrans had had enough experience of this practice 
to induce more caution than he exercised. 



205 



Alpine, in Broomtown Valley (upper Chattooga river), 
twenty miles to the right of Negley's division. Thomas 
was expected to pass thro the gaps in Pigeon Mountain 
and reach LaFayette, he and McCook then to strike 
Bragg's retreating columns on their right flank. 
Mitchell's cavalry was then to be on the right of McCook, 
in Broomtown Valley. 

These movements ordered and their success, in his mind, 
assured, on the 9th Rosecrans sent to Washington an ex- 
uberant report of his brilliant achievement and his pre- 
vision of the coming destruction of Bragg's army.* He 
did not realize that he was, in fact, in a most perilous 
position. His line — or, rather, his chain of troops, in 
broken form, with wide intervals — was forty miles long, 
two corps facing east and one south, in a field too narrow 
for movement except north and south and the most of it 
filled with the rough and thickly wooded foot-hills of the 
Lookout and Missionary ridges. He knew that he must 
depend upon Chattanooga for a base, from which he could 
be cut off by a successful attack upon his left. He was 
late in learning and too late in understanding the moment- 
ous movements of his enemy. 

Bragg had no idea of retreating. His leaving Chat- 
tanooga was only strategical. Tho he always minimized 
his forces, he knew he was much stronger than when, as 
he had said, he was ready for decisive battle with Rose- 
crans at Tullahoma, and, being a capable soldier, he saw 
clearly the very disadvantageous position in which Rose- 
crans was now placing himself. He took position in a 
short, compact line of hardly ten miles, facing west, just 
east of Pigeon Mountain, his right lying on the east side 
of West Chickamauga creekf and his left along the upper 
stream of Chattooga river, with Forrest's two divisions 
of cavalry on his right and Wheeler's two divisions on his 
left. 



* He said " Chattanooga is ours and without a struggle and east 
Tennessee is free. Our move on the enemy's flank progresses and 
the tail of his retreating column will not escape molestation." 

t There are three Chickamauga creeks — the West, Middle and 
East — all joining in one before they reach the Tennessee, but, 
tho the Middle and East were reached in preliminary operations, 
only the West branch was the " Chickamauga " of the battle. 



206 



His purpose was to make energetic attacks upon Rose- 
crans's separated divisions as they came down into the 
valleys from Lookout Mountain. If all his generals had 
been as energetic as he expected them to be this plan 
might well have been successful, and the disaster to Rose- 
crans, great tho it was, might have been yet greater, but 
they failed him on both the right and the left. For a long 
time after the battle he was involved with three or four 
of them in charges and countercharges and recriminations, 
a situation which had its close parallel on the Union side. 

From the 10th each day's developments more and more 
disturbed Rosecrans's assurance and opened his eyes. 
Wilder's mounted brigade, which had crossed the Ten- 
nessee by fording at Friar's Island, above Chattanooga, 
and, by fast riding, had reached Ringgold on the 10th, had 
then pushed on, with sharp fighting, toward Dalton and 
found the enemy there in force, whereupon, under orders, 
it returned to Ringgold. Crittenden's infantry, moving 
up West Chickamauga creek to Lee & Gordon's mill, 
found the enemy near there and in position for battle only 
two miles eastward; and the same day Negley, with his 
division of Thomas's corps, found him in strong force de- 
fending the gaps in Pigeon Mountain above Lee & 
Gordon's. And at all these places he obstinately refused 
to give way. On the contrary, early on the 11th his forces 
at the gaps of Pigeon Mountain advanced against Negley 
and Baird. Foreseeing this, from the aggressive charac- 
ter of their skirmishing on the evening before, the two 
generals decided to fall back. They got their trains safely 
ahead and their countermarch begun before the attack 
was made, but they had to face about and fight repeated 
assaults upon their columns, — the most im_portant engage- 
ment of the campaign preceding the great battle. The 
enemy gave it up, however, and the two divisions moved 
on west to Stevens's Gap, as intended, and went into camp. 

The next day (12th) brought another evidence of the 
position and purpose of the enemy. Rosecrans ordered 
Wilder, then at Ringgold, to rejoin his corps (Thomas) 
at La Fa.yette. His road was up the west side of Middle 
Chickamauga creek by way of Leet's tanyard, a point 
five miles east of Lee & Gordon's mill. But a few miles 
from Ringgold he struck Forrest's cavalry picket. While 



207 



driving ahead, fighting, he found another cavalry force 
striking at his rear. At Leet's the resistance was stronger, 
and not far beyond he came upon a brigade of cavalry in 
battle line. He instantly attacked and drove it back, and 
at the same time discovered another brigade advancing 
on his left. Feeling to the right, he found a brigade of 
enemy infantry (Strahl's, of Cheatham's division). Al- 
ways ready for action, he immediately made a demonstra- 
tion by strong skirmishing parties to the front and rear 
and left, and then boldly charged upon Strahl, rode down 
his resistance, and reached Crittenden's lines at Lee & 
Gordon's mill with small loss. 

Thomas was not at La Fayette. The news from Neg- 
ley's affair at Pigeon Mountain satisfied him that it was 
not Bragg's moving right flank, but his fixed battle-front, 
that must be met; and he approved of Negley's prudent 
withdrawal. But Rosecrans criticised it as a lack of 
courage, and criticised Thomas for not pushing on to La 
Fayette. McCook, however, had not gone even as far 
forward as Thomas. He waited at Alpine until he got a 
report from Negley of the forces in front and a report of 
the same kind from Mitchell's cavalry ; and he too decided 
to await further orders. The fact was, as afterward 
found, that Bragg had six divisions posted at and near 
Pigeon Mountain, under orders to make a determined 
attack upon Rosecrans's right, and that it was delayed by 
the necessity of cutting out the obstructions in the gaps, 
where his own men had felled the trees to prevent the 
passage of Rosecrans's. So this difficulty for Bragg prob- 
ably prevented either a terrible punishment of Negley 
and Baird for getting too far forward or a general en- 
gagement of the armies in McLemore's Cove. 

These accumulated evidences, with thickening other re- 
ports, at last, a week after the evacuation, forced the re- 
luctant Rosecrans to see that Bragg had not retreated, 
but was deliberately prepared to hold his present ground 
and put the fate of Chattanooga to the issue of a great 
battle. He was filled with alarm, perhaps chiefly because 
of the unfortunate position of his troops ; and his reports 
to Washington took a different and ominous tone. 

It seems clear since the campaign that he ought to have, 
instantly and with every possible effort, moved his in- 



208 



fantry and trains down the Chattanooga and Lookout val- 
leys and his cavalry down the West Chickamauga, and 
taken position in front of Chattanooga, a few miles to the 
south and southeast. He may have been attacked on his 
right or rear while moving, but he could have met that 
then without much concern. In that position he would 
have made secure the immediate object of the campaign 
— the possession of Chattanooga — and could have de- 
cided for himself whether the next use of his army should 
be in an offensive or a defensive campaign. And, as his 
adversary was (or was then becoming) the stronger, he 
would probably, for the present, have chosen the defen- 
sive. He could not have been reasonably criticised for 
considering his campaign rightly ended in the capture of 
Chattanooga. But he seems to have had now a despair- 
ing idea that he was compelled to accept a general battle, 
and that where his enemy chose to force it; tho he does 
say, in his official report, that it was absolutely neces- 
sary to secure our concentration and cover Chattanooga.'* 
But his hesitation made his orders for the concentra- 
tion two days late, and there is no adequate explanation 
of the slowness of movement after the orders were made. 
A capable general, deciding that it was " absolutely neces- 
sary to cover Chattanooga would have had the army 
in position in front of it (moving from McLemore's Cove) 
by the 15th, but the army was caught half way on the 
march, the evening of the 18th, while moving, and was 
forced to face about and fight a decisive battle in such posi- 
tions as the enemy's assaults compelled. 



209 



XVI 



1863 : September 13-21 

Battles on the Chickamauga — Minor Preceding Engage- 
ments — The Opposing Forces — Bragg Attacks Rose- 
crans on his March — Thomas on Forced Night March 

— Holds Left Wing Against all Attacks — Succession 
of Battles on the 19th — Reynolds Holds Right of 
Thomas's Line (Eleventh Ohio) — That Night Rose- 
crans Reports Success to Washington. Expects Com- 
plete Victory — The 20th Again a Succession of Battles 

— Left Wing, Under Thomas, Repels all Assaults — 
Right Wing, Directed by Rosecrans, Broken by Long- 
street — Rosecrans Abandons the Field — McCook and 
Crittenden Follow — Thomas's " Horseshoe " : He Holds 
it With His Corps and Parts of the Others Till Night — 

The Rock of Chickamauga " — His Great Achieve- 
ment in Retreat — Tur chin's Brigade {Eleventh Ohio) 
Makes the Last Charge, Wins the Last Battle — Colonel 
Lane and Eleventh Ohio Lost on the Field — Recovers 
Position — The Last to Leave the Field of Chickamauga 

The night of the 13th found the army halted, — Mc- 
Cook's corps at Alpine in Broomtown Valley, forty-two 
miles south (in a direct line) from Chattanooga; Mitchell's 
cavalry (except Minty's brigade) to the south and front 
of McCook; Crittenden's corps along the West Chicka- 
mauga at Lee & Gordon's mill, eleven miles south of Chat- 
tanooga and thirty-two northeast of McCook; Thomas's 
corps in front of the Stevens and Cooper gaps in Lookout 
Mountain, thirteen miles southv/est of Chattanooga, twelve 
southwest of Crittenden and twenty-four north of Mc- 
Cook. Extraordinary and extremely dangerous intervals, 
even if in a plain country. Nearly all the country between 
these places was then covered by forest and thicket and 
was hilly and rough, even over the valley called Mc- 



210 



Lemore's Cove, so that the roads were crooked, narrow and 
difficult for the loaded trains, only one of them being 
improved — the State " or La Fayette road, running 
from Chattanooga to La Fayette by Lee & Gordon's mill. 

Minty's brigade of cavalry, detached from Mitchell's 
command, was far to the northeast, reconnoitring in the 
vicinity of Ringgold. Reynolds's and Brannan's divisions 
of Thomas's corps were, on the 11th, moved from Look- 
out valley, around Johnson's Crook and over the mountain, 
and, on the 12th, descended by the Stevens and Cooper 
gaps, where they took position with their fellow divisions 
of Negley and Baird. Wilder's brigade of Reynolds's 
division, was, as already told, with Crittenden at Lee & 
Gordon's mill. 

General Rosecrans had his headquarters at Crawfish 
Spring, near Lee & Gordon's mill. General Bragg had 
his at La Fayette, his right wing covering Lee & Gordon's 
mill, protected on the north by Forrest's two divisions of 
cavalry, and his line extended southwesterly along the 
eastern side of Pigeon Mountain, with Wheeler's two 
divisions of cavalry on its left and front. 

Tho Rosecrans, on the 12th, hastily criticised Thomas 
and Negley for halting their advance upon La Fayette, he 
was privately much disturbed by their reports of the situ- 
ation, confirming definitely, as they did, the evidences he 
had been getting for two days; and by that night he 
reached a decision in practical approval of their prudent 
course. He was very loth to give up the belief in Bragg's 
defeat and retreat; but now, if Bragg really had halted 
and taken position behind Pigeon Mountain, he was nearer 
to either McCook or Crittenden than they were to each 
other and could strike either of them before Thomas 
could join. Common caution required that they be 
brought together at once. 

He then sent to McCook an order to close up with all 
speed upon Thomas's right at Stevens' Gap, leaving two 
brigades at Dougherty's Gap, the point where Pigeon and 
Lookout Mountains are joined. McCook moved early on 
the 13th, but he took the singular course of a long cir- 
cuit, going directly west over Lookout Mountain by Hen- 
derson's and Winston's Gaps, to Valley Head, and thence 
down Lookout creek to Johnson's Crook and over the 



211 



mountain east again by Stevens' Gap. If he could move 
two brigades over from Alpine to Dougherty's Gap, there 
would seem to be no reason why he could not move the 
whole corps that way, thus marching directly north thro 
McLemore's Cove, hardly more than twenty-five miles, 
with one crossing of the mountain, instead of over forty 
miles, with two crossings. As it was, he was five days on 
the movement, and did not join Thomas till the 17th. 

On the 13th Crittenden was ordered to leave one divi- 
sion at Lee & Gordon's mill, as an outpost, and move the 
others back west, to the south end of Missionary Ridge, 
connecting his right with Thomas's left ; and Thomas was 
directed to post one division in his front, at Pond Spring, 
keeping one brigade east of West Chickamauga creek in 
close watch of the gaps in Pigeon Mountain. Reynolds's 
division was assigned to this service, and Turchin's bri- 
gade took the first turn of heavy picketing in front of 
Dug and Catlett's Gaps. 

In this march, on the 14th, Turchin's brigade crossed 
the West Chickamauga and advanced to the mouth of Cat- 
lett's Gap, meeting the enemy at the creek and skirmish- 
ing thence all the way. Here the brigade had a hard 
service of three days. Colonel Lane writes that they were 
on picket two days without relief and continually fired upon, 
getting no rest and almost no sleep. He says the enemy 
was Hood's division (of Longstreet's corps), but it was 
probably one of Buckner's divisions, which were at that 
time posted at Pigeon Mountain. Twice on the 16th 
Turchin's brigade advanced in force to the mouths of Dug 
and Catlett's Gaps, only to find the enemy in them and 
determined to stay. On the 17th the Second (King's) 
brigade of the division came up to relieve Turchin, and 
his men had their first night of sleep for a week. 

Wilder's brigade of the division now came to Pond 
Spring from Lee & Gordon's mill and rejoined, after an 
independent service of more than a m.onth, and Brannan's 
division of the corps was sent forward to Pond Spring, 
to support Reynolds, taking post on his right, with one 
brigade advanced to the creek. 

As soon as McCook appeared at Stevens' Gap on the 
17th, Crittenden was returned to his former position at 
Lee & Gordon's mill and Thomas was directed to move 



212 



his whole corps into line on Crittenden's right, with his 
own right near Pond Spring, and McCook to leave one 
division at Stevens' Gap, with the two others take the 
position just vacated by Reynolds and Brannan near Pond 
Spring, and then close up to the left, to Gower's house. 
But the order to Thomas had required him to fill the same 
space and his men were already moving in, so that Mc- 
Cook's right was finally established above (south of) Pond 
Spring. The cavalry, of course, moved down (north) into 
McLemore's Cove, to keep within reach of the right of the 
infantry. 

Rosecrans had now got his three corps concentrated, 
v/ithout as yet any dangerous attack, and then began push- 
ing feverishly to the left, that is, for Chattanooga. He 
had no longer any doubt as to the position and purpose 
of his enemy: he feared an attack at any hour. His for- 
tune in escaping it was due only to Bragg's lack of aggres- 
sive quality. The nearer he could get to Chattanooga the 
better in every way his position for battle would be. All 
day and night of the 18th the movement went on, much 
encumbered by the trains. There appears no reason why 
the bulk of the trains could not have been sent from Mc- 
Lemore's Cove down the valley of the Chattanooga river, 
leaving the roads along the Chickamauga as free as possi- 
ble for the marching men. Many precious hours were 
lost by trying to move the trains along the same roads 
with the columns. 

The plan of movement seems to have been to take out 
from the center Thomas's corps and move it, by the rear 
of Crittenden, to a position beyond Crittenden's left, while 
bringing up McCook to take Thomas's place. This would 
keep a practically close front toward the enemy and place 
the strongest corps on the left, where an attack would be 
the most dangerous. But the enemy did not permit this 
movement to be made more than once ; this first attempt, 
indeed, was not completed when the storm broke. 

Under the order for this march on the 18th Thomas's 
column reached Crav/fish Spring by night, Baird's division 
in advance, Brannan's next and Reynolds's third. Neg- 
ley's was left for the present in position on the creek, in 
front of Catlett's Gap. 



213 



When night fell without an order to halt and go into 
bivouac and the march still went on, Thomas's men saw 
that the purpose must be highly important, tho they could 
only guess at it. They had known, in a general way, what 
the purpose of Rosecrans was in crossing the mountains, 
and they knew that Chattanooga had fallen into their 
hands ; and for a few days thereafter they all believed that 
their marches were made in pursuit of a beaten and re- 
treating enemy. But now they had come upon a stubborn 
and resisting enemy, and the whole army was concentra- 
ting and moving away from the enemy. The case looked 
to them very serious. 

Thomas had been directed to secure a position near the 
Kelly house on the State " road (Chattanooga to La 
Fayette) by dawn of the 19th. Kelly's was about twelve 
miles, by the roads, north of Pond Spring and ten south- 
east of Chattanooga. About two and a half miles east of 
Kelly's was Reed's bridge over the Chickamauga and at a 
rather shorter distance southeast was Alexander's bridge, 
— the only bridges over the creek within many miles, 
tho there were numerous fords available at low water. 
Good roads from these bridges converged near Kelly's, 
which, obviously, the enemy must not be permitted to 
control. It was this consideration that determined the 
limit of Thomas's present movement to the north. 

Reynolds's division being the rear of the corps, its 
march was the slowest and oftenest halted by one cause 
or another ahead, — always the irksome experience of the 
rear portion of a long marching column. It was a cold 
night, a hilly, stony road, all of it thro forests, except that 
here and there a " clearing " gave room for a field or two. 
Some soldier started a fire by the road-side, others fol- 
lowed, and fires sprang up all along the column. Colonel 
Lane, who had a poetic imagination, wrote an account of 
the weird scene, picturing the endless procession of armed 
men^ plodding under their loads along the rough, narrow 
road, while the varying fires lighted up fitfully the border- 
ing woods and thickets, leaving the depths densely black 
and mysterious. 

Thomas reached Kelly's at daybreak of the 19th. 
Baird's division, being in advance, moved at once into 
position east of the State road, at the fork of the roads 



214 



lea din p" to the two bridges. Brannan's arriving next took 
place on Baird's left, covering particularly the Reed's 
bridge road. But Reynolds's division in the rear was not 
yet fully past Crawfish Spring, four miles or more back, 
and Negley's had not been ordered to move. McCook 
closed up after Thomas, but, marching on a road further 
west and less obstructed, one of his divisions got to the 
State road and on the battle-field before Reynolds. 

On the same day of this march (18th) Minty's brigade 
of cavalry, at Reed's bridge, and Wilder's brigade of 
mounted infantry, at Alexander's bridge, were separately 
attacked by larger forces and, in spite of stubborn resist- 
ance, both were driven away. It appeared later that 
Forrest had two divisions of cavalry in that region. Later 
in the day two or more divisions of Bragg's infantry were 
discovered moving directly upon the crossing at Lee & 
Gordon's mill ; and Crittenden's divisions had to be hastily 
returned to their position covering it. 

Rosecrans was caught before he was ready, while he 
was still moving, but he had at least the negative good 
fortune of escaping the much worse position in which at- 
tack would have caught him any day for a week before. 
That is, if Rosecrans was too late in his action, so also 
was Bragg in his; and, in a military sense, Bragg was 
more reprehensible than Rosecrans. When Rosecrans 
once realized his mistake in separating his forces he moved 
for concentration with one of his characteristic spurts of 
energy and with as much success as any general might 
have had, allowing for McCook's inexcusable loss of time 
in moving up from Alpine; but Bragg, with his army 
practically massed and his opportunity lying within reach 
of his hand, hesitated and dallied until his plan of strik- 
ing Rosecrans's divisions in detail was lost. Even then 
he delayed a whole day more, permitting Rosecrans to 
get into better position and at least to begin an orderly 
formation for battle. He did finally gain a victory, but it 
was essentially incomplete, since he failed to get Chat- 
tanooga. And he knew he had failed (tho he wrote 
official reports of glorious success), as is shown by his 
acrimonious quarrels with several of his generals after 
the battle, charging them with neglect of orders and 
worse, which prevented him from recovering Chattanooga. 



215 



CHICKAMAUGA 



The battle of Saturday, September 19 

Now came upon General Rosecrans the dire penalty for 
Ms long dallying at Winchester while his enemy was busily 
increasing his strength. V/hen Bragg retreated from 
Tullahoma and entered Chattanooga his forces were far 
less than Rosecrans's — probably 25,000 less. Rosecrans 
had had some small gains, but not enough to make up his 
loss by the natural casualties of the service, so that when 
he crossed the Tennessee his numbers were materially 
smaller than when he took Tullahoma. And he had 
allowed to Bragg at Chattanooga full two months time 
for recuperation, in which he succeeded in bringing back 
at least a part of his many absentees and picking up here 
and there in his department a regiment or two, while he 
was constantly calling upon the authorities at Richmond 
and his department commander (Johnston) for fresh 
divisions. Two divisions already ordered from Johnston's 
Mississippi army were long on the way, but, thanks to 
Rosecrans's delay, they arrived in good time for the great 
battle. His War Department authorized him to bring 
Buckner's troops from Knoxville, and they came as a 
corps of his own two divisions of infantry, two bri- 
gades of cavalry, and a third small division of infantry 
v/hich had been operating separately under General John- 
son; and, finally, he was promised a heavy detachment 
from Lee's army in Virginia, which proved to be two good 
divisions of Longstreet's corps, with the very able Long- 
street in command. Thus Bragg's additions amounted to 
nearly or quite 40,000 men, with the usual complement 
of artillery. All of these came before Rosecrans crossed 
the Tennessee, except Longstreet's men, who did not 
arrive until the eve of battle, part of them only the night 
of the first day. 

After the battle both Rosecrans and Bragg minimized 
their forces, Bragg to an absurd extent, but the fact was 
that on the morning of the 19th the opposing armies stood 
nearly equal in numbers, Bragg (without Longstreet) 
being, perhaps, 2000 the stronger. But Rosecrans's num- 
ber was reached by his bringing forward from Bridge- 
port, at a late day and under Bragg's threat of battle, 



216 



i 




General Granger with 5000 men of the Reserve Corps- 
one division, under General Steedman. This division 
arrived at Rossville, near Chattanooga, in time to take 
part in the battle, and proved to be of such great value, 
under the fine conduct of Granger and Steedman, that it 
may fairly be said to have saved Rosecrans from an 
actual rout. 

With the arrival of Longstreet's divisions, however, 
(about 12,000 men) the balance was rather strongly on 
Bragg's side, his numbers being over 71,000 and Rose- 
crans's nearly 57,000. Bragg had five corps of infantry 
(Polk, Hill, ¥/alker, Buckner and Longstreet), containing 
eleven divisions, and two corps of cavalry (Wheeler and 
Forrest), containing four divisions. Rosecrans's organi- 
zation was in three corps of infantry (Thomas, McCook 
and Crittenden), containing ten divisions, and one corps 
of cavalry (Mitchell), containing two divisions, to which 
are to be added one division of infantry (Steedman) of 
Granger's Reserve Corps and one small unattached regi- 
ment (Harrison's Thirty-ninth Indiana) of mounted in- 
fantry. The divisions on either side ranged from about 
3000 to about 6000.* 



* General Rosecrans and his defenders (and, naturally, many 
of the officers and soldiers of his army) have insisted that Bragg 
had vastly greater forces, but that is certainly wrong. Bragg 
too, altho the victor, belittled his numbers still more than Rose- 
crans did his, making the astonishing statement, in an official 
report, that (including his reinforcements from Johnston and 
Buckner) he had but 35,000 men exclusive of the cavalry. 

His last preceding official return of strength, dated August 10, 
before Buckner joined him, shows " Present for duty, 53,418 
and nothing occurred to reduce that number between that date 
and the battle but the ordinary camp casualties. Deducting 12,000 
for his cavalry (v/hich is more than he would admit), he must 
have had over 41,000 infantry at the time of that return, and he 
had yet to receive the five divisions of infantry and two brigades 
of cavalry of Buckner and Longstreet. In a memorandum state- 
ment he made soon after the battle, when he was minimizing his 
forces in his appeal to Richmond for reinforcement, he put down 
Buckner and Longstreet at 15,000. But his losses in the battle 
averaged over 25 per cent, (by his statement they would be not 
less than 40 per cent.) so that Buckner and Longstreet must have 
brought him over 20,000. Allowing, then, for the ordinary sickness 
and casualties of one month of inaction, he must have had at the 
beginning of the battle well over 70,000. 



217 



The field of operations at the beginning of the battle, 
tho much too long, now had its northern limit near Mc- 
Dannel's house, three miles southeast from Rossville and 
seven from Chattanooga, its southern limit on a line drawn 
eastward from Johnson's Crook to Catlett's Gap, its 
eastern along West Chickamauga creek, and its western 
from Stevens's Gap north along the crest of Missionary 
Ridge. This space is about twelve miles long and varies 

The Confederate President, who was constitutionally unable to 
write on the war without distorting facts and building upon half- 
truths, says (in his "Rise and Fail, etc."), with details, that at 
Chickamauga Bragg had 47,321 and Rosecrans 64,392. Deducting 
from the 47,321 the two divisions sent by Johnston and the five 
divisions and two brigades brought by Buckner and Longstreet 
(less three brigades of Longstreet, said to have arrived late), 
certainly not less than 31,000, there remain only about 16,000 for 
the whole of Bragg's own army, altho it was composed of three 
corps of infantry (Polk, Hill and Walker), in six divisions, and 
two corps of cavalry (Wheeler and Forrest), in four divisions! 
Too ridiculous to dwell upon. 

At the same time an examination of Davis's 64,302 figures shows 
that he copied them from Rosecrans's report of his whole com- 
mand on June 30, from which he makes no allowance for the 
casualties and detachments of two and a half months nor for the 
troops necessarily left behind to guard the crossings of the 
Tennessee and garrison Chattanooga. And that disingenuous 
statesman had the same access to Rosecrans's later reports, w^hen 
he wrote, that he had to the reports of June 30. 

But Bragg himself disposes of Davis's figures (and of his owti) 
in a report he made September 20, a few days after the battle. 
In that he states his then " effective strength ", infantry and 
artillery, as 38,846. Adding his four divisions of cavalry at the 
very low estimate of 10,000 " effectives ", the whole must have 
been not less than 49,000. At the same time he reports his losses 
in the battle as " nearly, if not quite, 18,000 Thus he shows he 
had 67,000 in "effectives" alone at the battle; and there still re- 
mains to be added the difference between the reported " effectives " 
and the " present for duty ", the former being, in Confederate 
reports, always much less than the latter, tho no kno-\^Ti Con- 
federate document or statement allows for that difference in 
stating the numbers of Union forces. 

A highly competent student and critic of the campaigns of the 
war, himself an officer in active service in Sherman's command 
from the beginning to Atlanta (Colonel E. C. Dawes of Cincinnati) 
has made a very careful examination of all the related records 
in the V/ ar Department on both sides, from which he shows that 
Bragg's army in the field at Chickamauga numbered 71.551 and 
Rosecrans's 56,975. (And these figures prove, that, being on the 
defensive, Rosecrans ought not to have been defeated.) 



218 



from two to three miles wide, but the battle soon crowded 
itself into the middle part of the north half. 

At Rossville there is a gap in Missionary Ridge, thro 
which there was a good road east to Ringgold. From this 
gap the Ridge extends in a straight line southwesterly 
six miles, with a crest four hundred to five hundred feet 
higher than the Chickamauga creeks, and then falls away 
into McLemore's Cove. About midway it is broken by 
McFarland's Gap, thro which there was then a steep and 
narrow road, connecting the valleys of the Chattanooga 
and the Chickamauga. 

The eastern front of these six miles of the ridge is filled 
with a mass of irregular foot-hills, separated only by 
ravines and " hollows " and rising to crests in peaks and 
ridges from one hundred to three hundred feet high.* 
From Crawfish Spring to Hall's ford, on the West Chicka- 
mauga, about three miles, these foot-hills abut directly 
upon the creek, but from Hall's north there is a space be- 
tween them and the creek varying from nothing to a mile 
or more in width. Tho not a level valley, this region was 
occupied by a number of plantations in forest clearings, 
and, in diminishing number and size, plantations or farms 
were also scattered on the slopes of the foot-hills west- 
ward up to the foot of the main ridge. But everywhere 
outside the plantations and clearings stretched the primi- 
tive forest, much of it filled with dense thickets. 

This was the terrain of the great battle, and few of 
greater difficulties in action are found in military history. 
Yet, two months later, these same armies (both rein- 
forced) fought a battle on one more difficult only a few 
miles away, — on the north end of the same Missionary 
Ridge and the north end of Lookout Mountain. 

But Rosecrans was oppressed by more difficulties than 
those of the terrain. Bragg and he were equally at loss 
in the fact that neither could see the major movements of 

* It was within that portion of these foot-hills between the Glenn 
and Mullis, Kelly and Vidito houses, less than two miles long and 
one wide, that Rosecrans's forces were compressed when the set 
battle was begun on the morning of the 20th (the second day's 
battle) and in the final struggle the fighting remnant, under 
Thomas, was crowded into an area that barely included the Kelly 
and Snodgrass houses, less than a mile long east and west and 
little more than half a mile north and south. 



219 



the other, because of the hills and forests, nor even, at 
most times, the minor movements of the troops until they 
came within musket range; but Rosecrans had the worst 
of it, because he was struck when moving in long columns 
across Bragg's front, while Bragg was operating from an 
organized base upon a fixed plan covering precisely the 
field in which he compelled the battle. Tho there was a 
good deal of confusion in Bragg's army, due to the peculiar 
obstacles of the field and the varying demands of the pro- 
longed battle, there was much more in Rosecrans's, where 
the same troubles prevailed, v/ith the greater one that he 
had got only the head of his columns into position when 
he was compelled to go into action. From that moment, 
assaulted here or there without warning, constantly hurry- 
ing up this or that marching column, already all night on 
the march, he had to take his troops for reinforcement or 
support from any command he might happen to reach, 
and throughout the battle, during both days, his corps, 
divisions, even brigades, were divided and moved here or 
there and more or less kept separated, to the great embar- 
rassment and trouble of the generals, high and low. But 
the tenacity and fighting spirit of Rosecrans's troops re- 
duced Bragg to much the same condition. Steadily re- 
pelling his assaults and often pursuing the assailants, 
making successful countercharges and compelling him to 
find troops to fill the gaps, they harried him until his lines 
became hardly less ragged and entangled than their own. 

It would, therefore, be difficult and tedious to describe 
the battle in detail; and indeed, for the purpose of this 
narrative, it is hardly necessary. But a sketch of the field 
would give some aid, and one is appended, showing the 
places mentioned and something of the topography, tho 
the scale is not large enough to present the latter well. 

Early on the 19th General Granger, in position east of 
Rossville, had a brigade out on reconnoisance near the 
Chickamauga, and the colonel who commanded it reported 
to General Thomas, near Kelly's house, that he had found 
that a brigade of the enemy's cavalry had crossed to the 
west side of West Chickamauga creek and was isolated 
between the Reed and Alexander bridges. Thomas di- 
rected Brannan to advance with two brigades, to learn the 
situation and, if practicable, capture the lone brigade ; and. 



220 



in precaution, he moved Baird's division forward within 
reach of Brannan's right. This was about 9 a. m. 

The result was the beginning of the great battle. The 
enemy proved to be three brigades of Forrest's cavalry and 
one division of infantry (Liddell's, of Walker's corps), 
while on the left of this division (as learned later), be- 
tween it and Lee & Gordon's mill, the greater part of 
Bragg's infantry was across and in position. 

About 10 o'clock the advanced brigade of Brannan's 
division, on the Alexander's bridge road, was resisted by 
Forrests's cavalry. Colonel Croxton,* commanding the 
brigade, at once attacked and drove the rebels back half a 
mile toward the creek, but then found them determined 
to stand. Under order from Thomas, Baird then moved 
forward his whole division and drove them steadily ahead, 
taking many prisoners, while Brannan came up on his 
left and aided in clearing the whole front. Baird then 
found heavier forces of infantry advancing to envelop his 
right, and moved back that part of his line to a position 
that was better for receiving an attack. At this awkward 
moment the enemy, whose numbers had not been seen be- 
cause of the thick woods, advanced rapidly in a furious 
assault upon the exposed brigade and threw that one and 
the next on its left into much disorder, taking many pris- 
oners and a whole battery of guns, — of the Fifth U. S. 
Artillery, of General John H. King's brigade, Baird's 
division. The left of Crittenden's corps, stretching north 
from Lee & Gordon's mill, was not yet within supporting 
distance, but the head division (Johnson's) of McCook's 
corps, having (as already told) reached the field before 
Reynolds, just then came up, and was hurriedly run into 
line, protecting Baird's right and enabling him to recover. 
And Thomas intended to put the two brigades of Reynolds 
on the right of Johnson as soon as they arrived. 

The battle was on. But not half of Rosecrans's army 
was yet in position, and the positions held were not chosen, 
but forced upon him by the enemy's aggression. Rose- 
crans, unfortunately, was not fit for the hour of trial men- 
tally or physically. For a whole week now, since he had 

* Later highly distinguished as a brigadier of cavalry in Wil- 
son's Cavalry Corps in the great Selma campaign. See " Story 
of a Cavalry Regiment." 



221 



begun to see his mistake as to Bragg's retreat, he had 
been in terrible anxiety and overbusy night and day in 
plans and orders, under great difficulties, for saving his 
army by moving to the north. He was not a man of deep 
or broad reflection, he had little self-control — a bundle 
of nerves as the saying goes, — and he was very much 
alarmed. He hurried about from place to place and kept 
his staff officers still more hurried with orders and direc- 
tions more or less conflicting and more or less beyond com- 
pliance within the time required. Thomas thus, naturally 
and from force of character, assumed the responsibility 
and exercised the command of the whole left wing. The 
one great good fortune that Rosecrans had was to have 
this man of cool head, sane judgment, unshakable nerves 
and perfect courage in that dominating position in the 
battle. Without him, or with a lesser man in his place, 
Chickamauga would have been wholly a disaster. 

It was clear now that Bragg's purpose was to crush 
Rosecrans's left by sheer weight, and get between it and 
Chattanooga. He was compelled to change the plan which, 
on the 18th, he had written and sent to his generals. This 
was to cross the creek at Reed's and Alexander's bridges 
and the fords above, wheel to the left and sweep up the 
west side of the valley upon Lee & Gordon's mill. He ex- 
pected in this to drive Rosecrans southward and get pos- 
session of the Chattanooga roads. It was Thomas's forced 
march thro the night of the 18th and his appearance in 
front of the Reed and Alexander bridges that broke up 
Bragg's grand scheme and compelled him hastily to re- 
arrange his forces to fight to the north and west instead 
of the south. 

Of course Rosecrans's first orders were for bringing 
forward all the troops available. Crittenden was ordered 
to leave one division (Wood's) at Lee & Gordon's mill and 
move the two others (Palmer and Van Cleve) , by the left 
flank, toward the battle-field. Negley's division (of 
Thomas's corps) was left in its position southeasterly of 
Crawfish Spring, covering the crossings in front of Pigeon 
Mountain, and Sheridan's division (McCook's corps) was 
placed between that position and Wood's at Lee & Gordon's 
mill, supporting both, while McCook's last division 
(Davis) and Thomas's last (Reynolds) were pushed on 



222 



toward the battle by way of Widow Glenn's house. 

We left Reynolds's men (except Wilder's brigade) 
south of Crawfish Spring, marching north all the night 
and thro forests, their road lighted by an endless string 
of fires. Daylight found them north of the Spring, still 
tramping on, but about sunrise, between Gordon's house 
and Osborne's, they were halted to make coffee and get 
breakfast. The water had to be brought from a distance, 
which extended the halt to over an hour. They had to 
fill their canteens for the march (the weather was still 
hot by day and the roads very dusty) , but there was not 
enough water near and a detail of fifty men from each 
regiment was sent, v/ith all the canteens, to fill them at a 
creek half a mile away. Before these men could return 
came an urgent order to move on at once, to go into action. 
The guns of their corps, already fighting in front, could 
be heard. The division was thus left for many hours 
without water and vnthout the means of getting it, and, 
what was worse, each regiment was short fifty men. 

Turchin's brigade was in advance. King's following. 
On arrival at Glenn's they were sent toward Kelly's, by a 
cross-road, their thoughts and feelings intensely occupied 
by the battle going on only a mile ahead, when they were 
halted near Withers's tanyard. This was probably to 
await directions as to the position in which they were to 
be placed in front. They could not see the fighting lines 
of either side, because of the hills and woods, which made 
more intense the strain on their nerves. 

This was the time and place of that remarkable scene 
in which Chaplain Lyle was the central figure, referred 
to on page 150. At the Chaplain's request Colonel Lane 
moved the companies into suitable position for hearing, 
the Chaplain rode to the front and, still on his horse, spoke 
to them in such simple, direct, eloquent language that 
more than one of his hearers believed it to be inspired. 
In a clear, strong voice, ringing with restrained emotion, 
he spoke of the great cause for which they were to fight 
that day, which he said was not the cause of aggression 
or of glory, but that of home and country, of truth and 
liberty, of God and Humanity. He adjured them to be 
brave, to be manly, and to remember their old flag and 



223 



what it covers. He reminded them of their duty to God 
and His relation to them, and prayed that He would cover 
their heads this day in the battle storm. 

It was brief, and at the end he said It is but little that 
I can do for you in the hour of battle, but there is one thing 
I will do, — I will pray for you, as thousands all over the 
land are praying for you this morning Then, while the 
flag of many battle-fields was drooped and the men leaned 
on their rifles with their heads bowed, he prayed fervently 
the blessing of God upon the army, the officers, the sol- 
diers, the country and the cause, and His love and mercy 
for those who might fall. Then he rose in his stirrups, 
waved his hat over his head, and loudly cried " God bless 
you this day and make you strong and brave ! Strike for 
Liberty and Union! Strike for God and Humanity! 

Surely such a service, at such a time and place, in the 
very verge of battle, deeply moved every one who was 
there, and few could restrain their tears. General 
Reynolds, who was riding by, with several of his staff, 
stopped and remained to the end, and responded, with all 
— "Amen ! He too was in tears as he thanked the Chap- 
lain, in the presence of the men, for what he had done. 

Aptly enough, this episode was hardly ended when the 
two brigades were ordered by General Rosecrans to march 
at once up the State road toward McDannel's house, to 
take position for action, but, when approaching McDan- 
nel's, an order was received from General Thomas to 
countermarch in quick time to Kelly's house. Then, before 
Kelly's was reached, Turchin learned that two of his regi- 
ments, the Ninety-second Ohio and Eighteenth Kentucky 
(probably the two in the rear), had been taken off by 
General Reynolds and placed somewhere in the battle- 
front, and a staff -officer who told him of this undertook 
to lead him to their position, with his two other regiments, 
the Eleventh and Thirty-sixth Ohio. The Eighty-ninth 



* The account and language here given are taken partly from 
Colonel Lane and partly from the letter of a newspaper corre- 
spondent written on the field at the time. Scenes more or less 
similar to this, no doubt often occurred during the war, but, in 
four years' service, I never saw one, nor did I ever hear of one so 
apt and striking as this. 



224 



Ohio, of this brigade, was still absent, with Granger's 
corps. 

The Eleventh Ohio went into the action with 20 officers 
and 413 men. The Lieutenant-Colonel was absent, sick, 
but Major Higgins proved to be a most efficient right 
hand for the Colonel. 

None of the reports show precisely where this position 
was. Colonel Lane says it was " northeast of Gordon's 
he thinks two miles, and " on a hill " ; but it must have 
been four miles from Gordon's and the country is all hills. 
It was certainly east of the State road, not far from 
Kelly's. I think it was four or five hundred yards east 
of that road, about east of Kelly's house, and in defense 
of the cross-roads northeast of Kelly's. 

General Reynolds was just sending his Second brigade 
(King's) from Kelly's, to take position on Turchin's right, 
when General Palmer saw him and told him that his divi- 
sion (of Crittenden's corps) was in action in front and 
gaining ground, but was nearly out of ammunition, and 
he asked temporary relief. No troops but King's being 
in sight and the need being imminent, and knowing 
Palmer's position to be on the left of that he was himself 
assigned to, Reynolds sent King and three of his regi- 
ments with Palmer. Then, with King's remaining regi- 
ment and one of Wilder's mounted infantry — the Ninety- 
second Illinois, now dismounted, — and the two batteries 
of Turchin and King, he established a reserve near Kelly's 
house. 

Several hours were consumed in these movements. 
General Turchin's report has it about three o'clock when 
he d± last found his position, but the brigade took part in 
a renewal of the battle on this front which was fought 
and ended by or soon after two o'clock. It seems to be 
sure that the two brigades ended their march at Kelly's 
about one o'clock and were in position by half past one. 

Their position in the line of battle was now on the right 
of Palmer's division, which was on right of Johnson's of 
McCook's corps, and that on the right of Baird and 
Brannan of Thomas's. Wilder's brigade of Reynolds's 
division, again detached, was posted near Vineyard's 
house, half a mile to the right, except the Ninety-second 
Illinois, now serving dismounted directly with Reynolds. 



225 



This gap in the Kne gave the enemy an opportunity which 
he took advantage of in his next assault, in an attempt 
to overwhelm Reynolds's division, but Van Cleve's division 
of McCook's corps was moving up to occupy the space. 

Tho this is called a line, it was, in form, a very irregular 
one, as compelled by the ground, — an area of hills, hol- 
lows and ravines, nearly all covered with woods and 
thickets. Often the line of a regiment or brigade was not 
at all the line of the next regiment or brigade, and in 
most places it was impossible to see men beyond a hun- 
dred yards, — a condition full of perplexity and difficulty 
to commanding officers, whose judgment often had to be 
based upon guess. 

The enemy's success in driving back Baird's right was 
quickly made a failure. When Thomas got Johnson's and 
part of Reynolds's divisions into position he ordered the 
whole line forward, at the same time that Brannan, by a 
right wheel, was driving in on the enemy's right. Brannan 
fully revenged Baird, defeating the enemy in his front 
by a fierce assault and retaking the whole of the Fifth 
United States battery in a bayonet charge made by his 
Ninth Ohio regiment, while the rest of the line forced the 
enemy back upon his reserves at the creek. This brought 
a lull in the fighting for an hour, during which time 
Thomas improved his position by taking better ground in 
parts of his line and closing up. 

Defeated thus in his attempt to break Thomas's left, 
Bragg massed several divisions and, about three o'clock, 
made a furious assault upon his right. This struck, first, 
the exposed right of Reynolds's brigades and severely 
shook them. Up to this time the Eleventh Ohio had not 
been on the firing line, being held back with the Thirty- 
sixth Ohio in a second line, but both were now moved 
forward and the Thirty-sixth was sent into position where 
the two other regiments of the brigade were. This left 
Colonel Lane with his regiment alone and without orders.* 



* It should be borne in mind that one small regiment, in two 
ranks, would occupy hardly 150 yards and that the four or five 
divisions in front stretched, in a curve, probably over two miles, 
and, being in the woods, were quite out of sight from Lane's 
position. 



226 



The roar of the battle directly in front was tremendous, 
and it seemed to come nearer, as if the rebels were gain- 
ing. The wounded were seen coming and carried back 
to the rear in increasing numbers. Colonel Lane was 
very impatient and troubled, A mounted officer appeared, 
in nervous haste, and, seeing a regiment not engaged, 
appealed to the Colonel to move up to the help of his men, 
one of his regiments, he said, being nearly out of ammu- 
nition. It was General Hazen, who had a brigade in 
Palmer's division, Crittenden's corps. The Colonel could 
only answer that he was expecting orders from his own 
commander, and asked him to apply to General Turchin, 
but neither of them knew just where Turchin was, and 
Hazen hurried away to find him. Directly afterward the 
line in front appeared to be breaking, a part of it, at least, 
being seen falling back.* Colonel Lane took the responsi- 
bility of action and at once led his men up to fill the 
threatened gap. He soon found himself again alone and 
in conflict with the enemy, at the edge of a field in the 
forest. He pushed the attack and drove his enemy beyond 
the field, to the shelter of the forest on the other side. 
The men were so much pleased with their success in this 
action that they " clamored " (as the Colonel expresses it) 
for leave to carry it into a charge. They got it, and in a 
very few minutes the whole regiment had rushed the 
field, in the face of fire, and plunged into the rebels in the 
wood, driving them off, scattered in confusion, and taking 
many prisoners. In the middle of this charge the color- 
bearer. Sergeant John H. Peck, fell with the colors, 
severely wounded.f His brother, Lieutenant George E. 
Peck, seized the colors and bore them in the front thro 
the action.$ The rebels the regiment met in this affair 

This experience of Colonel Lane was like that of other, perhaps 
many other, regimental commanders that day and the next. 
Literally, he did not know where he was in relation to the position 
of any other troops on the field, not even to those of his own 
division. For some time he was even lost from his own brigade, — 
alone in the midst of a great battle-field, without any orders or any 
information. 

* This proved to be the Ninety-second Ohio, of Turchin's 
brigade, which had run nearly out of cartridges. 

t He died in hospital at Chattanooga a month later. 

j Killed in action two months later, leading his company in the 
battle of Missionary Ridge. These brothers were Cincinnatians. 



227 



appear to have belonged to the same Stewart's division 
it had met in action at Hoover's Gap, June 25. 

Finding no other Union troops near after holding his 
position half an hour, Colonel Lane moved back until he 
found himself near the right of the Thirty-sixth Ohio, 
then in action, when he formed in its support. He did not 
then know that his attack and success had been made 
possible by the aid of Croxton's brigade of Brannan's 
division, which Thomas had hurried by the rear to the 
right and which had arrived just in time to prevent the 
enemy from breaking Reynolds's exposed flank. At the 
same time Reynolds was strenuously at work, trying to 
check the falling back seen in both divisions ; and, getting 
another battery, he had eighteen guns and two of Wilder's 
howitzers in position near Poe's house, pouring all their 
fire into the enemy's positions. 

The movements of the different divisions in repelling 
these attacks and pursuing the beaten enemy had thrown 
the whole line out of place again, and it had to be read- 
justed. Baird's division was left in its position on the 
low ridge across the roads from McDannel's to the Reed 
and Alexander bridges, the divisions of Johnson, Palmer 
and Reynolds in the same order as before, extending to 
the right along the crest of another ridge, so that 
Reynolds's extreme right was about half a mile directly 
east of Withers's tanyard, while Brannan's was moved by 
the rear, along the State road, to near the tanyard, to be 
a reserve for the right in case of another attack. 

Brannan was not yet in position when the enemy again 
advanced to battle, this time striking first the center, on 
Johnson's division, and later Reynolds' on the right, in a 
most furious assault. The impetus and fierceness of the 
charge gave some promise of success, causing some con- 
fusion in Johnson's line and a little on Baird's right, but 
this was only temporary. Johnson and Baird made a fine 
counter-charge, and the rebels again fled faster than they 
had come. The attack upon Reynolds was promptly met 
and repulsed, and turned into a spirited counter- 
attack, in which Turchin's brigade was especially distin- 
guished. 

This was soon after Colonel Lane's regiment had joined 
the Thirty-sixth, as told above. The two regiments were 



228 



moved back and to the right, where they joined General 
Turchin with the Ninety-second Ohio and Eighteenth 
Kentucky of their brigade. With replenished ammuni- 
tion, they now advanced, changing front to the right, to 
meet the fresh assault just mentioned. It was their hot- 
test battle of the day. After a short, fierce struggle, al- 
most at close quarters because of the thick woods, the 
whole brigade threw itself upon the enemy in a determined 
charge, led by Turchin and backed up by King's brigade 
on the right, broke the rebels and drove them, it is said, 
a mile and a half (tho that is certainly too far), captured 
two guns and many prisoners, including a number of 
officers. But they suffered severely in killed and wounded, 
among whom were Colonel King,* of the Sixty-eighth 
Indiana, commanding the Second brigade, and Colonel 
Jones, of the Thirty-sixth Ohio, killed, and Colonel Fear- 
ing, of the Ninety-second Ohio, and the majors of the 
Ninety-second Ohio and Eighteenth Kentucky badly 
wounded. The enemy encountered by Turchin's brigade 
in this last battle was Law's division of Longstreet's (now 
Hood's) corps. 

The desperate struggle was over for the day, and the 
advantage certainly lay with Rosecrans. In spite of the 
great awkwardness of his position when attacked and the 
difficulties met in getting his troops into place under re- 
peated attacks, they had repulsed six set assaults and 
prevented the enemy from gaining any position he had 
attempted. 

Rosecrans had been unable to put into action more than 
five of his divisions of infantry, — three of Thomas's, one 
of Crittenden's and one of McCook's. His cavalry was 
occupied many miles to the south, with little fighting, in 
keeping off Wheeler's cavalry, which was trying to cross 
the creek into McLemore's Cove. Bragg, on the other 
hand, had crossed and thrown into the contest, at one time 
or another, eight of his eleven divisions of infantry and the 
two of Forrest's cavalry, and was moving up his three 
other divisions of infantry when his last attack was re- 
pulsed. In great disappointment he ceased all operations, 

* Edward A. King. He was succeeded in the command of the 
brigade by Colonel Milton S. Robinson, of the Seventy-fifth 
Indiana. 



229 



tho there was yet an hour or two of dayhght. His plans 
had been laid upon a fixed determination to finish and 
win the battle that day. Now he must withdraw from the 
field or try another day's battle, with his forces seriously 
diminished in number, and not a little in morale from the 
failure of all their attacks ; tho, in respect to losses, Rose- 
crans had suffered about as much in proportion as him- 
self. 

But Rosecrans considered that Bragg was defeated, at 
least for the present, and was in worse condition than 
himself for a renewal of the battle. He had the advantage 
as to ground, he had five divisions not yet engaged and a 
sixth (Steedman's) at Rossville, while, as he believed, 
Bragg had used all or nearly all of his. He was sure that 
Bragg's losses in men and guns were greater than his 
own, his men felt that they had won so far, and his posi- 
tion was still to be on the defensive. He might reason- 
ably look for complete success in any further contest. But 
he was confident of it, and he telegraphed that night to 
Washington, in effect, that he had beaten Bragg and that 
his defeat would be made complete the next day. This 
prophecy was to be expected from his sanguine mind, but 
one cannot fail to see a certain apprehension and caution 
in his despatch,* perhaps because he realized that, if 
Bragg should attack again, it would be after thorough 
preparation and choice of positions in the night and with 
greater determination than ever. 



The battle of Sunday, September 20 

When it was certain that the fighting was ended Satur- 
day evening the troops that had been engaged were moved 
back more or less, to get more commanding ground, and 
bivouacked on their arms, while the others were brought 



* It read — " We have just concluded a terrific day's fighting 
and have another in prospect for tomorrow. The enemy attempted 
to turn our left, but his design was anticipated and a sufficient 
force placed there to render his attempt abortive. * * * « -phe 
enemy was greatly our superior in numbers." (Just the language 
of Bragg's report to Richmond ! ) * * * « The army is in 
excellent condition and spirits, and, by the blessing of Providence^ 
the defeat of the enemy will be total tomorrow." 



230 



up nearer. Thomas had hardly got these dispositions sub- 
stantially made when he was called to Rosecrans's head- 
quarters, with all the principal generals, for a conference, 
which lasted until midnight; and the resulting plans and 
orders of the Commanding-General were made known to 
them all. Their importance was greater to Thomas than 
to any other, as he held the left, where the heaviest and 
most persistent attack v/as to be expected. He had borne 
the brunt of the battle on Saturday and he was to bear 
it again on Sunday. As it turned out, he became responsi- 
ble, practically, for the whole battle. 

Soon after Thomas returned to his quarters, about two 
o'clock, he had a report from General Baird, who had 
been ordered to take a strong position on the road from 
McDannel's to Reed's bridge, that his left did not reach 
that road and could not be made to reach it without weak- 
ening his line too much. He at once wrote a note to Rose- 
crans, stating the fact and asking to have his own Second 
division (Negley's) sent to take position on the left and 
rear of Baird, to make sure against an assault there. He 
was immediately answered, without question, that Negley 
would be sent at once, but the promiise was neglected, — 
one of the two conspicuously fatal faults of Rosecrans on 
that fateful day. 

At that time Rosecrans's divisions were in position, 
from left to right, as follows: Of the six immediately 
under Thomas, Baird's was on the extreme left and just 
to the left of Kelly's cross-roads, tho too weak to reach to 
the road of chief importance, from McDannel's to Reed's 
bridge ; Johnson's was on Baird's right and a little further 
front, lying across the Alexander's bridge road ; Palmer's 
at the right and rear of Johnson's; Reynolds's (two bri- 
gades) on Palmer's right, Turchin's brigade being east of 
the State road and a little northeast of Poe's house and 
King's (now Robinson's) just west of that road and nearly 
in front of Poe's house; Brannan's further west of that 
road and just north of Dyer's house, in reserve in column 
of brigades; Wilder 's brigade of mounted infantry (dis- 
mounted, with its horses concealed some distance to the 
west) still near (west of) Vineyard's house. Van Cleve's 
and Wood's of Crittenden's corps and Davis's and Sheri- 
dan's of McCook's (except one brigade of Davis, which:. 



231 



had been posted at Stevens's Gap) were all moving up on 
the roads between Glenn's house and Lee & Gordon's mill. 

Negley's division had been withdrawn from Crawfish 
Spring to the north the evening before and had reached 
Brotherton's house just as the enemy's last attack was 
being driven off east of Kelly's. Negley found on arriv- 
ing that a division of the enemy had reached the State 
road near Brotherton's, and he at once made a spirited 
attack upon his own responsibility, and successfully. He 
then took position west of Brotherton's and in front of 
the Withers tanyard. 

Mitchell's cavalry, closing up in McLemore's Cove to 
keep near the infantry, was near Crawfish Spring (except 
Minty's brigade), but was wholly employed in keeping 
Wheeler's cavalry out of the battle. Minty's brigade, 
which had been placed during the day (19th) in rear of 
the Glenn house and not employed, had been sent, at dark, 
by way of McFarland's Gap and Rossville, to reconnoiter 
the lower Chickamauga in the vicinity of Ringgold. 

Bragg had been, of course, as busy during the night as 
Rosecrans. He now had the whole of his army west of the 
Chickamauga, except ¥/heeler's cavalry, still on the east 
side, six miles south of the field of action, held there by 
Mitchell. He organized his army for the battle of the 20th 
in two wings. The right wing, commanded by Lieutenant- 
General Polk, was composed of Forrest's cavalry corps on 
the right, with Pegram's division on the extreme right, a 
little north of Jay's mill, mounted, and Armstrong's on its 
left, dismounted; then, from the left of Armstrong, five 
divisions of infantry, being Liddell's and Gist's of Walker's 
corps, Cleburne's and Breckinridge's of Hill's corps and 
Cheatham's of his own corps. In his left wing, com- 
manded by Lieutenant-General Longstreet, were six divi- 
sions of infantry, being Law's and Kershaw's of his own 
corps (now commanded by General Hood), Stewart's, 
Preston's and Johnson's of Buckner's corps, and Hind- 
man's of Polk's corps. The extreme left — Preston's 
division — rested on the creek, near Hall's ford, a mile 
north of Lee & Gordon's mill, and the whole line, from 
Jay's mill to Hall's ford, closely filled a space of nearly 
three miles. Stewart's division, of the left wing, was 
bivouacked within rifle-shot of the State road, near 



232 



Brotherton's house, a position which gave Thomas much 
trouble early in the morning. 

Thus Bragg had eleven divisions of infantry* and two 
of cavalry set for battle against Rosecrans's ten divisions 
of infantry, less two brigades, one of which was the garri- 
son in Chattanooga and the other on post at Stevens' Gap, 
fifteen miles away, tho he (Rosecrans) had another divi- 
sion of infantry (Steedman's of Granger's corps) at Mc- 
Afee's church, on the Rossville-Ringgold road, four miles 
to the north. 

Tho Rosecrans, the night before, felt assured of victory 
and the men generally believed the rebels were beaten, 
since they had seen every assault defeated, there was deep 
anxiety in all minds. Thomas, especially, put every min- 
ute to use in preparation, knowing that Bragg's chief pur- 
pose must be to break down his left and gain the road 
between him and Chattanooga. With Negley's division — 
if he had it — he could reach the McDannel cross-roads ; 
but, with his habitual caution, he made secure a chosen 
position half a mile south of McDannel's. This was on ris- 
ing ground in front (west) of Kelly's cross-roads. Here, 
in a rough crescent or semi-circle around Kelly's house, 
the base of which was seven or eight hundred yards along 
the State road, he established a defensive line and pro- 
tected it by having trees slashed and logs and rails placed 
so as to form a barricade, a provision which proved to 
be of great value in the battle. The axes were heard on 
Bragg's lines, and Bragg understood the purpose. 

The first gleam of dawn found Thom.as riding the lines, 
giving final directions and looking anxiously for the ar- 
rival of Negley's division, to hold the cross-roads on his 
left. Not yet at seven o'clock had Negley appeared, altho 
the promise to send him was given four or five hours 
before and his position was then not ten minutes walk 
from Rosecrans's headquarters. But the enemy's attack 
was delayed, for some reason not known to Thomas, and, 
at eight o'clock, he took the responsibility of sending direct 
to Negley an order to move up. Negley's report says that 
that was the first order he received ; that he at once began 



* But Bragg's report says that three brigades of Longstreet's 
had not yet arrived from Virginia, 



233 



to move and had one brigade out on the road when the 
enemy was reported advancing in his front and attack- 
ing his skirmish line ; that General Rosecrans then ordered 
him to hold the position until he could be relieved by other 
troops ; that he sent to Thomas, however, the one brigade 
drawn out (John Beatty's), and that no relief for the 
others appeared until nine-thirty. 

Thomas, thus compelled to give up his hope of holding 
McDannel's cross-roads (with what thoughts can be 
imagined, since the enemy now had on open road across 
his left), did the next best thing by disposing his men 
to hold the State road and Kelly's cross-roads from his 
position at the barricades. He placed twelve brigades in 
the semi-circle, — Dodge's of Johnson's division of Mc- 
Cook's corps, on the extreme left, with its left resting on 
the State road, then, to the right, John Beatty's, of Neg- 
ley's division of his own corps, then John King's, Scrib- 
ner's and Starkweather's, of Baird's division of his own 
corps, then Berry's and Willich's, of Johnson's division, 
then Cruft's, Hazen's and Grose's, of Palmer's division 
of Crittenden's corps, and then Turchin's and Edward A. 
King's (now Robinson's), of Reynolds's division of his 
own corps. The right of Turchin's brigade reached nearly 
to the State road, a little north of Poe's house, and faced 
to the southeast, and King's was placed just to the right 
of the road and had the same face. 

The other troops were placed by direct orders from 
Rosecrans as follows : On the right of King (Robinson) 
and parallel with the road the three brigades of Brannan's 
division and the two remaining of Negley's, both of 
Thomas's corps ; then, turning much to the right south of 
the tanyard, five brigades of McCook's corps, being 
Davis's two remaining brigades and Sheridan's three. 
This part of the line ran by the Glenn house and a few 
hundred yards west of it. Still to the west, and forming 
the extreme right, were the mounted infa.ntry, Harrison's 
regiment and Wilder's brigade. Then Crittenden's two 
remaining divisions. Van Cleve and Wood, were placed in 
the rear of the center, to the right of Vidito's house and 
just west of the Dry Valley road, as a reserve to the whole 
line. It was about two and a half miles, in direct line from 
the extreme right to the extreme left. All these troops 



234 



were up to or north of the Glenn house before dark of 
the 19th. 

To the question, why General Rosecrans did not then 
undertake to move on the three or four miles to the Ross- 
ville-Ringgold road, where his position would be much 
better and where he could not be cut off from Chattanooga, 
the only answer is, that he flattered himself that he had 
already, practically, defeated Bragg. 

Bragg had ordered the attack to begin at daybreak by 
Polk's advance up the Reed's bridge road, to strike and, 
if possible, turn Rosecrans's left, and, immediately after 
Polk's beginning, to open rapidly from right to left until 
the whole line was engaged. But Polk did no better 
this morning than the last. Bragg was out, with his 
horse held ready, before dawn, waiting to hear Polk's 
guns. After sunrise he sent an officer to him, to learn the 
cause of the delay. The officer did not find him with his 
troops, but finally found him beyond the creek, where he 
had spent the night comfortably in a house, but he had 
not yet ordered the attack. Bragg rode off to him (prob- 
ably not at a walk!) and found that he had made no 
preparations beyond sending two messengers during the 
night to General Hill, both of whom had failed to find him. 
Hill, in turn, when found, said he had had no orders, that 
his men were then getting breakfast and he would not 
call them off. The fact was, that neither of the two had 
any great love for Bragg, nor was any lost between them- 
selves. They did get started at last, and began the battle 
at nearly eleven o'clock, as Bragg says, but there is better 
evidence that it was not later than ten o'clock. 

When it did begin, however, there was no lack of resolu- 
tion or energy. The crash along the whole line on and 
near the State road was tremendous, but heaviest on 
Thomas's left. Repeated assaults there finally forced 
Baird partly out of position. The enemy was not only 
able to make this attack in heavy force, but to move two 
divisions past Baird, across the State road and partly in 
the rear of Thomas's position. This could not have been 
done if Negley's division had been sent as Rosecrans had 
promised, or an equivalent force; but now one of 
Brannan's brigades (Van Derveer) and one of Negley's 
(Stanley) were hurried to the left (two of Van Cleve's 



235 



brigades also were ordered there, but did not arrive), and, 
with the aid of two batteries rushed to the ridge at Snod- 
grass's house, broke up this very dangerous situation and 
forced the enemy off the State road and back toward the 
creek.* 

Meantime the attack upon Reynolds and Palmer (by 
Stewart's and Cleburne's divisions) was hotly pressed, 
renewed again and again, but always repulsed. Stewart 
especially threw his three brigades against the two of 
Turchin and Robinson, coming almost to close quarters 
with Turchin's men, whose position was the most exposed, 
but there was no shaking them or stopping their fire ; and 
about noon, after more than two hours of the contest, the 
enemy withdrew and left that part of the line inactive for 
several hours. 

But he was exceedingly active elsewhere. Failing to 
break Thomas's left or any part of his barricaded posi- 
tion, and learning or assuming that the right of Rose- 
crans's line was weaker, Longstreet undertook to break 
thro there. Rosecrans's line to the right of Reynolds then 
stood: First, from Thomas's corps, two brigades of 
Brannan's division on the right of Robinson's brigade of 
Reynolds's division and a little further back from the State 
road (Brannan had been placed there at first as a sup- 
port to Reynolds, which would put him a little to the rear, 
tho within immediate reach) ; then, from Crittenden's 
corps. Wood's division on the right of Brannan and a little 
in advance of him; then, from McCook's corps, Davis's 
division (two brigades) on the right of Wood and, finally, 
Sheridan's division on the right of Davis, with the 
mounted infantry (dismounted, to fight on foot) still fur- 
ther to the right. Van Cleve (of Crittenden's corps) , with 
two of his brigades, was in the rear, near Dyer's house. 

General Rosecrans realized that this line was too long 
for the number of troops in it, and before eleven o'clock 
decided to draw it in. He, naturally, first ordered Sheri- 
dan, who was on the far right, to move by the rear to the 
left and support Thomas. Then Van Cleve, with his two 
brigades near Dyer's house, was ordered to move to 

* In this battle the rebel General Helm, commanding a brigade 
in Breckinridge's division, whose wife was a sister of Mrs. Lin- 
coln, was killed. 



236 



Thomas. Then Davis's division was to be moved to the 
left. But it was too late: the enemy interfered, and the 
results were terrible. Tho neither side knew the other's 
situation, it happened, by singular fatality, that Bragg's 
strongest position in all the battle and Rosecrans's weakest 
exactly coincided in both time and place. 

A young aide-de-camp, riding from the right with some 
message for General Thomas, saw what he thought was a 
gap in the line between Reynolds and Wood. He made no 
investigation or inquiry, as he probably would have done 
if older, but, with more zeal than good sense, volunteered 
the report that there was a gap in the line. If he had 
ridden only a hundred yards into the gap (it was in the 
woods) he must have seen that it was occupied by 
Brannan. But he was too careless or " too fresh ", and he 
opened the gate to the great tide that swept away the 
whole right wing and lost the day. 

By another fatality Rosecrans had ordered Brannan to 
join, in turn, in the m.ovement to the left, and when this 
news of a gap came to him he supposed that Brannan had 
moved as so ordered, but when Brannan received the order 
he had a report of movement by the enemy in his front 
and discreetly judged that he ought to wait a little for any 
development. He reported this decision to Rosecrans, but 
before his report was received Rosecrans ordered Wood to 
fill the supposed gap by moving left to Reynolds. Thus, 
with Sheridan moved to the left, as ordered, and Davis 
closed up with Wood, he would have reduced his line by 
the length of two whole divisions and made it practically 
safe. 

Now came another blow for the troubled General, a 
cruel punishment for his lack of care in giving an impor- 
tant order. His order to Wood he left to a young officer, 
a captain and aide-de-camp on his staff. If not himself 
or his chiei-of -staff , then some officer of rank and experi- 
ence ought to have taken the order to Wood in person. 
But this aide-de-camp wrote it, and sent it to Wood by 
still another or an orderly. It read " The General Com- 
manding directs that you close up on Reynolds as rapidly 
as possibly and support him It does not appear whether 
Rosecrans dictated this order, but, whoever was responsi- 
ble for it, it was inexcusably obscure. In ordinary usage, 



237 



to close up on Reynolds " meant to connect in line with 
him, but " support him " meant, usually, a position 
somewhat to his rear and not in line with him. 
To do both was impossible, and Wood had to decide 
how to act. He was a West Point officer, had had long 
experience in the army and was distinguished for several 
high military qualities. He knew that Brannan was in 
place, that there was in fact no interval, and he actually 
thought, as any one would, that the order was made under 
some mistake. It was his duty to obey orders, but none 
the less his duty to exercise discretion where obedience 
would, probably, not be expected if the situation were 
fully known. That is, knowing Brannan was there, he 
ought to have reported that fact and held his position 
while awaiting further instructions. He was a masterful, 
self-reliant man, and surely had often before acted upon 
his own discretion. But what he did now was to obey 
orders " without discretion, and leave the general who 
mistakenly sent the order to take the consequences; but, 
having thrown away discretion to make himself technically 
safe in obeying the order, he immediately used discretion 
in acting upon one part of the order rather than the other. 
He decided not to close up on " Reynolds, but to move 
to his rear, to " support him Even then he did not move 
directly toward Reynolds, across Brannan's front, but 
around his rear, by a long circuit.* The only care he 
took was to ask General Davis to move to the left and take 
the place he was leaving, but Davis had only two brigades, 
both small and much too weak for the duty, tho he 
attempted it. 

Nov/, v/hen Polk's wing had been broken on the rock 
of Thomas's defense and that part of the field looked 
hopeless nearly all parts of the right wing were in 
turn repulsed, with heavy losses ", reports Bragg) , Long- 

* Of course Wood was severely criticised after the battle for 
this performance, but he had the defense that he had " obeyed 
orders But he was too intelligent a man and too capable a 
soldier to have entire faith in that defense. The real explanation 
may have been in private antagonism to Rosecrans, a state of 
m.ind not uncommon among the generals and lesser officers in that 
army. In fact many of them had little or no confidence in him 
as a general, and, therefore, little respect for or fear of him 
personally. 



238 



street set out to show that the battle could be won. He 
was far the ablest fighting general in Bragg's army, and 
his lieutenant, Hood, was conspicuous for daring and in- 
difference to fire. Singularly enough, Bragg in no way 
mentions this movement distinctively in his reports ; Long- 
street had thought of it and sent for leave to make it, but 
before his messenger returned, he found one or two of 
his divisions moving forward by Bragg's direct order, 
made without reference to him. He then took charge, 
massed three of the best divisions in column, led by Hood, 
had another division follow in close support, and moved 
straight upon the middle of Rosecrans's right wing, re- 
gardless of any fire. Most unhappily, it was just at the 
moment when Wood, Davis, Sheridan and Van Cleve were 
all out of position and moving, as already told, with their 
right flanks exposed, that this tremendous blow was 
struck. All of Bragg's struggles and losses up to this 
time were as nothing compared with this decisive advan- 
tage that fell to him by accident. 

It was Davis who first met the charging column. He 
had got one brigade into the gap left by Wood and the 
other was following. Sheridan's advance had just reached 
the space and Van Clove's rear was not yet across it. 
Hood's column rolled thro Davis and swept him aside with- 
out a halt, broke off the right of Brannan's line, knocked 
off the head of Sheridan's column and the rear of Van 
Clove's, and threw both these divisions into great con- 
fusion; and within an hour the four assaulting divisions 
were ranged in a semicircle around Rosecrans on the 
south, from the right of Reynolds's division, by the way of 
the Dyer house, to a point northwest of Vidito's. Half the 
field was lost and half his army knocked out of action. 

It happened that Rosecrans was a witness to the awful 
scene of disaster. He saw part of the overwhelming 
assault, saw Davis's men, a large part of Van Clove's and 
part of Sheridan's running in disorder to the west, not 
to stop until they were over the Ridge and in the Chat- 
tanooga valley. He knew the remainder of Sheridan's 
division was cut off, as well as Harrison's and Wilder's 
regiments; he assumed that the rebel success had swept 
all along his lines, that Thomas too, if not already broken, 
would inevitably break under another shock; he feared 



239 



that all his cavalry in McLemore's Cove was lost, and that 
Bragg would soon be marching on Chattanooga. 

His mind was not equal to any disaster. Qnce rattled, 
it saw nothing but disaster. And his experiences during 
the last three weeks, especially during the last week, were 
more than enough to rattle badly such a man. He had 
been in mental terror of the consequences of his mistakes, 
and now they were come, piled in an hour upon his head, 
a crushing avalanche. His severest critic, his worst 
enem.y, must have been pained to see his present plight. 
He was somewhere in the angle between the Snodgrass, 
Dyer and Vidito houses, his headquarters having hastily 
abandoned the Glenn house to escape the enemy. If he 
made any effort to reach Thomas or communicate with 
him he did not press it.* If he had seen him, or only sent 
to learn, he would have found that masterful general in 
full control of his post and of himself. So he did not get 
information to Thomas of the break, but left him to find 
it out by chance. 

It does not appear how long he remained on the field 
after the break. It may be guessed that he remained until 
he believed or fancied the enemy's left was pushing past 
his own right. Whatever the time he was unfit for any 
service and attempted none, tho at least a part of his staff 
and his mounted escort were with him. He thought he 
saw the whole situation in that shocking part of it near 
him. Completely unnerved, he rode away by McFarland's 
Gap, with his staff and escort. He probably reached the 
west base of Missionary Ridge before the troops of Sheri- 
dan, as the sight of a body of his troops in order would, 
perhaps, have roused his hopes. Riding thence down the 
Chattanooga valley, he must have suffered yet deeper 
humiliation in finding himself for miles in a hurrying 
mob of soldiers, guns, caissons, wagons, — his own army, 
broken, scared, flying. He did not stop until he reached 
Chattanooga, which could not have been later than two 
o'clock, so that he must have left the field before one. 

The situation of his two corps generals Crittenden and 

* He does say that he tried to get to Thomas and could not; but, 
if he was actually cut off by the enemy, he certainly would have 
said that; and there is no report of either side showing that the 
enemy was far enough forward to separate them. 



240 



McCook was little more to be envied. Each of them had 
one division in the steady fighting line, but was not with 
it. Thomas was in general command there. Each of 
them, remaining at his post behind his two other divisions 
on the right, had found them moved here or there, by parts 
or the whole, by direct orders of the Commanding-General, 
learning of the orders usually only after the movement 
v/as made, until each was left on the field without troops 
to command. 

A discussion as to what they ought to have done under 
such circumstances is hardly required here. Crittenden's 
account is, that he was literally cut off by the enemy, tried 
to get thro to the field and could not, supposed that the 
whole army was routed and Rosecrans lost, and that his 
duty was to go to Chattanooga and take command of the 
surviving remnant as it came in; McCook's, that he too 
was unable to reach the field again, and, with the same 
idea of a general rout, that he went to Rossville. Each 
of them, if he had remained as near the fi-eld as he could, 
or even as far away as the west end of McFarland's Gap, 
would have found one of his divisions, not much reduced, 
and part of another. With Wilder's and Harrison's 
mounted infantry (cut off with Sheridan), they would 
have had then three divisions, small ones, it is true, but 
numbering in all probably five or six thousand. Such a 
force, marching back thro the Gap, could have got onto 
the field easily, and would be strong enough at least to 
check Longstreet's left, if not to defeat it. Thomas would 
have given the world to have them there, and with them 
he would then have won the day. But they both rode 
away, with only their staffs, and were not ready for action 
again until next morning, far too late. 

It is true that Rosecrans thought, when he left the 
field or while on the way, that he might yet save Chat- 
tanooga and that he must go there to prepare for defense. 
Chattanooga ought to be ready for defense, of course, but 
it was certainly not the work for the Commanding-General 
at that time; and he soon learned that there were corps 
and division generals unemployed who could have been 
charged with it. 

But General Garfield, his Chief-of-Staff, who was with 
him on the road for Chattanooga, could not endure the 



241 



apparent abandonment of duty on the field. He asked 
leave to go back and join Thomas, if he was still on the 
field. Rosecrans refused, saying they must go on and pre- 
pare for defense at Chattanooga ; but he finally consented, 
and Garfield rode back, with part of the escort. On the 
way they took, eastward over the Ridge, they met some of 
the enemy and had some fighting, but they found Thomas 
about four o'clock; and it was from Garfield, at that late 
hour, that Thomas learned definitely, for the first time, 
what had happened to bring the enemy in heavy force 
upon his right and rear, what had become of the right 
and center of the army, and where Rosecrans and the other 
generals were. For three hours he had been defending 
his position in the dark, knowing only that it had to be 
done. 

Sheridan was another unbroken spirit, tho he had a 
more practical idea than Garfield of a way to redeem the 
day. He made at least a heroic effort, which, if he could 
have had an hour more, might have redeemed Chicka- 
mauga. He was moving at double-quick, in column, from 
his position on the right, under Rosecrans's order to reach 
Thomas, when Longstreet's assault struck across the head 
of his column, carried away part of the first brigade and 
threw the remainder into confusion. With quick and 
strenuous efforts, he got his men halted and in order, and 
moved to his left, for the Dry Y alley road, taking into his 
column the scattered men of other commands he found 
on the way, and attempted to get around Longstreet's left 
by that road and then east to join Thomas. It was too 
late : he reached the road only to find Longstreet's troops 
on it ahead. Then he turned to the west, got across the 
main Ridge somehow, and reached the Chattanooga valley 
road, at the west end of McFarland's Gap. He found 
Davis there with his remnant, and halted there for some 
time (tho he speaks as if it v/ere short), but he did get 
most of his own division into order, picked up parts of 
Negley's, Wood's and Van Cleve's, thus having 3000 or 
4000 men, and with this new column hurried down the 
valley to Rossville, turned to the right and south, and 
marched for Thomas's left, thus going completely around 
Longstreet and part of Missionary Ridge. This he believed 
the shortest way, tho it does not appear why he did not 



242 



go thro the Gap and take the road by the Mullis house. 
There is no evidence that the enemy had reached that road. 
By Rossville his route was quite six miles, the first two or 
three olpstructed by the tangled mass of the disordered re- 
treat ; but he did get nearly to McDannel's house, within a 
mile of Thomas's men, only to be turned back by news that 
Thomas was ordered to move to Rossville. And Thomas 
did not know he had come ! 

Davis, too, got into order, near McFarland's house, the 
most of his two brigades, put in with them several regi- 
ments and fragments of other commands he found there, 
mustering in all 3500 to 4000, and marched back thro the 
Gap. He says he reached Thomas's right and was form- 
ing lines for action when he got the same news; but he 
does not say and it does not appear that Thomas knew of 
this. 

Tho it may seem singular that Thomas and his men on 
the left did not know for some hours that the right had 
suffered a sweeping reverse, they knew, from repeated 
great firing in that direction, that a succession of attacks 
had been made there ; but they assumed that all such at- 
tacks had failed, just as all had failed in their part of the 
field.* The minor officers and the men under him, indeed, 
did not know of the great disaster till long after they left 
the field that night.f 

Thomas had been told by Rosecrans before eleven that 
Sheridan's division would be moved to his support. Not 
seeing or hearing from Sheridan, he went himself, about 
two o'clock, toward his supposed position on the right. 
Reaching the head of the valley of a small stream opening 
south on the east of Dyer's house, he met one of his staff 
officers, who told him that a large body of the enemy was 
advancing up that valley. This was incredible. It was 
just where Sheridan would be coming toward him: the 
enemy surely could not be there. But the coming troops 

* The extent of the field, all of it irregular hills and hollows, 
mostly covered with woods, must be kept in mind. 

fA report of a brigade-commander in the crescent (Colonel 
Berry) on the left of Turchin, shows that he (and so, probably, 
the other commanding officers there) was entirely surprised to 
find, when withdrawn in the evening, that they were on a retreat, 
his only knowledge being that of defeating the enemy in every 
conflict of the two days. 



243 



could now be seen, and several officers present disputed 
as to whether they were Sheridan's or Bragg's. The un- 
certainty was soon ended in Brannan's attack upon them. 

Thomas found himself in an appalling situation. The 
most of the Crittenden's and McCook's corps gone from 
the field, the Commanding-General and his staff not heard 
from, and a successful enemy moving in heavy force 
against his right flank and rear. He could learn nothing 
of the two other corps generals; but if he had known 
v/here they were and why they had gone, if he had known 
the whole awful extent of the abandonment of the field, 
he would have held to his post with no less determination 
and courage. If he thought of an attempt to retreat, he 
knew that that, by day, would be much more dangerous 
than holding on. It is, perhaps, fortunate that he did not 
know the details of the frightful event nor the actual 
situation of the troops of the right wing, tho he feared 
that Rosecrans, McCook and Crittenden were all dead or 
captured. He must have thought of the whole body being 
overwhelmed, tho that must have seemed incredible. He 
knew that some brigadier-generals and colonels command- 
ing brigades had been killed or disabled. In fact there 
were then seven. But thirteen more generals (four divi- 
sion and nine brigade commanders) were gone, as the two 
corps generals and the Commanding-General were gone; 
all the cavalry had been cut off in McLemore's Cove, and 
its commander had shown nothing of the initiative or 
daring that make the first qualities of a cavalry general; 
a large part of the artillery had been captured and a larger 
part of it taken off the field by General Negley (to save it 
from, capture, he reports, tho his explanation is not con- 
vincing, and he had been specially placed in charge of it, 
with orders for planting it in certain positions and keep- 
ing it in action) ; and, finally, as if all other calamities 
were to be crowned by the greatest, somebody had wildly 
taken the whole ammunition train away in the retreat, 
and the men had but little left in their cartridge boxes!* 
Thomas received the terrible shock of this last fact thro 



* The only mention of or reference to this climax of calamity 
made in his reports by this man of a great soul is this : " our 
ammunition train was ordered to Rossville by some unauthorized 
person " ! 



244 



the urgent calls from all along the lines for cartridges. 
His officers and messengers found not one ammunition 
wagon left on the field. 

A stouter heart than that of " Old Pap " Thomas — 
" The Rock of Chickamauga — where could it be found? 
He never lost his head or nerve. If there was to be no 
help, he would fight it out himself. Fortunately, on the 
right of his position, he had another lion in General 
Brannan, commander of the Third division of his own 
corps. He went to him. at once, had him fall back to a 
strong position, on a ridge extending westward from the 
Snodgrass house, and then sent to him more troops, all he 
could get not already in position on his left, chiefly those 
General Wood had rallied, among them one of his own 
brigades intact (Harker's).* At the same time he sent 
word to Reynolds, that the right had been turned and 
that the enemy was in his rear in force. 

Tremendous news for Reynolds, with his two small 
brigades holding the right of the crescent position and 
another enemy in force " in his front. The fire of Long- 
street's artillery in his rear was already reaching his 
Second brigade. He moved back the right of this brigade, 
so as to face this new enemy and thus at least escape an 
enfilading fire. In his report of this movement he goes 
on to say, that he then " learned that the enemy was be- 
tween us and our ammunition train " and that " but for 
this circumstance we could have maintained our position 
indefinitely ".f 

The left wing had maintained its position around 
Kelly's house all the mxorning, suffering no ill-fortune but 
the temporary forcing back of part of Baird's command in 
the enemy's first attack upon his left flank. This faithful 
line in the crescent had, in fact, beaten Bragg's right wing 
in every assault, and so effectively that there was no re- 
newal of attack for several hours after noon, — so effec- 
tively that when Longstreet, checked and driven back by 
Brannan and Wood, sent to ask Bragg for reinforcement 
from Polk's wing, Bragg answered that Polk's men had 



* One brigade of Wood's three had been left at Chattanooga, as 
garrison, and another had been mostly swept away in the storm. 

t Exactly the language one of his colonels — Lane — would 
have used I 

245 



been " repulsed in every assault and beaten so badly that 
they could be of no service 

Turchin's four regiments, now sadly reduced, were in 
the front on the right of the crescent and, with Robinson's, 
had borne more attacks in number than any other part of 
that line (because these brigades there held the main 
road) and never wavered, tho they saw, with increasing 
anxiety, their ammunition getting very low. 

With Brannan's division posted, as described, on the 
right, Thomas placed the four brigades and parts of bri- 
gades of the other corps that had survived the break be- 
tween Reynolds's right and Brannan's left, that is, at a 
right angle with the State road and from it to the Snod- 
grass house. With the curved line on the east side of the 
Sta,te road, he was thus in the famous " Horseshoe ", 
which is still the great pride of the survivors of the Army 
of the Cumberland, and which was never to be beaten or 
broken, tho assailed again and again and again, from the 
south, the east and the west, by an exulting enemy more 
than double the number of its defenders. It was here that 
the unconquerable soul of General Thomas gained for him 
that great name, unequalled in all the war, — The Rock 
of Chickamauga ". 

In this " Horseshoe " he then had, nominally, eighteen 
brigades of infantry, all of them much reduced by the 
battles and vicissitudes of the campaign and some of them 
now reduced to mere remnants by the disaster. These 
men, in their splendid isolation and devotion, ought to be 
distinguished here, if only by their brigades.* From left 
to right (tho the positions of several were changed at 



* As to regiments, many of them in the two broken corps could 
not now be identified with certainty as being in the Horseshoe, at 
any rate not without very tedious search, and even then some 
would be found only as small fragments, the greater part gone 
in the retreat. Of Thomas's corps there were there about 40 
regiments, of McCook's about 15 and of Crittendan's about 20, 
but all of them reduced by casualties in killed and wounded and 
some in captured and dispersed, until the average must have been 
much under 300 men to a regiment. 

It is not intended by this to show any special superiority in 
Thomas's men. If it had been their fortune to be put into the 
same situation in which the Commanding-General so imprudently 
put the others, it is quite likely they would have met the same fate. 



246 



times, as occasion compelled) they stood: Dodge, Grose, 
John King, Scribner, Starkweather, Berry (succeeding 
Baldwin, killed), John Beatty, Cruft, Hazen, Turchin, 
Robinson (succeeding Edward King, killed), Willich, 
Hays (succeeding Croxton, wounded), Harker, Buell, 
Stoughton (succeeding Stanley, wounded), Van Derveer 
and Barnes. Nine of these belonged to Thomas's corps, 
(John King, Scribner, Starkweather, John Beatty, 
Turchin, Robinson, Hays, Stoughton and Van Derveer), 
six to Crittenden's (Grose, Cruft, Hazen, Harker, Buell 
and Barnes), and three to McCook's (Dodge, Berry, and 
Willich). But parts, large or small, of some of these and 
all of the twelve other infantry brigades were gone in the 
flight. Before the battle was ended, however, two bri- 
gades (Whitaker and Mitchell) of Steedman's division of 
the Reserve Corps came up and shared fully and very 
effectively in it to the end. 

In the Horseshoe he had not exceeding 20,000 men — 
probably less until Steedman arrived — and their ammu- 
nition was so low that they were constantly urged to great 
care in using it. Surrounding him, east, south and west, 
was an enemy numbering not less than 45,000,* strength- 
ened by a large quantity of captured artillery, small arms 
and ammunition. And the contact was so close that re- 
treat was impossible (at least by day) , even if he thought 
of retreat. 

If the deserting generals had known what was happen- 
ing behind them, they would have had more hopeful 
spirits, and some of them, at least, would have tried to 
get back upon the field, with whatever men and guns they 
could bring. The fact v/as, that Longstreet's drive was 
short, and he met a very destructive check, losing nearly 
as many men on that field as all the rest of Bragg's army 
in the two days. Even the sm.all body of mounted infan- 
try (Wilder's brigade and Harrison's regiment), dis- 
mounted and on Rosecrans's extreme right, attacked 
Hindman's division on Longstreet's left with such courage 
and effect as to compel its retreat as far back as the State 

* This deducts all of Bragg's reported losses in the two days 
battles and the fighting of the 18th and all of "Wheeler's cavalry 
and a margin for error or possible detachments, tho none are 
reported. 



247 



road, tho they had to give way before a renewed and ex- 
tended attack and move up on to the Ridge. And Brannan, 
with tv/o of his brigades and Harker's one, effectually 
checked and forced back Longstreet's center, so that that 
enterprising general was limited all the remainder of the 
day to a practically settled line, extending from opposite 
Reynolds's right to the right of Brannan's command west 
of the Snodgrass house. 

But he was not content to remain there. He knew he 
had seriously damaged Rosecrans's army, but he could 
not know how much and he supposed the forces now 
opposing him to be much heavier than they were. He made 
a set assault upon Brannan and was repulsed, and an- 
other and another. He had a brave and determined sol- 
dier to deal with; Brannan never shook. He only closed 
up his men after each attack, improved his position from 
time to time, and kept at it. His ammunition was nearly 
out, tho the boxes of the killed and wounded were 
stripped, and he ordered the bayonet to be used in the 
next repulse. 

It was during this struggle that Longstreet sent to 
Bragg for reinforcement from the right wing and was 
answered (as already told) that the right wing was too 
much beaten to be of use to him. But probably Bragg 
had not realized the extent of Longstreet's achievement. 
It is certain, from all the records, that he (Bragg) was , 
discouraged and nearly of the mind that he had lost the 
battle. And he believed he was still confronted by forces 
much larger than his own. About two o'clock, however, 
he was roused to hope by news from Longstreet, and then 
undertook to help him by a final effort to get his right 
wing into action again. He sent written orders to Polk 
(and later, distrustfully, followed them up in person), to 
" assault the enemy in his front (Thomas's left) with his 
whole force and to persist until he should get their posi- 
tion ". At the same time he directed Longstreet to renew 
the attack upon Thomas's right. Longstreet attacked 
vigorously, putting into action everything he had but one 
division (Preston's), which he reserved for the final blow 
when the right moment should come. This was met as 
before by the sturdy Brannan, who lost no ground, but 



248 



gained some in improving his position, and used the 
bayonet in his repelling charges for lack of cartridges. 

On Thomas's left Polk's men were not so aggressive. 
Tho they did advance they kept a safer distance than 
Longstreet's and made no definite charge upon the cres- 
cent, but they kept up a more or less continuous fire, 
especially by artillery and sharpshooters, the latter caus- 
ing the most loss, at least in Turchin's brigade and in the 
Eleventh Ohio, until driven off temporarily, by a daring 
charge by Turchin's men, into their cover in the woods. 

The enemy's shells started a fire in the barricade in 
front of Turchin's brigade, which threatened to be worse 
for it than the attack. To put it out the men would have 
to be exposed to the enemy's fire and be without their 
guns. In front of the Eleventh Ohio the fire was rapidly 
spreading. Colonel Lane called for volunteers. Lieuten- 
ant Hardenbrook, with his Company B, at once volun- 
teered, and these brave men sprang to the work energetic- 
ally, speedily beat out the fire and saved the protecting 
screen. 

The struggle continued in a more or less fitful way along 
the crescent until about four o'clock, when Bragg, under 
a new alarm, again personally urged forward the sullen 
Polk and Hill. They crowded a last attack upon all this 
part of the line and succeeded in flanking its left and 
pushing troops to the west across the State road and 
toward Baird's rear.* Reynolds's right rear was already 
exposed to Longstreet, but a direct attack there had not 
yet been made. A desperate situation for the faithful 
men in the crescent, but they obstinately held on. There 
too, as with Brannan, cartridges were almost gone, and 
the killed and wounded were stripped of theirs as fast as 
they fell. 

Bragg's alarm, just spoken of, was probably caused by 
a dramatic interposition of fortune in Thomas's favor. 
General Granger had been posted at McAfee's church, two 
miles east of Rossville, to hold the Ringgold road. This 
was about three miles north of the battle field. He had 



* Baird then commanded the brigades in the left of the crescent, 
Palmer those in the center, and Reynolds those on the right. 



249 



there three brigades of his Reserve Corps, numbering 
about 3600, commanded as a division by General Steed- 
man. He had no orders as to the battle, he had not 
heard of the break, did not know that Rosecrans was gone, 
but he had heard the guns, and, from the great increase in 
the fire about two o'clock, he judged that the situation 
was perilous for the Union troops. He decided to risk his 
present orders and go to their relief. Steedman heartily 
approved, and together they marched, at quick time, led 
by the sound of the guns. On the road, near the Cloud 
house, they struck the enemy (Forrest's dismounted 
cavalry or Liddell's infantry), who offered fight, but 
Granger would not be delayed by what he thought a minor 
part of the enemy's forces. He only drove them off the 
road eastward and pushed on, leaving one brigade and a 
battery at the Cloud house, under Colonel Dan McCook, 
to protect his rear. From there he hurried, as it happened, 
directly toward Thomas himself, between the Snodgrass 
and Vidito houses, where Longstreet was just making 
another attack. 

One can imagine som.ething of Thomas's feelings on 
meeting this Godsend. It was then half past three and 
every m.an he had surviving had been under the fearful 
strain for five or six hours. Under his direction Steed- 
man rushed his two brigades (Whitaker's and Mitchell's) 
into position on the right of Brannan, where the enemy 
was already overlapping, and was at once in a battle as 
hot as any of the day, in which he drove the rebels back 
and out of the position they had gained. 

And Longstreet soon made it hotter. He guessed that 
fresh troops had been set against him, and he was com- 
pelled to throw in his last division, giving up the hope for 
which he had carefully kept it out of action, — that of 
using it to strike the breaking blow. If Thomas had only 
known that! If he had had only one division more, or 
but two brigades, to hurl upon Longstreet now, he would 
have won the battle. But Steedman's men fought with 
unshaken courage against the great odds. Another attack 
was made upon his (Steedman's) whole line, with a con- 
centrated rush upon his extreme right, which succeeded 
in cutting off part of his right brigade. His loss in killed 
and wounded there was shocking and nearly 450 men 



250 



were captured.* Still undaunted, Steedman only changed 
his front, to suit his reduced line, and held on. 

Thomas was now literally surrounded in a continuous 
two-thirds of a circle, having a radius of less than one 
mile, by thirty-nine brigades of the enemy, commanded 
by four lieutenant-generals, nine major-generals and 
thirty-four brigadiers, with artillery and ammunition more 
than they could use, while on his side there were twenty 
brigades and portions of brigades, commanded by four 
major-generals and nine brigadiers, with only a few pieces 
of artillery and nearly all ammunition gone. General 
Steedman had brought up only the ammunition for his 
own brigades, but he immediately divided with the other 
generals. It is touching to see in the official reports the 
gratefulness of the other generals for this allowance of a 
few rounds to the man. 

Now came the humiliating end to this gigantic struggle. 
Soon after four o'clock, when the renewed assault was 
crashing from end to end of the line, Thomas received an 
order from Rosecrans, written in Chattanooga, the first 
word he had from him after eleven. Rosecrans had been 
roused from despair by news that the army was not 
routed, not even beaten, for Thomas was still fighting and 
holding his post just where he had left him. This lifted 
his hopes and pluck wonderfully. He still had an army! 
and he would win the battle yet. But he did not return to 
the field. His order directed Thomas to assume com- 
mand of all the forces, move to Rossville and, with Crit- 
tenden and McCook, take a strong position and assume a 
threatening attitude 

If Thomas made any comment upon this order he let 
no one know it. There was, indeed, comment enough in 
merely repeating its language. He had already, hours 
before, assumed command of all the forces " left, com- 
pelled to do so by the Commanding-GeneraFs abandonment 
of the field. How he was to move to Rossville when 
heavily superior forces were fighting him at close range 
on three of four sides the order did not tell him, nobody 
could tell him. The order to " assume a threatening 

* About two-fifths of these captured were from the Eighty-ninth 
Ohio, which belonged to Turchin's brigade, but was temporarily 
serving in Granger's corps. 



251 



attitude " at Rossville was now the height of irony : would 
the enemy permit him to abandon the " threatening atti- 
tude " he already held? 

Nothing can be clearer than that Rosecrans's only duty 
and best plan now, seeing that Thomas was still on the 
field and therefore holding it, was to send word to him to 
use his own judgment in all things and that more troops, 
ammunition and supplies were being hurried up to him 
with utmost urgency. Troops enough were at Rossville 
and they could have reached him within two hours after 
the order did. In fact Sheridan was already almost there. 
But Crittenden was not at Rossville, as the order implied. 
He was at Chattanooga till two o'clock next morning, when 
he left Rosecrans to go to Rossville; but McCook was at 
Rossville from two o'clock that afternoon, and had, as 
he reports, the Twentieth Corps assembled there in good 
order by night. Most of his troops, however, had been 
there long before night. 

But Rosecrans was the Commanding-General and 
Thomas was a soldier who obeyed orders. He did not 
obey at once, tho, since that was impossible. The enemy 
was still making assaults which even Thomas describes as 

fierce " and furious ". It was only the timely coming 
of Steedman and his small supply of ammunition that 
had enabled him to hold out till this hour. Whether he 
wanted to stay and try again in the morning, or would 
have done it if left to his own judgment, in no way ap- 
pears from anything he has said in the records; but he 
said nothing, did nothing, that in any way indicated any 
other purpose than that. And the records of the enemy 
prove that he would have won. 

Bragg bivouacked on the field, but he and his generals 
believed that the Union army was there too; and his 
despatch to Richmond that night shows that he thought 
the battle still in doubt and that he expected more fighting 
the next day,* while he had now no fresh troops. If 
Thomas had remained he would have won. He would 
certainly have had Sheridan's new division, with ammuni- 
tion. Not much later would come Davis, with his reor- 
ganized force ; and, with Steedman's brigade left near the 



* See the despatch, page 261. 



252 



Cloud house and the rallied troops at Rossville, Thomas 
would, or could, have been reinforced by at least 10,000 
men, with a plenty of ammunition, within the sixteen 
hours from Rosecrans's order to the time when any fight- 
ing could begin in the morning. In short, Thomas had 
won the battle of Chickamauga and Rosecrans threw it 
away. 

The execution of the order laid another great anxiety 
upon Thomas. To retreat from the front of an enemy 
when a battle is only threatened is an extremely delicate 
and dangerous operation, but to retreat when the enemy 
is attacking at musket range on three sides must be vastly 
more perilous. But Thomas did it, and did it successfully ; 
and, tho actually fighting as he left his lines, the enemy 
did not suspect his purpose. 

He must have the cover of darkness because of the 
danger of discovery and attack in the rear, which would 
bring ruin, and yet he must not delay. The sun would 
sink behind Lookout Mountain and the light begin to fail 
before six. He conferred with Reynolds at five o'clock 
and gave him the order and instructions for withdrawing. 
Retirement from either flank would be more likely to be 
discovered than from the center, and Reynolds had the 
center. No other general was yet told, so that when, a 
little after five, Reynolds began to withdraw, quietly and 
without haste, it looked like only a change of position. 

The line of the right wing, running from east to west as 
it did, from the position of Reynolds to that of Steedman, 
served as a screen behind which the troops of the left 
wing could move across westward to McFarland's Gap, 
thro which it was intended to move most, if not all, of the 
rem.aining army, as the shortest way to a road the enemy 
could not reach in force. After Reynolds was well on the 
way, in the dusk, the brigades on the left and then on the 
right were to retire, quietly, and move directly toward the 
Gap. The last to move would thus be after dark. 

But the enemy kept firing viciously as long as there 
was good light, especially upon Baird's men on the ex- 
treme left and Brannan's and Steedman's on the extreme 
right ; and just as Reynolds was drawing out his men from 
the center there was a defi_nite attack upon each of these 
points. The object appeared to be to force back the two 

^ 253 



extremities of Thomas's line and extend the encircling line 
at both ends still further around him. If this was the 
object, it failed on Thomas's right, where Steedman and 
Brannan steadily held their place, but it partially suc- 
ceeded on his left, where Baird was compelled to retire 
his left flank to protect his rear, so that part of his line 
now faced to the northwest. 

Thomas guessed what would follow that movement and 
immediately acted. Reynolds's two brigades, on leaving 
the front, marched each brigade in double column, the 
four columns abreast. This formation was taken with a 
double purpose, — to get this division quickly out of the 
way of the division to follow, so as to avoid causing any 
halt, and to be able to face either right or left (north or 
south) in double line, if attacked on either flank. It was, 
in fact " running a gauntlet ", or would have been if the 
enemy had known of it. The double column was headed 
west for McFarland's Gap, but had barely crossed the 
State road when Thomas ordered them right face and 
forward (to the north) . This brought Turchin's brigade 
in front, and his two columns into two lines. Then the 
two brigades, in line of battle, moved rapidly north thro 
the woods, along the west side of the road. 

Thomas himself, with Reynolds, led this counterstroke. 
As he had foreseen, the enemy, using the last attack upon 
Baird as a screen, had pushed west across the State road, 
between his left and McDannel's house. This proved to 
be Liddell's division of Walker's corps, supported on its 
right by Armstrong's dismounted cavalry, but only a part 
of them had then passed the road, the movement being 
checked by the battery of Colonel Dan McCook's brigade 
which Granger had prudently left in position on a hill 
southwest of Cloud's house, as already told. 

When Reynolds's column was nearing McDannel's, 
Thomas said to him, pointing in the direction of Cloud's 
house, There they are ! Clear them out ! " The double 
lines pushed on in quick time, Robinson's brigade obliquing 
to the left, double-quick, to get a clear front to the enemy. 
The movement was made with such precision and the 
whole body moved on so steadily that different officers 
have described the scene with great admiration. 

It was a short, hot battle. The enemy threw shot and 



254 



shell with remarkable rapidity from a battery directly in 
front, near McDanneFs, and another battery on the left, 
toward the Ridge, was quite as active with a cross-fire.* 
Reynolds's men believed they were raked by artillery both 
in front and on the flank, but the battery on the left was 
of their own army. It was Colonel McCook's, which had 
already checked the movement of LiddelFs division in 
crossing the State road and was now firing upon it across 
the front of Reynolds's line. But the Reynolds men knew 
nothing of the presence of other Union troops and thought 
they were under fire of the enemy's forces of unknown 
strength in two positions. 

As soon as the line was near enough a charge at double- 
quick was ordered, the men whose cartridges were ex- 
hausted running with fixed bayonets; and the climax of 
this separate battle was reached. General Turchin's horse 
was killed, but he went on afoot. General Reynolds him- 
self led, mounted, and his men expected to see him fall 
at any moment. The Eleventh Ohio, Colonel Lane leading, 
mounted, must have been on the extreme right, nearest to 
the State road, the Ninty-second Ohio holding the left of 
the brigade. Under this daring charge the rebels broke. 
The survivors fled in complete disorder across the road 
eastward toward the creek, losing, besides their dead and 
wounded, their battery, overrun and taken in the charge, 
and several hundred prisoners. 

This was a brilliant deed, and the more remarkable in 
that it came at the end of three days of most strenuous 
work, two days filled with battles. Even in the dry and 
matter-of-fact reports of Thomas we read that it was a 
" splendid advance " * * * Turchin threw his bri- 
gade upon the rebel force, routing them and driving them 
in utter confusion a mile and a half and entirely beyond 
Baird's left ", * >n * Turchin's handsome charge 
upon the enemy, who had closed in on our left." And 
Turchin, tho his report is very brief, feels bound to dis- 
tinguish one regiment, saying that " Colonel Lane and 
Major Higgins of the Eleventh Ohio most gallantly di- 
rected the movements of their regiment." 

* Colonel Lane's description of the concentrated fire, the 
tremendous crash of all arms in the forest, and the darkness under 
the cloud of smoke is an effective one. 



255 



General Rejoiolds continued the advance on the State 
road, with Colonel Lane and the Eleventh Ohio immedi- 
ately following, and had reached a point north of McDan- 
nel's when the division became separated thro a misunder- 
standing of orders, which resulted, in Turchin's brigade, 
in one of the many remarkable events of this extraordinary 
series of battles. As General Reynolds understood from 
ThomaSj the movement was intended to open the road to 
Rossville, but he (Reynolds) did not know of the road 
thro McFarland's Gap and believed the State road was 
the one meant. Nor did he know that Thomas's object in 
this minor battle was only to clear the enemy off from his 
(now) right flank and prevent interference with his with- 
drawal westward. Turchin, however, seems to have had 
an order directly from Thomas, after the charge, to bear 
to the left and take position on high ground in rear of 
Colonel McCook's brigade at Cloud's, while Robinson, by 
the same order, was sent to take position in Turchin's 
rear, the object being still to protect the movement of the 
other divisions direct from the Horseshoe " thro the 
Gap. 

Rejrnolds accordingly led right ahead on the State road, 
followed by the troops nearest him, who knew of no order 
except the one to move forward. So Colonel Lane, with 
his regiment (or part of it) and part of the Thirty-sixth 
and Ninety-second Ohio, followed Reynolds, all supposing 
that the remainder of the division was coming behind. 
They reached the forks of the road " and found the 
rebels there in front. Then they discovered, in dismay, 
that they were only a remnant, — a small part of Turchin's 
brigade. They supposed the main body of the division 
had, somehow, been cut off and captured. It was a most 
trying situation. The " forks of the road " must have been 
the one seen on the map next south of Hein's house. It 
was in a dense forest. General Reynolds took a few men 
and reconnoitered both the roads, and found rebels on 
both, — probably only pickets of small forces, but, under 
the circumstances, they v/ould be supposed to be the front 
of a substantial body on either road or both; and, if the 
remainder of the division was captured, the enemy must 
also be on the road in the rear. It looked much as if they 
were lost. There were, some say 150, others 200, men 



256 



there, with their company officers and Colonel Lane and 
General Reynolds. Colonel Lane of course assumed com- 
mand, as his rank required him to do ; and, in a conference 
between him and the General, it was agreed that, tho the 
chances were much against success, they would undertake 
to fight their way out on the left-hand road, believed to 
be the one to Rossville, but that they would not move 
until it was dark enough to conceal their number, unless 
attacked from the rear while there was yet light. They 
accordingly disposed themselves in the woods to the left 
of the road and waited. The particular place is not men- 
tioned, but it must have been in the northwest angle made 
by the State road and the branch road to Cloud's house. 

Soon after this a single soldier was seen approaching 
on the left, and the men on guard there were about to 
seize him when they saw he wore their own uniform. 
When he was hurried to General Reynolds, it appeared 
that he belonged to Colonel McCook's brigade, which he 
said was near Cloud's house, with its picket-line hardly 
more than two-hundred yards away. It was more than 
that, but the lost remnant got over the ground between 
with swift steps, and then hearing that some troops had 
a little earlier moved into position behind McCook's bat- 
tery, they went still faster, and fairly ran into their lost 
comrades. Each party had believed the other captured, 
and loud was the cheering and rejoicing. Colonel Lane 
says they shook hands all around and that " many an eye 
was moist And well there might have been : it would 
have been a dreadful grief to suffer such a disaster as all 
had feared there was, after two days' successful battling 
side by side under such soul-trying conditions. 

Wilhch's brigade of Johnson's division (McCook's 
corps) on its way to McFarland's Gap, was turned aside 
and posted west of Cloud's, near Turchin's and Robinson's, 
and the three brigades stood there, facing east, covering 
the movement of the other troops into the Gap, thus being 
the last on the field. 

While all this was going on the other divisions were 
moving out of the crescent, brigade after brigade, and 
across the country west to the Gap. Those in the center 
marched in perfect order and unmolested, those on the 
left were attacked in the act of drawing out and one bri- 



257 



gade was, temporarily, somewhat disordered, but Baird 
held his ground, meeting the attack and keeping up his 
defense long enough to enable his regiments to move 
steadily out on the line of march toward the Gap, the 
enemy making no attempt to follow, prevented, probably, 
by a wholesome apprehension caused by Reynolds's suc- 
cessful attack near McDanneFs. 

Then, from left to right, Thomas brought out his right 
wing. Wood's, Brannan's and Steedman's men, from the 
face of Bragg's left wing, moving first, as far as practi- 
cable, the regiments without ammunition. To make up 
partly for this weakness, half of Robinson's brigade was 
brought over from near Cloud's and put under Brannan's 
command. Another attack was made upon this front be- 
tween six and seven, but it was quickly repulsed, and when 
the men at last withdrew there was entire quiet there. 
At half past seven Steedman was well on his way to the 
Gap, the whole front was cleared, and Thomas ordered 
the brigades now left on guard near Cloud's to fall in 
behind Steedman. 

There appears no report showing which of these bri- 
gades moved first. Robinson's report, if he made one, 
has not been preserved, while Willich and Turchin speak 
only of their own movements, without reference to any 
other troops. The three were so posted, however, that 
Willich was nearest the Gap, Robinson next, and Turchin 
beyond Robinson, which makes it more than probable that 
Turchin's men were the last of the army to quit the ter- 
rible field of Chickamauga. 

It was eight o'clock when they began their march and 
quite dark. Colonel McCook's brigade had begun to draw 
out from its position near Cloud's, north of Turchin's bri- 
gade, to take a road directly toward Rossville, along the 
east base of the Ridge, and his battery had just fired its 
last round, as a defiance to the enemy or a warning to keep 
off — the last guns of the great battle. The echoes of these 
guns were still sounding among the hills as the Eleventh 
Ohio and its comrade regiments of the brigade left their 
ground. After the last echo the only sound they heard 
in the dark forest thro which wound the narrow road into 
the Gap was the low tone of their tramping. 

At Rossville, about ten o'clock, the division went into 



258 



bivouac, while the generals spent the night in trying to 
bring order out of the great confusion. For the whole 
army was now at Rossville, excepting only those lost on 
the field and the stragglers who had gone on to Chatta- 
nooga. Large details were made from all commands, for 
a heavy picket line from Chattanooga river on the right, 
over the Ridge south of Rossville, and on to Chickamauga 
creek; and this heavy guard was maintained until early 
in the morning of the 22d, when all the army was 
cautiously drawn off and put into position for defense 
within the fortifications surrounding Chattanooga. 

The volume of writing on the campaign and battles of 
Chickamauga is almost immeasurable, but only rarely and 
briefly has anything been written of the retreat from the 
" Horseshoe ". Yet it was by far the m_ost remarkable 
exploit of all. Many generals have been distinguished for 
genius and energy in planning and conducting campaigns, 
many more for skill and daring in making attacks, and 
still more for spirit and courage in fighting on the field, 
but rarer than any of these abilities are those which must 
be possessed by the general who plans and successfully 
conducts the retreat of an army from a position in the 
face of the guns of an enemy superior in numbers and 
armament. Military history contains a few examples of 
brilliant retreat under adverse conditions, each proving 
abilities of a high order in the general conducting it, but 
none of these was more difficult than Thomas's retreat at 
Chickamauga, none so diflficult as that. There is no 
parallel to it in the Civil War, there is no close parallel 
that I know of in any foreign war. 

At the time he began the movement his lines were at 
least two miles long, running irregularly over hills and 
thro forests and every foot within rifle-shot of an enemy 
much superior in numbers and guns. In the very act 
of beginning the movement he was attacked and compelled 
to fight on both flanks, while he knew that if the enemy 
could but push a little further on either flank they would 
gain one of the two roads, possibly both, by which alone 
the retreat was practicable. He must therefore rely only 
upon courage and steadiness in moving parts of his troops 
while other parts were fighting, or held ready to fight, as a 



259 



cover to the movement, and then rely upon darkness to 
hide the bodies moving last. And yet he lost not a step 
in the movement, lost not a man or a gun, and his enemy 
did not discover what he was doing, nor know until the 
next day that it was done. 

During all the war no general fought his troops better 
than Thomas did at Chickamauga, no troops fought better 
than those he commanded there, but the fame he gained 
in that battle, or in the many he fought successfully before 
and after it, can never outrank that he ought to have for 
his retreat from that famous field of heroic deeds. 

Whether he did or did not realize, when he received the 
order to retreat, that he was at the verge of success can- 
not be learned from anything in his public papers. If he 
had remained and Bragg had renewed the battle the next 
day, Bragg would have been defeated. Thomas would 
have been prepared, with increased forces and guns and 
ample ammunition, to meet any assault even better than 
on the 20th, when he had repulsed every one the enemy 
had made where he was in command. He would have 
been then strong enough to insure victory over an enemy 
already much weakened and dispirited by an unbroken 
series of repulses on his right wing and a substantially 
equal defeat at the end of the day on his left wing. It is 
an old maxim in war, that the battle goes to him who can 
throw in the last fresh division; and the morning would 
have found Thomas V\^ith several practically fresh divi- 
sions. What would have happened to Bragg if only the 
two of Sheridan and Davis were then thrown against him, 
with replenished ammunition, is almost beyond any doubt. 

The reports and boasts written by Bragg, Longstreet 
and their lesser officers days, weeks or months, after the 
battle, tell only of complete, unparalleled victory, but they 
are, in that respect, exuberant figments. The conduct of 
these officers at the time and Bragg's official report, sent 
to Richmond the night of the 20th, tell the real mind of 
the enemy. After noon of the 20th Bragg had no hope 
but in Longstreet's struggle on his left, as is shown by his 
own statement to Longstreet, already quoted, that the 
right wing was beaten. He must have been influenced 
by the indomitable spirit of Longstreet (who, tho beaten, 
still was ready to fight) when he wrote his report to 



260 



Richmond that night. In that he said ''After two days 
hard fighting we have driven the enemy after a desperate 
resistance from several positions and now hold the field; 
but he still confronts us. The losses are heavy on both 
sides, especially so in our officers In a later report he 
wrote (speaking of the end of the second day) " The 
enemy, tho driven from his line, still confronted us and 
desultory firing was heard until eight p. m. Other noises 
indicating movements and dispositions for the morrow, 
continued until a late hour of the night." 

This is not the language of a general who has defeated 
his enemy or won the battle. It is the language of one 
still in doubt and apprehension. Other claims of absolute 
victory, along with the trumpeting of lesser officers after 
they recovered from their surprise and joy in finding 
themselves actually in possession of the field, are only the 
bragging so commonly met with in war, in which South- 
erners were characteristically unrestrained. Such claims 
by those in Polk's wing are especially untrue, since their 
only experience, from the morning of the 19th till their 
last unqualified rout in the charge of Turchin's brigade in 
the evening of the 20th, was that of unbroken defeats. If 
Bragg had a victory it was Longstreet alone who won it. 
What really happened was just what happened between 
him and Rosecrans at Murfreesboro nine months before, 
when Rosecrans was astonished, the morning after the 
unfinished battle, to find that Bragg had left him on the 
field during the night. But, for that occasion, Bragg and 
all Confederate writers have insisted that Rosecrans had 
no victory, as indeed Northern critics also contend. 

The fact was that Bragg turned out on the morning of 
the 21st still undecided as to what he would or could do. 
He had not even given any orders during the night. He 
had, indeed, no great strength left for any action. He 
rode over to Polk's quarters, to learn the condition of his 
right wing. He says he went there after sunrise. There 
is other evidence that it was about ten o'clock. As usual, 
Polk was not there; but he found there General Liddell 
(who was in command of his infantry on the extreme 
right) , waiting for Polk ; and Liddell told him that he had 
just come to report to Polk that his pickets found no 
signs of an enemy on that front. This was exciting news, 



261 



and Bragg quicklj^ had his advanced troops feeling for an 
enemy all along his lines.* Then " there was a simultane- 
ous and continuous shout from the two wings/'f and they 
all boldly advanced toward Rossville, while Wheeler's 
cavalry v/as pushed down the Chattanooga valley. But 
when Thomas's pickets were reached south of Rossville, 
no attack was made ; Bragg contented himself in awaiting 
events. He probably looked for an attack upon himself. 
On the 22d, finding again that his enemy had disappeared 
from his front, he advanced, and finally drew his lines from 
Lookout valley on his left, across Chattanooga river and the 
main Chickamauga creek, and thence, by the way of the 
northern end of Missionary Ridge, up to the Tennessee 
river above the town. The Richmond authorities and also, 
in particular, General Longstreet, urged him to make an 
aggressive campaign, if not directly against the town, then 
to " turn " it by moving into the interior of Tennessee by 
the north or the west; but he judged all such plans im- 
practicable and sat down to a siege, expecting to starve 
Rosecrans into either evacuation or surrender. 



* He further reports that " Members of my staff, in passing 
thro the lines of our left wing (Longstreet's) (i. e, on the 21st, 
a. m.) were warned of danger and told they were entering on the 
neutral ground between us and the enemy. But this proved to 
be an error, and our cavalry soon came upon the enemy's rear- 
guard where the main road passes thro Missionary Ridge." — That 
is, his advanced cavalry did not reach McFarland's Gap until 
some time before noon of the 21st. 

t Official report of Longstreet ; but he makes it appear to have 
been the evening of the 20th, which Bragg's report shows was 
quite impossible. See above note and pages 258 and 261. 



262 



XVII 



1863: September — October 

At Chattanooga. After the Battle — Confederate Reports 
— Bragg Did Not Knoiv He Had Won — Colonel Lane's 
Report — Rosecrans in Despair — Holds Chattanooga, 
But Neglects Protection and Supply of the Army — At 
Last Removed, Superseded by Thomas — Ch^ant in Su- 
preme Command in Mississippi Valley 

Chickamauga was the most destructive of the great 
battles of the war. There were small engagements in 
which one side, or both, lost a greater proportion of the 
men engaged, but these do not attract attention because 
the loss in number is not large. But Chickamauga may 
fairly be said to have been twenty battles in one. Every 
brigade under Thomas's command, except the two of 
Steedman which came into action near the end, must have 
been in eight or ten distinct engagements. 

The whole losses of Bragg were larger than those of 
Rosecrans, but then he had larger numbers engaged 
(especially during the afternoon of the 20th), and his 
action was aggressive while Rosecrans's was chiefly de- 
fensive. There are many erroneous and som.e extravagant 
statements made of the losses on both sides, but the final 
revised official reports (except as to one brigade of Long- 
street's comm.and, the report of which had not been re- 
ceived) show that Bragg lost 2389 killed, 13,412 wounded 
and 2003 captured or missing, — total, 17,804. If the loss 
of the missing brigade be taken at the average of the 
others, these numbers become 2452 killed, 13,765 wounded 
and 2056 captured or missing, — total 18,273. Rosecrans's 
revised reports show 1656 killed, 9749 wounded and 4774 
captured or missing, — total 16,179. 

Bragg's army as a whole was one-fourth larger than 
Rosecrans's, but his loss in killed was about one-half larger 



263 



and in wounded about two-fifths larger. Taking only 
the men actually engaged, however (that is, excluding on 
Bragg's side all of Wheeler's cavalry and on Rosecrans's 
side all of his cavalry and — for part of the time — his 
troops that left the field on the 20th) , the number of Rose- 
crans's killed and wounded, relatively, was greater than 
Bragg's. Taking the armies in the whole and the cap- 
tured or missing as lost (the usual method in counting 
losses), Rosecrans lost a little over 27 per cent of his 
forces and Bragg a little less than 26 per cent of his. No 
other battle of the Civil War brought losses so heavy, nor 
any great battle in any other country in modern times, if 
ever. Of course this statement is intended to exclude 
small engagements, some of which were, proportionately, 
more destructive, as well as those cases in which defeat 
involved the surrender of the whole or a large part of an 
army. 

The common experience in the exaggeration and un- 
reliability of reports of battles, made even by officers in 
high positions, is illustrated in Longstreet's report. He 
says he took into action on the 20th, 22,882 men and 
officers and lost 7867 in killed in wounded. That is, out 
of less than one-half the army, fighting little more than 
one-half a day, his loss was nearly one-half that of Bragg's 
whole army in the two days' fighting, or, relatively, four 
times that of all the rest of the army. This could have 
been the case, but it is, to say the least, highly improbable. 
Then he says he captured over 3000 prisoners, not less 
than 40 pieces of artillery, and 17,645 small arms. Rose- 
crans's mustering of his men after the battle accounted 
for all but 4774, who were therefore the captured and 
missing. Thus Longstreet's captures, made in half a day, 
would be about three times as many as all the rest of 
Bragg's army made in tvv^o days, a claim that would cer- 
tainly have excited resentment in the men of Polk's wing, 
if they did not beat it by their own claim. The Chief of 
Ordnance of Rosecrans's army, whose duty it was to keep 
accounts of all arms, reported officially after the battle 
that 36 pieces of artillery were missing and nearly 9000 
small arms. So that Longstreet alone captured more 
artillery than Rosecrans lost and Polk got none at all ; and 
he captured nearly twice as many small arms as Rosecrans 



264 



lost, which leaves Polk far behind. But these things are 
written for amusement rather than profit. Any battle, 
big or little, is likely to produce this kind of foolish 
boasting. 

When the troops were settled in their positions around 
Chattanooga and it was seen that Bragg had no immedi- 
ate purpose of attacking, all commanding officers were 
directed to make the reports usually following a campaign 
or engagement. The report of Colonel Lane — one of the 
very few (and the longest) he wrote during the war* — 
is here given. It will come in the more aptly now, as being 
near the end of this story, and it will serve to show the 
simple way in which he wrote of his own experiences : 

Chattanooga, Tenn., September 26, 1863. 

Sir: I have the honor to report the following details of the 
part taken by the Eleventh Regt. Ohio Vol. Inf. in the action of 
the 19th and 20th inst. 

The effective strength of the regiment was 413 enlisted men and 
20 commissioned officers, all our commissioned officers being pres- 
ent except Captains Duncan and Layman and Lieutenant Morris, 
absent on recruiting service in Ohio, and Lieutenant-Colonel 
Street, sick in hospital. 

We arrived on the battle field at 9 a. m. on the morning of the 
19th inst., and were soon after placed in a position to support the 
Ninety-second Ohio Regiment, then under fire. Soon after Gen- 
eral Hazenf notified me that one of his regiments to my front and 
right was cut of ammunition and was falling back, and wished 
me to occupy its position. I referred him to you,^: but in the mean- 
time the regiment fell back and I took the responsibility of order- 
ing my regiment forward to fill the gap, but before this movement 
was completed I received your order to occupy the position. § The 
Ninety-second Ohio was soon after relieved and the Thirty-sixth 
Ohio moved up on our left; the enemy kept up a brisk fire on our 
front and right fiank; my regimient was ordered to charge, which 
was done with spirit and we drove the enemy from a field in our 
front and captured a number of prisoners. At the commencement of 
the charge the Color-bearer was struck and fell. The colors were 



* Some reports made by him have been lost thro accident or the 
carelessness of officials after he sent them in, — the fate of many 
papers in the army during the war. 

t Of Crittenden's Corps. 

$ General Turchin. 

§ That is, General Hazen, who had hurried away to find General 
Turchin, had found him. See page 227. 



265 



seized by Lieutenant Peck of Company E and carried at the head 
of the line. We held the ground gained for half an hour or more, 
and then I moved the regiment by the left flank under cover of tim- 
ber and supported the Thirty-sixth Ohio Regiment, which was then 
lying to the left and rear and exposed to a heavy fire on their 
right. We were then ordered to fall back to our first position, more 
to the right, to meet the enemy, who were making heavy demon- 
strations in that direction. The E]eventh (being) on the left and 
the Thirty-sixth on the right, we were ordered to make a second 
charge, which was done successfully, cleaning out the front of the 
enemy and taking a number of prisoners. We then fell back to our 
first position, which we held until dark. 

On the morning of the 20th, we were stationed in the second 
line to support the Thirty-sixth Ohio Regiment, in rear of a rude 
fortification* on the left of the Second Brigade. We were kept 
alternately on left and rear until the afternoon, all the time under 
a brisk fire. During the hardest fire our rude fortification caught 
fire and Second-Lieutenant Hardenbrook, Company B, took a part 
of his company and separated the timber to prevent its spreading 
and destroying the protection it afforded us. Company D, deployed 
as skirmishersf on the left of our line, lost 13 killed and wounded 
in a short time. We were withdrawn from this position to make 
a charge on the enemy, who were moving in our rear. The charge 
was made by the rear rank and the line became much broken, but 
it was made with spirit and success, taking a large number of 
prisoners. 

We followed up the enemy some 3 miles on the Rossville road. 
By some misunderstanding more than two-thirds of the regiment 
marched by the left flank soon after the flrst line of the enemy 
was broken. The other third and about the same proportion of the 
Thirty-sixth kept to the front, led by Major-General Reynolds. 
We found the enemy in force on the Rossville road, about 3 miles 
from, the point we started from. We halted here and formed the 
fragments of the Eleventh, Thirty-sixth and Ninety-second Ohio 
Regiments, and marched by the left flank and joined General 
Granger's command, where we found our brigade. Our loss during 
the two days v*^as 5 killed, 36 wounded and 22 m.issing. The miss- 
ing are probably nearly all prisoners, as they were sent to the rear 
with prisoners on our last charge, and the enem.y being in that 
vicinity our men and their prisoners were captured. Up to the 
time of our last charge not more than 6 of my men were missing. 

The officers and men of my regiment endured every hardship and 
braved every danger with cheerfulness. Many of our men were 
without water for twelve or fifteen hours. Nearly all of our 



* A barricade, hastily made of felled trees, logs and rails, de- 
scribed on page 233. 

t " Deployed as skirmiishers " is placed in advance, in a line, with 
intervals of many yards or rods between each two. They are 
easily picked off by enemy skirmishers or sharpshooters. 



266 



wounded of the 20th were left on the field. Our hospital arrange- 
ments were a total failure; neither surgeons, hospital corps or 
ambulances were to be found. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

P. P. LANE, 
Colonel, Comdg Eleventh Regt. Ohio Vol. Inf. 

J. B. TURCHIN, 

Brigadier-General, Commanding Third Brigade. 

But the action of Colonel Lane was not to be left to his 
own commonplace and modest account. The reports of 
his brigade and division generals speak of him with high 
praise, and the formal full report of the campaign by the 
Commanding-General, made January 7, 1864, contains a 
list of those honored in " Special Mention in which ap- 
pears ''Colonel Philander P. Lane, Eleventh Ohio Volun- 
teers, commended for his gallantry." 

He would have had substantial recognition by promo- 
tion to brigadier-general if he had remained in the army 
a little longer. 

The battle of Chickamauga produced a great and very 
painful sensation in the North, fully corresponding to the 
elation and encouragement in the South. The contrast 
between the brilliant promise of the campaign and its 
disastrous outcome was shocking. For the moment the 
great gains of Gettysburg and Vicksburg, two months 
before, seemed to be wiped out, and the end of the war, 
which those victories had seemed to assure, now looked 
far off. The disheartened and complaining reports and 
correspondence of Rosecrans even caused a great fear that 
Chattanooga would be lost. But before all the facts were 
knov/n the officials at Washington (except Stanton and 
som.e other members of the Cabinet) w^ere disposed to 
look upon the defeat as only a great misfortune, which it 
was the duty of all to try to recover from as quickly as 
possible. Stanton had already lost confidence in Rose- 
crans, and now intolerantly insisted that the disaster was 
due directly to his incapacity and that he ought to be re- 
moved at once. 

Lincoln and Halleck were wiser for the present. They 
steadily tried to encourage Rosecrans, and energetically 
set to work to reinforce him and make sure of his holding 



267 



Chattanooga. Tho they could not understand how his 
numbers could be so small, or the enemy's so large, as he 
represented, they ordered large reinforcements to him. 
Two army corps were sent from the Army of the Potomac, 
the Eleventh and Twelfth, about 20,000 men, under the 
erratic Fighting Joe Hooker " ; the Fifteenth Corps, 
under General Sherman, was ordered from Vicksburg; 
two divisions were organized at Memphis and forwarded ; 
and Lincoln wrote to Rosecrans several remarkably patient 
and hopeful letters. The purpose was to make sure of 
the position at Chattanooga and at the same time provide 
for a later aggressive campaign. 

But Rosecrans did not respond well to encouragement. 
He had reached and got beyond his limit of abilities, but 
his egoism made it impossible for him to see that there 
was such a limit. The failure was due to causes quite 
outside of himself or his plans. The physical difficulties 
of the country were greater than any general had ever 
before had to meet, and the Government had left him to 
struggle without hearty co-operation and without ade- 
quate means. These two tremendous imagined "handicaps 
were never out of his mind. He knew that no one could 
have succeeded against them. His wasting of time in 
camp thro July and August, while Bragg was getting rest 
and reinforcements-, his passing the mountains with his 
wings forty miles apart in a strange country, not knowing 
where his enemy was, his obstinate clinging to the belief 
that Bragg was defeated without battle and in full retreat 
when he was in fact massed for battle directly in his 
front, his slow and badly managed movements for con- 
centration when he learned where Bragg was, his hasty 
and conflicting orders for the movements of troops to and 
on the battle-field, and his own abandonment of the field 
when his troops still held possession of it, — none of these 
things seem to have affected his judgment of the final 
event. 

He could not recover his courage or his head. On the 
21st, before he could have had any idea of what Bragg 
was doing or could do, without reflecting that Bragg's 
forces must be at least as badly crippled as his own, he 
telegraphed to Washington — '\ We have no certainty of 
maintaining our position here He must have been think- 



268 



ing of evacuating Chattanooga when he wrote that; but 
two days later Lincoln had a Richmond newspaper con- 
taining Bragg's report sent the night of the 20th,* and 
he immediately telegraphed it to Rosecrans, to show him 
that Bragg did not consider him beaten, whereupon the 
mercurial spirit braced up and sent to Lincoln a very dif- 
ferent message : We hold this point and I cannot be 
dislodged unless by very superior numbers and after a 
great battle ". 

But he displayed little energy in preparing for further 
action. He seemed to think the responsibility was not 
now on him, but on the Government, and that he could 
only wait until a great army was concentrated at Chatta- 
nooga for him. He thought that such an army should be 
at least from 100,000 to 125,000. Yet he neglected even 
the obvious precaution of holding, or at least trying to 
hold, the northern ends of Missionary Ridge and Lookout 
Mountain. Getting possession of the whole of Missionary 
Ridge, Bragg was able to extend his line so as to cover 
the whole east side of Chattanooga, up to the left bank 
of the Tennessee river ; and, v/hat was much more impor- 
tant for his purpose of besieging the place, he found the 
north end of Lookout Mountain unoccupied, planted some 
of his long-range artillery there, posted troops at the 
mouth of Lookout valley, and thus cut off Rosecrans's 
transportation between Bridgeport and Chattanooga by 
the river, the railroad, and the wagon roads along the 
river. This last could have been prevented by only 
ordinary foresight, and the failure to prevent it can only 
be called gross negligence. Rosecrans was then compelled 
to rely upon army wagons, hauling his supplies by a cir- 
cuit of sixty miles to the north, from Bridgeport by the 
rough and steep roads over Walden's Ridge, and the 
wagons soon proved to be hopelessly inadequate. Within 
a few days all the men and the animals were on short 
rations and within two weeks the alternative of starva- 
tion or evacuation was openly discussed. The men 
showed the effects of insufficient food and the horses and 
mules engaged in hauling died by hundreds. Whenever 
there was a rain the poor animals were unable to pull thro 



* See page 261. 



269 



the mud, and the whole course of the road was marked 
by abandoned wagons and broken down or dead animals. 
The morale of the army, already much affected by the 
shame of defeat, was lowered still more by a discontented 
and rebellious feeling that both government and generals 
were neglecting even its essential needs. 

But they were mistaken as to the government : its duty 
was being done remarkably well, both in reinforcements 
and supplies, the latter reaching Bridgeport by rail from 
Nashville immediately and in ample quantity. The prac- 
tical obstacle was only in transportation from Bridgeport, 
and that was a military obstacle which it was Rosecrans's 
duty to remove by action, if he should not evade it by re- 
treat over the Cumberland mountains. He says that he 
had given great attention to this difficulty and that as early 
as the 4th of October he had fixed upon a plan for reopen- 
ing the direct line from Bridgeport and was building boats 
to carry the troops his plan required ; but, if he had such 
a plan, he had not acted upon it up to the 20th, when he 
was superseded. 

The severe public and military criticism of his manage- 
ment preceding and during the battle, the surprising ac- 
counts sent to the War Department by its representative 
at his headquarters of his employment of his time in un- 
important and petty things and controversial defenses of 
the campaign while the army was under siege, practically 
cut oflt from all supplies, and when duties of the very 
highest importance lay upon him, the loss of confidence in 
him in the army, and especially his own persistent dis- 
trust of success and exaggeration of difficulties, at last 
brought the Government to the point of replacing him. 
But even then a chance was left for him, as v/ill appear 
in the next paragraph. It was still willing to retain him 
(under a certain intended reorganization), tho probably 
not so much to gratify him as to escape, if possible, the 
bad effect upon the country of the news of the removal 
of another general for incapacity. 

This course being decided upon, General Grant was sent 
for. He was then at New Orleans and was ordered by 
Secretary of War Stanton to go to Cairo, tho not informed 
of the purpose. At Cairo he found an order to go to 
Louisville, still not telling him what for. On the way he 



270 



was intercepted by the Secretary himself, who went on 
with him. Stanton showed him two orders and asked him 
to take his choice. They were identical except in one re- 
spect. Each of them created the new " Military Division 
of the Mississippi " (embracing the whole Mississippi val- 
ley, except that part under General Banks in Louisiana) , 
and put him in command of it, with all the departments 
and armies in it; but one left Rosecrans the command of 
the Department and Army of the Cumberland and the 
other gave it to Thomas. Grant at once chose the latter. 

A day was spent at Louisville (October 18) in confer- 
ence between the two and plans were agreed upon, but 
that night Stanton received a telegram from his Assistant- 
Secretary, Dana, who was at Chattanooga, to the effect 
that Rosecrans would retreat unless prevented, and ad- 
vising a peremptory order against it. Stanton's excite- 
ment and anger ran high. Grant immediately issued an 
order, assuming command of the new Military Division, 
telegraphed it to Rosecrans, then telegraphed to him the 
order relieving him of command and appointing Thomas ; 
and then repeated this to Thomas and directed him to hold 
Chattanooga at all hazards. Thomas promptly replied in 
eight words : " We will hold the town till we starve 

The next day Grant started for Chattanooga by a 
special train, reached Stevenson (Bridgeport) the night 
of the 21st and Chattanooga (by the wagon road over 
Walden's Ridge, on horseback) the night of the 23d. At 
Stevenson he met Rosecrans (on his way north), who 
discussed the situation " freely " and " made some excel- 
lent suggestions as to what should be done ". On this 
Grant's naive comment was — My only wonder was that 
he had not carried them out ". 

Here is another of the striking illustrations of Rose- 
crans's limit as a general. He was full of ideas, could 
make plans of high merit and, after much hesitation and 
spurring, issue elaborate and adequate orders for their 
execution, but the power to direct their execution person- 
ally in the field was not in him. Each of his greater bat- 
tles fell into confusion and had to take the chances of 
developing in the action a capable subordinate. 

But he took his rem.oval in good spirit, at least without 
any resentment that appeared publicly, tho he was grieved 



271 



to think of the unhappy condition of the army when de- 
prived of his control.* 



* He received the order relieving him the night of the 19th of 
October, and left Chattanooga at dawn of the 20th, v^rithout any 
formal announcement to the army and without bidding bood-bye 
to any but those nearest him. His reason for this extraordinary 
course was, he says, his " fear of exciting profound sorrow and 
discontent in the Army of the Cumberland, which my continued 
presence after it (the order relieving him) became known would 
increase." The fact was that his departure dispelled a general 
discontent, which had increased to a point dangerously near mutiny. 
He had many warm personal friends, who excused and de- 
fended him, but generally the army had lost both confidence in 
him and respect for him. 



272 



XVIII 



1863 : September — October 

Siege of Chattanooga 

Reorganization of the Army — Reinforced by Hooker and 
Sherman — Bragg Undertakes a Siege — Thomas Re- 
opens The Cracker-line — Brilliant Capture of 
Brown's Ferry — Colonel Lane and Eleventh Ohio 
Share in it — Bragg Sends Long street to Recover Look- 
out Valley — Meets Total Defeat 

The confused state of the army at Chattanooga after 
the battle made a reorganization imperative. The suspen- 
sion from command of the two corps generals,* the loss 
in the campaign and battle of several division and brigade 
generals, many other field officers and more than one 
quarter of the troops, so that regiments and brigades were 
reduced to numbers too small for the most efficient man- 
agement, and the appearance of much discontent, not to 
say disaffection, especially in the Twentieth and Twenty- 
first Corps, — all called for immediate consideration and 
action. 

* A court-of-inquiry was appointed to consider the conduct of 
McCook and Crittenden in leaving the field at Chickamauga and 
of Negley in leaving his post on the field and taking with him 
most of the artillery, but it was several months before the court 
sat and its proceedings were slow. But there was no inquiry into 
Rosecrans's conduct, and he was called as a witness by the accused 
generals. They all offered elaborate explanations, assuming the 
impossibility of acting otherwise than as they did and their right 
and duty to exercise each his own judgment under the circum- 
stances; and Rosecrans, in his testimony, supported them as far 
as he dared, being unable to condemn or criticise their conduct 
without admitting that his own was still more to be condemned. 
The court-of-inquiry finally reported, advising against a court- 
martial, and the three generals were exonerated. They were re- 
lieved of the suspension and assigned to duty, but not again in 
the Army of the Cumberland. 



273 



Accordingly, under date of September 28, the Twentieth 
and Twenty-first Corps were discontinued and the Fourth 
Corps (a new Fourth — the old one, in the Army of the 
Potomac, having been recently discontinued) was organ- 
ized, with General Gordon Granger, who had acted with 
such good judgment and promptness in the battle, in com- 
mand. This corps was composed of part of Granger's 
Reserve Corps and the greater part of the Twentieth and 
Twenty-first, the remainder going into the Fourteenth. 
The Fourth Division (Reynolds's) in the Fourteenth Corps 
was discontinued and its brigades were assigned to the 
other divisions, which were also reorganized. Turchin's 
brigade became the First Brigade of the Third Division. 
To make up for the small size of its regiments, three more 
were added — the Seventeenth and Thirty-first Ohio and 
Sixty-eighth Indiana; but the Eighteenth Kentucky was 
put into another division. The depletion had been so great 
that, of the seven regiments now in Turchin's brigade, 
only two had colonels. Three others were commanded 
by lieutenant-colonels, one by a major and one by a cap- 
tain. 

In this reorganization several generals who had been 
distinguished by good conduct in the battle were advanced, 
as well as Granger mentioned above. General Reynolds 
became Chief-of-Staff to Thomas; General Brannan was 
made Chief-of-Artillery and all the artillery put directly 
under his command (a significant and great improvement 
upon the former condition of a lack of intelligent co-ordina- 
tion) ; and General Baird, who had temporarily com- 
manded the First Division of the Fourteenth Corps, was 
given permanently the Third Division. A little later Gen- 
eral Palmer, who had had a division in the Twenty-first 
Corps and had directed it in the " Horseshoe " with char- 
acteristic bravery and success, was put in command of 
the Fourteenth Corps. 

This radical reconstruction brought the Army of the 
Cumberland into a compact form, resulting at once in 
greater ease of management, as it soon would in greater 
efficiency, and did much to restore the heart and confi- 
dence of the troops, who no longer saw the small and 
weak brigades or divisions, and who highly appreciated 
the selection for command of generals whom they had seen 



274 



tried in great emergencies and by fire. Tho their morale 
was still much affected by the lack of supplies and the 
fear in the camps that a retreat might be compelled,* the 
opening of the cracker line " thro Brown's Ferry (de- 
scribed later) instantly dispelled the clouds, high confi- 
dence and hopefulness prevailed, and the splendid deeds 
of the Army of the Cumberland in the great battle of 
Chattanooga (or ''Missionary Ridge") on November 25 
proved that it was essentially sound, and the equal in 
enterprise, daring and achievement of any army in the 
war. 

Grant's first work on taking command was to get food 
and clothing for the army, and a permanent supply; for 
he did not even think of giving up Chattanooga. Thomas 
was a tower of strength for him, with his steady judgment 
and unquestioning execution of orders, and supported, as 
he was, by an army which, especially since the great battle, 
idolized him. 

The plan which General Rosecrans claimed as his own 
for the relief of the army was also claimed by his Chief- 
Engineer, General William F. Smith (known in the army 
as Baldy Smith ") f ; and he and his friends have always 
fought any attempt to deprive him of the sole credit for 
it. But a commission of army officers appointed by the 
Secretary of War many years after the time, after much 
inquiry, reported in favor of Rosecrans, leaving the pro- 
motion and execution of the plan to Smith. When Grant 
arrived and examined it, and had ridden over the field of 
proposed operation, he fully approved; and he added to 
Smith's authority the command of the troops required to 
carry it out. 

A share in the daring and picturesque adventure which 
followed fell to Colonel Lane and his regiment ; and it was 
the last service of special importance he was to render 
during the war. 

General Rosecrans's gross carelessness or lack of judg- 
ment in making no effort to hold the north end of Lookout 
Mountain when he retired to Chattonooga has already 
been spoken of. He must have seen his blunder when 

* General Rosecrans and his staff assiduously kept up the belief 
in the camps that Bragg's army was vastly superior in numbers, 
t See page 270. 



275 



too late. General Bragg promptly seized the great advan- 
tage offered him, planted ample long-range guns at the 
front of the crest, supported by a strong force on the 
mountain and in the mouth of the Lookout valley, with 
outposts on the south bank of the river at all places of 
possible crossing down to Bridgeport. He thus had ab- 
solute control of the railroad, the only direct wagonroad, 
and all the river. His confidence, then, in the recovery of 
Chattanooga without a battle was so great that he reported 
to Richmond that Rosecrans's surrender or destruction 
was only a question of time ". In his judgment Rose- 
crans was reduced to the alternative of surrender or an 
attempt at retreat north of the river, and retreat would 
have to be either up the river toward Knoxville, which 
he had provided against by posting a heavy part of his 
army on the river above the town, or westward over the 
barren Walden and Cumberland mountains, where he 
would have no supplies and " could not live ". So he sat 
under the tree waiting for the ripening plum to fall, while 
his army had no employment but that of guard and the 
occasional amusement of throwing shells into Chattanooga 
and Rosecrans's camps from the top of Lookout Mountain. 
It proved to be not a plum tree, but a persimmon, and the 
fruit he found to be very sour and bitter.* 

Looking at the map,t one sees that a little west of Chat- 
tanooga the river turns south, then runs west a couple of 
miles along the northern foot of Lookout Mountain (which 
there has a precipitous front, close to the river), and then 
turns abruptly north for a reach of six or eight miles, then 
turns west and southerly and runs nearly as far, making 
another and larger tongue of land, which is the northern 
spur of Raccoon Mountain. The tongue in the bend first 
described is known as Moccasin Point. It was not occu- 
pied by the rebels, but its southern half was completely 
dominated by their guns on the point of Lookout Mountain. 
They occupied the Raccoon bend, however, by outposts, 
especially at Brown's Ferry and Kelly's Ferry. The map 
shows a road from Chattanooga, beginning on the north 

* On his failure and total defeat at Chattanooga, he was super- 
seded by General William J. Hardee and never afterward had a 
command in the field. 

t The sketch opposite page 200 will do. 



276 



side of the river and running west a few miles, across the 
base of Moccasin Point, to Brown's Ferry; thence, from 
the left bank, th^re were two roads, — one going directly 
south, about five miles, to join the railroad and wagon- 
road just vv^est of Lookout creek, near the sta.tion called 
Wauhatchie, the other across the base of the Raccoon 
tongue to Kelly's Ferry, and thence, from the right bank, 
keeping along the river until it again turns south, when it 
goes on directly west to Jasper. This last road was shorter 
than the one Rosecrans's wagon trains were compelled to 
use, which ran from Jasper farther to the north, over the 
south end of Walden's Ridge, but the use of it was pre- 
vented by Bragg's control of that piece of it across the 
Raccoon tongue. In that part of the river from Brown's 
Ferry around to Kelly's was " The Narrows ", a place 
where it ran thro a narrow gorge with great force, so that 
boats were moved up stream there only with great diffi- 
culty and labor; but from Kelly's to Bridgeport the pas- 
sage was easy. 

Now the plan of General Smith was, to seize Brown's 
and Kelly's Ferries by surprise, fortify the position at 
Brown's (which could easily be reinforced from Chatta- 
nooga within two hours), while a heavy force from 
Hooker's command was to move from Bridgeport up along 
the railroad to Wauhatchie, drive the enemy out of the 
mouth of Lookout valley, and hold permanently that posi- 
tion and the road from Wauhatchie north to Brown's 
Ferry. The enemy would still control the railroad and 
wagonroad immediately around the foot of Lookout Moun- 
tain (tho unable to use them), but, if all this were accom- 
plished, supplies could be brought by rail to Wauhatchie 
or by boat up to Kelly's Ferry, and thence from either 
point, hauled by wagons to Chattanooga, only eight miles, 
with no difficult hills to climb. 

The night of the 24th (October), after Grant's tour of 
inspection, he gave Smith full authority to execute the 
plan and the command of 4000 men for that purpose. 
These men, apparently, were chosen by Thomas. They 
were the two brigades of Generals Hazen and Turchin. 
Hazen's had been in Crittenden's Twenty-first Corps and, 
in the reorganization of the army, was now in Granger's 
Fourth Corps. Turchin's (as already told) was now the 



277 



First Brigade of the Third Division in the Fourteenth 
Corps. The selection was probably intended as a dis- 
tinction earned by the fine action of these brigades in the 
grf>of >>offio to get the service of the two generals who 
had shown such prompt judgment and inspiring courage 
on that field. 

On the 26th Smith had all his men and materials ready 
for movement on the north side of the river at Chatta- 
nooga, keeping all concealed from observation from Look- 
out Mountain. Up the river, out of sight, he had impro- 
vised a saw-mill, cut the planks and timbers required, and 
built sixty boats or barges, to be used, first, for transport 
of the men down the river and then for pontoons in a 
bridge he intended to lay on the river at Brown's Ferry. 

In the night of the 26th-27th, under the immediate com- 
mand of General Hazen, fifty-two of these boats were filled 
with men, well armed and equipped for any service, 24 
men and one selected officer in each boat, with axes and in- 
trenching tools. Hazen was to command on the flotilla, 
and about 1200 of the men were from his own brigade; 
the remainder and their officers (about 100) were selected 
from Turchin's brigade, as being experienced in river 
boating, and were all from the Thirty-sixth and Ninety- 
second Ohio. The remainder of both brigades was com- 
manded by Turchin and was to march across the country 
to a point near Brown's Ferry, timed to arrive with the 
boats. Colonel Lane and the Eleventh Ohio were in this 
division, and so did not share in the dramatic and excit- 
ing (but yet, as it proved, entirely quiet) voyage. All the 
generals concerned had carefully inspected all the ground, 
and the whole m.ovement was managed with thorough in- 
structions and a clock-like regularity that reduced to the 
last degree the chances of failure or delay. Even the 
work of shipping of the men was assigned to a selected 
colonel and his regiment (another Ohio regiment — the 
Eighteenth infantry) who were not to move on the ex- 
pedition, so as to cut off any doubling of duties or chance 
of confusion. 

At three o'clock in the morning of the 27th the boats 
were released and drifted down on the current. Oars had 
been provided for emergencies, but they were not used: 
the rudders were the only guides. Absolute silence was 



278 



ordered and no lights permitted for any purpose. Almost 
immediately the boats came within range of the enemy's 
guns on Lookout Mountain and were then within range 
almost until they reached their goal ; and for two or three 
miles, while rounding the bend directly at the foot of 
Lookout Mountain, they were within easy rifle shot of the 
enemy's pickets and patrols on the south bank; but they 
kept as much in the north part of the current as was 
practicable and wholly escaped discovery until near the 
landing at Brown's Ferry. 

At five o'clock and the end of the nine miles drift, the 
advanced boats rounded to for landing on the left bank, 
when a volley from the bank showed that they were in 
front of the rebel pickets. The ansv/er was a vigorous 
use of the oars, a quick landing, and a dash for the ferry 
road, which brought the capture of the ferry landing and 
part of the guard. 

A chain of rounded, steep hills stands close along the 
river there, and the road from the ferry landing runs 
west thro the ravine between two of them. Before the 
reserve of the rebel outpost, whose camp was just west 
of these hills, could get into the ravine, Hazen had posses- 
sion of it, and at its western front, in the dim light of 
dawn, fought the whole force with such spirit and daring 
that he soon defeated it and drove it off. 

The marching troops, led by Smith and Turchin, arrived 
just on time. As fast as the boats discharged on the west 
side they pulled for the east side, to bring them over. The 
remainder of Hazen's brigade were taken first, so that 
that brigade could be used as a whole in gaining the two 
hills in the chain next south of the road. Immediately 
after them came Turchin's men, who turned to the right 
and struck for the two hills to the north. But they were 
not in time to take a direct part in the battle. Hazen's 
men had finished that, got possession of their two hills; 
and, as the light increased, had the satisfaction of seeing 
the defeated rebels marching hurriedly southward. Bragg 
had made the serious mistake of posting only two regiments 
to hold this very important post. 

Before Turchin's men were all over the energetic Smith 
was slinging the boats into position and directing as many 
men as could possibly work in the construction of a pon- 



279 



toon bridge. By ten o'clock it was finished, six-hundred 
feet or more in length, and the guns were rolling over. 
At the same time all the other men were quite as busy in 
the work of fortifying the hills for the defense of the 
position, Hazen's having the left of the line and Turchin's 
the right. Within a few hours more the two brigades were 
secure against attack, even if made by several times their 
own number, and their guns were in command of the 
river and the roads at the foot of Lookout Mountain, so 
that Bragg could only reinforce his position in the Look- 
out valley by sending troops over the mountain, a slow and 
difficult movement. Meantime Smith had sent a small 
force on a rapid march west across the neck, thro a gap 
in Raccoon Mountain, and captured the enemy outpost at 
Kelly's Ferry. 

This completed the recovery of one of the two short 
and easy routes of supply to the army, and it remained 
only to hold it. But within one day more the other route 
(by Wauhatchie) was to be gained, with the total wreck 
of Bragg's assurance of victory by siege. 

General Hooker had arrived at Stevenson (near Bridge- 
port) two weeks before, with his reinforcement from 
Virginia — the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, about 20,000 
men,* — had received from Thomas (before Grant came) 
provisional orders for his share in the operations for open- 
ing the supply lines ; and now, on the 25th, he was ordered 
to move at once from Bridgeport along the railway to 
Wauhatchie in the lower Lookout valley. The possession 
of this place and the road from there north to Brown's 
Ferry would complete Thomas's movements, give him a 
secure line from Chattanooga around Bragg's left, make 
his (Bragg's) position on Lookout Mountain practically 
useless, and at the same time put the permanent supply of 
the army beyond any question. 

On the 26th Hooker's advance surprised the enemy's 
outpost opposite Bridgeport and his column began crossing 
the river. General Howard led, with the two divisions of 
his corps (the Eleventh), followed by one division 

* Hooker moved this large body of troops, with all their artillery 
and baggage, from the Rappanhannock, via Wheeling, Cincinnati, 
Louisville and Nashville, to Stevenson within eight days, — an 
exploit very remarkable indeed for those days. 



280 



(Geary's) of the Twelfth. Howard reached Wauhatchie 
on the morning of the 28th, struck the enemy brigade 
posted there, quickly disposed of it, and moved north and 
connected with Smith at Brown's Ferry, thus completing 
the chain. Geary turned south at Wauhatchie, moved a 
mile or so up Lookout valley, took a strong position on 
some small hills on the road, and became the extreme right 
of Grant's line. Now, with some repairs of the railway, 
supplies could be brought by rail from Nashville nearly 
to the foot of Lookout Mountain. A second and quicker 
route of supply was open, the only wagon-haul being from 
Wauhatchie over the pontoon at Brown's Ferry, eight 
miles. 

The telegraph started the urgent movement of food, 
clothing and ammunition by both routes, the news flew 
thro the camps like lightning ; " the cracker line ", as the 
soldiers called it, was restored, and the day was filled with 
the noises of great joy. The cheering was so general and 
continuous that in Bragg's camps, where the cause was 
not yet known, it was supposed that there had been a 
great battle somewhere and that the Yankees " were 
celebrating a victory. 

The achievement at Brown's Ferry, marked by such 
high skill and courage, by perfect success and immeasur- 
able value to the army, would be sure to be generously 
appreciated and publicly recognized by General Thomas. 
He issued General Order No. 265, Headquarters Depart- 
ment of the Cumberland, November 9, 1863, in which he 
said " The skill and cool gallantry of the officers and men 
composing the expedition under Brigadier-General Wil- 
liam F. Smith, consisting of the Brigades of Brigadier- 
Generals Turchin and Hazen, in effecting a lodgment on 
the south side of the river at Brown's Ferry deserve the 
highest praise " ; and on November 20 he specially recom- 
mended Generals Smith, Turchin and Hazen to favorable 
consideration for gallantry and skilful conduct displayed 
by them in the battle of Chickamauga and in the opera- 
tions at Brown's Ferry on the night of October 26, 1863." 

The news from Wauhatchie, following closely upon that 
from Brown's Ferry, was a terrible shock to Bragg. Not 
a shred was left of his plan of siege, in which he had seen 
no defect. Unless he recovered Lookout Valley at once 



281 



he must withdraw to the east of Lookout Mountain and 
face a decision by battle instead of the starvation of his 
enemy. No enemy of his could have wished him a more 
bitter feeling of humiliated pride than that he must then 
have had. He must act quickly if at all, and he sent his 
best general and best troops (Longstreet and his Corps) 
to " drive the enemy out of Lookout Valley." 

Longstreet had never approved of the besieging plan; 
he had urged upon Bragg an aggressive campaign, and his 
report of this attack in Lookout Valley rather clearly in- 
dicates that he had little faith or hope of success in it. 
The position of Hazen and Turchin at Brown's Ferry 
made it impossible for him to march on the level ground 
around the front of Lookout Mountain, and he was com- 
pelled to go over it, altho time was of vital importance. 
He made the attempt, however, and moved with such 
energy that he got into the valley, below Trenton, when 
Hooker had but one division (Geary's) there, and at- 
tacked before a reinforcing division could be brought up ; 
but he was badly beaten and had to retreat. 

He marched back into Chattanooga Valley, by Johnson's 
Crook, and reported total failure to Bragg, with an " I 
told you so!" in tone, if not in language, that must have 
increased his chagrin and irritableness to their deepest. 
In his (Longstreet's) opinion, it would be folly to make 
any further attack in Lookout Valley. There was no place 
on the mountain from which artillery could reach the 
position J the passage around its northern base was already 
effectually cut off by the capture of Brown's Ferry, and 
a frontal attack down the valley from Trenton would be 
far too costly in life and v/ould probably fail in any event. 
Bragg had to give it up and see that the only choice he 
now had was between attacking an enemy fortified, re- 
inforced and well supplied, and waiting to be himself at- 
tacked. He chose the latter, and the result, within a 
month, was a total defeat and disastrous retreat, which far 
outweighed his success at Chickamauga and brought his 
removal from command. 



282 



XIX 



1863: October — November 

Colonel Lane's Service Ended 

Brown's Ferry His Last Engagement — He Offers His 
Resignation — It is Accepted — Reaches Home in 
November 

But these later events do not belong to this story. In the 
brilliant affair of Brown's Ferry we have reached the end 
of the service of Colonel Lane in the army. Like his first 
service in the field, on the Kanawha in July, 1861, and 
others between, it highly distinguished him and his regi- 
ment. It was a fitting close to a soldier's career, — filled 
with great labors, great hardships and many battles, but 
always honorable and of immeasurable value to his 
country. 

The reasons for his leaving the field, which had ap- 
peared to him six months before to be urgent, had become 
imperative. He was not of robust constitution, and at the 
time the war broke upon the country he was further 
hampered by the wearing effect of many years of un- 
relieved industry and long hours in building up and carry- 
ing on an important and complicated manufacturing busi- 
ness, so that it was his peculiar nervous energy and 
tenacity of spirit, with an intense patriotic fervor, rather 
than his physical powers, that carried him thro the ex- 
posure and hardships of the first year and a half in the 
field. In the spring of 1863 he saw that he probably could 
not endure such a life much longer ; his severe illness and 
slow recovery at Carthage in May and June (tho he did 
not wholly give up his official duties) were the inevit- 
able reaction; and he decided then that he must resign. 
But he was not willing to leave the field when a great 
campaign was impending. To go then seemed to him some- 
thing like shirking a plain duty ; and, in his optimistic or 



283 



hopeful view, the great cause was then assured of success 
and the end of the war near. He wanted exceedingly to 
be in at the end. In this mind he went thro the Tullahoma 
campaign of June- July; and, fortunately, the climate 
of southern Tennessee was much better for him than that 
of West Virginia, while the physical hardships of the 
campaign were less severe than those he had had to endure 
before. But, like all the Army of the Cumberland, he 
considered the taking of Chattanooga as part, and the 
only fitting end, of the Tullahoma campaign; and no one 
imagined that Rosecrans would delay as long as he did the 
march upon Chattanooga. So he hesitated and withheld 
his resignation in the hope of reaching Chattanooga before 
offering it. 

Meantime his anxieties for his family, whom he con- 
stantly felt he was neglecting, and about the condition of 
his business, which had been much injured by the war 
and which he certainly was neglecting, were more and 
more increased. It was thus in a much troubled mind 
that he marched upon the final campaign for Chattanooga. 
But the road to Chattanooga proved to be long and toil- 
some and filled with great events: and the duty of the 
present hour put any one's personal affairs far out of 
mind. But when the stronghold was taken and finally 
held, and the great object of the campaign was thus 
achieved, he thought that his time to retire had come. 

A fitter time could hardly have been found. A long 
period of lying in camp then seemed sure, both the great 
campaigns had succeeded, and he and his regiment had 
gained a distinction for courage and faithfulness which 
could hardly have been excelled anywhere in the army. 
Yet, while Bragg was threatening the retaking of Chatta- 
nooga and Rosecrans's army was suffering from incom- 
petent management and lack of supplies, he still hesitated 
to resign because that looked, again, like shirking a duty 
and leaving his regiment when it was oppressed by mis- 
fortune. He knew that an officer who left the army now 
was, as he expressed it, " liable to have his motives mis- 
construed." But, after a month without, an attempt upon 
the town by Bragg, and when Hooker's reinforcement had 
come from Virginia and Sherman's was known to be on 
the way from the west, there remained no doubt of the 



284 



security of the army and the position. Further, he sup- 
posed the Confederate army to be much larger than it 
really was (the belief of all around him) , and that it would 
be a long time before his regiment was called into an 
aggressive campaign. 

So, on the 23d of October, he wrote and sent in his 
resignation. If he had waited but one day, he would 
probably have waited for another campaign. For General 
Grant arrived at Chattanooga the night of the 23d, to take 
general command. The presence of the hero of Donelson 
and Vicksburg was, no doubt, an assurance of a new and 
better* order of things, as well as of an early aggressive 
campaign and the ultimate defeat of Bragg. He must, 
therefore, have felt keen regrets over his resignation when 
he learned, on the 24th or 25th, that Grant was in com- 
mand ; but, in view of the reasons he had given for offer- 
ing it, he could not recall it, and had to find what com- 
fort he could in the assurance that it was unmistakably 
necessary. 

An officer resigning his commission is required to state 
his reasons, and they must be certain and practical. And 
especially in time of war they must be such as to show, on 
their face, that it would be unjust or unnecessary to retain 
him in the army. Under this rule a man of dignity and 
pride would not be willing to speak of his family, nor 
even of his health, if he could avoid it. So he used only 
two reasons, one, that his business and pecuniary affairs, 
in the two and a half years of his absence, had become so 
seriously affected as that his personal attention was neces- 
sary to prevent further complication and avoid disaster, 
and the other, that his presence with the regiment was 
not practically necessary, inasmuch as the two other field 
officers were there and the regiment was now so reduced 
in number that three would not be allowed under the 
existing army regulations;'*' and he added that, in view 
of the short time remaining of the term of enlistment of 
the regiment, he had but little hope that it would be filled 
up again. 

Under these circumstances there could be no reasonable 



* Under the army regulations, when a regiment fell below the 
" minimum " in numbers, if there was a vacancy among the field 
officers, it would not be filled, the others being deemed sufficient. 



285 



doubt that his resignation would be accepted; but the 
Colonel did not permit that consideration to affect his 
view of duty. He went right on as usual in the perform- 
ance of all duties, his conscience not permitting him to 
stop until he was officially relieved. He could have had 
relief from duty while awaiting official action upon the 
resignation, if he had asked for it (a common practice of 
officers) , but he knew he was still legally in the service and 
he would not evade it. So when he marched on the Brown's 
Ferry expedition (which was thought to be especially 
perilous) he had resigned; and the day when his resigna- 
tion was accepted (October 27*) and he was thus officially 
released, he was crossing the river in that famous move- 
ment and strenuously occupied in fortifying the heights 
near the Ferry, in preparation for a battle which, if it 
should occur, would certainly be fought fiercely. 

Altho the acceptance of his resignation was dated 
October 27 he did not learn of it till some days later. We 
cannot now tell what day it was. A letter he wrote to his 
wife on the second of November may be read as indicating 
that he had received either the acceptance or an assurance 
that it had been ordered. It tells her for the first time 
that he had resigned and speaks confidently of being at 
home " within two or three weeks He probably re- 
ceived the formal acceptance on the third of November, 
or, perhaps, on the fourth, for his farewell order to the 
regiment was dated the fourth. This paper was evidently 
written in deep feeling, for he had a high regard for the 
men of his regiment and great confidence in them, as in- 
deed he might well have whenever he thought of their 
bravery and devotion on the field of Chickamauga. 

The two or three weeks " in the letter to his wife 
written November second meant that it would take some 
time for official action in respect to his resignation and 
more afterward for the closing of his accounts as com- 
mander of the regiment, to get the formal acquittance 
necessary before he could be mustered out of the army. 
No doubt he left for home at once on muster-out, but I 
find no paper indicating the date of that last step. It was 
probably on or near November 15. A letter written to 



* Also reported as October 26. 



286 



him by an officer of the Eleventh, dated at Chattanooga 
November 26, shows that he had then been heard from 
as being in Cincinnati; so it is certain that there was a 
double Thanksgiving at his home on the day of the great 
national feast in that year, with the returned soldier at the 
head of the table. 

If, on coming to the end of this story, one thinks of 
finding there an encomium, he may be reminded that there 
is a better encomium than any one else could write in the 
papers and records left by and relating to Colonel Lane, 
from which the story is drawn. Clearly do these show 
forth an honest man, of strong but simple mind, a kind 
and courteous gentleman, seeking only to be just, intoler- 
ant only of injustice and secession, a zealous patriot, 
ready on the instant for any service, for the sacrifice of 
any personal interest, for the endurance of any hardship ; 
always a faithful soldier and a thorough and efficient 
officer, fighting in the front with perfect courage many 
battles against the enemies of his country. 



287 



XX 



1863-1864 : November — June 

Closing Career of Eleventh Ohio — Grant's Campaign 
of Chattanooga — His Great Victory at Missionary 
Ridge — Eleventh Ohio Engaged — Battle Above the 
Clouds " — Thomas's Campaign Against Johnston — 
Battle of Buzzard Roost — Campaign Against Atlanta 
— Battle of Resaca, Last Battle of the Eleventh Ohio — 
End of its Three-years Term — Sent to Ohio and Mus- 
tered-out — Veterans and Recruits Remain as Eleventh 
Battalion — Served to the End of the War — Muster ed- 
out at Washington, June, 1865 

There ought to be some further account of the career 
of the Eleventh Ohio, the men with whom Colonel Lane 
had been so long and so intimately associated and whose 
fortunes had been so much in his keeping. When men 
share together the hardships and dangers of war there is 
sure to come a deep mutual respect and affection; and, 
altho he left them in the field before the work was all done, 
he was glad to maintain all his life a friendship with them 
that nothing could mar. 

The regiment continued in service under command of 
Lieutenant-Colonel Street until the expiration of its three- 
years term. This was not measured, however, as the men 
had assumed, from the date of enlistment, but from the 
date of muster-in, so that the muster-out did not come 
until June, 1864. 

Until that time it went on in a very effective career, 
with one more great battle and several lesser ones. As 
soon as the line of supplies to Chattanooga was restored 
General Grant devoted himself to preparation for an active 
aggressive campaign, tho intending not to move until 
General Sherman arrived with the Fifteenth Corps. But 
all was ready against that day. Sherman's troops, accord- 



288 



ingly, were not halted at the town but moved on to a camp 
position some miles north of it, to be used on the left in 
the coming attack. They were to cross the river eastward 
and strike Bragg's right, which held the hills adjoining 
the north end of Missionary Ridge proper, about three 
miles northeast of the town. 

Hooker held the right wing, in Lookout Valley, and 
Thomas the center, directly in front of the middle of the 
northern section or half of Missionary Ridge.* 

On the 23d of November the preliminary movement in 
the attack upon Bragg was made. This was an assault 
by Thomas's two corps, the Fourth and Fourteenth, di- 
rectly upon the enemy's position in his front on the west 
side of the Ridge. Baird's division, containing Turchin's 
brigade, was at first held in support of Sheridan's division 
on the right of the Fourth Corps, but later moved into the 
front line, the remainder of the Fourteenth Corps being 
held in reserve. At two o'clock the advance was begun, 
and the troops moved to battle with such regularity and 
precision that the enemy, seeing them in open country 
from the high ground, supposed there was a grand drill 
or parade in progress and were put to some confusion by 
the suddenness of the attack. They had the advantage, 
however, of higher ground and a line of fortifications 
along the lower slope of the Ridge, and there was a hot 
battle for two hours. Thomas carried the day, gained a 
mile to the front all along his lines, took the fortifications, 
and by night had them so far reconstructed that he could 
turn them against the enemy. 

The same night Sherman successfully crossed the Ten- 
nessee eastward, two or three miles above the town, and 
the next day, with three divisions, made a vigorous attack 
upon Bragg's right, drove it from the hills north of the 
end of Missionary Ridge, and captured the north end of 
the Ridge itself. While Sherman was beginning this at- 
tack Hooker moved upon Bragg's left on Lookout Moun- 
tain, ran over the division posted between Lookout creek 
and the mountain and, with three divisions, performed the 

* It is of peculiar interest to note, that Bragg: defeated Rose- 
crans on the eastern slope of the southern section of Missionary 
Ridge, and Grant defeated Bragg, two months later, on the western 
slope of the northern section, only five miles away. 



289 



extraordinary feat of climbing the steep mountain (on the 
west side near the north end), and assaulting the position 
on top. It was a gray and misty day, with clouds settling 
from time to time on the top of the mountain, tho 
occasionally the sun broke thro. This was the famous 

Battle above the Clouds It was a complete and bril- 
liant success, and has been the source of much unre- 
strained poetry and rhetorical writing. 

Both of Bragg's wings were now severely clipped and 
all his front line along Missionary Ridge lost. 

The next morning, the 25th, beautifully clear and bright, 
began the great Battle of Chattanooga (or Missionary 
Ridge) . It was almost wholly a struggle for the posses- 
sion of the section of the Ridge from Rossville north, about 
five miles. Immediately in front of the main Ridge were 
placed four divisions of Thomas's army, Baird's division 
having the left of the line. Sherman was on the north 
end of the Ridge and Hooker was moving across Chatta- 
nooga river against the south end at Rossville. 

Thomas's men steadily advanced under fire until the 
base of the main Ridge was reached, when they were 
ordered to charge, Grant and Thomas looking on from 
Orchard Knob, a bare hill in the rear which gave them 
view of the whole ground. Twelve brigades, in a con- 
nected line, moved to this assault, Turchin's being the 
third from the left. Grant's order to charge was intended 
to include only the enemy's first position, a fortified line 
part way up the slope of the Ridge, and that was the only 
objective he mentioned to the generals commanding; but 
he was to learn something more that day of the character 
of soldiers experienced and full of confi-dence. They ad- 
vanced rapidly and with such uniformity of action and 
spirit that the whole of Bragg's first line was captured in 
hardly an hour's fighting. 

But then the charging troops did not stop. Without 
orders, moved only by their great zeal and determination, 
they pushed right up the steep front of the Ridge, fighting 
from tree to tree, from rock to rock, and always advanc- 
ing, until they reached the enemy's last position on the 
crest. Baird's division, as it happened, had the hardest 
and most costly work, because in its front Bragg's troops 
had been massed to resist Sherman moving south along 



290 



the crest. To Turchin's brigade fell the share of assault- 
ing a separated knob on which the enemy had mounted a 
battery. Compelled to fall back once, a short distance, 
it only reformed and returned to the charge, carried the 
position with a rush, the surviving enemy flying down the 
eastern slope, and found itself alone, the other brigades, 
on either hand, being out of sight. It is more than inter- 
esting to read General Turchin's report of this battle: it 
cannot be read without a thrill.* 

Bragg's defeat was total and irremediable. In great 
haste and confusion his troops abandoned all the ground, 
hurried across the Chickamauga at and near Ringgold, 
and moved south, leaving to capture large numbers of 
prisoners, guns and wagons, and littering the road with 
the debris of a flying army. 

The Eleventh Ohio and the other regiments of Turchin's 
old brigade could now add to their great pride in the 
memory of holding the last ground on the field of Chicka- 
mauga that of their conspicuous share in the ample revenge 
of the defeat of their army there. 

The pursuit of Bragg could not be pushed far because 
of the difficulties of supply by wagons, and he was allowed 
to halt about Dalton. Grant's army was then returned 
to Chattanooga and its vicinity, and both armies finally 
settled into winter quarters. 

Early in March following Grant was called to Wash- 
ington, promoted to Lieutenant-General, and put in com- 
mand of all the armies and military departments. He 
then prepared plans for the operation of all the armies, 
assigned the generals to the work required; and, among 
them, put Sherman in command of the Military Division 
of the Mississippi, which included the army at Chatta- 
nooga, and gave him general instructions for a campaign 
against Atlanta. 

This brought the Eleventh Ohio (still in Turchin's bri- 
gade) again into an aggressive campaign, — Sherman's 
famous campaign against Atlanta, begun from Chatta- 
nooga early in May, 1864, and ending, after many battles, 
in the capture of Atlanta early in September. 

Before this, however, in February, Grant (then at St. 



* Official Records, War Dept. ; Vol. XXXI, Part II, page 512. 



291 



Louis) had ordered Thomas to move out upon Dal ton, 
threatening a campaign against Atlanta, the immediate 
object being to prevent Johnston from sending more 
troops against Sherman, who was then on his " Meridian " 
campaign in Mississippi. Thomas was slow, as he too 
often was, but he did move ten days later, on the 22d, with 
the Fourteenth Corps. On the 25th Baird's division was 
in advance, Turchin's brigade leading, when the enemy- 
was struck near Rocky-Face Ridge, twenty miles below 
Ringgold and forty from Chattanooga. The Eleventh 
Ohio, under Lieutenant-Colonel Street, was in front and 
first in the battle of Buzzard Roost (the name of part 
of the Ridge), which was carried on fitfully, in advance 
and retreat, all day. The Eleventh had none killed, tho a 
considerable number wounded. The next morning the 
enemy had fallen back to the south ; but Thomas returned 
to Ringgold, reporting that his transportation was so un- 
equal to the work that further advance was dangerous. 
A week later, however, Sherman arrived and took com- 
mand of the campaign in person. 

Bragg had been superseded on his failure at Chatta- 
nooga by Lieutenant-General William J. Hardee, and then 
General Joseph E. Johnston, who commanded the grand 
department, appeared and took command of the whole 
field of the defense of Atlanta. Johnston resisted Sher- 
man steadily from Dalton down, but was forced back step 
by step, by flanking and fighting, until the little town of 
Resaca, on the Etowah river, was reached. Here there 
was a hot battle on the 15th of May, in which Turchin's 
brigade was engaged. The Eleventh Ohio, in particular, 
happened, in a charge, to get into a very difficult and dan- 
gerous position, from which it was extricated only under 
cover of night, its loss, however, being only a few wounded. 

This was the last engagement of the Eleventh Ohio as 
a regiment. The army remained in camp about Resaca 
several weeks. The three years of the regiment were to 
end in June, and it was to be discharged. It had not been 
recruited to the regulation number (which now justified 
one of Colonel Lane's reasons for resigning) , but some of 
the m.en had reenlisted as " Veterans " under the law of 
1863 and the series of orders of the War Department fol- 
lowing, tho not enough in number to preserve the organiza- 



292 



tion as a " Veteran " regiment. So, as a regiment, it must 
be mustered out of the service. 

Accordingly, on the 10th of June, all the men and 
officers who had served three years and had not become 
" Veterans " set out for home, marched to Chattanooga, 
and went thence by rail to Louisville and by boat to Cin- 
cinnati, where, on the 15th, the citizens gave them a grand 

reception And then, at Camp Dennison, where the 
regiment had been originally organized and begun its 
career, they were mustered-out on the 21st of June, 1864. 

The career of this regiment was different from that of 
many others in the war in this, that the whole of its three 
years was in active service in the field. Its only respite 
was in the winter-quarters of 1861-62 on the Ohio. With 
that exception, it had to keep out its pickets every day 
against a present or expected enemy. The first year and 
a half, spent in western Virginia (excepting six weeks on 
the Antietam campaign), was filled with great labors, 
often exposed to wretchedly bad weather and severe cold, 
and marked by many small battles; and all (as the men 
believed) with little gain to the cause and no reward to 
themselves. The difference between that service and that 
of the next year and a half, in Tennessee and Georgia, was 
so great that, to the men, only the latter seemed to be 
worth while. 

Yet, besides many minor engagements, the regiment is 
officially credited with the battles of Hawk's Nest (Lewis- 
burg Pike) , August 20, 1861 ; Gauley Bridge (Cotton Hill) , 
November 10, 1861; Princeton, May 15-18, 1862; Bull 
Run Bridge, August 27, 1862; Frederick, September 12, 
1862; South Mountain, September 14, 1862; Antietam, 
September 17, 1862 ; Hoover's Gap, June 25, 1863 ; Tulla- 
homa, July 1, 1863; Chickamauga, September 19 and 20, 
1863; Lookout Mountain, November 24, 1863; Mission 
Ridge, November 25, 1863 ; Buzzard Roost, February 25, 
1864 ; and Resaca, May 15, 1864. 

This list seems to be mistaken as to " Princeton " and 
" Lookout Mountain The Eleventh Ohio was not in 
either of these engagements. But then the list omits four 
others that ought to be included: Big Creek (on New 
river), November 21, 1861; Catlett's Gap, September 14 



293 



and 15, 1863; BroWs Ferry, October 27, 1863; and 
Mission Ridge (Thomas's preliminary assault), November 
23, 1863. 

Those who had enlisted later than the original organiza- 
tion, being the two companies (E and I) organized in 
1862, with all recruits received at different times, and, 
above all, those who had honored the regiment and them- 
selves by reenlisting as " Veterans were formed into 
a battalion, known from June, 1864, as the Eleventh Bat- 
talion Ohio Volunteer Infantry. 

This battalion was organized in four companies (C, E, 
H, and I) and numbered on its rolls, in the aggregate, 
about 370. It was commanded by Captain D. Clinton 
Stubbs, of this Company E, who had been Sergeant-Major 
of the regiment. He was later commissioned Lieutenant- 
Colonel, but the command was too small to permit his 
muster in that rank under army regulations. Three ser- 
geants commissioned as Lieutenants were refused muster 
for the same reason, so that two captains and five lieuten- 
ants were all the officers in the battalion. 

This plucky little band remained in Baird's division in 
the Fourteenth Corps, marched and fought with Sherman 
through the tremendous campaign ending in the taking of 
Atlanta in September, thence on with Sherman in the 
famous March-to-the-Sea, and thence north with him thro 
the Carolinas, to the final surrender of the last rebel army 
east of the Mississippi. And then they marched thro 
Washington in the magnificent closing review of May 14- 
15, 1865. Surely they had glory enough to compensate 
their holding on to the end. 

They were encamped near Washington until the 11th 
of June, when they too were mustered-out and began their 
journey home, free from all " orders ", surely the happi- 
est men of all the famous regiment, because they were a 
part of the glorious ending of the war. 



294 



XXI 



After the War 

Tho Colonel Lane, after resigning, was very much 
and anxiously employed in recovering his ground in his 
long-neglected business and in the care and education of 
his children, his mind was at the same time never off the 
war. He had a most disquieting sense that he had left 
the army before its work was done; and his disappoint- 
ment in finding himself mistaken in the judgment that 
Gettysburg and Vicksburg marked, practically, the end, 
caused him many regrets. He was eager for every piece 
of news and watched all the movements of the armies with 
keenest concern, keeping up constantly a correspondence 
with friends remaining in the field. With Grant's defeat 
of Lee and investment of Richmond and Sherman's cap- 
ture of Atlanta, however, his optimistic assurance was re- 
established : the final victory then no one could doubt. 

As long as he lived after the war he was filled with an 
untiring interest in its events. He was a' conspicuous 
member of the Military Order of the Loyal Legion, and 
nothing pleased him so much as meeting any of the sur- 
viving officers and soldiers, especially those of his own 
regiment and brigades. He was fond of calling 
" reunions " at his own home, near Cincinnati, where his 
large grounds offered a fine field for an " encampment " 
of the veterans. Some of his addresses on these occasions 
have been preserved; and he wrote a number of other 
papers, relating to the events and experiences of the war, 
for different occasions. 

But his interest in the veterans was also of a more prac- 
tical kind. Numberless were the instances of his kindness 
and substantial aid in their lives, tho often these deeds 
were discovered by his friends only by chance. 

In the recovery and further development of his manu- 
facturing business he showed the same spirit and zeal as 



295 



of old, tho the hard service in the field had much shaken 
his physical powers. Under his management, however, 
the business grew in extent and importance until it became 
one of the largest and best-known in the west; and the 
Corliss and other engines built by his firm made it widely 
famous. 

The inevitable result followed, tho he struggled against 
it indomitably for years. About 1890 his physical decline 
was unmistakable, and then steadily increased, tho he still 
kept partly at work. At last he was compelled to retire, 
and then could only await the progress of his illness, which 
he did with great fortitude and patience. He died at his 
home on the 6th of December, 1899, praised and lamented 
by the whole community and followed to his grave in 
Spring Grove Cemetery by many distinguished citizens 
and all the surviving officers and soldiers of the Great 
War who could reach the funeral. 

THE END 



296 





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